



INSROP WORKING PAPER
NO. 83 - 1997, IV.2.1

National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic - the Case of the Northern Sea Route

By W. Østreng (ed.), F. Griffiths,
R. Vartanov, A. Roginko and V. Kolossov

INSROP International Northern Sea Route Programme

Central Marine Research & Design Institute, Russia

The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway

Ship and Ocean Foundation, Japan

International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP)

Central Marine Research & Design Institute, Russia

The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway

Ship & Ocean Foundation, Japan

INSROP WORKING PAPER NO. 83-1997

Sub-programme IV: Political, Legal and Strategic Factors

Project IV.2.1: The Northern Sea Route in the Context of Arctic Military and Ecological (Environmental) Security

Supervisor: Willy Østreng

Title: **National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic - the Case of the Northern Sea Route**

Authors: **Willy Østreng (ed.) (1), Franklyn Griffiths (2), Raphael Vartanov (3), Aleksei Roginko (4) and Vladimir Kolossov (5)**

Addresses: (1): Fridtjof Nansen Institute, P.O.Box 326, 1324 Lysaker, Norway.
(2): Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 100 St.George Street, Toronto M5S 1A1, Canada.
(3): Murmansk Region-Barents Sea Sustainable Development Project, Education Development Center Inc., 55 Chapel St., Newton, MA 02160, USA.
(4): Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Acad. of Sciences, Profsouyznaya Street 23, 117859 Moscow, Russia.
(5): Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyi per. 29, 109017 Moscow, Russia.

Date: 4 July 1997

Reviewed by: Professor Oran R. Young, Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA.

What is an INSROP Working Paper and how to handle it:

This publication forms part of a Working Paper series from the **International Northern Sea Route Programme - INSROP**. This Working Paper has been evaluated by a reviewer and can be circulated for comments both within and outside the INSROP team, as well as be published in parallel by the researching institution. A Working Paper will in some cases be the final documentation of a technical part of a project, and it can also sometimes be published as part of a more comprehensive INSROP Report. For any comments, please contact the authors of this Working Paper.

FOREWORD - INSROP WORKING PAPER

INSROP is a five-year multidisciplinary and multilateral research programme, the main phase of which commenced in June 1993. The three principal cooperating partners are **Central Marine Research & Design Institute (CNIIMF)**, St. Petersburg, Russia; **Ship and Ocean Foundation (SOF)**, Tokyo, Japan; and **Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI)**, Lysaker, Norway. The INSROP Secretariat is shared between CNIIMF and FNI and is located at FNI.

INSROP is split into four main projects: 1) Natural Conditions and Ice Navigation; 2) Environmental Factors; 3) Trade and Commercial Shipping Aspects of the NSR; and 4) Political, Legal and Strategic Factors. The aim of INSROP is to build up a knowledge base adequate to provide a foundation for long-term planning and decision-making by state agencies as well as private companies etc., for purposes of promoting rational decisionmaking concerning the use of the Northern Sea Route for transit and regional development.

INSROP is a direct result of the normalization of the international situation and the Murmansk initiatives of the former Soviet Union in 1987, when the readiness of the USSR to open the NSR for international shipping was officially declared. The Murmansk Initiatives enabled the continuation, expansion and intensification of traditional collaboration between the states in the Arctic, including safety and efficiency of shipping. Russia, being the successor state to the USSR, supports the Murmansk Initiatives. The initiatives stimulated contact and cooperation between CNIIMF and FNI in 1988 and resulted in a pilot study of the NSR in 1991. In 1992 SOF entered INSROP as a third partner on an equal basis with CNIIMF and FNI.

The complete series of publications may be obtained from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute.

SPONSORS FOR INSROP

- Nippon Foundation/Ship & Ocean Foundation, Japan
- The Government of the Russian Federation
- The Norwegian Research Council
- The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade
- The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment
- State Industry and Regional Development Fund, Norway
- Norsk Hydro
- Norwegian Federation of Shipowners
- Fridtjof Nansen Institute
- Kværner a.s.
- Phillips Petroleum Company Norway

PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS PERMANENTLY ATTACHED TO INSROP

- Ship & Ocean Foundation, Japan
- Central Marine Research & Design Institute, Russia
- Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway
- National Institute of Polar Research, Japan
- Ship Research Institute, Japan
- Murmansk Shipping Company, Russia
- Northern Sea Route Administration, Russia
- Arctic & Antarctic Research Institute, Russia
- ARTEC, Norway
- Norwegian Polar Research Institute
- Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
- SINTEF (Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research - Civil and Environmental Engineering), Norway.

PROGRAMME COORDINATORS

- **Yury Ivanov, CNIIMF**
  Kavalergardskaya Str.6
  St. Petersburg 193015, Russia
  Tel: 7 812 271 5633
  Fax: 7 812 274 3864
  Telex: 12 14 58 CNIMF SU
- **Willy Østreng, FNI**
  P.O. Box 326
  N-1324 Lysaker, Norway
  Tel: 47 67 11 19 00
  Fax: 47 67 11 19 10
  E-mail: sentralbord@fni.no
- **Ken-ichi Maruyama, SOF**
  Senpaku Shinko Building
  15-16 Toranomon 1-chome
  Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan
  Tel: 81 3 3502 2371
  Fax: 81 3 3502 2033
  Telex: J 23704

INSROP Project IV.2.1:
"The Northern Sea Route in the context of Arctic military and ecological (environmental) security"

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC

- THE CASE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

by

Willy Østreng (editor),
Franklyn Griffiths, Raphael Vartanov, Alexei Roginko
and Vladimir Kolossov

Foreword

The basic objective of this report is to place the debate about the future of the Northern Sea Route into the larger picture of Arctic politics and the emerging agenda of the Arctic as a developing region in international society. *National security* and *international environmental cooperation*, are the objects of study employed, both separately and in various conceptual combinations, to realize this purpose. To help me in this, I was privileged to draw on the profound expertise of my highly esteemed co-authors, Professor Franklyn Griffiths at the University of Toronto and Senior Researchers at IMEMO in Moscow: Raphael Vartanov, Alexei Roginko and Alexander Kolossov. To their cooperative spirit, friendship and solid contributions to this report, I am deeply indebted.

The report is the result of multiple contributions, both in terms of substance and funding, extending far beyond the inputs of the team of authors. The professional input and thorough work 'behind the scene' done by Liv Astrid Sverdrup, Researcher at FNI at an early stage of the project, has been invaluable. Senior Consultant Kjell Moe at the Norwegian Polar Institute also provided valuable comments and improvements to the biological parts of the Introductory chapter, whilst Senior Consultant Ann Skarstad at FNI, worked wonders with the language for those of us not having English as our mother tongue. Professor Oran Young at Dartmouth College ended the process of external substantive contributions by making a most critical and useful review of the first draft of the manuscript. His valuable comments have been included in the final report, which owes much of its quality to his profound expertise in Arctic affairs. To all these people, the authors are collectively indebted.

The report has received financial support from two independent sources: from the INSROP budget of which it is an integral part, and from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, which provided funding for a separate study on: *Norway and environmental security in Northern Areas*. As the work progressed with both reports, it gradually dawned on this editor that the merging of the results of the two processes would make more professional sense than producing two independent reports of partly overlapping content. The funding from the Defence Ministry was thus used to complete, broaden and deepen the analysis of chapters 4 and 7 and to harmonize those chapters with the rest of the book. I hope the co-funders join in and find this to be a valid decision on my part.

It is the hope of the authors that the readers and funders of this project enjoy the report as much as we enjoyed researching and writing it.

Lysaker, 2 July 1997
Willy Østreng

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: International Use of the Northern Sea Route: What is the Problem? ***By Willy Østreng*** ..... **p. 1**

- The Case of the NSR: What Makes it an International Challenge? ..... p. 3
- I. The Arctic Bioregion: Its Functioning, Fragility and Vulnerability ..... p. 8
  - Oil Pollution in Arctic Seas ..... p. 11
  - Political Implications ..... p. 14
- II. Civility in Utilization ..... p. 17

CHAPTER 1: National Security and the Evolving Issues of Arctic Environment and Cooperation. ***By Willy Østreng*** ..... **p. 23**

- The Security and Cooperative Order of Cold War Arctic ..... p. 24
  - Threat Perceptions and Security Behaviour in the Cold War Arctic ..... p. 24
  - The NSR and Arctic Cold War Security ..... p. 25
- Arctic Security in the post Cold War Period ..... p. 33
  - The Changing Soviet Conception of Arctic Security ..... p. 33
  - The Northern Fleet and the Reconceptualization of Arctic Security ..... p. 35
  - The Emerging Russian Security Concept of the 1990s and the NSR ..... p. 37
  - The Western Concept of Arctic Security ..... p. 39
- The Evolving Pan-Arctic Concept of Environmental Cooperation and its Relevance to Security ..... p. 44
  - The Arctic as an International Region? ..... p. 50
- Summary ..... p. 53

CHAPTER 2: Russian Security Policy 1945-96: The Role of the Arctic, the Environment and the NSR. ***By Raphael Vartanov, Alexei Roginko and Vladimir Kolossov*** ..... **p. 57**

- 1. Evolution of Soviet Security Perceptions, 1945-1991, and Approaches Toward the Arctic ..... p. 58
  - The Roots of Soviet Security Thinking and the Arctic ..... p. 58
  - Evolution of Security Priorities over the Post-war Period ..... p. 60
  - Dynamic Interrelations among Political, Economic and Environmental Factors .. p. 65
  - The Murmansk Initiatives and the New Political Thinking ..... p. 68
- 2. Arctic Security Thinking Within the Current Political Process in Russia ..... p. 70
  - A Geopolitical Setting and the Role of the Arctic in the New Russian State ..... p. 71
  - Impact of Domestic Political, Socio-economic and Military Factors ..... p. 72
    - *National Security and the Choice between Democracy and Authoritarism* ..... *p. 72*
    - *Role of Military Factors in Shaping Security Perceptions* ..... *p. 78*
    - *The Socio-economic Situation of the Northern Regions and the Role of the State* ..... *p. 83*

The Problem of the Integrity of Russia and the Arctic ..... *p. 87*
International Factors of National Security in the Russian Arctic ..... p. 91
- 3. Environmental Security Issues in the Russian Arctic in the Context of INSROP ..... p. 95
  - Environmental Threats Posed by Military and Naval Activities ..... p. 96
  - Environmental Threats Associated with Natural Resources' Development ..... p. 106
- Conclusion ..... p. 110

CHAPTER 3: Environment and Security in Arctic Waters: A Canadian Perspective. ***By Franklyn Griffiths*** ..... **p. 113**
- Canadian Security Perspectives, 1945-1997 ..... p. 115
- Cooperative and Common Security as Frameworks ..... p. 128
- Securing the Arctic Marine Environment ..... p. 137
- A Way Ahead ..... p. 146

CHAPTER 4: Norwegian Security Policy: The Role of the Arctic, the Environment and the NSR. ***By Willy Østreng*** ..... **p. 149**
- Changing Norwegian Perceptions of Threats to National Interests ..... p. 149
- The Basic Elements of Norwegian Security Policy in the Post-World War II Period ..... p. 151
  - Geopolitical Realities ..... p. 153
  - The Self-Imposed Security Regime ..... p. 154
  - The International Svalbard Regime ..... p. 155
  - Norwegian Political Rules of Conduct ..... p. 160
- New Times - New Policy? ..... p. 163
  - The "Geographical Expansion" of Security ..... p. 163
  - The Thematic Expansion of Security ..... p. 165
  - New Geopolitical Realities? ..... p. 166
  - Changes in Self-imposed Security Regime ..... p. 171
  - Changes in the International Svalbard Regime? ..... p. 173
  - Changes in the Political Rules of Conduct ..... p. 175
    - *I. The Multipolarity of the EABR* ..... *p. 179*
    - *II. The Extension of the Concept of Security* ..... *p. 180*
    - *III. Various Polities in Regional Security Policy* ..... *p. 180*
  - The Barents Initiative, Extended Security and the NSR ..... p. 185
  - The New Overall Norwegian Security Posture: A Summing up ..... p. 190

CHAPTER 5: Environment in the U.S. Discourse on Security: The Case of the Missing Arctic Waters. ***By Franklyn Griffiths*** ..... **p. 193**
- Tendencies in U.S. security discourse since 1945 ..... p. 194
- Environment and Security Debate in 1997 ..... p. 200
- Arctic Waters in U.S. Security Policy ..... p. 209
- Conclusions ..... p. 219

CHAPTER 6: Danish Security Policy: The Role of the Arctic, the Environment and Arctic Navigation. ***By Willy Østreng*** ..... **p. 223**

- The Basic Elements of Danish and Greenlandic Security Policy in the
- post World War II Period ..... p. 225
- Greenland's Military-strategic Use and Potential ..... p. 227
  - Greenland as a Protective Shield ..... p. 228
  - Greenland in the Maritime Strategy ..... p. 231
- Greenlandic Security Politics ..... p. 237
  - The Decision-making Competence and Structure ..... p. 237
  - A greater Greenlandic Say in Foreign- and Security Policy ..... p. 238
  - The Inuit Tradition ..... p. 239
  - Polarization of Greenlnadic Politics ..... p. 242
  - Increasing Pragmatism ..... p. 242
- Greenlandic Attitudes to Arctic Shipping ..... p. 243
  - Greenland's own APP ..... p. 247
- Environmental Security and the Danish Realm: Possible Implications for Greenland ..... p. 250
- Conclusion ..... p. 254

CHAPTER 7: The NSR in the Context of Arctic Environmental Cooperation and National Security: Some Concluding Remarks. ***By Willy Østreng*** ..... **p. 257**

- I. Theoretical Concepts, Political Realities and International Cooperation ..... p. 257
  - The Fit of Words in Northern Politics ..... p. 258
  - Environmental Security and Arctic Security ..... p. 261
  - Comprehensive and Extended Security and the Arctic ..... p. 264
  - Security and Cooperation in the Arctic? ..... p. 265
  - Common Security and the Security Posture of Arctic States ..... p. 268
- II. The Environmental and Security Position of the NSR ..... p. 271
  - The New Pattern of NSR Usage ..... p. 271
  - The New Pattern of NSR Cooperation ..... p. 271
  - The New Pattern of NSR Organization ..... p. 274
- III. The NSR's Capacity to Build a Pan-Arctic Feeling of Community ..... p. 276
  - Level of Government - International Relations ..... p. 276
  - Level of Regional Government - Transregional Relations ..... p. 278
  - Level of Indigenous Government - Transcultural Relations ..... p. 279

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

INTERNATIONAL USE OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE: WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

By Willy Østreng

The basic objective of this book is to place the Northern Sea Route (NSR)[1], as the most large-scale economic endeavour of the North, into the broader picture of contemporary Arctic politics. Or put somewhat differently: to assess the political prerequisites involved in getting international use of the NSR recognized as a pan-Arctic challenge to be an object of concerted concern between the Arctic states. The overall focus will be on the issue-specific needs, properties and interactional pattern existing at present between the two driving forces of regional politics: the urge to achieve an adequate level of *environmental protection* to sustain an eco-system of unique fragility, and the need to utilize regional environmental and geographical components for the sake of preserving *national security*. The prevailing perceptions on the coexistence and relationship between these two issue areas are twofold. First, the conception is that some of the measures implemented to take care of the respective needs of the issue areas may conflict, creating severe political restrictions on the pace, scope and depth of the regional process to set an Arctic agenda of timeliness and adequacy. Second, and partly contrary to the first, the assumption is that the two issue areas are apt to coexist in conditioned harmony - in a parallel fashion. The concept of *environmental security*, even indicates the possibility of merging the two forces. The claim is that the concept of environmental security is of particular relevance to the Arctic due to "the extreme vulnerability (of the eco-system) to any human disturbance."[2] Due to the inclination by some analysts to make a close fit of words between security and environment in the Arctic, a special focus will be on the various concepts of security - not least the extended version, which includes the environment. Thus, the overriding purpose of this book is to analyse and identify some of the straining and promoting forces applying to the process of agenda setting for the area as such, as they have been manifested both in the interrelationship between the two issue areas and the Arctic and NSR-policy of regional states.

---

1 The NSR is a series of shipping routes along the Russian coast passing through the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas, which can be located, depending on ice conditions, in the Russian economic zone, territorial or internal waters. The northern boundary of the NSR coincides with the boundaries of the Russian economic zone. The length of the shipping route varies between 2200 - 2900 nautical miles (see figure 1).

2 James M. Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov (eds.), *The Oceans and Environmental Security. Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives* (Washington D.C and Covelo: Island Press, 1994), 163.

Figure 1: The NSR and adjacent land and river areas of relevance to the study (marked area).



Source: T. Armstrong: "The Northern Sea Route," *Polar Record* (1988) 24(149). p.130.

The purpose of this chapter is confined to focusing on the environmental prerequisites stemming from the fragility, vulnerability and functioning of the Arctic bioregion. The overall purpose is to identify and substantiate political interdependencies existing between states acting within, belonging to, and depending upon, a functioning ecosystem within more or less definite spatial confines. Or to be more specific: The purpose is to investigate how the opening of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to international shipping may affect the bioregional interconnectedness of the Arctic and also enlarge the common interests of Arctic states[3] in the context of the environment. The chapter will serve as a backdrop, against which to assess the awareness and representation of bioregional interdependence in the formation and actualization of common interests in Arctic politics.

---

[3] When referring to Arctic states at least three alternative definitions come to mind: *the Arctic five*, meaning the five coastal states to the Arctic Ocean, *the Arctic eight*, meaning all coastal states plus Sweden, Finland and Iceland, and *the extended group of Arctic states*, meaning all states with traditions and actual engagement in the region. All these definitions of Arctic states concern the bioregional basis of this book. When we, nevertheless, attune ourselves to the Arctic five and do not provide country-chapters on Iceland, Finland and Sweden this is due to the maritime-oceanic-shipping related focus of this inquiry. The Arctic Ocean physically links the coastal states together in an ocean-related community of interests, not least in relation to the NSR. Other states are less affected by, and farther removed from, the immediate problems stemming from maritime activities in the Arctic. If our concern had been atmospheric and centered on long-range airborne transport of pollutants, not only the 8 countries would be in play but also a number of non-Arctic states.

The Case of the NSR: What Makes it an International Challenge?

The NSR, stretching from Novaya Zemlya in the west to the Bering Strait in the East, is part of an interconnected rectangular transportation system for the Russian North. The legs of the rectangle consist of, in addition to the route itself, the big Siberian rivers, which are navigable for most of their length, and the east-west running railways, connecting with the rivers thousands of miles south of the NSR (see figure 1, marked area). In terms of production output, manpower, number of settlements, geographical scope of activity, composition and range of activities, etc., the NSR and its adjacent land territories are the most pronounced exploitation area in the whole of the Arctic. The extent and seriousness of pollution stemming from this activity is uncertain and, to a certain degree, an object of debate among scientists. A Russian expert claims that certain parts of the NSR are heavily polluted, i.e the deltas of Ob, Lena and Yenisei.[4] When it comes to the Lena river, however, this is partly contradicted by western sources saying that: "The Lena river can be considered a non-polluted river discharging into the Arctic Ocean, since dissolved trace element concentrations (As, Cd, Cu, Ni, and Zn) are very low, and the particulate trace element concentrations close to the lower limits of the range found in unpolluted major world rivers."[5] Be this as it may, consensual scientific knowledge[6] is that the oil pollution levels of coastal and estuarine zones of Russian arctic seas have in recent years been rising, and in certain locations, i.e. in the Ob estuary, concentrations seem to exceed national standards by as much as sixfold.[7] In comparison the HC-values in the Ob-delta are four times higher than those of the most polluted rivers discharging into the North Sea.[8] Pollution in the Arctic stems principally from shipping and transport of hazardous materials, exploitation of non-renewable resources and river runoffs from industry, farming and municipalities along the big Siberian rivers.[9] In terms of composition and volume of pollutants, the NSR, probably has no match

---

4 S. Melinokov, "Zones of relatively enhanced contamination levels in Russian Arctic Seas," *Arctic Research of the United States* 8 (1993), 277-283.

5 J.M. Martin, D.M. Guan, F. Elbaz-Poulichet, A.J. Thomas and V.V Gordeev, "Preliminary assessment of the distribution of some trace elements (As, Cd, Cu, Fe, Ni,Pb and Zn) in pristine aquatic environment: The Lena River estuary," *Marine Chemistry* 43 (1993), 185-199.

6 See Ernst Haas: *When Knowledge is Power. Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

7 Broadus and Vartanov (eds.), *The Oceans and Environmental Security*, 165.

8 State Pollution Control Agency, "State of the Arctic Environment. Report on Oil Pollution," *Document 90:08* (Oslo: 1990).

9 For a more detailed account see G. Futsaeter, et al., "Report on Oil Pollution," *The State of the Arctic Environment: Report* (Rovaniemi: The Arctic Center, 1991).

among Arctic exploitation areas. And Russia is "clearly the major Arctic-state source of contaminants in the region."[10]

In the 1980s the volume of freight shipments along the NSR increased steadily culminating in 1987, and has since steadily declined. As of now, the Russian North and the NSR are experiencing a set-back in economic activity. Fresh analysis and documentation provides firm evidence that the economics of the NSR are most uncertain due to Russia's inability to put her act together in providing a favourable investment climate and realistic legal and political ramifications to attract western interest.[11] This is acknowledged by the Russian government, which has since 1992 been striving to implement anti-crisis and stabilization measures based in the **Master Programme of Economic and Social Development of the Russian North of 1992** and in the **Programme of the Revival of the Merchant Fleet of Russia of 1993**. The government's need to succeed in its efforts are imperative and self-evident, and related to the economic benefits and prospects stemming from the richness of Russia's northern resources. Of total national reserves estimates suggest that the Russian North accounts for 70 to 90 percent of important minerals: 73 percent of Russian oil, 92 percent of natural gas, 76 percent of nickel, 83 percent of tin, close to 100 percent of diamonds, more than 40 percent of workable wood and more than 50 percent of fish and sea products are extracted and produced in the Russian North, which alone earns about 60 percent of Russia's hard currency.[12] To alleviate the present economic impasse of Russia, the government simply has to get her northern affairs in order, i.e. to attract investments, foreign as well as domestic. Alexander Granberg - a leading Russian economist and former advisor to President Boris Jeltsin - recently struck an optimistic chord: "The crisis (of the Russian North) is coming to an end, financial stabilization is near, investment activity is reviving."[13] Western economists are however less optimistic, pointing out that much remains to be done in the field of economic reform before the Russian North is opened up to a functioning and effective market economy. What, however, is not an object of controversy, is

---

10 David Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council," *Security Policy Library* 1 (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1996), 10.

11 For a discussion of this see: Anders Backlund, "III.01.3: Development of Oil and Gas Exports from Northern Russia," *INSROP Working Paper* 22-1995; Bruce Buchan, "III.07.2: The Potential of the Northern Sea Route for a regular cargo service," *INSROP Working Paper* 15-1995; Øystein Andersen, Tore J. Heggeli, Tor Wergeland, "III.10.1: Assessment of Potential Cargo from and to Europe via the NSR," *INSROP Working Paper* 11-1995;, and Trond Ragnvald Ramsland, "III.01.3: Oil Products from North West Russia," *INSROP Working Paper* 8-1995 (Lysaker: The INSROP Secretariat).

12 Alexander Granberg, "The Northern Sea Route and the economy of the Russian Arctic: from INSROP I to INSROP II," *The INSROP Newsletter* 4, No. 1 (June 1996), 1.

13 *Ibid.*, 2.

that the Russian North is vital to the economic health of Russia at large and that the new regime is left with no option but to strengthen her endeavours to ensure that the present economic crisis is no more than a transient phenomenon. The unrealized economic potential of the Russian North is one of the more important measures of alleviation the nation has at its disposal. Anticipating that this will happen and pay off in due time is the basic premise warranting this study on the anticipatory and precautionary biopolitical challenges lying ahead of the Arctic states in the years to come.

Throughout the Cold War, the expansion of the economy in the Soviet North was hampered due to an exclusive reliance on national resources, know-how, capital and entrepreneurship.[14] Today the political barriers of the past are, in principle, gone, and a new will, based on the premises of the market economy, to pool resources across boundaries, has emerged. The Russian government has taken stock in this and opened up her northern territories for Western investment, know-how and participation. These changes may in due course promote a gradual increase in the pace of extraction of the rich resource base of the Russian North despite the present economic set-backs. With an ever accelerating growth in world population, a mounting demand for northern resources is likely to occur in the future. Recent economic trends indicate, as they have in the whole of the period of the post-World War II era that "those who would like to see the strain on the earth's finite resources diminished can hope only to reduce the rate at which it is increasing."[15] These outlooks, along with the easing of East-West relations and the bad shape of the Soviet economy in the late 1980's, prompted the opening of the NSR to international shipping July 1, 1991.[16] This move made the NSR, for the first time in the post World War II period, a readily available means of international transportation of resources between Russian production sites and the world market.[17] In a long term perspective the NSR may also be called upon to serve some of the transportational needs of international trade between Europe and the Far East.[18] In comparison with the Suez and Panama Canals, the NSR offers a short cut in sailing distance between the most industrialized parts of the North Atlantic and North Pacific, which, north of latitude 30 degrees North, combined accounts for more than

---

14 See chapter 1.

15 Terence Armstrong, George Rogers and Graham Rowley, *The Circumpolar North. A Political and Economic Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic* (London and NewYork: Methuen & Co Ltd, A Halsted Press Book, John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 274-275.

16 See chapter 1.

17 Lawson W. Brigham, "The Russians open the Arctic for Business," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 119/1/1,1,079 (January 1993), 92-93.

18 Tor Wergeland, "The Northern Sea Route - Rosy Prospects for Commercial Shipping?," *International Challenges, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Journal* 12, No. 1 (1992), 43-57.

80% of world industrial production.[19] These non-Arctic international perspectives will eventually come on top of the short term use of the NSR for regional developments. As of March 1997, the Russian government had to acknowledge, however, that despite the importance of the Route to the country, Russian economy was in such bad shape as not to allow for sufficient financial support to keep it running at an optimal level. Indirectly, the chairman for the former State Committee for the North (Goskomsever), Viktor Kuramin, at the same time, invited for international cooperation to compensate for the insufficiencies of Russian funds to improve transportation in the maritime Arctic.[20]

In recent years, environmental organizations oppose these anticipated trends, questioning the premises of the economic approach. The environmentalists tend not to see economic development as something inevitable, self-evident and societally desirable. Large-scale human activity may cause environmental degradation far outweighing the benefits of economic exploitation. In the conservationist ethic the Arctic should be preserved as a haven of solitude and natural beauty devoid of pollution, and serve mankind as a natural laboratory in which science can find answers, not only to Arctic problems, but also to problems of wider application.

The conservationists, who command increasing political power internationally, have already quite an impressive record in influencing polar politics. In Antarctica they succeeded in convincing/forcing the responsible states to abandon their long negotiated *Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities* (CRAMRA) for the sake of adopting a prohibition on mineral activities lasting for no less than 50 years.[21] In the Arctic, governments are taking stock of this Antarctic experience and discussing the possibility of defining more than 50% of Arctic territory as a specially protected area and to include marine areas as well.[22] Many environmental organizations opt for more radical prescriptions of preservation.

There are powerful arguments behind each point of view. But unlike Antarctica, the Arctic has its own multinational population to feed. More than 10 million people, aboriginals (appr. 1 million) and "southern immigrants," live north of the Arctic Circle. In order to sustain life under

---

19 Willy Østreng, "Die Nordliche Seeroute und das Neue Russland. Wirtschaftliche, volkerrechtliche und sicherheitspolitische Aspekte," *Die sicherheitspolitische Bibliothek* 13, (Oslo: Das Norwegiische Atlantische Komitee, 1992), 5-8.

20 Article in *Segodnya*, March 1, 1997.

21 Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds.), *Governing the Antarctic. The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System* (Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also: Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng (eds.), *The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 1991).

22 "Circumpolar Protected Area Network. Highest on the Agenda," *Arctic Bulletin* 2 (1995), 6-7.

harsh Arctic conditions and to improve their standard of living, these people, according to Russian officials, "need preservation of nature as a resource for their living and their existence, but in addition, ...further development and possibilities within them."[23] Most Arctic governments seem to agree that exploitation and preservation are two sides of the same coin and that the political priority should be to make the two objectives supportive rather than conflictive of each other. At the same time we all - governments and environmental organizations alike - lack a definite answer to the crucial and overriding questions posed at the interface between conservation and exploitation:

- How do we balance exploitation and preservation to secure sustainability for the Arctic ecosystem and economic viability for Arctic peoples?
- What are the political preconditions for securing responsible conduct in economic utilization?
- What new political measures should be applied to secure the immediate attention and response of governments in cases of serious environmental degradation stemming from human activity?
- At what level should states react to serious cases of environmental damage: at the level of high politics, at the level of ministerial politics or at the lowest level to which decision-making can practically be devolved (see chapters 3,4 and 6)?
- Does the level of politics matter in coping with the environmental challenges confronting the states concerned?

To provide answers to these questions some analysts and governments resort to the concept of environmental security, temporarily defined as *the reasonable assurance of protection against threats to national well-being or the common interests of the international community associated with environmental damage.*[24] In common usage the concept is cross-cutting in that it associates the objectives of security policy with natural phenomena and raises the latter to the level of high politics. The underlying premise is that the repercussions of environmental imbalances pose such a pronounced threat to national and international well-being as to require levels of vigilance and political attention as have come to be associated with security policy. The concept has been assumed to be particularly relevant in the Arctic, for three reasons.[25] The first relates to the fragility of northern ecosystems and their extraordinary vulnerability to human infringements. The second refers to "the Arctic factor," i.e. its profound influence upon the

---

23 Citation of Natalia Romanovna Danilina, Director of the Department for Nature Reserve Management in the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation, in *Arctic Bulletin* 2 (1995), 7.

24 Broadus and Vartanov (eds.), *The Oceans and Environmental Security*, 6.

25 Alexei Yu. Roginko and Matthew J. LaMourie, "Emerging Marine Environmental Protection Strategies for the Arctic," *Marine Policy* (1992) 259-276.

global environmental processes, such as oceanic and atmospheric circulation, ozone layer depletion and global warming. Last but not least, the concept suggests a close relationship between environmental factors and the changing military strategic objectives in the region. In line with this, a Canadian research team defines a secure environment as being one "in which the core values of a State and of its citizens are protected from real and perceived threats, be they internal or external in nature."[26] The core values to be protected in the Arctic should, according to this reasoning, be: (a) to preserve the integrity of the physical environment, (b) preservation of the social and cultural characteristics, (c) prudent economic development and (d) the maintenance of a stable, participatory political process.[27]

In essence, the values to be shared among and between the Arctic states and their populations are:

I. the *preservation* of the bioregion upon which all depends (point a, above) and

II. mutual *civility* in political, cultural and economic conduct[28] (partly covered in points b and d above. More on this below). Let us address these two values in some detail.

I. The Arctic Bioregion: Its Functioning, Fragility and Vulnerability

In the literature of political science the Arctic has been characterized as a prime example of a bioregion[29] or an ecogeographical region.[30] Both concepts cover the same reality, namely that the Arctic is **a specialized ecosystem hosting a community of organisms interacting with each other and the environment in which they live. Thus defined, an ecosystem is made up of living and non-living environmental components forming a life support system within an orderly working totality.**

Ecogeographical regions are, at least in theory, identifiable and distinct from other bioregions in that they vary with regard to the composition and interaction pattern of their life support systems. The Arctic bioregion differs in that it is more sensitive to human pressure and less

---

26 Alex Morrison, "Security in the Arctic Region. Coming in from the Cold War: Arctic Security in the Emerging Global Climate: A View from Canada," *Disarmament* 15, No. 4, (1992), 39-57.

27 *Ibid.*

28 For a discussion of this concept see: Franklyn Griffiths, "Civility in the Arctic," in Franklyn Griffiths (ed.): *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North* (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), 279-309.

29 See Patricia M. Mische, "Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty," *Alternatives* 14, No. 4 (1989), 424.

30 Arthur H. Westing, *Comprehensive Security for the Baltic. An Environmental Approach*, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1989), 2.

Figure 2: Various definitions of the Arctic bioregion.



Source: *Arctic Bulletin*, no. 2, 1995, p. 24.

capable of self-restoration than most other ecogeographical regions. This raises the question of where it biologically and geographically delineates from neighbouring bioregions - where the southern delimitation is to be found.

In the social sciences, the Arctic is a relative concept - a region without fixed delimitations southwards. The focus of political science is on processes, structures and interaction patterns of regional relevance wherever they take place, rather than on geography as such. However, since we are here dealing in the interface between social and natural science, a brief, if not absolute, indication of what area we are talking about may prove to be of some utility. On this backdrop, we chose to define the Arctic bioregion chiefly to correspond with the *Conservation area of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF)* (see figure 2)[31].

[31] There is no lack of definitions of the Arctic. The criteria for delimitation are many: the northern limits of trees, the 10 degree July-isotherm, the southern limit of tundra, sea ice extension, the Arctic Circle and various functional definitions to suit research (see figure 2). The difficulty arises when one tries to find a definition to fit all purposes and subjects. Most of the definitions are made

Life in the Arctic exists close to the limits of the possible. The fauna's vulnerability to human disturbances is significant and marginally adjusted. Because of low rates of biological and chemical processes, low reproduction potential, simple food web and temporal and spatial aggregations "...far more serious consequences may be generated in the Arctic than in other areas. In case of perturbation of environmental damages at the "wrong" place at the "wrong" time, the recovery may last for decades - at best."[32] The list of contaminants possessing the ability to degrade the Arctic environment in such a way, is fairly long. In order to give this introductory chapter a reasonable length without losing out on the ambition to illustrate the environmental challenge at hand, the discussion will be confined to oil as a contaminant.

In popular opinion, **oil spilled in the Arctic** is depicted as an environmental nightmare. Some scientists take issue with this conception and point out that ecosystems, including the Arctic, are resilient, possessing an astonishing capability to heal over and achieve a new balance if disturbed by human encroachments.[33] The complexity of the matter is illustrated by some of the results of the Baffin Island Oil Spill Project (BIOS). First, the project showed that the amount of oil stranded on the selected Arctic beach disintegrated mechanically in the course of two years by as much as 70 percent. The pace of disintegration surprised the scientific community. From the point of view of long-term environmental degradation, the spot is then on the remaining 30 percent of low concentration oil resting on the beach. Research on oil spills in the temperate zone has identified oil in the sediments 20 years after the occurrence.[34] The likelihood is that similar long-lasting depositions of oil will be found in the sediments of the Arctic if and when a spill occurs. Since climatic, logistic and technical constraints still severely reduce the practicality of shoreline cleanups in polar areas, low concentration oil may prove to represent a serious and

---

for purposes different from those relevant to the social sciences. The political processes important for the Arctic, do not end or change much at any of these delimitations. They are webbed together with the political processes of the South and are, by and large, dictated by the power centres located beyond the limits of any appropriate definition of the region. For this reason, the definition matters little for the purpose of the analysis. However, since the book has an important focus on the functioning of the ecosystem, we delimit the Arctic to coincide with the delimitation of the Arctic bioregion as defined by the International Working Group for the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna.

32 Rasmus Hanson and Kjell A. Moe, "INSROP sub-programme II: Environmental Factors, Conceptual Design and Current Status," mimeographed paper in the INSROP archives (Oslo: 1995).

33 M. J. Dunbar, "The Arctic Marine Ecosystem," in F.R. Engelhardt (ed.), *Petroleum Effects in the Arctic Environment* (London and New York: Elsevier Applied Science, 1985), 27.

34 Teal Farrington, J.W. Burns, K.A.Stegemann, J.J. Tripp and C. Phinny, "The West Falmouth Oil Spill after 20 Years: Fate of fuel oil compounds and effects on animals," *Mar Poll. Bull.* 12, No. 24 (1992), 607-614.

long enduring burden on the local terrestrial environment - more so in the Arctic than in southern latitudes.[35]

What BIOS and supplementary research experiments reveal about the state of existing knowledge is that **uncertainties** and **unknowns** still are the most prevalent features of the field. Scientists are still being surprised by the healing capacity of the Arctic ecosystem. But, as warned by one of the most ardent opponents to the theory of exceptional Arctic fragility, Professor Dunbar: "This is... not to say that there are no dangers of pollution in the Arctic; far from it."[36] Oil pollution of Arctic waters is one of the more prominent concerns in this respect.

Oil Pollution in Arctic Seas

Scientists indicate that oil spilled in Arctic waters may prevail for more than 50 years before natural elimination processes make it disappear.[37] If oil is trapped beneath the ice cover it is close to impossible to remove it by human encroachment. The general pattern of water and ice circulation in the Arctic Ocean shows that the path of pollutants will run across large sections of the Arctic Ocean (see figure 3). This ocean is semi-enclosed by the landmasses of Eurasia and America and will trap huge amounts of the pollutants within its confines. The slow destruction of most pollutants means that they will circulate for years and have a more prolonged and widespread effect than would have been the case in the open oceans of the South. Vast areas may be affected, posing a regional environmental threat of some transnational magnitude, underscoring the physical interconnectedness of the states bordering the Arctic Ocean. For these reasons,"no arctic rim state can be secure against the effect of such pollution, even when the pollution source is a thousand miles away from its coast."[38] What then, is the likelihood for major oil spills to take place?

Due to ice, extremely shallow depths[39] and convoying, the likelihood of accidents in marine transportation (groundings, collisions etc) is particularly high along the NSR. Russian

---

35 Gary A. Sergy and Peter J Blackall, "Design and Conclusions of the Baffin Island Oil Spill Project," *Arctic* 40, supp. 1 (1987), 5.

36 Dunbar, "The Arctic Marine Ecosystem," 27.

37 W.J. Campbell and S. Martin, "Oil and Ice in the Arctic Ocean: Possible Large Scale Interactions," *Science* 181, (1973).

38 *Ibid.*, 166.

39 The average depths of the marginal seas off Siberia and Northwest Russia are as follows: Barents Sea= 229 meters, Laptev Sea= 519 meters, Kara Sea= 118 meters, East Siberian Sea= 58 meters, Chukchi Sea= 88 meters. More important than average depth of seas is the fact that most straits through the archipelagos have depths of less than 20 meters with smallest depths down to 11 and 8

Figure 3: Pattern of water and ice circulation in the Arctic Ocean.



Source: Rene O. Ramseir: "Oil on Ice," in *Environment*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1974.

researchers acknowledge that "being at sea is risky, being at sea in ice is twice as risky, and being at sea in convoy with an icebreaker presents three times the risk."[40] According to Russian sources, in the period 1954-1990 the total number of ice damages to ships traversing the NSR averaged 800, i.e. 22 a year. The accidents were distributed as follows: the Kara Sea - 40% (here the intensity of navigation is the highest), the Laptev Sea - 20 %, the East Siberian Sea - 21 %, the Chukchi Sea - 14 % (here the density of ships is the lowest and ice conditions the worst).[41]

Uncontrolled blow-outs are also a potential source of pollution in the off-shore Arctic, being extremely rich in oil and gas. The probability that this will occur is uncertain and highly debated.

---

meters. Source: Donat Pharand, *The Law of the Sea of the Arctic with Special Reference to Canada* (University of Ottawa Press, 1973), 257.

40 A.I. Arikaynen and K.N. Chubakov, "Azbukha ledovogo plavaniya" (The A to Z in Ice Navigation), *Transport* (1987), 130-184. The citation is taken from Gordon G. Watson, "Technical aspects of ice navigation and port construction in Soviet Arctic" in Lawson W. Brigham (ed.), *The Soviet Maritime Arctic* (London: Belhaven Press, 1991), 159 .

41 L. Lensky, "Damage Statistics on Ships Sailing the Northern Sea Route," undated mimeographed paper in the Fridtjof Nansen Institute archives, 1.

Probability estimates range between 1:200 to 1:20000[42], but under no circumstances will it be less than in the temperate zone. Climatic conditions also make it harder to cope effectively with polar blow-outs. In the late 1970s, Canada experienced a gas blow-out in her northern territories persisting for nine months before being brought under control.[43] If this had been an oil blow-out, the environmental effects might have been serious and long-lasting.

If the oil is trapped beneath the ice, it sooner or later will make its appearance at the surface of the ice. It will gradually work its way up to the surface of the ice cover as the ice melts at the surface in summer and freezes below in winter. Experiments conducted in the Beaufort Sea show that the oil is elevated to the surface in the course of a 4-year period. When at the surface, the oil film will cause changes in the ice structure and in its physical and chemical properties. Among other things, the ability of ice to reflect solar radiation (albedo) will be reduced and its capacity to absorb solar energy will increase. Experiments show that snow and ice will have their albedo reduced by some 10-35 percent if covered with an oil film. Surface oil films also affect the heat, moisture and gas exchange between the ocean and the atmosphere by approximately 50 percent and slow the rate of ice growth by roughly 25-50 percent. In the summer months these effects accelerate.

In June-July the areas north of 70 degrees N receive more solar energy than any other place on earth. In the summer season the natural reduction in thickness of sea ice is approximately 1 meter - from around 3 meters to 2 meters.[44] Because of the large dose of solar energy fed into the Arctic Ocean during summer, the ice is sensitive even to small changes in albedo. If the albedo is sufficiently low, the solar energy at sea level may, according to model experiments, start a comprehensive melting process.[45]

Recent studies suggest that changes in the albedo of the ice, snow and water surface due to continuous pollution of the Arctic, are among the factors accounting for the greenhouse effect. Indications are that the greenhouse effect will have a serious impact on the warming of the Arctic. Scenarios suggest that the warming will be 2 to 2.4 times greater in the Arctic than in other regions of the world. If these figures reflect reality - which from a scientific point of view

---

42 "Drilling in the Beaufort Sea," *Canada Today* 1 (Ottawa, 1977), 10-12.

43 *Canada Ministry of Supply and Services. The MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry* 69, (Ottawa, 1977), 69.

44 *Report on the Study of Man's Impact on Climate (SMIC) Inadvertent Climatic Modification,* sponsored by MIT and hosted by The Royal Swedish Academy of Science and the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (Cambridge, 1971), 73.

45 G.A Maykut and N. Untersteiner, "Some Results of a Time-Dependent Thermodynamic Model of Sea Ice," *Journal of Geophysical Research* 76 (1971).

is still uncertain - it will lead to increased icemelting, and consequent changes in the extent of the ice-cover and its albedo. Climatic changes caused or accentuated by Arctic-related processes and phenomena may, according to expert opinion, occur in the next few decades in several northern locations even if the rate of human activities is stabilized at the current level.[46] The cumulative effect of these processes may, according to a highly pessimistic and unconfirmed assumption, go like this: "--- when the melting process has begun, natural feedback mechanisms tend to perpetuate or increase the melting. Thus, as larger areas of the Arctic Ocean are exposed to the sun, more ice (will) be melted, which (may) further increase the earth's temperature as a result of climatic change, which (may) lead to further melting of ice, which (may) expose more sea water - and so on as the cycle continues."[47] A process of this magnitude may or may not occur. The scientific community has yet to come up with a definite answer. In general, Soviet researchers seem to consider the Arctic environment more fragile and easily put out of balance and damaged, than some of their western counterparts.[48] The lack of scientific certainty, makes the uncertainty a collective environmental challenge underscoring the interconnectedness of Arctic states within the confines of their Arctic bioregion, and also the interdependence existing between countries belonging to different bioregions.

Political Implications

The political problem of the Arctic is that its ecogeographical boundaries do not coincide with the national borders regulating the region. Ideally, the managerial requirement to a bioregion should be that its coherent life support system is managed according to the functioning and dynamic preconditions of the system itself, i.e. in a coherent, streamlined managerial fashion by all states located within the region. As of now, the Arctic is divided into five national compartments, varying in utilization degrees, patterns and managerial procedures. Parts of the Arctic (e.g. parts of the Central Arctic Basin) are, in relative terms, unspoiled by human activities.[49] Other parts, like Svalbard, Greenland, the Canadian North and Alaska are the object

---

46 J.B. Maxwell and L.A. Barrie, "Atmospheric and Climate Change in the Arctic and the Antarctic," *Ambio* 18, (1989), 42-49.

47 Rene O. Ramseier, "Oil on Ice," *Environment* 16, No. 4 (1974), 8.

48 Douglas Brubaker, *Marine Pollution and International Law. Principles and Practice* (London and Florida: Belhaven Press, 1993), 278.

49 We use the term **relative** deliberately, in that the regional variations in the sediment load in sea range from very clean to very dirty across the whole of the Arctic Basin. During the USCGC Polar Sea transarctic crossing in 1994, foreign, long-transported substances including: sediment, driftwood, fossils and anthropogenic pollutants, were observed in varying degrees along the entire 1700 nm trackline to the North Pole. What can be said is that within the whole of the central Arctic Basin there are both clean, non-polluted pristine areas and areas of pollution. Reference: "Information Package," *USCGC Polar Sea WAGB 11, Arctic Ocean Section'94* (Washington D.C.:

of small and medium scale economic utilization, whilst the Russian North, including the NSR, is most heavily industrialized. These variations imply that parts of the unified Arctic life support system are more heavily loaded and burdened with human infringements than are other locations. Science has not come anywhere near discovering all mechanisms and the detailed functioning of the bioregion. Neither can it specify what level of human burdening the bioregion can sustain before a malfunctioning is triggered. Much more long-term and basic research is needed to come up with more exploratory answers. By the same token we can not, on scientific merits, rule out the possibility that national activities of a certain magnitude and/or the cumulative effect of local activities of lesser magnitude, will affect the dynamics and the balance of the whole bioregion in such a way that the detrimental consequences spread with a domino effect across large parts of the hemisphere. Thus, the burden of environmental degradation will be shared by all. This is why it has been suggested that the **precautionary principle** should apply in the Arctic.[50] The meaning of this principle, basically, is that, if there is any doubt as to the environmental effects, then preventive or remedial action should be taken. Any decision should err on the safe side with the aim of being able to cope with the most realistic worst-case-scenario. The reasoning is that the burden of proof should lie with those urging that preventive action is not required.[51]

All Arctic states have hitherto followed a strict national line in deciding on their own economic programs of development. No one has publicly asked the question what the total effect of *all* national programs will be on the working of the bioregion. Neither have intra-regional encroachments in nature been assessed in relation to the overall environmental soundness of planet Earth, nor in relation to the level of extra-regional pollution imported from southern latitudes (see figure 4). The Arctic states are here - individually and collectively - confronted with the **cumulative effect** of all national intra- and extraregional development programs, that in bioregional terms may affect the political framework used in national planning. In this perspective, national development programs - like the opening up of the NSR to international shipping - possibly affecting the functioning of a coherent and consistent transregional life support system, should be dealt with as a community issue for all nations located within the limits of the bioregion. The possible systemic linkage between what happens in the various locations of the region creates a new kind of political interdependence across national boundaries and ecogeographical regions. To cope, the regional states, all being active in economic utilization and pollution, and sharing a common interest and responsibility for

---

U.S. Coast Guard, 1994). See also: Lawson Brigham, "Across the Arctic Ocean," *The Explorers Journal* (Winter 1994/95), 127-131.

50 See Douglas Brubaker, *Marine Pollution and International Law*, 278.

51 See Ellen Hey, "The Precautionary Approach. Implications of the revision of the Oslo and Paris Conventions," *Marine Policy* (1991), 245.

preserving a sustainable environment, should come up with a unified long-term policy to counteract and coordinate what they try to achieve in their respective national security policy: *to cope with uncertainties and to prepare to meet the worst case situation.* The overall goal of such a policy would be to achieve "environmental security," i.e. a reasonable assurance of protection against threats to national well-being or the common interests of the international community associated with environmental damage. In this way, the Arctic states may become ever more linked together in a new environmental **interest community**, calling for pan-Arctic concern and collective action, transcending, to a certain degree, national sovereignty and security. This is not to say that most of the environmental problems facing the Arctic states are circumpolar in nature. The work to identify pollution "hot-spots" undertaken by the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program (AMAP) indicate that environmental emergencies will tend in most cases to be of subregional interest. The appropriate form of action thus depends on the particular type of pollution being addressed: "Some solutions might lie at the bilateral level, others in Arctic-specific arrangements, while others might require action with larger regional or global regimes."[52] This subdivision of action forms can be taken even further. The large scale oil spill in the Komi Republic in the fall of 1994, and the western financial and technical assistance in coping with the incident, make it, according to David Scrivener, a legitimate concern for neighbours to take an active involvement on the territory of other Arctic states "even when such incidents have no immediate or significant transboundary impact."[53]

There are indications that this perspective is gaining ground in Arctic cooperative dealings. In the Statement of Intent for the establishment of the Northern Forum in Anchorage in September 1990 the heads of regional governments accept their responsibility "to manage and protect shared natural resources and ecosystems, to prevent and deal with air, land and water pollution originating both within and outside the northern regions and to restore damaged natural areas."[54] In implementing this intention, the concept of environmental security may prove helpful in linking the political and bioregional components together into a pan-Arctic effort to secure sustainable development for all Arctic states (see chapters 2-6). **Civility** in the use and management of the NSR may be one of several measures to achieve this.

---

52 Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic," 11.

53 Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic," 13.

54 *Statement of Intent Among the Governors, Premiers, Ministers and Chairs of northern regions*, at the Third Northern Regions Conference on Regional Environmental Cooperation, Anchorage, Alaska, (September 1990), 1.

Figure 4: Longtransported pollution to the Arctic by way of the dominating wind pattern of the Northern Hemisphere.



Source: *Aftenposten*, 30.04.96.

II.Civility in Utilization

The word civility stems from the Latin civilitas, which refers to communities gathered in towns where civilization and citizenship first flourished. Outside was chaos. Professor Franklyn Griffiths points out that the concept has gained and lost a great many meanings since it first came into use in the English language in 1380.[55] Among these he finds **the art of civil government, a community of citizens, a good polity or social order, the state of being civilized**, and so on. According to Griffiths there are at least two indications that the least common denominator and core of these original meanings may gradually emerge to apply in the international politics of the post-Cold War Arctic. First, civil cooperation is now a prime concern of the Arctic states in their multilateral relations. Second, in the military realm, the circumpolar countries are moving towards "more civilized forms of behaviour" in that weapons are separated from their delivery platforms and decisions are made to revert the offensive

[55] Franklyn Griffiths, "Epilogue: Civility in the Arctic" in Franklyn Griffiths (ed.), *Arctic Alternatives*, (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), 279-310.

Figure 5: Structural changes in Arctic decision-making.



posture of strategic weapons deployed in the region (for both these points see chapter 1).[56] In Griffiths' reasoning civility is a political concept gradually to replace the prevalent concept of military security. A state of regional civility has, to his mind, been achieved when "the circumpolar citizen behaves with respect and consideration towards others and towards Nature."[57] What he is projecting is a kind of **Arctic community** which is based on shared values and conventions promoted through international cooperation and a sense of solidarity. To start and in line with the topic of this book, we here define civility as a code of conduct based on a mutual expectation that no one will act in a way that will disturb, beyond repair, the functioning of the Arctic bioregion and the well-being of other Arctic states. Civility is thus a component in the concepts of sustainable development and environmental protection.

Thus defined, civility has two interacting elements; one political/ participatory and one ethical. In line with the values of a secure environment defined above, the political component refers to the preservation of social and cultural characteristics and a stable participatory political process in the region. Those peoples depending on a stably functioning bioregion for preserving their cultural heritage, social organisation and livelihood are, through representative organisations, to take part in Arctic decisionmaking processes. Recent changes in domestic and intra-regional politics have broadened and evolved participation in decision making.

During the Cold War, Arctic decisions were the prerogative of central governments. Interests of high politics ruled the day and defined the content of policy, managerial procedures and legislation in most capitals (see chapter 1). Native peoples and their interests had, at best, a

---

[56] *Ibid.*, 305.

[57] *Ibid.*

marginal say in influencing the course of developments. This marginalization was, to a large extent, due to a lack of intermediate social structure, to act as an interest buffer between the individual and the state, and to speak their case and represent their interests in national as well as intra-regional decision-making (see figure 5). [58]

In the post Cold War era native people are, gradually but slowly, being represented in Arctic politics. A number of cooperative regimes and regional organizations have seen the light of day explicitly inviting native participation (see chapter 1). The *Statement of Intent* for the establishment of the Northern Forum is one of several examples of this new acknowledgement. Here regional governments state their responsibility "to maintain the unique culture, economy and way of life of indigenous peoples inhabiting remote northern regions."[59] In a resolution two years later the Northern Forum followed suit and stated that the coordination of "work between national and regional governments will promote better environmental protection and sustainable development in the North by avoiding duplicative efforts and by involving, firsthand, the citizens and indigenous peoples of the North who may be most affected by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and its decisions."[60] More importantly though, is the intention put forward unanimously by the governments of the Arctic 8 when forming the Arctic Council (AC) in September 1996. In cooperative endeavours among themselves the stated intention of the AC is "to ensure full consultation and the full involvement of indigenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of the Arctic..."[61] At the same time these governments seem to acknowledge the valuable contributions and support of indigenous organizations (see chapter 1) to the formation of the Arctic Council and its cooperative agenda.[62] Whether these intentions will be put into practice is a different matter. Sceptics assert that not very many of the parties "...in the negotiations were concerned about how to ensure "meaningful" participation (of indigenous peoples), that is making a contribution to the process itself" (the realities of these intentions will be dealt with further in subsequent chapters).[63]

---

58 See Franklyn Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1971).

59 *Statement of Intent Among the Governors, Premiers, Ministers and Chairs of Northern Regions*, at the Third Northern Regions Conference on Regional Environmental Cooperation, Anchorage, Alaska, (September 1990), 1.

60 *The Northern Forum Resolution no. 007*, Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada, (2-4 September 1992).

61 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," September 1996, *WWF Arctic Bulletin* 4 (1996), 4-5.

62 *Ibid.*

63 Monica Tennberg, "Indigenous Peoples' Involvement in the Arctic Council," *Northern Notes* 4 (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College, 1996), 30.

This intra-regional policy of inclusion, also, to a ceratin extent, has a parallel in domestic politics; native peoples are slowly but gradually being organized in national representative fora, in some instances with the help of central government, to influence the making of their national Arctic policy. Structural changes of this kind comply with the requirements of civility, but will not result in civility in conduct if the making of real politics fails to reflect native interests. The societal buffer between the state and the individual that these organizations constitute seems to be a structural prerequisite to create civility in Arctic conduct. Native peoples living along the coastline of the NSR have, in general, been more isolated, less organized, and had less say in domestic politics, than have their kinsmen in other circumpolar states. This marginalization has left scars both on the Arctic bioregion and the native minds. A circumpolar movement to include all Arctic peoples in national decision-making may be an important measure to further and speed up international cooperation in the region.

Many nationalities of Arctic ethnic groups are international in kinship and culture. The Sami community, as an example, is in its nature "non-state" in cultural orientation. When national borders were established in the northern part of the Nordic region last century, they cut across a community area of cultural spirit and created artificial delimitations between representatives of the same nation.[64] The underlying feeling of regional identity and cultural community of the Samis, formed some of the political basis for the establishment of the Euro-Arctic Region in 1993 (see chapter 4).[65] Similar community feelings across national borders in other localities of the Arctic may contribute to the internationalization of Arctic politics and ease the process to establish an intra-regional community of interests .

The ethics of civility refers to a state of mind, or regulatory framework, reflecting a deeply rooted respect for the functioning of planet Earth, i.e. to sustain the interactions and interdependence within and between bioregions. Or in terms of societal organizations: it concerns the parties' ethical/political commitment to be bound by the results of joint decision-making processes, resulting in prudent economic development within the assumed confines of the bioregion. What the ethics of civility is to counteract is the quest for quick and easy money at the expense of nature. The national interests at stake should suffice to make them act in concert.

To sum up: The assumed prescription to handle large-scale economic exploitation like the NSR, is to preserve the ecosystem's sustainability on the basis of *civility* in human behaviour. In other

---

64 *Barentsregionen, Et regionaliseringsprosjekt i det nordligste Europa*, (Oslo: Det kongelige norske utenriksdepartement, 1993).

65 Willy Østreng, "Organiseringen av den Euro-arktiske Barentsregionen: Formål, funksjon og potensiale," *in prep.*

words: The gist of the environmental problem of the Arctic relates to *scientific uncertainty* about the functioning of the ecosystem and *doubts* as to the level of civility in human political and economic behaviour. Where science and the physical environment are concerned, the interconnections are not yet proven and consensual, but they are troubling enough to require collective precautionary action in some cases, for instance the NSR. As such, they are sufficiently real to have the Arctic states strive to produce shared threat assessments and joint precautionary action as appropriate. The concepts of environmental security may or may not prove to possess the ability to string the various components of the Arctic environmental challenge together into a coherent policy, based on a pan-Arctic feeling of community and joint bioregional interests. The book is assessing the ability of national politics through international cooperation to elaborate a sense of interconnectedness sufficient to foster and assist collective actions among the Arctic states when it comes to economic endeavours like the utilization of the NSR. Chapters 2,3,4,5 and 6 will tell if this is practically attainable and within the reach of political reality.

CHAPTER 1

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EVOLVING ISSUES OF ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND COOPERATION

By Willy Østreng

In the post Cold War years world society has striven to foster new modes of international cooperation and security. This endeavour has taken on a pronounced course in the Arctic and is promoted through four sets of interrelated, but highly incremental processes[66]: a *reconceptualization of regional security*, i.e. a distinction has been made between military and civil security, *civilianization*, i.e. the multiplying of cooperative regimes in civil issue-areas, *regionalization* of decision-making processes and an intentional *mobilization of non-state actors* in Arctic policy formation[67].

The overall purpose of this chapter is to address the implications of these processes to Arctic security and environmental cooperation, and to assess their relevance for the utilization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The focus will be on the *declared goals* and *political rhetoric* of Arctic governments when it comes to the interrelationship between environmental protection, comprehensive security and international cooperation. The aim is to make clear the declaratory backdrop of Arctic- and NSR politics against which government policy may be assessed in further chapters of this book.

Recent changes in Arctic international relations can be fully understood only if contrasted with the fading regional security and cooperative order of the Cold War.

---

66 Willy Østreng, "The Barents Region: A Contribution to European Security and Cooperation?," *International Challenges, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Journal* 12, No. 4 (1992), 13-20.

67 Olav Schram Stokke, "Politiske og samfunnsmessige utfordringer i Arktis," *Strategisk plan for norsk polarforskning* 2, (Oslo: Norwegian Research Council, 1995). See also Willy Østreng, "The post-Cold War Arctic: Challenges and transition during the 1990's" in Davor Vidas (ed.), *Arctic Development and Environmental Challenges. Information needs for decision-making and international cooperation* (Copenhagen: Scandinavian Seminar College, GRID Arendal and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1997), 33-45.

The Security and Cooperative Order of Cold War Arctic

Until World War II, the Central Arctic was from a military point of view, one of the few unexploited regions of the world. It was the place where military man did not have anything to do, or anywhere to go when he arrived there. The harsh climatic conditions and the abundance of moving sea ice made up an effective barrier to prevent any military invasion across the Arctic Ocean. Nature sufficed to provide secure northern borders for all the five Arctic states.

During and after the Second World War this situation changed quite dramatically. Developments in military technology during the war and the geostrategic location of the Arctic Ocean in between the superpowers, made the Arctic a suitable deployment area for strategic, high-tech weapons systems. In the 1950s and 60s Arctic airspace served both as a deployment area and as an attack route for strategic bombers. To counteract this threat both the East and the West transformed their circumpolar land areas - apart from the demilitarized archipelago of Svalbard[68] - into sealed off militarized zones, with numerous air defence surveillance and warning sites. This process was further accelerated in the 1970s with the deployment of new generations of ICBMs.

In the course of the late 1970s and the 1980s the Soviet Northern Fleet, based at the Kola peninsula, gradually moved their Delta and Typhoon submarines from the fringes of the Arctic Ocean to the water columns beneath the icecover. This Fleet grew to be the most modern and potent of the Soviet fleets, and, in the late 1980s, it ranked second to none with regard to strategic retaliatory capability. The Soviet *rear deployment strategy* to keep strategic naval forces north of the GIUK-gap and close to homebases, made the US Navy follow suit and introduce military countermeasures in the same waters[69]. In this way, areas of the Arctic north of the Norwegian Sea gradually were transformed from a *military vacuum* prior to World War II, to a *military flank* in the 1950-70 period and to a *military front* in the late 1980s.

Threat Perceptions and Security Behaviour in the Cold War Arctic.

The gradual inclusion of the North into Cold War strategic planning made most governments conceive of Arctic security solely in military terms. Due to the hegemonic features of the East/West conflict, international civil issue areas like circumpolar transportation, resource

---

68 Willy Østreng, *Politics in High Latitudes. The Svalbard Archipelago* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1978), 44-60.

69 For a detailed account of this development see: Willy Østreng, "The Soviet Union in Arctic Waters. Security Implications for the Northern Flank of NATO," *Occasional Paper* 36 (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1987), 16-25,42-47.

exploitation, scientific research, environmental protection and trade were not accorded autonomous significance of their own. The two sets of issue areas - civil and military - were, for strategic reasons, tightly interlinked. Not only were few distinctions made between them, but civil affairs were subordinated to military-political requirements. As a rule, military interests and security considerations gained the upper hand in national priorities for the North. Whenever the military establishment perceived of a conflict between the two types of interests, the yielding obligation rested with the civil sector. The military embracement of the civil sector was tight and close to suffocating[70]. For the Arctic this created from the outset of the East-West conflict a *military dominated concept of security to which civil issue areas were subordinated.*

How did this particular security conception relate to the Soviet handling of the NSR?

The NSR and Arctic Cold War Security

Use of the NSR fell prey to this security-based hegemonialism and became integrated into it. This was so even though any military use of the route was at best minimal.[71] Thin-hulled surface warships are not able to ply the route on a regular basis due to their vulnerability to impact of

---

70 Willy Østreng, "Political-Military Relations among the Ice-states: The Conceptual Basis for State Behaviour," in Franklyn Griffiths (ed.), *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North* (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), 26-45.

71 In the 1960s and 1970s the Soviet Union transferred one or two convoys of surface warships between the Kola peninsula and the Pacific. This happened in the part of the transit season when ice conditions were most favourable. On average it is possible to transit between the Atlantic and the Pacific on 15-20 days a year without ice breaker assistance. Transit of warships probably took place in such periods. See Tønne Huitfeldt, "A Strategic Perspective on the Arctic," *Cooperation and Conflict* 2/3 (1974), 83-99.

In the period 1957-62 the US Atlantic and Pacific fleets conducted long lasting submarine operations beneath the ice of the Arctic Ocean, and covered a distance of about 50,000 kilometers. At that time the US Navy demonstrated that it was possible to navigate parts of the marginal seas (the Chukchi Sea) just 25 feet above the sea floor, and with the ability to break through more than 4 feet of ice. See Waldo Lyon, "The Submarine and the Arctic Ocean," *Polar Record* 10, No. 66 (1960), and E.P. Stafford, *The Far and the Deep* (London, 1968), 323.

Ventures like these - unique as they are - were regarded as evidence that the NSR possessed a strategic potential to be reckoned with. In the heat of the Cold War western analysts publicly transformed these exceptional demonstrations of naval mobility into an all-year Soviet capability to be counteracted by the West. This over-generalization fed on the hegemonialism of the East/West confrontation and disregarded the operational differences confronting submarines in respectively the Central Arctic Ocean and the shallow ice-infested NSR.

ice.[72] This became clear to the Russians during the Cold War. Fresh Russian data indicate that, on average, 10 warships annually were moved to enforce the Northern and Pacific fleets by way of the NSR. While on route, however, every third warship had to be repaired due to damage by ice pressure, whilst unmanoeuvrable ice conditions forced the ships of every fifth naval transfer to spend the winter in Arctic waters.[73] These facts indicate that naval convoys along the route, timewise reduced, rather than enhanced, the overall naval effectiveness and military preparedness of the USSR. The only reason these transits were not discontinued on their own merit was that the two fleets individually did not possess sufficient capability to build the required number of new warships. Thus, naval transfers were deemed necessary for mutual reinforcements, but effected only in the most favourable period of summer navigation. For only 15-20 days a year is it possible for warships to navigate the route without icebreaker assistance, and even in the most favourable months, probability of failure to pass it amounts to about 20 percent.[74] As of today, Russian authors admit that the "ice conditions rule out year-round escorting of warships. Even after ice strengthening the (surface) vessel, her light hull, rudder and propellers do not allow one to guarantee that the ships be safely led during summer navigation either."[75] This also explains why the route was never used for operation and battle training of Soviet surface warships.[76]

Submarines for their part experience severe limitations in manoeuvring ability through the restricted underwater spaces between deep extending ice and the extremely shallow shelf off Siberia[77]. Strategic submarines (SSBNs) are simply too big to operate in these areas. As an

---

72 A.N. Yakovlev, O.A.Kossov and A.P. Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," INSROP *Discussion Paper, (St.Petersburg, December 1994)*, 39.

73 Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 10-11 and 43.

74 A.I. Arikaynen and O.A. Kossov, "Technological Possibility of Safe Convoy of Non-Ice Class Ships Along the Northern Sea Route," *Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Ice Technology*, Downing College, Cambridge University, 18-20 September, 1990 (Boston: Computational Mechanics Publications, 1991), 260-261.

75 Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 39.

76 *Ibid.*, 10-11.

77 Average depth in meters, marginal seas of the Northern Sea Route:

- Kara Sea	118
- Laptev Sea	519
- East Siberian Sea	58
- Chukchi Sea	88

example, the Russian Typhoon submarines are much longer (165 meters) than a soccer field, wider than a handball field and as high as a 12 storey building. It goes without saying that such a vessel (as big as the biggest battleships of World War II) needs considerable space to manoeuvre, both in the horizontal and vertical plane. Based on general experience, submarine sources estimate the operational space needed for SSBNs between surface (ice) and sea bottom, to be between 180 and 200 meters.[78] In the Arctic Ocean, only the Laptev Sea has average depths of such a magnitude (519 metres). The rest of the marginal seas of the NSR in no way satisfy this depth requirement.

The much smaller tactical submarines, however, proved, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, their ability to operate for reconnaissance and research purposes in parts of these seas. From 1957 to 1962 US submarines from the Pacific and Atlantic fleets conducted under-ice operations in the Arctic Ocean and covered a distance of more than 50,000 kilometers in submerged sailings.[79] This they did also during the period of the year with worst ice conditions. In January and February 1960 the US submarine Sargo sailed in submerged position for 31 days a distance of 6000 kilometers in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, which have an average depth of 88 meters. In places the vessel was only seven meters above the bottom to avoid top collision with ice.[80] Navigation with such small margins naturally assumes adapting the speed accordingly: average speed of the Sargo was only 4 knots. If the speed is increased, the room to manoeuvre must also be increased. US nuclear submarines have subsequently made similar trips to the high latitudes of the NSR and the Kara Sea as well.

The operational skill demonstrated by US submarine crews during the Cold War made tactical submarines a possible vehicle of war to attack convoys and to interrupt supplies to and from northern Russia. The merits stemming from these daring deeds notwithstanding, even the small tactical submarines of the 1960s had difficulties in times of severe ice conditions, to operate at will and on a year-round basis in extensive parts of the East Siberian, Chukchi and Kara Seas, not to say sail through the Bering Strait, which was described as "a navigator's nightmare" by

---

Source: Donat Pharand, *The Law of the Sea of the Arctic with Special Reference to Canada* (University of Ottawa Press, 1973), 257.

78 H.O.Bergesen, A.Moe and W. Østreng: Op.cit. 71-72. See also: John Berg, *Nærbilde av Sovjets ubåter* (Oslo: Sem og Stenersen A/S, 1984), 11, and Harriet Critchley, "Polar Deployment of Soviet Submarines," *International Journal* 39, No. 4 (1994), 856.

79 John E. Sater, *The Arctic Basin*, revised edition (Washington, 1969), 265-274.

80 Waldo Lyon, "The Submarine and the Arctic Ocean," *Polar Record* 11, No.75 (1963).

submarine commanders.[81] Today, the tactical submarines are much bigger than their relatives of the 1950s. This has further reduced their ability and possibility to access these waters.

The implications of these operational limitations are that the military capabilities of naval vessels cannot for most of the year be projected effectively if deployed for operations along the NSR. In the Arctic Ocean the most suitable year-round deployment area for strategic submarines is the central basin, whilst surface warships are designed largely for blue water operations. Terence Armstrong pinpoints the state of affairs adequately: "...the USSR do not give much priority (to the naval use of the NSR) since its value as a way of passing unseen between Atlantic and Pacific - an important factor in 1905 - no longer holds."[82] Russian authors agree: "Currently (December 1994) transference of Russian warships along the NSR has nearly stopped."[83]

These facts - obvious as they are - never surfaced in publicized military analyses, nor did they achieve official acknowledgement in naval quarters, either in the Soviet Union or in the West. One of the more persistent notions was that the Soviet Navy, in an emergency situation, possessed the option and the capability to transfer surface warships between the Atlantic and the Pacific, undisturbed and in a short time, by way of the Northern Sea Route[84]. According to one western analyst "Soviet nuclear submarines may transit the area (NSR) virtually at will"[85]. As late as 1989 the assertion was put forward that geographic and oceanographic considerations "demonstrate the suitability of the shallow and partly ice-covered seas around the periphery of (Russia) as safe bastions for Russian SSBNs."[86] To protect and preserve this option the Soviet government, according to western experts, created a significant national security zone along their northern seaborder, asserting absolute control of the NSR, which was regarded as a national waterway[87].

---

81 G.E. Synhorst, "Soviet Strategic Interests in the maritime Arctic," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (May 1973), 110-111.

82 Terence Armstrong, "A History of the Northern Sea Route," *International Challenges, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Journal* 12, No. 1 (1992), 41.

83 Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 50.

84 T.J. Laforest, "Strategic Significance of the Northern Sea Route," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 93, No. 12 (1967), 63.

85 D. Luehring, "The Never-Never Sea," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 95, No. 8 (1969), 142.

86 George Lindsay, "Strategic Stability in the Arctic," *Adelphi Paper* 241 (London: Brassys for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), 73-74.

87 K.M. Shusterich, "International Jurisdictional Issues in the Arctic Ocean," *Ocean Development and International Law* 14, No. 3, 257.

Perceptions like these nourished a widespread belief that the NSR was closed not only to military ships of foreign countries[88], but also to civil shipping. Apparently, hegemonialism was the dominating source providing the premises and guiding the content of military analysis, distributing strategic significance, more or less equally, to all localities, including the NSR, and all aspects of Arctic affairs. The Cold War was all-embracing and to a large extent non-discriminatory. Everything and all was part of it. This affected the civil utilization pattern of the route in at least three respects:

First, regional economic utilization of the Northern Sea Route was, in general, allowed only as long as it did not conflict with, or negatively influence, national security priorities, i.e. the military and resource-extraction needs defined for the North by central government. In instances where the two interests were incompatible the regional civil sector was the one obliged to yield.[89]

Second, the NSR was for all practical purposes, de facto closed to foreign shipping throughout most of the Cold War. The only exception to this rule was Norwegian freighters which, in the early part of the 1950s, took part in the timber trade on the western extreme of the route. This exception, however, contradicts the widely held belief that the Soviet Union, in *formal terms*, closed the NSR to foreign presence. She never did. What Soviet authorities acted against was "foreign warships' *penetration* into the Soviet arctic sector, whereas it held a more flexible official position towards international commercial navigation."[90] Nationalities other than Russians have long enjoyed the formal right to use this waterway provided certain strict and highly controversial procedures and obligations enacted unilaterally by the Soviet Union, were observed. Soviet authorities maintain among other things that military vessels must submit their request for passage through territorial waters 30 days in advance, and via diplomatic channels[91]. It is further maintained that the right to innocent passage does not apply unconditionally in the straits along the Northern Sea Route[92].

---

88 S.M. Olenicoff, "Territorial Waters in the Arctic: The Soviet Position," *R-907-ARPA*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1972), 28.

89 Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 5.

90 Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 11. Italics of penetration added by the author.

91 For a detailed account of this legislation see William E. Butler, *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea* (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 17-101.

92 For a detailed account of this legislation see A.L. Kolodkin and M.E. Volosov, "The Legal Regime of the Soviet Arctic: Major Issues," *Marine Policy* 14 (1990).

In the opinion of many western governments, this legislation far exceeded what reasonably could be warranted in international ocean law. The disagreement on the legality of this legislation stalemated in the 1960s, and potential foreign users were left with two options: either to comply with Soviet rules and violate own legal position, or to confront the Soviet position and risk conflict. For most states neither of these alternatives seemed politically tempting, or of any practical utility. Thus deterred, they stood back both from confrontation and acquiescence. The US government was the only actor possessing adequate capabilities to choose a different course of action. In the period 1962-67 the American Coast Guard discharged ships for oceanographic research to the Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, Kara and Barents Seas. In addition to research, the purpose of these expeditions was "openly to assert the high seas status of these waters."[93] This provoked a fairly hostile reaction on the part of the Soviet government and triggered off a diplomatic exchange of notes underscoring and publicly highlighting their different legal positions[94]. Lack of compliance with Soviet regulations was met with a policy of "...deterring the NATO naval forces from the Soviet Arctic."[95] Since then there has been no serious US testing of the Soviet jurisdictional claim to the NSR. In principle, the Soviet government seems to have been open for civil business concerning the NSR, albeit on terms western shippers and governments could not accept.

The incompatible legal positions of this controversy and the possibility that it might unleash a serious East-West confrontation, along with a lack of western utility of, and economic interest for, the NSR, contributed in sum to a de facto *"political,"* if not *formal*, closing of the route to foreigners. Who actually closed it - those nationalities deliberately not using the route or the Soviets enacting unacceptable rules - is still to be debated. What may reasonably be said is that both parties made their contribution to the "closing."

Whatever the assumption offered, the consequences were the same: For most of the Cold War period, the NSR hosted and entertained ships of Soviet flag only. In the heat of contemporary hegemonical politics, this outcome may have been perceived as making two contributions of some utility to Soviet military security. First, it might have forestalled the possibility of foreign espionage from ships on landbased military facilities along the route. Second, it might have reduced westerners' operational experience in and from the area.[96]

---

93 Erik Frankx, Op. Cit. 270.

94 Erik Frankx, "Non-Soviet Shipping in the Northeast-Passage and the Legal Status of Proliv Vil'kitskogo," *Polar Records* 24, No. 15 (1988) .

95 *Ibid.*, 12.

96 Willy Østreng, "The Northern Sea Route: A New Era in Soviet Policy," *Ocean Development and International Law* 22, No. 3 (1991), 259-287.

Against this backdrop, it came as a surprise to many that Soviet authorities in 1967 offered to open up the NSR for transit sailings to international shipping in return for payment of a fee for icebreaking and pilot assistance. The offer was not followed up by western shippers, who probably were in doubt as to the profitability of such a venture. Nor was it ever repeated by the Soviet government, which most likely withdrew it quietly due to the political circumstances surrounding the Six Days' War. If the Soviet government had decided to pursue her offer to the West by making an alternative to the closed Suez Canal, Soviet influence in the Arab world and good diplomatic relations with Egypt, would have suffered. The reason for posing it in the first place is still unclear. It might have been a political move to test the solidarity of the West pertinent to the heated controversy on the legal status of the NSR following the period 1962-67. A more hackneyed explanation is that the Soviet government was in need of hard currency and saw the opening of the NSR as a potential source of income. A third explanation is that Soviet naval authorities tacitly, if not publicly, acknowledged that the strategic utility of the NSR was never to become anything more than minuscule, and, for that reason, made no serious objections to the proposal made by their own politicians. From an actual intelligence point of view, long distance visual sightings of land-based installations from the deck of western ships - soon to be made redundant by satellite imagery from space - could never reveal anything but coarse features of the constructions (location, shape etc.). The prime goal of espionage activities is to get hold of the details and level of sophistication of the opponent's applied military technology. Visual sightings of the kind we are discussing here would in no way suffice to fulfil such a goal. Soviet military decision-makers might even have come to have doubts as to the continued strategic significance of the land areas adjacent to the NSR. According to Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, circumpolar "northlands," had lost in strategic value since the late 1960s as a reflection of changes in weaponry, and they saw no signs of this being reversed.[97] Be this as it may, the very fact that the Soviet offer was never renewed probably reinforced and preserved prevailing western myths that the route served strategic purposes of significance to the defence of Soviet national interests. At the same time, this myth distracted western attention from areas of growing significance and high priority to the defence of Soviet soil: the Central Arctic Basin.[98]

Third, the crux of Soviet policy towards international cooperation in Arctic affairs was one of national self-sufficiency - relying on own abilities and resources. Thus, collaboration with western interests in for instance improving sailing conditions along the route in resource-intensive areas like ice reconnaissance, icebreaker technology, satellite navigation,

---

97 Terence Armstrong, George Rogers and Graham Rowley, *The Circumpolar North. A Political and Economic Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1978), 277-278.

98 For an early account of this see Willy Østreng, "The Strategic Balance and the Arctic Ocean: Soviet Options," *Cooperation and Conflict* 1 (1977), 41-62.

oceanographic research etc, was for long inconceivable and beyond the reach of reality. If, in certain rare instances, cooperation could not be avoided, the Soviet government preferred it organised on a binational basis and could only accept multinational arrangements under special circumstances (more on this posture below).

This policy of seclusion and self-reliance was not only part of Soviet politics, but a component in the dealings of other Arctic governments as well. This reinforced a pre-existing *segmentation* of the region into national compartments with little or no interaction between the activities taking place within each of them[99]. Most parties kept to themselves and their own territories, trying, most of the time, to avoid direct contact and interaction across the East-West divide, also, though to a much lesser extent, between the western compartments.[100] The Arctic rim states became *national-geographic* in their Arctic engagements, leaving the region, in political terms, segmented.

The difference in policy between the Arctic states was one of degree, rather than kind; the Soviets insisted on upholding the Arctic compartmentalization more rigorously and consistently than the others. Military tension, not civil cooperation, ruled the day in the perception of most states and was decisive in defining the interaction pattern of the Arctic states throughout the duration of the East-West conflict[101]. Periods of detente made some, but not much, difference.[102] The Cold War created a region deprived of an interactional and communicative infrastructure to promote international collaboration and ease tensions. It was an area of prevailing strong and mutual suspicion - far removed from, and alien to, the successful cooperative regime fleshed out in the Antarctic Treaty regulating a whole continent on the basis of a multilateral agreement and international cooperation. The frozen south hosted superpowers acting in concert to respect Antarctica's demilitarized status, to promote international cooperation and to uphold a regime of

---

99 Franklyn Griffiths and Rosmarie Kuptana, "Det långsiktiga behovet av ett arktiskt råd," *Nordisk Kontakt* 2 (Stockholm: Nordiska Rådet, 1993), 10-13.

100 See Willy Østreng, "De skandinaviske land i Arktis. Forutsetninger og muligheter for samarbeid," mimeographed manuscript from study AA: H007, Arktis/Antarktisprosjektet: Nye-territorie problematikken, (Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, January 1973), 62-72.

101 Willy Østreng, "Political-Military Relations between the Ice States: The Conceptual Basis of State Behaviour," in Franklyn Griffiths (ed.), *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North* (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), 26-45.

102 See Willy Østreng, *Polhavet i internasjonal politikk* (Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1978), 264-302.

unannounced inspections in each others' camps. The polar South and North were miles apart in most respects, geographically, politically, strategically and economically.[103]

Arctic Security in the post Cold War Period

The Changing Soviet Conception of Arctic Security

The first public attempt to break out of this integrated security thinking came from the party most rigorously insisting on it in the past. On 1 October 1987, Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk, in which he signalled a will to distinguish more sharply between military and non-military issue areas in the North. The aim sketched out was to bring about " ...a radical lowering of the confrontation level in the area," and to "let the northern part of the globe,... become a zone of peace," and to "let the North Pole become a pole of peace."

The Murmansk-programme, consisting of six items included both military and non-military issues. Gorbachev proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe and consultation between the Warzaw Pact and NATO on restricting military activities in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas. (Observe that no mention was made of the Central Arctic Ocean - the prime deployment area of the strategic forces of the Northern Fleet).[104] Opposed to former practice, he then went on to identify five non-military issue areas as particularly suitable for international cooperation: *Joint utilization of natural resources; instituting a joint energy programme for the northern region; cooperation on environmental protection and a joint environmental plan for the region, establishment of an international forum for scientific research, and the opening of the Northern Sea Route for international shipping.*

In identifying these areas of cooperation Gorbachev also indirectly introduced, for the first time in the post World War II period, a comprehensive security concept to make a distinction between *military* and *civil (political) security*. Both were regarded as vital for safeguarding national security, and in compliance with the new political thinking, the civil component was to

---

[103] Willy Østreng: "Polar Science and Politics: Close Twins or Opposite Poles in International Cooperation," in Steinar Andresen and Willy Østreng (eds.), *International Resource Management: The Role of Science and Politics* (London & New York: Belhaven Press, 1989), 88-114.

[104] For a discussion of why the Arctic Ocean is not suitable as a nuclear free zone see Willy Østreng, "Strategic Developments in Norwegian and Polar Seas: Problems of Denuclearization," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 13, No. 2 (1982), 101-112.

be given enhanced priority thereafter.[105] Actually, the new approach held that security lay in the *political* rather than *military sphere* and that national security is a comprehensive and complex matter based on two principles: first, national security is an integral part of the security of others, implying that no country can be more secure than others and that one country's insecurity equals the insecurity of the rest. Thus, military imbalances and asymmetries should as a long term goal be eliminated. Second, common problems of a transboundary nature - ecological, economic or whatever - can only be resolved through international cooperation. The increased complexity and interdependence between states had, according to Gorbachev, created a need to develop a *comprehensive system of international security* based on a *mechanism capable of discussing common problems in a responsible way and at a representative level.* In this context, he felt a need to extend the concept of security to comprise, in addition to military matters, economy, ecology and human rights. His justification for including ecology stemmed from the general observation that environmental problems was no longer something abstract, but a real part of everyday life, affecting all across national borders.[106]
Thus, international cooperation was defined as a measure to bolster national security.[107]

The Murmansk-programme was from the outset regarded as the commencement of a long and complex process to establish a reasonable *modus vivendi* in the North - as an initiative to safeguard the security of the Arctic as a whole and the security of each of the Arctic states.[108] The new security concept was one of **comprehensive complexity, extended to comprise and counteract all possible threats (environmental degradation included) to the well-being of the states on an evolutionary long term basis.**

As compared to the Cold War period with an absolute priority over and integration of civil issues in military planning, the new security order should be based on a decoupling of the two issue areas with increased emphasis on the civil-political sector. Preserving a healthy environment had thus become an issue of security. Prime Minister, Ryzhkov, clarified the implications of this distinction: "We do not make the implementation of the military and political aspects of the Murmansk initiative an absolute condition for the development of

---

105 For an excellent account of the security thinking of the Gorbachev regime see Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National Security under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* 37, No. 10 (1988).

106 Mikhail Gorbachev, "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World," in *Moscow News* 39 (1987).

107 Andrey E. Granovsky, "Soviet Approaches to Security in the Arctic," in W.A. Hurlburt (ed.), *The Arctic. Choices for Peace and Security* (Seattle: The True North Strong and Free Inquiry Society, Gordon Soules Book Publishers, 1989), 215-222.

108 Alexei A. Rodionov, "Soviet Approaches to Security and Peaceful Cooperation in the Arctic: An Overview," in W. H. Hurlburt (ed.), *The Arctic. Choices for Peace and Security* (Seattle: The True North Strong and Free Inquiry Society, Gordon Soules Book Publishers Ltd, 1989), 212.

cooperation between the Arctic rim states in the economic, scientific, ecological, humanitarian and other areas." However, the close interconnectedness between the two components of national security made him underline that "everybody will understand that even a sturdy house built as the result of such cooperation could easily be destroyed by the destructive power concentrated in the Arctic areas."[109] Or, put in a different way by another representative of the Soviet government: The effects of international cooperation to national security could be reduced if the Arctic states have "to elbow their way through the armada of military vessels, many with nuclear armaments, that is now concentrated in this region."[110]

In other words, the civil and military sectors were regarded as being both *separated* (Murmansk-programme) and *closely interconnected* (Ryzhkov's statement above) in the realm of national security and should, as such, be handled in an interactive, but sector-specific manner. The relationship between the sectors, however, should be based on the premise that no sector was in a position automatically to violate the others' independent abilities to fulfil their unique obligations to contribute to the national security of the then Soviet Union. The separation of Arctic security in two parts was an acknowledgement of the complexity of national security, the military component being only one. In comparison, the Cold War concept was one of *military partiality*, regarding civil activities as a potential obstacle, or even threat to military security, whilst the new concept was one of *comprehensiveness*, regarding civil cooperation as one of two sets of measures to prepare nations to meet, in principle, all kinds of threats to national security, military as well as civil. In order to have a consistent security concept, the separation of the two issue-areas did not at that time call for supremacy of the one over the other, but for integration and extension on syntonic terms.

Not surprisingly, this new conception rocked the foundation and position of the armed forces, the Northern Fleet being no exception.

The Northern Fleet and the Reconceptualization of Arctic Security

During the Cold War the Murmansk oblast was the extended arm of Moscow in the North, executing the wishes and goals of central government. In line with the traditional hierarchical nature of Russian government, the military was defined as a service entity to support and implement the orders of the South. They were the obedient heroes of the Soviet Union and the guarantors of sustained Communism - the backbone of the oblast's economic, political and social life. Thus, it was both symbolic and ironic that Murmansk - the most Soviet of cities - was

---

[109] N.I. Ryzhkov, "Neighbours in Northern Europe: The Soviet Union and Norway," *International Challenges, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Journal* 9, No. 2 (1989), 7.

[110] Rodionov, "Soviet Approaches," 211.

chosen as the launching ground of the Glasnost-inspired, Murmansk programme. When Gorbachev reconceptualized national security, opting for comprehensive, cooperative security and denouncing the enemy perceptions of the past, he at the same time undermined some of the rationale "for subordinating the region to the needs of the Northern Fleet."[111] With this move, central government underscored that the region had needs of its own, which could only be realized if the veil of military secrecy was lifted and the region was opened up to the civil sector, market economy and international investments and business. Glasnost clearly prioritized a new, non-existent, class of economic entrepreneurs, partly at the expense of the old established class of privileged military.

The lifting of the veil of secrecy also revealed that the Northern Fleet and its supporting industry for years had been on bad terms with nature. The disposal and dumping of radioactive waste in northern waters could pose a serious threat to the very survival of local communities. In a very short time the former regional "rulers" and security protectors were defined as impediments to economic progress, made guilty of local self-destructive pollution and "alienated from major developmental interests of the Murmansk region."[112] On top of this, very little preparation was done on the part of the government to reorient the Navy and its personnel to function under the new economic and political circumstances.[113] This process of marginalization implied that the armed services, at least temporarily, lost out in political influence, regionally as well as nationally. Many a navyman felt let down, and the humiliation experienced was blamed directly on the federal government.

The resulting demoralization of officers and crews of the Northern Fleet gained a new momentum and was further accelerated by the decaying Russian economy. Virtually over night, the former privileged were exposed to terrible housing conditions, food shortages, supply uncertainties, unpromising careers, low inflationary salaries and deprivation of social recognition and status. Along with this, the Northern Fleet - the naval pride of the past - gradually fell to pieces due to scarcity or unobtainability of spare parts, lack of fuel, uncertain equipment maintenance, poor quality recruitment of manpower etc. All in all, the military was "assaulted by so many problems from so many directions that its personnel, morale and supply are in a chaotic condition."[114] Not surprisingly, conditions of such a nature reflect negatively on

---

[111] Robert Bathurst, "Where Cultures Cross: Old Russia in a New North," in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (eds.), *The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 53.

[112] Robert Bathurst, "What Happens in Murmansk," Internal mimeographed report of PRIO, Oslo (1994), 1. This report is based on a visit to the area.

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] *Ibid.*, 7.

the military preparedness of the armed forces in general and the Northern Fleet in particular. The numerical cuts in armaments following the START- and CFE agreements come on top of the "reductions" stemming from these domestic processes and changes. The combined effects of all these developments on the naval capability of the Kola-based fleet, are partly reflected in these figures: In the mid-1980s the Northern Fleet had at its disposal 168 submarines out of a total of 347 vessels for the Soviet Navy as a whole, and 220 surface vessels out of a total of 1277.[115] In the mid 1990s, the Northern fleet commands 119 submarines out of a total of 214, and 98 surface vessels of a total of 361.[116]

For the time being, these changes have made the Northern Fleet both a less staggering vehicle of war, and a less influential actor in the tug-of-war of the emerging pluralism of Russian societal decision-making. This is not to say that the Northern Fleet has been crippled beyond repair in its future possibility to restore the preponderance of military over civil priorities or to regain its former military might. Nor are we saying that the Northern Fleet at present does not possess a sufficient number of quality weapons to fulfil its designated security objectives. What we are saying is that the military sector has lost in governmental backing to decide singlehandedly on the course of regional developments, and that military threats are not the only threats to national security recognized by the government. We are also indicating that the level of naval militarization of the Arctic Ocean has been reduced in the 1990's, both in number of vehicles and probably also in geographical operational scope.

The Emerging Russian Security Concept of the 1990s and the NSR

The corollary of this new thinking on the utilization pattern of the NSR should, at least in theory, be that the military grip loosened and that the civil sector got a bigger say on own terms. On 1 July 1991, the NSR was, in accordance with the Murmansk speech, opened to international shipping. In the subsequent seasons, a few western ships transited the NSR with Russian consent, for the first time since the early 1950's. At the same time, the Soviet Ministry of the Merchant Marine asked the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway to take the lead in organizing international research on the NSR. The invitation was accepted and came to fruition in 1993 in that the *International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP)* was organised on a multidisciplinary and multinational basis to address relevant questions relating to: ice and navigation, environmental challenges, and the commercial, military, legal and political aspects

---

[115] *Militærbalansen, 1984-85* (Oslo & London: Den norske Atlanterhavskomiteen & Institute of Strategic Studies, 1985), 116-121.

[116] *Militærbalansen, 1994-95*, (Oslo & London: Den norske Atlanterhavskomiteen & Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994), 196-203.

of increased utilization of the NSR.[117] The whole heap of controversial and sensitive topics from the Cold War was now to be analyzed by Russian and international experts in collaboration. The break with former practices could not have been more startling.

The Yeltsin administration has followed suit in encouraging international scientific cooperation, not least in the Arctic. In 1992 official representatives of the new regime urged that the NSR-project (INSROP) should be speeded up internationally to identify new research topics to promote the development of the NSR zone.[118] The first phase of this programme was completed in 1996, and later in the same year the decision was made to prolong it for two more years in order to integrate and implement its results. A fresh call for further and extended cooperation with western states concerning the Route was issued in 1997. In March of that year the Chairman of the State Committee for the North (Goskomsever), Viktor Kuramin, stated in a speech to Western Parlamentarians that "...apart from sustaining the ecological balance of regions bordering the Arctic, a revitalization of the Northern Sea Route is of paramount importance to Russia."[119] Given the ailing Russian economy, however, this, in his mind, could only materialize if Russia's neighbours saw it in their interest to take an active part in the endeavour.[120] In this way, economic aspects seem to have precedence over military interests. As early as in 1995, influential Russian sources stated that military navigation of NSR-waters is now being considered from the standpoint of its influence on commercial utilization, rather than the other way around.[121] With regard to NSR-priorities, the defence component is no more the

---

[117] INSROP is a five-year multidisciplinary research programme, the main phase of which commenced in June 1993. The three principal operating partners are Central Marine Research and Design Institute (CNIIMF) in St. Petersburg, Ship & Ocean Foundation (SOF) in Tokyo and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) in Lysaker, Norway. INSROP's main secretariat is located at FNI. The aim of INSROP is to build up a knowledge base adequate to provide a foundation for long-term planning and decision-making by state agencies as well as private companies etc, for purposes of promoting rational decision-making concerning the use of the NSR for transit and regional development. For more information see: *The INSROP Newsletter* 1, No. 1 (1993); 2, No. 1 (1994); 2, No. 2 (1994); and 2, No. 3 (1994). (Lysaker: The INSROP Secretariat)

[118] Alexander Granberg, "International Economic Cooperation Along the Northern Sea Route," in Henning Simonsen (ed.), *Proceedings from the Northern Sea Route Expert Meeting, 13-14 October, 1992*, (Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1993), 153-166.

[119] *Segodnya*, 1 March 1997. The citation is translated by this author.

[120] *Ibid.*

[121] Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 39.

most important one, whilst the significance of the ecological component has grown (for a detailed discussion of the balancing of various aspects see chapter 2).[122]

Although Russia has undertaken an important reshaping of her environmental, security and scientific policies, serious difficulties still remain. The weakening of central state authority may, for instance, have a negative influence on the central government's ability to implement its new political intentions (see chapter 2).

In retrospect, it is hard to avoid the conclusion, that the Soviet Union has gradually assumed a leading position in setting the Arctic security agenda. This became most prevalent during the Gorbachev era.
During the 1990s the most important security setting initiative initiated by the Russian government has been the revision of the flank article of the CFE-agreement (more on this in chapters 2 and 4).
Western security behaviour has, repeatedly, been one of block reactions led by the US to Soviet moves and actions. In recognition of this action-reaction pattern, and taking into account the bird's-eye-view purpose of this chapter, we take the liberty in the next paragraph to treat the western Arctic states as a block and their security perceptions as one of consensus. The slight differences in viewpoints existing within the western group will, whenever they matter in our context, be accounted for in the subsequent chapters, 3,4,5 and 6.

The Western Conception of Arctic Security

Throughout the last twenty years of the Cold War, the western rim states have been somewhat more open to functional multilateral cooperation in non-military issue areas than the Soviet Union. This relative openness was nourished by the heritage from US Vice-President, Henry A. Wallace, who, during World War II, proposed that his country should lead the way in establishing an Arctic Treaty for, inter alia, scientific exploration and cooperation among the Arctic States.[123] The drafting and implementation of such a treaty never materialized, partly due to the hegemonical features of the Cold War, and partly due to lack of pressing contemporary needs for international cooperation in most civil fields. The majority of such activities carried out by states in the region during the years 1945-70 had an overriding local interest and orientation. Examples of such activities include the use of the Northeast and Northwest Passages for supplies to local outposts, administrative measures concerning native settlements, mineral

---

122 Yakovlev, Kossov and Ushakov, "IV. 2.2: Political Aspects of International Shipping along the Northern Sea Route," 5.

123 Herman Pollack and Peter Anderson, "United States Policy for the Arctic," *Arctic Bulletin* 1, No. 2 (1973).

production and resource extraction in non-disputed national territories. Only a few activities could in those years be termed *international* in the sense that several states carried on the same type of activity and collectively either were affected by or had an interest in the others' involvement. Thus, the segmentation of the region in national compartments is not only to be understood as a result of Cold War-politics and features, but just as much as a reflection of circumpolar needs, locally as well as nationally, science being one salient exception.

Ever since World War II, all Arctic states have carried out research in the region. Apart from the multilateral cooperation taking place during the International Geophysical Year (1957-58), this research has mostly been conducted under national auspices, in a non-cooperative fashion. This, despite the fact that representatives from the scientific community on both sides of the East-West divide expressed a desire for cooperation on the basis of a joint philosophy: "Science and scientists have a kind of objectivity which is congenial to co-operation. The nature of science is not only conducive to co-operation, but indeed demands it, for no man, no nation, has a monopoly of science."[124]

In the late 1960s and early 1970s some cautious and conditional initiatives on scientific collaboration between the Arctic states were proposed. Few of these were conceived in the first instance by governments. Most had their origins either with individual researchers or in meetings between scientists with related interests.[125] Irrespective of origin, most of these initiatives were either *rejected*, *altered* or *reluctantly implemented* by Soviet authorities.[126] Some examples will serve to illustrate the differences in attitudes between the two sides:

In the latter part of the 1960s Soviet scientists came up with the idea of establishing a multinational research program, *The Polar Experiment* (POLEX), to study the impact of the interaction between ice-covered oceans (The Arctic and Southern Oceans) and the atmosphere in global climate formation.[127] The proposal was later on adopted by the UN Global Atmospheric Research Programme (GARP), but not implemented in accordance with the original idea, as a cooperative multinational program between polar nations. In the Arctic the program was split into national parts and conducted as individual projects under the auspices of GARP. The Soviet side objected to making the program an exclusive cooperative effort between the Arctic states.

---

[124] Hugh Odishaw, "International Co-operation," in *Science and Technology*, unnumbered and undated, in the archives of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 28.

[125] Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, *The Circumpolar North*, 269.

[126] For a more detailed discussion of the western attitudes towards cooperation in these years see Willy Østreng, *Supranote 4*, 39-41.

[127] Treshnikov, Baranov, Surukhanyan, Smirnov and Timokhev, *The Polar Experiment* (Leningrad: AARI, 1974).

In 1970 the USA issued an invitation to pool international resources for implementing *The Arctic Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment* (AIDJEX), to study the heat balance between the ice-cover of the Arctic Ocean and the atmosphere. The invitation was coolly received. In the end, only two countries accepted, Canada and *the out-of-region-country*, Japan.[128] The Soviet Union declined on the grounds that "the economic and scientific reasons for investigating the Arctic Ocean are intertwined with military ones, which have elicited great interest on the part of the US Navy."[129] The rest of the Arctic states renounced participation, basically, on the grounds that the similarities in scientific focus between Aidjex and Polex might result in overlap and duplication of research. No one could afford this simply for the sake of politics.

In 1972 Norway took a fresh initiative on negotiations for a polar bear agreement between the United States, Canada, Denmark, the USSR and Norway. To the surprise of many, the Soviet Union accepted the invitation and contributed favourably to the outcome, *The Polar Bear Agreement of November 15, 1973.*[130] When it came to the implementation of the scientific part of the agreement, however, the parties' ability to deliver differed substantially. Among the western signatories, the exchange of information was profuse, and in line with the letter and spirit of the agreement. By contrast, the Soviet contribution was long so negligible as to give rise to the following western reaction: "Whether only little research has been carried out in the Soviet Union, or whether the data exchange is being hampered by governmental red tape, is difficult to say."[131] Nor did Soviet scientists take part in joint field studies or invite Western researchers to participate in field work on Soviet territory - both of which activities are provided for in the agreement. In line with the segmentation of the Arctic, the Soviet government totally excluded foreign researchers from her northernmost regions. As Professor Trevor Lloyd described it in 1969: "It must be acknowledged that there has been a definite barrier between the scientists of the Soviet Union and associated countries, and other countries. There has been no easy interchange between western group members and the rest... Although Polish and

---

128 See "Aidjex Scientific Plan," *Aidjex Bulletin* 15 (Seattle: University of Washington, 1972). See also "United States/Canadian Project: Arctic Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment (Aidjex)," *Polar Record* 15, No. 98 (1971), 725-726.

129 A.F. Treshnikov, E. Borisenkov, N.A. Volkov and E.G.Nikiforov, "The American Ice Dynamics Joint Experiment Project," in A.F. Treshnikov (ed.), *Problems of the Arctic and Antarctic* (Leningrad: ARRI, 1971), 38.

130 Anne Fikkan, Gail Osherenko and Alexander Arikainen, "Polar Bears: The Importance of Simplicity," in Oran Young and Gail Osherenko (eds.), *Polar Politics. Creating International Environmental Regimes* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 96-152.

131 Tore Gjelsvik, "Science and Politics in Polar Areas," mimeographed article in the archives of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, October 1985, 6-7.

Czechoslovak scientists have worked with Soviet scientists in Antarctica, there is no record of this being done in the North, whether in the Soviet Arctic or elsewhere. The Soviet Arctic has not yet been opened to western scientists, although a few individuals have made short visits there."[132]

This is not to say that western scientists were not subjected to security regulations in the execution of their work. The few non-Canadian scientists who carried out field studies in northern Canada in the 1950s and 1960s were obligated to observe security guidelines in their conduct. The same applied in Greenland and in Alaska.[133] Gradually, many of these obstacles to the freedom of research on western Arctic soil vanished. In the late 1970s and early 1980s scientists from other countries were usually welcome to run their own expeditions or to participate in joint endeavours throughout most of the western Arctic. This, however, carried with it a concern that the host country might "be left without some of the scientific knowledge and expertise she required to operate effectively in her own north. This was one of the considerations that in 1976 induced the Canadian government to issue guidelines for scientific activities in northern Canada."[134]

In comparison, Western scientists had, throughout most of the Cold War, much more leverage in their international dealings than their Soviet counterparts. Apart from taking an active part in the few international research programs that saw the light of day, they also participated in multilateral fora established for scientific cooperation in the Arctic, such as *the Committee for High Arctic Scientific Research, Liaison and Information Exchange, Comité Arctique* and *the Arctic Ocean Sciences Board.* In contrast, Soviet authorities forbade their own scientists to participate in these and other international organizations concerned with Arctic studies.[135] The fear that this kind of multilateralism would serve as a source of intelligence gathering on the Soviet North, long guided the internal deliberations in the Kremlin. This policy apparently came to a halt and review in the latter part of the 1980s. The first indication of a loosening up came in 1987 when Soviet scientists and official representatives alike accepted a private US/Canadian invitation to participate in the **Working Group on Arctic International Relations** (WGAIR) assembling polar experts from all Arctic countries (the Arctic eight).[136] As stated by a high

---

[132] Trevor Lloyd, "International Co-operation in Arctic Science and Disarmament" mimeographed article in the Library of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, March 1969.

[133] *Ibid.*

[134] Armstrong, Rogers and Rowley, *The Circumpolar North,* 268.

[135] Gjelsvik, "Science and Politics in Arctic Areas," 7-10.

[136] For the work of this group see: Oran R. Young, "The Work of the Working Group on Arctic International Relations," *Northern Notes* 4 (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College, 1996), 1-21.

ranking representative of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990: "We do think that the happy idea to create such a group (WGAIR) was extremely timely, coming exactly at the right moment of the emergence of what we can call the 'Arctic awareness and integration process'."[137] Later on the Soviets/Russians took a similar positive stand to the cooperative work taking place within the **International Arctic Science Committee** (IASC) (see below).
The interesting point about these examples is that they show that the western states, in practice if not in principle, shrunk the hegemonical concept of security and opened up for pan-Arctic cooperation, a good ten years before the Soviet government did. The western process proceeded along the lines later followed in the Murmansk programme: Non-military issues appropriate for international cooperation are identified and then peeled away from those interests defined as pertaining to military security. Thus, in terms of security conceptions, the two sides - East and West - stood on an equal philosophical footing around 1987 when Gorbachev made his historic speech in Murmansk. This is one of the very few examples where the West stole a march on the Soviet Union in setting the Arctic security agenda. The cooperative rhetoric soon materialized in the parties' inclination to commit themselves to the organization of joint research programs.

When it came to bilateral scientific cooperation, the policy of denying western scientists access to Soviet northern soils was actually relinquished, or at least modified, some years before the Murmansk speech. This happened in 1984 when Canada and the USSR agreed to sign their joint *Arctic Exchange Programme*. The same was agreed upon four years later when Norway and the USSR signed an *Agreement Concerning Technical-Scientific Cooperation on Exploration of the Arctic and the Northern Areas of 1988*. Furthermore, scientific areas, previously kept out of bounds to international collaboration due to military sensitivity and applicability, were now defined as suitable objects of collaboration.

In the agreement with Norway, the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) agreed that joint oceanographic studies were to be carried out, inter alia, in the waters between Greenland and Svalbard, the Fram Strait. This strait was, as early as the 1960s, indicated in the Soviet media as a route for Northern Fleet submarines in transit between their bases on the Kola peninsula and the Arctic Ocean.[138] As of 1988, it constituted one of the main sea routes for Soviet SSBNs on their way southwards to launch position in the Norwegian Sea. When one recalls that naval strategists have claimed that "oceanography and its contribution to the knowledge of the environment are more important to undersea warfare than to any other

---

[137] Letter from Jasov A. Ostrovsky to Oran Young and Franklyn Griffiths, October 15, 1990, published in *Northern Notes* 4 (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College, 1996), 18-19.

[138] Gordon W. Brown,"The Arctic ASW," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 88, No. 3 (1962). See also "Reds Issue Hudson Bay Threat," *Montreal Daily Star*, 18 August 1959, and " New Dangers in the North," *Ottawa Evening Journal*, 11 August 1958.

warfare area"[139], then it will certainly appear that such research cooperation in the North with a NATO country would run counter to Soviet security interests. Here, the Soviet side may have stretched their will of cooperation even beyond the limits of the New Political Thinking and the spirit of the Murmansk initiative. Or put in a historic perspective: Cooperation on such a topic in such a geographical area would certainly have been inconceivable during the 1945-80 period. The new pan-Arctic cooperative mood also showed in the parties' willingness to engage in processes of regime formation.

The Evolving Pan-Arctic Concept of Environmental Cooperation and its Relevance to Security

It took three years for the conceptual agreement to be followed by concrete political action, leading to a surge of international cooperative arrangements, in the form of *civilianization, regionalization* and *mobilization.* These three processes are intertwined. They concur and comply in addressing the same topic: *international civil cooperation*, but differ when it comes to focus: Regionalization highlights the *changing pattern of decision-making between central and local governments*, civilianization is preoccupied with the *processes of regime formations*, whilst mobilization addresses the *participatory dimension of politics.*

The process of civilianization was initiated with the formation of the *International Arctic Science Committee* (IASC) in 1990. Here independent scientific organizations (mostly, the Academies of Sciences) in 14 countries - the Arctic eight and seven extra-territorial states[140] - decided to develop and implement international research programmes comprising the whole or parts of the Arctic. IASC has adopted a multi-disciplinary approach, covering a wide range of topics - the natural, cultural, ethnic and social sciences. One area in particular has been assigned prime importance: environmental research and monitoring. As an NGO, IASC has proved to be a useful vehicle for the exchange of scientific information, coordination of research and planning and building environmental monitoring stations.

One year later the socalled *Rovaniemi process* culminated in a Ministerial conference between the Arctic eight, which decided to implement the *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy* (AEPS), defining five basic objectives:

- to protect the Arctic ecosystem, humans included,
- to secure sustainable development of resources,

---

[139] Charles Bishop, "Oceanography in Naval Warfare," *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 85, No. 5 (1959), 82.

[140] The extraterritorial states are: France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland and Great Britain

- to accept and adjust one's own actions to the cultural needs, values and customs of indigenous peoples, and

- to identify, reduce and counteract pollution.

To put these objectives into reality four international working groups were set up; *The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme* (AMAP), *Protection of the Marine Environment* (PAME), *Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response* (EPPR) and the *Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna* (CAFF)[141] (for a more detailed discussion of the working of these working groups see country-chapters 3 and 5). In addition to these multilateral regimes, most Arctic rim states have been fairly active in promoting the process of civilianization through a network of bilateral agreements within science, environment, sea rescue operations and credits.

The intention to mobilize non-state actors to political participation and to change the pattern of decision-making in Arctic international relations saw its first result in the Rovaniemi process. This inter-governmental initiative introduced for the first time in history "indigenous knowledge" through "indigenous participation" in the development of a strategy for sustaining an environment from which these peoples depend exclusively for their livelihood. As such it marked an "historic" watershed, a point acknowledged not least by representatives of the indigenous peoples.[142] According to one analyst the three international aboriginal peoples' organizations (IPOs) - the *Inuit Circumpolar Conference* (ICC), *Saami Council* (SC) and the *Association of Aboriginal Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation* (RAPON) - have been given extensive opportunities to participate and make an input in the AEPS-process.[143] This despite the fact that the IPOs along with environmental NGOs were excluded from the meetings of Heads of Delegations in the Working Groups.

The policies of regionalization and mobilization took one more step forward with the establishment of the *Northern Forum* (NF) in 1991 in Anchorage, Alaska. This forum has as its main objective to further the dialogue between regional authorities in the circumpolar area and to identify areas of cooperation which have pan-Arctic and transregional interest. As a parallel initiative to the establishment of the Northern Forum, the Canadian Government introduced the idea of establishing an *Arctic Council* (AC) in the early 1990s, involving the eight Arctic central governments, the ICC, SC, RAPON and various NGO observers. The purpose was to ensure that all Arctic voices are heard in a centralised process and to ease the coordination of all the newly

---

141 For a detailed discussion of this cooperation see David Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council," *Security Policy Library* 1 (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1996).

142 Monica Tennberg, "Indigenous Peoples' Involvement in the Arctic Council," in *Northern Notes* 4 (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College, 1996), 23.

143 Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic," 18.

born cooperative arrangements in the region. Further, the AC is to enhance the collective environmental security of Arctic states and people, to promote international cooperation and peace, and to advance the principle of sustainable and equitable economic, social and cultural development throughout the area. On this basis, the AC was established on September 19, 1996.[144] Its aims and objectives are based on two pillars: the AEPS, inherited from the Rovaniemi process, and the *Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative* (ASDI). The latter will be promoted through Working Groups dealing with economic, social, cultural and other issues that will be identified. The over-arching principle to guide the Council's work and string the two pillars together, is the idea of sustainable development.[145] In Article 2 of the *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* the ICC, SA and RAPON are designated Permanent Participants of the AC. This implies that they have full access to take part in virtually all discussions taking place in the meetings of the Council, Senior Arctic Officials (SOA) and the Working Groups, although without a vote. This participation notwithstanding, there are indigenous Arctic organizations that are not represented in the Council. The Athabaskans and Aleuts of Alaska, which are not members of any of the IPOs, have submitted their wishes to become Permanent Participants because the present representation is "hardly representative" of all indigenous peoples.[146] Even though the Declaration does not preclude any extension of the number of Permanent Participants in the Council there is a notable reluctance on the part of most Arctic governments to accept any significant increase in this category of participation. This is so, because the number of Permanent Participants in the Council should at any time be less than the number of governmental members. For this reason, participation at the tribal level is out of the question for all governments. A third category of participants have been assigned observer status, i.e. non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations and NGOs. Consequently, the Arctic eight are in charge - the intergovernmental element holds primacy in decision-making.

According to some critics, with these varying "...categories of participation and representation, the states have aimed to create hierarchical rules for participation. They contain ideas of who has the right to speech, from which institutional place the speech can take place, and what kind of positions the objects of discourse can have."[147] In sum, the organizational structure of the AC is such, that there are no structural guarantees that the indigenous voices will be heard and, if heard, that they will be sufficiently representative. As has been pointed out, there was not many parties in the negotiations who were concerned about how to ensure "meaningful" participation

---

144 *Ibid.*, 18-28.

145 *Ibid.*, 23

146 See Tennberg, "Indigenous Peoples' Involvement in the Arctic Council," 28.

147 *Ibid.*, 29.

of indigenous peoples, that would make a real contribution to the process itself.[148] Only in times of optimal political conditions, i.e. when governments see it fit, indigenous knowledge and participation may be utilized to influence the content of inter-governmental decisions on Arctic matters. What undoubtedly is new, however, is that indigenous peoples for the first time in history have been designated a formal role and position in the decision-making structure set up between Arctic states for regional environmental management. In line with this, the AC has been described as "an institutional knot tying together the various-level cooperative processes in the Arctic" - to merge the diverse processes of the region, be they transregional, international or subregional.[149] The AC will most likely serve - at least intentionally - approximately the same functions at government level as the Northern Forum is set out to do at county level, but probably with far greater effect. It may be the prime organ to reduce the basic problems of the region as they materialized during the Cold War, i.e. to counteract the *marginalization* of Arctic questions in national and international politics, to loosen up the geographical *segmentation* into national compartments and to reduce its *dependence on extra-territorial forces*.[150] The overall objective is to have a forum able to address and identify the Arctic specifics, rather than extra-territorial requirements to the region.[151]

In June 1991, the process of mobilization produced a new cooperative organ outside the realm of central and local governments: *the Arctic Aboriginal Leaders' Summit* (ALS). This is an alliance of indigenous peoples, including the Inuits of North America, the Saamis of Fennoscandinavia and the indigenous peoples of the Russian North. The purpose is to protect and promote the interests of the Arctic's permanent residents, to coordinate their actions and harmonize their respective positions in international regional fora. Like the formation of IASC, ALS is the result of an initiative from below - from concerned citizens and non-governmental organizations wanting a say on developments. By organizing themselves transregionally, the aboriginals have scored significant victories in the overall process, especially in the pursuit of self-determination (see chapter 6). But as has been pointed out: "...it would be a mistake to anticipate that the Arctic's indigenous peoples will emerge united and triumphant in the North."[152] The organized struggle to influence political processes has just recently commenced. The structures are young

---

148 *Ibid.*, 30.

149 Olav Schram Stokke, "Arctic Environmental Cooperation after Rovaniemi - What Now?" in Lise Lyck (ed.), *Nordic Arctic Research on Contemporary Arctic Problems: Proceedings from Nordic Arctic Research Forum Symposium* (Aalborg University Press, 1992), 231.

150 Griffiths and Kuptana, "Det långsiktiga behovet av ett arktiskt råd," 7-17.

151 For a most interesting discussion on the working agenda of the Arctic Council see: Oran R.Young:, "The Arctic Council: Making a New Era in International Relations," in *The Twentieth Century Fund Report* (New York: 1996).

152 *Ibid.*, p.13.

and fragile, and the interests multiple, partly conflicting and the natives' abilities and measures to affect political outcomes may be inferior. The indigenous peoples are not even free from conflicts among themselves in determining how to manage the environment to the best of their collective interests.[153] The ALS, however, may turn out to be a useful vehicle to seek compromise and sort out differences among the IPOs, and in dealings with central and regional governments within the new regimes.

The last development in regionalization and mobilization was the establishment of the *Euro-Arctic Barents Region* (BEAR) in 1993. This is a two-tier cooperation between the governments of Finland, Sweden, Russia and Norway on the one side, and the 8 northernmost counties of the same four countries on the other.[154] The organizational set-up also involves the political participation of the Saami people and various organizations of civil society. Two intertwined objectives have been set for this transregional and intergovernmental cooperation: First, to transform the eight peripheral provinces into growth-resistant entities based on their own initiatives, resources and prerequisites. Second, to replace the confrontational security strategy of the Cold War with a security strategy of cooperation. In other words: By way of civilian cooperation, a web of interdependence and confidence building measures shall be created to stabilize the political conditions in the most militarized sub-region of the Arctic. Here the civilian societies and their cooperation has been assigned a long-term security objective. In terms of security policy, the BEAR explicitly builds on the concept of comprehensive and civil security as introduced publicly to the Arctic for the first time in the Murmansk programme (for a detailed discussion of BEAR see chapter 4).

Three features of interest in our context reappear from regime to regime: First, conservation and preservation of the environment has been assigned a unique status among the civil issue-areas designated for international cooperation. As of now, the environment is, together with science, the only field addressed by all regimes and decision-making bodies. At the same time, the bulk of scientific programmes coordinated by IASC deal with topics of the highest relevance to environmental conservation. As such, the two issue areas appear to be the most prominent among Arctic concerns and priorities in all rim states. Addressed by all in all contexts, makes them the most pronounced area of pan-Arctic cooperation on all levels and types of governance, local and central, private and official. If science and environmental protection are two sides of the same coin, the environment and regional cooperation are identical twins.

---

153 *Ibid.*

154 See Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander (eds.), *The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe* (London: FNI, PRIO & Sage Publications, 1994).

Second, none of the Arctic regimes addresses the question of security directly or in a positive way. Neither does BEAR, whose prime objective, according to its own founding father, is to build civil security in the sub-region. The sensitivity of the matter shows in the organizational structure of BEAR which has not been set up to host a Working Group for security matters. In comparison and contrast, all the other priority areas of this sub-region have been assigned a Working Group to secure progress, operationalization and implementation of respective objectives. The AC is even more adamant, explicitly stating that it shall not deal with "...matters related to military security."[155] In this context, security is simply off limit. As has been stated: "Apart from the vague objective of promoting collective environmental security in the region, such issues will not feature on the Arctic Council's initial agenda."[156] The other regimes are tacit about such matters. However, if not officially declared, the effects on Arctic security stemming from the results of the other cooperative arrangements do not, in principle, differ from those of BEAR. Provided those regimes produce what is declared, the overall cooperative process to civilianize and regionalize Arctic international relations will, by implication, affect the process to reconceptualize regional security. Consequently, all regimes purport contributing indirectly to regional security.

Third, in a short and medium term perspective, the issue area most salient as an object to promote civil security is environmental preservation - the common denominator of all the regimes. In principle, these three features, also apply to the NSR, which has received some added attention in its own right.

Among all the regimes, BEAR, and to a certain extent NF, are the only ones explicitly addressing the economic potential and environmental challenges of the Northern Sea Route. BEAR has set up a special Working Group for the NSR, whilst NF, in an early phase, designated the Route an area of prime priority. The interest devoted by BEAR to the NSR is based in how the latter can be used to further economic cooperation among the members of the former. In this respect, the Route is part of the new cooperative structure of the Arctic and an area to benefit from pan-Arctic cooperation in science and environmental protection. Recently, however, the NF dropped the NSR as a priority project, and BEAR has not progressed significantly in integrating the NSR in its own sphere of interest. Thus, the Route is gradually assuming a more modest position in Arctic international relations. Evolving processes of civilianization and regionalization may carry a potential to reverse this development.

The proliferation of initiatives and regimes aimed at promoting sustained international cooperation has created political dynamics of area-specific relevance. Gradually, the Arctic is

---

155 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," *Arctic Bulletin* 4 (1996), footnote 1, 5.

156 Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic," 22.

being transformed from an area governed mostly by central governments for the satisfaction of Southern needs to an area defining its own political agenda for the satisfaction of northerners as well as southerners. We are witnessing a process where *extra-territoriality* is being challenged by *area-specificity* as the guiding principle for regional utilization, management and governance. This development has posed the question if the Arctic is becoming a region in its own right and on own merits, in international relations. If the answer to this question is in the negative, Arctic cooperation may be turned on and off and fluctuate in accordance with the changing and volatile needs of the South; If it is in the positive, cooperation will have a regional impetus and momentum of its own to sustain itself to benefit increasing area-specificity in agenda setting.

The Arctic as an International Region?

Regions are, according to Oran Young, spatially delimited areas encompassing parts of two or more states marked by (1) possessing political agendas framed in regional as opposed to global terms, (2) pattern of alignments and political interactions that are not just a reflection of the politics of international society as a whole, and (3) the evolution of codes of conduct or regimes defined in regional terms.[157] In this respect, regions present particular assemblages of attributes that give them personalities of their own. On the basis of their interactional patterns, spatial confines, identity and agendas, they stand out as different from bordering areas and regions.

The features of the Arctic regimes are all instrumental in counteracting and breaking up the territorial segmentation of the past. The Arctic is becoming a spatial entity of political and geographical contiguity between the Arctic states - an area for joint implementation of pan-Arctic decisions. Since the regimes are multiple and pan-Arctic in application, and based on the same codes of conduct, it will be hard, if not impossible, to revert to anything like the segmentation of the past. In this respect the Arctic satisfies the requirements of the third definition criterion of a region.

When it comes to pattern of alignments the Arctic eight stands out as a group different from the rest of Arctic-interested states. The Regional Board of IASC is exclusive in that it is only open to the Arctic eight, having assumed the obligation to secure that the activities undertaken by the organization are in line with the interests of the region (read: as seen with the eyes of the Arctic eight). The IASC Council, ranking above the Regional Board are, however, in principle open to all extra-territorial members having an interest in Arctic affairs. The core group of members in the Arctic Council are identical to those of the Regional Council of IASC, whilst non-Arctic states may only apply for observer status. Regional non-state actors like the indigenous peoples rank as Permanent Members, which is higher than the position assigned to non-Arctic states. It is

---

[157] Young, "The Arctic Council" (1996), 9.

also stated that the AC shall provide a voice in outside forums.[158] The organizing principle of political interactions is here: "We in relation to them." The Northern Forum deviates somewhat from this exclusive pattern in its membership policy. Here the provinces of Heilongjiang in China and Hokkaido in Japan enjoy membership in the Board of Directors, as does the Republic of Korea, recognized as a membership II according to the bylaws of the institution.[159] In BEAR, four of the Arctic eight members have been assigned a special status. This is so because of the sub-regionality of the cooperation. By and large, the Arctic alignment pattern is based in regional conditions and prerequisites, and since the formation of IASC and NF in the early 1990s, this pattern has been sharpened and made explicit to apply to regional states only. So, even though there are regional deviations in the pattern of political interactions among the various regimes, the developmental trend in regime formation is unambiguous: *The Arctic eight is gradually becoming a grouping of political recognition.* This implies that the marginalization of the Arctic in domestic and international affairs is gradually fading away. In this way the second definitional criterion is leaning heavily towards satisfying the requirements of a region.

The first criterion requiring political agendas to be shaped by and based in regional conditions and not in global interests, is by implication fulfilled by the existence of the two previous. The grip of extra-territoriality on Arctic governance is thus slowly yielding to area-specificity. On this backdrop, it seems reasonable to conclude in line with Oran Young that the Arctic has become a region in international affairs. However, Young acknowledges that such a conclusion "...may become a subject of disagreement"[160] As of now, some observers talk about the Arctic as a distinct region, others prefer to keep to the tradition of thinking about it as a periphery, whilst yet others perceive it as functionally integrated in the centers of the South.[161] This variety of perspectives and conclusions, clearly show that the Arctic is in a transitional period - in dynamic change, on its way to something new.[162] Franklyn Griffiths takes care of the transitional, dynamic element when making a distinction between levels of region-building. He distinguishes between what he calls *minimal political region*, which is a theatre of operation in which unilateral behaviour and bilateral interaction occur more frequently than multilateral relationships; *co-ordinate political regions* which are based on substantial coordination of state

---

158 Oran Young, "A Sustainable Development Strategy for the Arctic Council," in *WWF Arctic Bulletin* 1 (1997), 7.

159 *The Northern Forum Resolution no. 001*, Whitehorse, Yukon, Canada., 4 September 1992.

160 Young, "The Arctic Council" (1996), 9.

161 Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl, "The Arctic and the Rest," in *Challenges of a Changing World. Festschrift to Willy Østreng* (Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1991), 55.

162 For an interesting discussion of this development see: Leonid Timtchenko, *Quo Vadis, Arcticum? The International Law Regime of the Arctic and Trends in its Development* (Kharkov: State University Press "Osnova," 1996.

behaviour through especially multilateral interaction on issues perceived to be significant; and lastly, *integration regions* which are characterized by significant progress in the creation of a feeling of regional community for concerted actions (see introductory chapter).[163] Applied to the Arctic, Griffiths concluded in 1989 that the region was undergoing a transition from a *minimal political region* to a *coordinate political region.* In the 1990s, developments in regionalization, civilianization and mobilization have picked up additional pace and momentum when it comes to international cooperation and coordination. Thus, in the latter part of the 1990s, the Arctic has more features resembling a coordinate political region than a minimal political region. Thus, developments indicate that the Arctic is becoming a region of increasing integration, but still having a long way to go to fulfil the definitional requirements of a region of community. This conclusion calls for yet a qualification.

As stated above, the environment and science have been assigned a unique status among the civil issue-areas designated for pan-Arctic cooperation. At present, they are the two sole objects of coordination. Within these issue areas a momentum based in Arctic conditions seems to exist to sustain a process producing more area-specificity in agenda-setting. Thus, the Arctic is gradually becoming a coordinate political region functionally restricted to environmental protection and scientific cooperation. A potential exists, however, for this issue-specific cooperation to "spill over" to other functional areas and broaden the collaborative extent of the evolving coordinate political region of the Arctic.

The emerging cooperative structure of the Arctic has five salient features of significance in this context:

First, the fresh regimes and organisations form in total a communicative infrastructure which may serve to guide, direct, broaden and strengthen the civil and international component in the emerging mode of cooperation in the North. In many respects, this structure may be regarded as the first sign of an evolving **system of interactional polities** for the creation, promotion and allocation of shared environmental values among the various levels of politics within the Arctic bioregion.

Second, the collaborative structure established for science and the environment may serve as a working foundation to include more issue areas of relevance for the promotion of civility in economic conduct.
Regimes like NF add for instance education, economic utilization, joint efforts to protect the cultural heritage of northern peoples, management of resources etc., to their agenda of

---

[163] Franklyn Griffiths: "Challenge and Leadership in the Arctic," in E.J. Dosman (ed): *Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic*, London and New York, Routledge, 1989, 211-227 Toronto, 1976,

cooperation.[164] The AC is established as a high level forum to provide a means of promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States in general and not only within the exclusive areas of sustainable development and environmental protection, which, for the time being, hold primacy in priority.[165] The growing number of bilateral regimes add to this trend, in that they cover issue areas like for instance sea rescue operations and credits.

Third, Gorbachev explicitly related the environment to the extension of national security, thereby helping to make it more of a prime concern in high politics. He also regarded international cooperation as a prerequisite to further national security, regionally as well as globally. These are all reasonable elements in what has been denoted environmental security.

Fourth, the Russian government acknowledges that the economic activities of a state should not damage the environment within and beyond its jurisdiction, and that global, regional and local control should be provided over the state of the environment and changes in it.

Fifth, the Arctic Council - the coordinating body to rationalize the overall institutional development of the region - is obligated to promote the enhancement of collective security, regional cooperation and peace. In due time, it may serve the function to string the various polities and the various levels of politics and functional areas together in a coordinated multifunctional entity acting on the basis of civility.

Summary

Since 1987, important changes have taken place in the value-base of Arctic politics, i.e. the accumulation of declared goals and political rhetorics of the rim states. These changes are relative in that they vary both in scope, degree and emphasis from state to state. They are most dramatic in the case of the Soviet Union, and now Russia. Some of the changes are indicative in that Arctic politics were not being framed in a transitional period between the Cold War and the post-Cold War prerequisites. Shifts may, and will most likely, still occur, even though what has been achieved in terms of cooperative regimes and regional organizations already, should constitute a force to counteract a reversion to the value-base of the old order. This being said, the changes identified this far undoubtedly point in the same direction for all Arctic states and appear to be based on a common feeling of belonging to what may develop into a political pan-Arctic community of interests. The Arctic has become a region of increasing integration - a

---

[164] *Statement of Intent Among the Governors, Premiers, Ministers and Chairs of Northern Regions*, at the Third Northern Regions Conference on Regional Environmental Cooperation, Anchorage, Alaska, (September 1990), parapgraphs IV and V.

[165] "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," in *Arctic Bulletin* 4 (1996), article 1, 5.

functional coordinate political region in the fields of environmental preservation and scientific cooperation. Area-specificity is on the rise in regional agenda setting. As of now, among the more salient changes in the spectrum of Arctic political values are the following:

- the content of international affairs in the Arctic has changed from being a unidimensional military concern to a comprehensive conception comprising military as well as civil issue areas,
- civil issue-areas are, at least in a short term perspective, designated a higher priority in domestic deliberations on the formation of national Arctic politics than are military concerns. This relates in particular to the Murmansk programme,
- the region is gradually moving from a state of affairs of non-cooperation (segmentation) to civilianisation and regionalisation on a pan-Arctic basis,
- environmental protection and preservation has, for the first time in the post World War II period, been assigned international significance by all Arctic states, and, by some, been defined as an element of extended security,
- the concepts of interrelatedness and interactiveness in environmental (large, medium and small scale environmental threats) and military security matters are gaining ground, implying that a commencing community of interests exists within the region to be handled jointly between and among the Arctic states,
- the Arctic specifics are slowly and gradually being put on the Arctic agenda as a supplement to extra-territorial interests,
- the marginalization of Arctic questions in multilateral and domestic politics is gradually being reduced through the internationalization of Arctic politics in general, and the new communicative structure being established by the processes of regionalization, mobilization and civilianisation in particular,
- the segmentation of Arctic dealings is gradually being watered down through the internationalization of Arctic politics,
- the emerging cooperative structure of the Arctic is gradually having the effect of enhancing a concern for the environment to the point where various levels of politics are on the verge of starting to speak of a biopolitical rather than a geostrategic region.

In sum, the post-Cold War declared goals and political rhetorics imply that the preconditions of regional security are being altered in three ways: First, security is being extended to comprise a whole new range of civil issue-areas, among them the threats emanating from environmental degradation. Second, international cooperation is increasingly being addressed by decision-makers as a measure in national security policy and planning. Third, a pan-Arctic communicative structure is in the making, integrating all Arctic states across the former East/West divide. This structure may in due time be used to enhance regional security and stability. The political rhetorics may lead to a gradual merging of these elements into a functioning whole, and pave the way to what can be labelled *cooperative security.*

These apparent changes in Arctic political values relate - directly or indirectly - to the NSR as the most pronounced economic activity area in the whole of the Arctic. Several possible/assumed changes are worth mentioning:

- the military grip on the utilization pattern of the NSR has been loosened,
- civil issue areas are given an independent and elevated position in relation to military priorities in national planning,
- the NSR has been opened up to international utilization and research,
- in a medium term perspective, the anticipated pressure on the NSR in relation to increased exploitation of resources located in areas adjacent to the route itself, may pose a challenge to the overall pan-Arctic goal to frame any utilization within the confines of sustainable development,
- the emerging regional cooperative structure stemming from regionalization, mobilization and civilianisation provides channels of communication to influence the various parties' political priorities concerning the use of the NSR,
- the NSR is the most likely and susceptible locality for pollution of varying magnitudes and effects in a short, medium and long term perspective.

The overall conclusion to be drawn thus far is that the national waterway of Russia is becoming international in its pattern of utilization, concern and impact. However, this should not be misinterpreted as implying that international cooperation will rule the day in the Arctic also in the years to come. Arctic politics are now in a period of transition - in a melting pot, being formed and framed in the tension field between the militarization of the Cold War and the cooperation of the present detente. These two opposing forces of contemporary politics make the recollection of the armaments race of the past coexist with the enhanced sense of peace in the present. Or put differently: The effects of the Cold War and the political manifestations of the new detente exist as two concurrent realities or historical periods in the present day Arctic.

There are two reasons for assuming that this situation may persist for some time. First, the transition from political confrontation to rapprochement does not in itself carry sufficient weight to overcome the geostrategic preconditions for militarization of a region belonging to an international system more volatile and anarchic than ever before. Thus, there is every reason to assume that the Arctic will play a significant role in preserving the strategic balance between the nuclear powers also in the foreseeable future. Second, the distinction made between civil and military security, implies the intention to preserve a concurrent and interactive existence between the two. As long as the international situation is not heading towards a crisis, the one may not be allowed to dominate or exclude the other.

Figure 1: The correlation between militarization and cooperation in the Arctic in the post-World War II period.



As seen from a Russian point of view, the Arctic Ocean is the only area offering strategic submarines direct access to the high seas without being forced to pass through confined waters controlled by other states. However, as of now, the possibility can not be completely ruled out that either of the two forces may gain the upper hand. If so, the regional conception of national security may be altered. So far, surprising correlations exist concerning the relationship between civil cooperation and militarization. As shown in figure 1, post-war Arctic history indicates that marginal militarization has been correlated with marginal cooperation and heavy militarization with improved incentives for collaboration.

If, down the road, the militarization of Arctic waters should increase, the effects on the international utilization of the NSR will not necessarily be damaging given the route's lack of strategic potential and military utility. In other words: As long as the distinction prevails between civil and military issue areas in Arctic security thinking, the NSR has a positive civil and negative military potential to be kept outside of the realm of a new militarization period. The question is: is this possible, and what will the relationship be between the declared goals/political rhetorics and actual needs of Arctic politics in the years to come?

CHAPTER 2

RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY 1945-96: THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE NSR

By Raphael Vartanov, Alexei Roginko and Vladimir Kolossov

Widely publicized Murmansk initiatives put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1987 have marked not only the beginning of the review process in the traditional Soviet Arctic policies, but a new understanding of the national security concept as well. In the course of the final years of the USSR existence these proposals, however, have been implemented only to a limited extent, and current perspectives of the new Russian policy in the Arctic still remain ambiguous.

At the time of writing, two major scenarios of Russian policy in this region seem possible. The first scenario involves a hard-line policy aimed at closing down the Russian Arctic from any international contacts, a refusal to review its "sectoral status" inherited from the Soviet era, a continuation and expansion of unrestricted exploitation of northern resources for the sake of deriving fast export profits, albeit with the participation of foreign capital, a preservation of the leading role of the state as the major (and quite often the sole) actor in all spheres of human activity, with an absolute priority assigned to military activities. The second scenario involves the implementation of the concept of "cooperative security" which links together the national security of a country and the region as a whole and is comprised of military, economic, environmental and political security components. A great deal would depend on the extent to which the Russian administration would be guided by a new military doctrine (1994) and the new concept of national security (1997), and how it would interpret the provisions of these documents, many of which are fairly ambiguous.

In the current chapter the authors attempt to analyze the probability of both scenarios, as well as the factors contributing to and counteracting the evolution of events according to each of them, their consequences for environmental security.

The first section explores the origins and the evolution of the Soviet concept of national security since the Second World War under the influence of new economic, social and environmental concerns and the increasing significance of the Arctic in this concept. The authors argue that before the final years of the existence of the Soviet Union, the views of Soviet strategic and economic planners on the Arctic have been somehow coherent, as all

developments in the area have been determined by closely intertwined military and "strategic" economic reasons.

In the second section, the authors examine the impact of the Soviet heritage and of the role of new geopolitical, domestic political, socio-economic factors, as well as of the emergence of new players and stockholders on the Russian policies toward the Arctic. They come to the conclusion that the importance of the Arctic to Russia has even increased when compared to the Soviet Union due to the weight of Northern regions in the Russian exports and to their role in military strategy and foreign economic relations. New trends in the evolution of the Russian Arctic would most likely lead to its increasing openness and to a more integral, organic and comprehensive understanding of national security in this region, thus strengthening the probability that the events will be developing according to the second, more "optimistic" scenario. At the same time, if the current policy of the Russian government aimed at pursuing short-term economic benefits is continued, this very trend can provoke detrimental and unpredictable consequences for the environment.

The third section demonstrates that the growing inclusion of the Russian Arctic into the world economy as a result of the commercial use of "old" and "new" natural resources can accelerate the degradation of the environment, and that the legacy of heavy militarization and dumping of radioactive wastes in the Soviet period under the conditions of the severe economic crisis aggravate the environmental threat to fragile Arctic ecosystems. The major preconditions to avoid the materialization of this threat are the improvement of the economic situation in the country as a whole, political decentralization and wider participation of the public, including indigenous ethnic groups, in the decision-making processes; of utmost importance is the cooperation with other Arctic countries which, apart from being a source of technical and financial assistance, contributes to the introduction of norms of civility into domestic Russian Arctic policies.

1. Evolution of Soviet Security Perceptions, 1945-1991, and Approaches Toward the Arctic

The Roots of Soviet Security Thinking and the Arctic

The basic principles of Soviet security thinking were shaped during the pre-World War II period. Three major objectives guided the development of security policy throughout the Soviet history:

- protection of the country's "most progressive" socio-political and economic system;
- strengthening the power and capabilities of Soviet armed forces; and
- strengthening the country's economic and industrial capacity.

Table 1: Priorities of the Soviet security thinking, 1922-1991.

Years	Priority number	Priority issue
1922-1939	1	Economic/Industrial
	2	Military
1939-1945	1	Military
	2	Economic/Industrial
1945-1991	1	Military
	2	Economic

In this context, the two latter objectives have been subordinate to the first one which played a leading role: Strengthening the defense capacity has been regarded as an essential prerequisite for the survival of the Soviet state as a stronghold of world social progress in the hostile "imperialist" environment, and the reinforcement of its economic and industrial power as a precondition for sustaining and strengthening its defense capacity. Despite the fact that the "iron curtain" was erected in the Soviet Union shortly after the revolution and the civil war, the USSR immediately after its establishment started a competition with the rest of the world in the fields of military technology, economy (or, rather, industrial development), science, education, etc.

Such an approach implied that all spheres of human activity, including the economy, became subordinate to the military machine of the state. The so-called "strategic," or military, targets had to be attained at any price, regardless of the costs involved: Throughout virtually the whole of Soviet history, all the resources of that vast country were mobilized for this purpose. The policy of industrialization which started in the twenties has been aimed primarily at the attainment of autarky - a resource and technological self-sufficiency, independence of the world economy in the name of supplying the growing armed forces with modern military technology. In the Soviet political mentality and lexicon, the term "strategic" has been applied to any sector of the economy which related (or even could be related in theory) to the interests of military-political leadership. As a result, not only military industry proper, but also such industries as, for example, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, oil and coal production as well as railroad and marine transportation, have been regarded as "strategic" ones. The railroad industry was even nicknamed "younger brother of the Red Army." The military-political-economic objectives were always paramount, as they embodied the basic ideological principle on which the Soviet society was built (Table 1).

Due to these reasons, economic reasons and factors of "mastering" the Arctic and other remote regions, which required colossal investments, have played a secondary role. Still, prior to World War II, the economic development of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route has always gone hand in hand with strategic, military tasks. It is no coincidence that the Northern Fleet was set up at the same time as the Northern Sea Route Administration (1932). In fact, the establishment of NSR, as well as the whole process of "mastering the Arctic" by the Soviets was to a very large extent motivated by strategic, defense considerations: The NSR was supposed to serve as a substitute for the Trans-Siberian railway in the event of its disruption as a result of military activities[166], linking the Soviet east and west coasts in a new way.[167] Since the pre-war period, the NSR has been considered by the Soviet decision makers to constitute an important element of the country's strategic capacity in the Arctic, and especially so after World War II. (In the eight years from 1932 to 1941, freight turnover at NSR ranged between 100,000 and 300,000 tons per year, and the number of ships employed ranged between about 40 and 150).[168] Another, probably no less important, motive was to support and to reinforce the Soviet claims for the "Arctic sector" by demonstrating the flag, by asserting presence in the northern lands and waters and by ensuring "effective occupation" of polar coasts and islands.[169] In short, as Terence Armstrong pointed out long ago, Soviet advances in the Arctic flowed from the nature of the Soviet system itself.[170]

Evolution of Security Priorities over the Post-war Period

The basic principles of the Soviet concept of national security have remained in force throughout the post-war period as well. At the same time, the new geopolitical position of the country, a breakthrough in military technology, the increasing need for natural resources, the involvement of new territorial "reserves" into economic and military expansion, and, finally,

---

166 See an interview with academician M. Vinogradov, *Izvestiya*, No. 28, February 12, 1994, p. 2.

167 This task has not materialized, however: Despite all efforts, the NSR has never taken on any great military/strategic importance as a link between the Pacific and the Atlantic (see Willy Østreng, "The Northern Sea Route: A New Era in Soviet Policy?," *Ocean Development and International Law*, 1991, Vol. 22, pp. 265-267).

168 Terence Armstrong, "A History of the Northern Sea Route," *International Challenges*, Vol. 12 No. 1, 1992, p. 38.

169 See Vladimir Trofimov, "Komu prinadlezhit Arktika? K voprosu o rossiyskikh granitsakh v severnykh moryakh," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, April 29, 1995, p. 1-2.

170 T. Armstrong, *The Northern Sea Route: Soviet Exploitation of the North East Passage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 173, cited by F. Griffiths, "The Arctic in the Russian Identity," in Brigham L. W. (ed.), *The Soviet Maritime Arctic* , Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1991, p. 102.

the accumulating social changes have necessitated the development of new approaches to the foreign policy in general and Arctic policies in particular.

After the Second World War, Soviet foreign policy became essentially global in orientation. The USSR had turned into a superpower, its foreign policy had acquired a global scope and was aimed at countering the West "on all azimuths." "Currently, there is probably not a single corner left on the globe, the situation where we, in one way or another, have to take into account when formulating our foreign policy," said Leonid Brezhnev in 1976 in his speech at the 25th Congress of the CPSU.[171]

The globalization of Soviet foreign policy has been inextricably linked to the appearance of *nuclear weapons and modernization of the means of their delivery*. Initially, a major role had been played by strategic bombers; their employment required the establishment of air bases in the closest possible proximity to the borders of the potential enemy; subsequently, the other two components of the emerging "strategic triad" - land-based ballistic missiles and SLBMs - came into forefront. Their deployment drastically changed the strategic role and geopolitical situation of many regions, and particularly the role of the Arctic.

The global ambitions in Soviet foreign policy brought about, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, *the unprecedented naval build-up and expansion of the sphere of Soviet naval activity*; that, in turn, has dramatically increased the strategic significance of Arctic ports which provided an unimpeded access for the Soviet navy to the world's oceans. The latter became essential to establishing the country's status as a superpower. In the course of this period, the transition of the Soviet Union "from a state possessing an insignificant navy and merchant marine and whose marine interests lay primarily in coastal waters into a state possessing a formidable naval capability, a major high seas fishing fleet and merchant marine, and worldwide maritime interests has been as unexpected as it was rapid."[172]

This shift toward a Soviet global-scale approach to security came to be reflected in the technical and practical goals and targets of the Arctic security policy, though the primary goal of protecting the "socialist motherland" (essentially, the Soviet socialist system) remained basically unchanged.

Since the end of World War II until the late 1960s, the main concern of the Soviet policy makers in ensuring international security for the Soviet Arctic was the protection of national

---

[171] *Materialy XXV S'ezda KPSS*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1976, p. 5.

[172] W. Butler, *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1971, p. 4.

borders in a wider sense, including first and foremost defense against US nuclear attack. (Since 1926 the Soviet borders in the Arctic were defined in very vague terms, according to the so-called sectoral principle which asserted that all land areas within the Soviet portion of the Arctic circumference were the legal territory of the USSR).[173]

If today the sea is clearly the most important security element in the Arctic, this has not always been the case: In the late 1940s and during the 1950s Arctic airspace was strategically more important than the northern waters. In the 1950s the strategic bomber was the dominant strategic delivery system, and Arctic airspace provided the shortest routes for attacking bombers. As a response, both sides started to develop their northern air defenses.[174] In the second half of the 1950s the Soviet Union has set up a series of radar installations along the entire Soviet Arctic coast and on several polar islands, comparable to the U.S. DEW line system, with both early warning and interceptor functions; a series of ice airfields has been constructed as well.[175]

With the advent of submarine-based ballistic missiles the Arctic became an area of SSBN deployment. The relatively short range of the first-generation SLBM missiles meant that in the early 1960s the northern waters became a patrolling area for the U.S. Polaris submarines and, from the late 1960s onwards, a transit area for the first Soviet credible SSBN type, the Yankee. Developments in SSBNs led the Soviets to the conclusion that the Soviet navy's ASW capabilities had to be improved since it was expected to protect Soviet SSBNs during their transit from the Kola bases to the coastal waters of North America. Thus SSBN survivability had become a Soviet strategic priority.[176]

With the development and eventual deployment of long-range SLBMs it became possible for the Soviet navy to maintain credible SSBN patrols in or near their home waters. The new Delta-class submarines armed with SS-N-8 missiles were able to reach targets in the continental USA and Western Europe without the need to transit from their home bases into the North Atlantic and thus without running the high risk of being detected and destroyed while passing through the GIUK gap. Moreover, the Northern Fleet had much better chances

---

[173] See E. Franckx, *Maritime Claims in the Arctic: Canadian and Russian Perspectives.* Dordrecht, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1993.

[174] Olli-Pekka Jalonen, "Russian naval strategy: The feasibility of non-offensive alternatives," in J. Käkonen (ed.), *Vulnerable Arctic: Need for an Alternative Orientation.* Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report No. 47, 1992, p. 14.

[175] G.E. Synhorst, "Soviet Strategic Interests in the Maritime Arctic," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1973, p. 93.

[176] Jalonen, *op. cit.*, p. 14-15.

of protecting their missiles submarines in areas closer to its own bases where land-based air cover was available. In the 1980s, the modernization of the submarine fleet has led to the introduction of Typhoon-class SSBNs with their first under-ice capability[177]. These developments have been generally viewed by the Soviets as a necessary consequence of the Soviet Union's ascendance to the role of the leading military power in Europe, and to a status equal to the United States on the global level. For other countries, however, and especially for those who feared Soviet military strength, these gave reason to look for ways and means to counter and offset the new maritime threat.[178]

The rapid growth of Soviet naval strength in the Arctic, and the establishment of a major Soviet naval base on the Soviet-Norwegian border on the Barents Sea, forced the NATO countries to respond. The neighboring countries had no doubt that this zone of military confrontation had not just a regional but a global significance: It has been recognized in Norway that "this huge [Soviet] naval power is not primarily directed against ... Norway," but "forms a part of the nuclear balance between superpowers." It was also clear, however, that "Norway could not remain indifferent to this development, as it took place in close proximity to Norwegian territory."[179] On the other hand, in the published Soviet literature of approximately the same period, the growing military capacity of the USSR in the Arctic was explained in terms of the need to respond to the military preparations of the NATO countries in Northern Europe, and especially in Norway, the only NATO country that borders the Soviet Arctic.[180]

It is during the post-war period, starting from the end of the 1940s, that another, particularly dangerous type of military activity in the Arctic has emerged. In the 1950s, the Novaya Zemlya archipelago became a unique Soviet testing ground for most powerful nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. During the period from 1949 to May 8, 1963, when the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union detonated 91 atmospheric nuclear explosions in the northern regions, 79 of which were on Novaya Zemlya, which became also the testing ground for the underground explosions that followed in subsequent years. For this

---

177 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

178 Finn Sollie, "The Soviet Challenge in Northern Waters," in K. Möttölä (ed.), *The Arctic Challenge: Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region.* Boulder & London, Westview Press, p. 88.

179 Willy Østreng " The Soviet Union in Arctic Waters..." p.1

180 See "Severnyi Ledovitiyi Okean i Mezhdunarodnaya Bezopasnost," in: *Geografiya Mirovogo Okeana: Severnyi Ledovityi i Yuzhnyi Okeany*, Leningrad, Nauka, 1985, p. 151.

reason, Novaya Zemlya has remained hermetically sealed for all except military personnel right up until today.[181]

Thus, changes in the Soviet approach toward the Arctic and Western responses initiated a dynamic of USSR countermeasures in response to Western countermeasures that *dramatically increased the militarization* of the Arctic and have transformed it into one of the major "fronts" in the Cold War. Of course, the main overall reason for the change in the strategic significance of the Arctic was the fact that the logic of confrontation between the USSR and the West could not but take advantage of the unique geography of this region for military purposes. Consequently, the Cold War divided the Arctic into East and West and made regionalization, or any other significant steps toward comprehensive cooperation, impossible for several decades. "The Arctic was changed socially, economically, politically and culturally by becoming a priority territory in the military strategy."[182]

For all these reasons, the Arctic has been viewed in the USSR primarily in terms of strategic interests, and this has produced a situation in which all issues concerning the region - including economic, social, and in some cases even cultural ones - have been shrouded in secrecy to a degree that is uncommon even by Soviet standards. Even non-military matters concerning the Arctic were discussed by a limited group of people within a special interdepartmental body (State Commission on Arctic Affairs), and all publications about any Arctic-related issues were subject to special censorship procedures.[183] Needless to say, Cold War tensions between the two superpowers effectively prevented any access of foreign researchers into the Soviet Arctic or almost any cooperation in any matters pertaining to the Arctic (with probably the only exception being the 1973 Polar Bear Conservation Agreement).

The atmosphere of military confrontation between the superpowers has contributed to the formation of a pervertedly "integrated" concept of security, where the links between the military and non-military issue areas were nearly absolute, with few distinctions, if any, being made between the two. Consequently, all activities in the Arctic that even marginally or

---

[181] Willy Østreng, 1991, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

[182] Lise Lyck, "Military Strategy and its Socio-Economic Consequences in the Arctic since World War II." Paper Presented at Aarhus University, October 25-28, 1993 at the Conference "Military Development and Socio-Cultural Change in the Arctic."

[183] This fact accounts for a virtual absence of any Soviet non-classified writings concerning Arctic security issues published prior to *perestroika.* Even the comprehensive monograph on the geography of the Arctic ocean published in 1985 (see "Severnyi Ledovitiyi Okean i Mezhdunarodnaya Bezopasnost," *op. cit.*) avoided any references to the Soviet security interests in the Arctic. The heavy censorship on "Arctic" publications was lifted only in 1988.

potentially could touch upon the interests of the other side were seen as an expression of conflict between East and West. The development of the Arctic and the use of the NSR fell prey to this hegemonistic approach, even though the military use of the NSR itself was at best minimal.[184]

Dynamic Interrelations among Political, Economic and Environmental Factors

Despite the obvious significance of military factors as a driving force for the development of the Soviet Arctic during the first two post-war decades, the key role in this process throughout the period was nonetheless played by "strategic" economic considerations. The economic importance of the Soviet North has been steadily growing, primarily as a region concentrating unique, even for the vast Soviet territory, deposits of minerals (e.g. Yakutian diamonds, polymetallic ores of Talnakh, etc.), as well as colossal fossil fuel (oil and natural gas) resources; the latter became ever more scarce, which justified investing enormous funds into their development even in the harsh northern environment. During the Cold War period, there were practically no contradictions between military and economic factors in the formulation of a security concept for the Arctic. A significant part of the natural resources developed, extracted and refined in the Soviet Arctic was consumed by the military industry, and the development of the Northern Sea Route - to provide transportation along the Arctic coast - was undoubtedly motivated by "strategic" economic arguments. The growing importance of the military as a leading component of Arctic security thinking (see Table 2) since the late 1960s was perceived by economic/resources actors in a very positive light. For economic/resources actors, it raised the prominence of Arctic policy within the political institutions of the country and created more opportunities to keep their activities behind closed doors.

Because of the unique importance of the Arctic component to security policy and arrangements, all Soviet leaders prior to Gorbachev kept not only the Arctic policy making but even their thinking process in a "highly organized context."[185] It was thus in the Arctic that "...the most accomplished specimens of the Soviet command system were created." Initially, the major players in the Arctic were the military and the military-industrial complex as a whole; however, as natural resources in the earlier-populated part of the country, in its southern and central European parts, started to get exhausted, and the mining industry began its gradual shift to the North, industrial ministries (particularly oil and gas and non-ferrous metals) that pursued their own specific aims, began to play an increasing role. They usually

---

[184] Willy Østreng, 1991, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[185] F. Griffiths, "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy-Making," in G. Skilling and F. Griffiths (eds.), *Interest Groups in Soviet politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 372.

Table 2: Priorities of the Soviet Arctic security thinking, 1922-1991.

Years	Priority number	Priority issue
1922-1939	1	Economic
	2	Military
1939-1945	1	Economic
	2	Military
1945-1960	1	Economic
	2	Military
1960-1986	1	Military
	2	Economic
1987-1991	1	Military
	2	Economic
	3	Environmental

achieved their objectives (extraction of oil, gas, non-ferrous metals' ores, gold, diamonds, etc.), but at a heavy social and environmental cost.[186] In the North, as a rule, even local Party committees, not to speak of the executive authorities (Soviets), have had incomparably smaller real powers compared to wealthy and powerful mining enterprises, which were the sovereign masters not just of the industry itself, but of the greater part of the "social sphere," of many northern towns and settlements. As a result, the "mastery" of the North was dominated by narrow industrial interests, while the interests of the northern natives and environmental issues have been left far at the background. Even today, the inertia of this deeply rooted approach and the important role still played by the "red directors" and politicians maintaining the old "Soviet" mentality, increase the chances that the situation in the Arctic could develop according to the first scenario.

When there began to appear in the literature, in the mid-1980s, accounts of economic development practices, environmental degradation, and long-existing problems with indigenous peoples in the Arctic, there were many, including scholars, who were stunned. The rigid administration system controlling financial, material and labor resources had the backing of regional Communist Party committees and left no room for democratic institutions.

As a result of the policy of *perestroika* and the Chernobyl disaster, Russian environmental policy has finally begun to change and to redress the "ecocide" that was part and parcel of the

[186] Alexander Granberg, "The Northern Sea Route and the Policy of New Russia," *International Challenges*, 1992, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 7.

communist regime. New concepts, such as licensing and charging for resource use and setting fines for pollution, were introduced. Other significant changes have included a shift to decentralized environmental management, environmental impact assessments of industrial projects, and the introduction of litigation procedures for environmental damage.[187] The use of the term "environmental security" by scholars and politicians became more frequent, and this concept has been gaining in popularity. As a result, beginning from the mid-1980s, there occurred a "substantial change in the correlation of developmentalism and preservation as the latter began to influence Soviet Arctic policies directly."[188]

A reflection of these trends in governmental policy was the adoption, on 26 November 1984, of the Edict "On Strengthening the Protection of Nature in the Areas of the Far North and the Sea Areas Adjoining the Northern Coasts of the USSR." This edict declared governmental endorsement of the creation of the protected territories in the Arctic (reserves and sanctuaries) and stipulated that navigational vessels and other floating facilities within the sea reserves and other specially protected territories may operate only via the sea lanes established by the competent Soviet authorities, the appropriate information being provided according to an established procedure.[189]

In addition to the growing perception of environmental problems and the awakening of environmental consciousness, the 1984 edict reflected a growing interest among some Arctic policy-makers in the USSR to investigate opportunities to use "environmental instruments" to preserve control over marine coastal areas. These two sets of interests prompted cooperation between very different groups: environmentalists and sophisticated politicians and policy analysts who were closely integrated into the official governmental structures.

Since the late 1970s, some Russian scholars (primarily international lawyers) had begun to look very favorably on the example of the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Act, which was adopted in 1970 and established shipping safety control zones, prescribing certain standards of construction, navigational aids, manning, pilotage and icebreaker assistance to prevent vessel-

---

[187] V. Kotov and E. Nikitina, "Russia in Transition: Obstacles to Environmental Protection," *Environment*, 1993, Vol. 35, No. 10, p. 11.

[188] Griffiths F. "The Arctic in the Russian Identity," in Brigham L. W. (ed.), *The Soviet Maritime Arctic* , Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1991, p. 103-104.

[189] For a detailed description and discussion of the Edict, see chapters 5 and 14 by A. Roginko and William Butler in *The Soviet Maritime Arctic, op. cit.*

source pollution of the Canadian Arctic and thus to realize the Canadian sovereignty claims without generating official protests on the part of other states.[190]

In addition, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention placed special emphasis on the Arctic Ocean. Initiated by the Canadian delegation, under Article 234 the Convention granted the coastal states bordering the Arctic Ocean the authority to adopt and enforce laws and regulations for the prevention and control of marine pollution by vessels in the Arctic. The fact that the United Sates objected to such broad Canadian jurisdiction in the Arctic was at the time an attractive reason for the Soviet government to consider attentively the Canadian approach as a means to secure its own interest in the Arctic. The more troublesome aspect of such an approach was the issue of whether the Soviet fleet itself could comply with such strict regulations[191].

By the mid-1980s, environmental issues relating to the Arctic were just beginning to surface in discussions of scholars and among a relatively broad group within the intermediate level of the Soviet elite. These discussions, in the context of Arctic policy formulation, underscored the need for more information and paved the way for a new era of Soviet Arctic policy.

The Murmansk Initiatives and the New Political Thinking

The final period of Soviet Arctic policy reflected the general changes in Soviet society, as well as an objective necessity to formulate the new approaches towards the development of Arctic policies, bringing them in line with the new political thinking, which emphasized the priority of common human (universal) values over class values.

The Murmansk initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev no doubt represented a challenge to the status quo in the region, to the *realpolitik* of the region's states and, first and foremost, to the previous Arctic policy of the USSR. The radical shift in policy by the USSR, as the largest Arctic-rim country, had a definite impact on the Arctic policy of other states in the region.

---

190 See, e.g., Barsegov Yu. G., "Osobennosti mezhdunarodno-pravovogo rezhima," in *Geografiya Mirovogo Okeana: Severnyi Ledovityi i Yuzhnyi Okeany*, Leningrad, Nauka, 1985, p. 155.

191 In the late eighties, observers have noted an almost total lack of waste oil reception facilities in place at Russian arctic ports; nor have adequate oil spill contingency plans been established in the Arctic in the event of an accidental release along the NSR (see Latukhov S.V. "Transportnoie ispol'zovanie Severnogo Morskogo Puti i zagryaznenie Arktiki," in *Geoekologiya Mirovogo okeana*, Leningrad, 1990, p. 127-128). There are no reasons to believe that the situation has significantly improved (if not deteriorated) since then.

In his Murmansk speech, Gorbachev called for an "Arctic zone of peace." He formulated a six-point program for international cooperation in the area: the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, limiting naval activities in the adjacent seas; peaceful cooperation in the exploitation of Arctic resources; the advancement of scientific research in the Arctic; cooperative measures for protecting the environment; and the opening of the Northern Sea Route for international transit.

The Murmansk speech has signaled a departure from the "integrated" security concept characteristic of the Cold War period, by singling out non-military issue areas and separating them from military ones.[192] For the first time, a real alternative to the old Soviet approach to the Arctic based on the priority of military-"strategic" interests was officially proclaimed by the leader of the state, and the prerequisites for the development along the second scenario implementing the principles of "cooperative security" were created. Based on an understanding that economic development and environmental protection are both, in considerable measure, contingent upon controlling the arms race, it has reflected a recognition that Soviet security, economic, scientific and environmental goals in the North depend increasingly upon cooperation with the West across the spectrum of these issues, and that prospects for progress in one area are conditioned to some degree by progress in the others.[193]

Now that almost ten years have passed since the Murmansk speech, one can criticize the inconsistency with which the Murmansk goals have been pursued or enthusiastically proclaim that a new era has emerged in Arctic activities, cooperation and politics. What is important, at any rate, is that since 1987 Arctic international cooperation has progressed more than during the previous 70 years of the Soviet state. Bilateral agreements have been concluded with Norway, the United States, Canada, and Finland. With an active support from the Soviet Union, the International Arctic Science Committee was established at the conference held in St. Petersburg/Leningrad. The Soviet Union was an active participant in the process of creating a comprehensive regime for the protection of the Arctic environment spearheaded by the Finnish Rovaniemi initiative. With the formation of the Northern Forum, essential barriers were removed that prevented cooperation between native peoples of the Soviet Arctic and those of the neighboring countries. The Arctic became an active sector of Soviet foreign policy; embodying the principles of the new political thinking, the Murmansk Initiative had a significant impact on the domestic policy priorities of the USSR in the Arctic.

---

192 Willy Østreng, 1991, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

193 David Scrivener, *Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech: The Soviet Initiative and Western Responses*, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1989, p. 17.

The Soviet leadership (especially Russian leadership, during the last two years of the USSR's existence) realized the necessity of securing multiple interests in the Arctic. In previous years, the sphere of interests had been limited to strategic factors, resources and, to some extent, scientific interests. After the Murmansk initiative, the USSR domestic policy was marked by a clear shift of priorities toward the social domain. Since the end of the 1980's, the whole complex of military, environmental, scientific, economic, and social factors has been taken into account in formulating Soviet Arctic policy.

Immediately after Gorbachev's Murmansk speech, many researchers were very optimistic as to radical changes occurring in the Arctic policy, and became rather disappointed in the course of time. This was not unforeseen, since changes in Soviet Arctic policies had not been prepared by a steady evolution of Arctic affairs; the Murmansk initiative emerged as a challenge to all former Arctic policies. That is why, only a few years after the declaration of the Murmansk initiative, the real priorities of the USSR policy in the Arctic were markedly different from the policies declared in Murmansk. The military component was still accorded primary priority, due to the pre-existing tradition and the enduring political power structure.[194]

It would, therefore, be an exaggeration to state that a new security concept was applied in the Arctic before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, or even that a new Soviet Arctic policy was developed. The most that can be said is that the previous concept was recognized as unworkable, and that Murmansk has opened the way for a "new political thinking" in the Arctic. The probability of the development along the lines of the first, "pessimistic," scenario still remains even after ten years since the Murmansk initiatives.

2. Arctic Security Thinking Within the Current Political Process in Russia

The future of Russian politics in the Arctic is determined, on the one hand, by the burden of the Soviet legacy and, on the other, by new constraints which have appeared since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These include:

- a new geopolitical setting in the world as a whole, in Europe and in the Arctic;
- the complex of domestic factors:
    - the balance between different political forces on the domestic political scene;
    - the perceptions of the notions of national security and military strategy by the the political forces in power;
    - the economic crisis and perspectives of economic reforms;

---

[194] R.V.Vartanov, "Commentary Article: The Arctic: One of Many Concerns of the New Russian Decision-Makers," *International Challenges*, 1992, Vol. 12, No. 3.

- the social situation in Northern regions, the willingness and the ability of the state to control the development of regions with harsh natural conditions;
- the process of federalization and the preoccupation of central authorities with the problems of the integrity of the Russian political, economic and legal space, the relationship between federal authorities charged with the affairs of the Arctic, their institutional organization and regional administrations;

– international factors of regional security in the Russian Arctic.

A Geopolitical Setting and the Role of the Arctic in the New Russian State

The collapse of the Warsaw Treaty organization, the withdrawal of half a million Soviet troops from East Central Europe and the political implosion of the USSR at the end of 1991 constituted a "geopolitical earthquake" - in the words of the former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, "a tectonic shift, a global change in the world's political landscape."[195]

The Russian Federation which has emerged is an historically new polity, in resource terms represents 76 per cent of the area and 60 per cent of the population of the former Soviet Union, but accounts for no more than 50 per cent of the former Soviet GNP[196] - simply due to a huge proportion of sparsely populated northern territories. First of all, what does the term "North" mean for Russia? Obviously, the Russian North is more "northern" compared to most other countries. Its boundaries are often drawn by using physical-geographical criteria (the isotherm of 0 degrees Celsius, the boundary of permafrost, etc.), but the administrative boundaries remain especially important, delimiting "the Far North and regions equated to it" from the rest of the country. These boundaries have appeared and have been many times modified in the course of the Soviet period as more and more territories received privileges in material supplies and the right to use the so-called "northern coefficients" - special rates applied to wages and salaries agreed for such areas. Anyway, according to any criteria, Russia is a much more "northern" country as compared to the former USSR.

The Arctic continues to be the leading source of a number of very important industrial resources - as much as 80% of total supply in some cases - and there is every reason to believe that the Arctic will retain its role as the energy and mineral base of the Russian economy in both the short and long terms even in the event of increased energy and material conservation. There is no alternative to northern resources since they will be replacing deposits in the more

---

[195] Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: a chance for survival," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1992, p. 1.

[196] Andrei Nikolayev, "Military Aspects of Russia's Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 10, October 1993, p. 2.

developed central and southern regions of Russia as the latter peter out. Oil, gas, metal and timber exports will also remain highly efficient in economic terms.[197]

In geostrategic terms, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of post-Soviet independent republics have strengthened the importance of the Arctic and Pacific maritime facades for Russia. In the west, Russia has lost the greater part of its coastline and was thrown back to its geographical situation of the eighteenth century. In order to understand the importance of this loss, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the USSR has always lacked port capacities and has been obliged to pay annually $50-100 million extra for using expensive railroads to cover its needs in international transportation and has even processed five million tons in the ports of Finland. In 1993, Russian transit via the ports of the "near abroad" was estimated to be at least 50 million tons. The cost of this transit to Russia was about $780 million, in addition to a portion of the goods transported. Moreover, four out of five Russian naval bases on the Baltic Sea are now located abroad, as well as twelve other bases out of sixteen, in addition to 64 per cent of military ship repair capacities. The situation on the Black Sea is even more dramatic for Russia. Almost 90 per cent of the former Soviet navy in this basin was located in the Crimea and three other Southern Ukrainian regions. Their re-establishment on Russian territory will take at least 15 years and will cost more than $1 trillion. It is doubtful whether under present economic conditions Russia could allow itself to spend such sums. All these developments taken together have dramatically increased the importance of its only non-freezing maritime gateway to the Arctic - the ports on the Kola Peninsula.

Impact of Domestic Political, Socio-economic and Military Factors

National Security and the Choice between Democracy and Authoritarianism

The outlook for the Arctic legal regime will depend to a great extent on the future developments in Russia, on that country's ability to deal with pressing domestic economic and social concerns. Ultimately, the scenario for development of the situation in the Russian Arctic will be determined by political choices, by the course the country as a whole will follow: whether nationalistic-patriotic tendencies will prevail, or the politics of further integration into the world community and democratization will be pursued.

Many of the events of the past few years were apparently not very conducive to the progressive re-assessment of the Russian Arctic policy. "Since the end of 1993, sentiments in the spirit of Russian nationalistic self-assertion began to grow stronger; also, politicians and

[197] A. Granberg, 1992, *op. cit.*, p.12-13.

analysts have not only begun to separate the external national interests of Russia and its mission in the world from those of western democracies, but to increasingly set them off to each other." At times, depending on the domestic political fluctuations, "non-acceptance of various "universal values," norms of international law and other "idealist" principles as political guidelines was growing; simplistic and pragmatic geopolitical approaches were gaining in popularity."[198]

It is not by chance that members of the military (as individuals and sometimes in concert) have become very active in the political process, usually unified under the common "patriotic" or "power" (*derzhavnyi*) themes. Active-duty and former military personnel were running for political office in increasing numbers. In the December 1995 election campaigns to the Parliament, the Defense Ministry identified more than 1,000 candidates who represented the military-industrial complex, veterans' organizations, and military pensioners. However, it seems unlikely that the military would attempt to seize political power by force, although some analysts do not exclude the possibility of their taking radical measures.

The problem of Russia's self-identity that became especially pressing in the course of the 1996 presidential campaign, has a direct bearing upon at least the two key issues in formulating the Russian approaches to the Arctic: the identification of national interests and security policy in this area and the future of the so-called Russian sector inherited by the new Russian state from the Soviet Union.

Competing perceptions of ***national security interests*** are to be expected at a time when democratic institutions are new and uncertain and political parties, movements, and pressure groups are proliferating. Although these conditions present opportunities for decision makers to forge a new consensus on national security, it would be a mistake to overestimate the prospects. The various political forces are so polarized (on both domestic and international issues), and the willingness to cooperate is sometimes so weak that it is very difficult to imagine such a consensus being achieved by those currently in power or even by others who may come to power in the near future. Thus, the summary of priorities presented in Table 3 should not be interpreted as a consensus on current security thinking in Russia (which does not exist), but as an assessment based on recent political decisions and attitudes of the current political leadership.

Currently in Russia it is very difficult to identify consensus as to the definition and the components of national security, either among the Russian population in general or within the ruling circles. The definition of the term "security of the nation" (or "national security") has

---

[198] A. Arbatov, "Rossiya: natsional'naya bezopasnost' v 90-e gody," *MEiMO*, 1994, No. 7, p.10.

Table 3: Priorities of the security thinking in the Russian Federation, 1995.

Priority number	For the country as a whole	For the Arctic
1	Economic	Economic
2	Integrity of the country	Military
3	Military	Environmental

appeared in the official documents of the Russian Federation just recently.[199] A "Concise glossary of special terms for the commanding officers of the armed forces of the Russian Federation" describes "security of the state, national" as the "state of affairs that ensures the protection of vitally important interests of the state and of the civil society in economic, political, military, environmental, humanitarian and other fields."[200] This definition, however, was not integrated into the process of security thinking of those civilian experts and politicians who participated in the process of decision making in the security field.[201]

Finally, in May 1996, the draft document entitled "National Security Policy of the Russian Federation (1996-2000)," prepared in the apparatus of the National Security Advisor to the President, was published - first in a brief critical account, and later as a full text.[202] This document declared an individual to be a key element of the system of values, his rights and freedoms as a supreme value, and the achievement by each person and by each family of an adequate standard and quality of life as the main national objective for 1996-2000. At the same time, in respecting the secular Russian tradition and claiming to take into account

---

[199] The very notion of "national security" was first mentioned in Russia in 1989 at one of the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when the Supreme Soviet authorized a group of academicians headed by the Chairman of the Committee for Science and Technology, Yuri Ryzhov (currently Russian ambassador to France) to work out the basic provisions and concepts of national security. That was when a broader approach to the very notion of national security was officially adopted, and it came to comprise not only military and "special" aspects, but also economic, cultural and environmental security (see V. Litovkin, "Kontseptsiyu natsionalnoi bezopasnosti kritikuyut experty, no khvalit prezident," *Izvestiya*, May 8, 1997).

[200] *Kratkiy slovar' spetsial'nykh terminov dlia rukovodiashchego sostava vooruzhennykh sil Rossiyskoi Federatsii (KSST)*. Moscow, 1994, p. 9, cited in Zhinkina I. Yu., "O poniatii 'bezopasnost gosudarstva'," *SShA: EPI*, 1995, No. 9, p. 58.

[201] I. Zhinkina, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[202] "Politika natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii (1996-2000)," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 23, 1996, No. 93 (Supplement).

aspirations of all political forces, which manifested themselves during the 1995 electoral campaign and in the outcome of the elections to the State Duma, the authors paid much attention to the role of the state and to the state-building. They followed the example of the U.S. national security doctrine in assuming that this notion is based on the triad "defense of the people, of the territory and of the way of life." But it is not clear from the document what the term "the national territory of Russia" means and, in particular, whether the Arctic sector is a part of it, what is understood by the term "a way of life" in a multi-ethnic Russian state (which bears a direct relation to the problem of minor indigenous peoples of the North).

Hence the new comprehensive national security policy is still in the process of development.[203] Moreover, it is only barely possible to identify the primary stakeholders among the major governmental entities, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Security Council, the newly-formed Defense Council, and, to some extent, the President's Office. Today the formulation of security policy in Russia tends to be reactive rather than proactive or preventive. Even if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, should reach some type of consensus within its own ranks on a given issue, recent experience suggests that it will nonetheless reach an impasse with the Ministry of Defense or the Parliament.

Should the current leadership, in a populist move, assume a more nationalistic stance or, moreover, should democracy in Russia fail, the new leadership is likely to advance the ***sectoral principle*** more aggressively than when the Russian parliament declared its jurisdiction over all the resources within its territory, the adjoining continental shelf, and the 200-mile EEZ. Any possible alternative to democratic government (communists or ultranationalists) will pursue the territorial ambitions of the former USSR, when the Arctic sector was perceived very much as a part of the territory of the country. Under democratic scenarios of future development, Russia is more likely to secure its economic interests (especially those related to its rights on mineral and fish resources) in the Arctic Ocean by elaborating a new approach towards an international legal regime, but will support joint

---

[203] On May 7, 1997 the Security Council, headed by the President, has finally approved the Russian concept of national security. However, the document itself has been classified and it is unclear whether it would be made public. Still, it became known that this very compact (30 pages) document confirms the priority of the individual's security over the security of the society, declares that domestic non-military threats, such as crime, corruption, regional separatism and mass poverty, pose the main danger to Russia's security, and urges "strengthening Russian federalism," promoting economic growth and building "public concord" as the main directions for reviving Russia as a global power (see V. Litovkin, *op. cit.*; I. Bulavinov, "Odobrena kontseptsiya natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossii," *Kommersant-Daily*, May 8, 1997).

cooperative approaches and will work together with its neighbors on removing obstacles to such a cooperation.

Several analysts, referring to a presumed lack of "independent space"[204] for the development of Russia in a new geopolitical situation, have put forward the idea of the Russian Far North serving as a last stronghold of Russia, the only vast "independent space" where Russia's positions were still unshakable.[205] Not surprisingly again, the Russian North was defined in a "traditional" sense as a "part of Russia including the Arctic sector" with a vertex at the North Pole and a total area of about ten million square kilometers, with historically established and consequently consolidated in "appropriate documents" political and legal regime based on a sectoral principle, i.e. on the "fact of this sector belonging to Russia." The obvious policy recommendation for the Russian authorities was to "display firmness" when confronted with the attempts to change the status quo, such as "repeated visits of the US submarines to Russian northern coasts."[206]

The idea of a Soviet polar sector that allegedly protected and secured the USSR's interests in the Arctic and that was very attractive to the Soviet political, military, and even academic circles, has been neither officially denounced nor reaffirmed; neither was it elaborated to respond to the new opportunities in ocean space and resource usage. Despite many radical changes in Russia's international policy since Gorbachev's *perestroika* was introduced, including new approaches to the Arctic and the development of international Arctic cooperation, the sectoral principle still has not been reconsidered. It would appear that it survives attacks by its critics because of its centrality to the political traditions of the past, its compatibility with today's growing nationalist sentiment, and, not least, because of the preoccupation of Russian decision makers with other problems, which has caused them to leave Arctic problems to be handled on the working level by the same people who dealt with them throughout the Soviet era.

Hardly anybody would argue that the sectoral principle, despite its rather long history (since 1926), was insufficiently elaborated as it did not take into account the development of

---

[204] This geopolitical concept, obviously associated with the process of erosion of Russian sovereignty in its constituent territories and with centrifugal tendencies within the Federation, was not sufficiently clarified conceptually, but was nevertheless surprisingly similar in essence to a well-known Haushofer's concept of *lebensraum* which served as a theoretical basis for the expansion of the Third Reich.

[205] See Ilya Mogilevkin, "Arktika kak posledniy oplot Rossii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 25 1994, p. 3.

[206] *Ibid.*

economic activities in the Arctic, their expansion under the ice cover, in the air, offshore, and even in underwater spaces. Today there is an apparent need to define more precisely the correlation of the sectoral principle with the provisions of the contemporary law of the sea and to reconsider radically the whole international legal regime of the Arctic. This process might go either through specific international arrangement (intergovernmental conferences, international task forces, etc.) or as an empirical process via discussions on different levels of interrelationships among Arctic rim countries, and especially the five circumpolar states.

Luckily, more sober voices are heard in Russia as well: A prominent international lawyer, the former head of the apparatus of the State Duma Committee on international affairs contends that real arguments in support of the "Soviet polar sector" concept simply do not exist. "The concept of the Arctic sector as a part of the state territory has collapsed due to many reasons: the adoption of Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and, later on, of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, due to international practice, the non-recognition by other states, due to the fact that other circumpolar states have given up the sectoral principle, etc. It is only the Soviet political inertia that remained unsinkable. Nobody had yet enough courage to admit that sectoral claims are not only groundless, but sometimes are harmful as well."[207] At the same time, a renunciation of the "Soviet sector" concept does not equate to non-application of sectoral lines as such, which can be successfully used for the delimitation of maritime borders in the Arctic.[208]

In sum, security thinking and policy formulation with respect to the Arctic in Russia are characterized by a growing number of stakeholders, a lack of a developed decision-making process, and a long and difficult path to consensus on many of the key issues. There is only one point on which virtually all parties agree: namely, that Russia's pressing economic problems are of overriding importance to the nation's security. These same problems are playing a decisive role in determining the scale of the Russian military presence in the Arctic, and the Russian leadership is viewing Arctic strategic issues primarily in the light of its economic priorities, and not vice versa, as previously.

---

[207] Vladimir Trofimov, "Komu prinadlezhit Arktika? K voprosu o rossiyskikh granitsakh v severnykh moryakh," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, April 29 1995, p. 1-2.

[208] For example, this principle has been used in the 1990 USSR-USA Maritime Boundary Agreement and is being used by Russia at the negotiations commenced by the USSR in 1974 with Norway on the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf in the Barents Sea (see L.Timchenko "The International Legal Regime of the Arctic and Trends of its Development," a paper submitted to International Conference on Military Development and Socio-Cultural Change in the Arctic, Aarhus University, October 25-28, 1993).

Role of Military Factors in Shaping Security Perceptions

In military terms, Russia is still one of the most powerful nations in the world. The Russian army is nearly as large as that of the United States and has three to four times the strength of the largest army among America's European allies. Under the existing agreements, Russia will maintain parity with the US in nuclear warheads, and in terms of conventional armaments it is the strongest country in Europe. In a hypothetical confrontation with NATO that includes the countries of Eastern Europe, however, the situation is clearly not in Russia's favor.[209] Whereas the military balance in 1989 favored the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe over NATO by a factor of 2.7 to 1, in the mid-1990s this balance has shifted dramatically in favor of the West, by a factor of 4.5 to 1.[210] Based on this assessment, Russian security analyst Alexei Arbatov concludes that Russia should do its best to prevent the formation of a broad coalition against it. We would add that this obvious military disadvantage also argues for enhancing the channels of cooperation with the West to develop other than military means to ensure Russia's international security standing.

There is no doubt that the Russian navy still represents a formidable force as well. However, by the late 1980s it had already become clear that the Gorshkov era of naval expansion was coming to an end. The Gorbachev years saw a reduction in naval shipbuilding, a cut-back in out-of-area exercises and ship days at sea, and a selling or scrapping of excess vessels - largely older units having a limited utility[211]. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, acute budgetary constraints in Russia, the block obsolescence of a large number of vessels, the collapse or conversion of many of Russia's warship building yards and the loss of the shipyards in the Ukraine ensured that not a single new construction commenced in 1992. Since then, the number of warships has decreased almost twice (from 1,000 to 540 units) and the strength of naval aviation - by over 60 per cent (down to about 900 aircraft). Personnel numbers have been reduced from 457,200 to 230,000, and the warship crews are manned to 65 to 70 per cent of the complement.

---

209 This assessment has been made by Russian security analyst A. Arbatov, on the basis of data provided by D. Krawford (A.Arbatov. "Rossiya: Natsional'naya bezopasnost' v 90-e gody." *MEiMO*, 1994, No. 8-9, p. 11-12).

210 *Ibidem.*

211 See Gael D. Tarleton, "Red Star of the Sea: the Soviet Navy and Strategic Policy," in D. Leebaert and T. Dickinson (eds.), *Soviet Strategy and the New Military Thinking* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 127-153.

Since 1990, no new nuclear ballistic missile submarines have been completed, and only one SSBN (the fourth generation Severodvinsk-class) has been laid.[212] Construction of nuclear submarines has been halted at three of the four yards that formerly had this task.[213] Although in the future some warship building programs will continue, notably the production of general purpose nuclear and diesel submarines, the Russian Navy looks likely to be reduced by one third in size and one fifth in tonnage by the year 2000. Total submarine forces, in particular, look likely to be halved, whilst the arms reductions stipulated by the START-1 and START-2 treaties will reduce the force of 55 to approximately 17.[214]

Still, as the Russian naval power set to shrink, two of the navy's chief missions - to provide protection for the remaining SSBNs and for the homeland - look likely to become more rather than less important, since START-1 and START-2 will enhance the importance of the Russian strategic missile fleet, two-thirds of which are deployed from the home bases of the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula. As a consequence of these priorities, the Northern Fleet looks set to retain its key strategic importance; moreover, it would probably have to assume some of the former missions of the Baltic and the Black Sea Fleets.[215]

An outstanding strategic significance of the Northern Fleet for Russian military security is reflected in a new concept of the so-called "Northern strategic bastion" which provides for the concentration of a major part of the national sea-based nuclear forces in the northern seas, the only area where the Russian navy still enjoys a competitive advantage.[216] This concept also

---

212 Despite the issuance, in June 1995, of a special Presidential decree No. 567 "On urgent measures to support the combat readiness of strategic naval nuclear forces," government has practically stopped the financing of the naval component of Russian strategic nuclear forces, with no funds allocated for SSBN's maintenance and repair either in 1995 or in 1996 budgets (O. Yerofeyev, "Morskaya sostavliayushchaya yadernoi triady," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, March 14, 1996).

213 Valeriy Aleksin, Eduard Shevelev. "VMF v obespechenii natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossii," *NG — Nezavisimoye voyennoe obozreniye*, October 24, 1996, p. 4.

214 See *The Military Balance 1992-3* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 91-92; Admiral Felix Gromov, "Reforming the Russian Navy," *Naval Forces*, Vol. XIV, No. IV, 1993, p. 6-12.

215 K. Pleshakov, "Mirovoy okean i Andreevskiy flag," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 11-12, 1995, p. 65.

216 According to Russian naval experts, this advantage is based on the specific design features of Russian SSBNs (capabilities to launch missiles from high latitudes and to break ice cover) as well as on the existence of heavy ice cover in the Arctic seas, that ensures the submarines' adequate protection from enemy ASW aircraft and space surveillance, and provides for their high combat stability (V. Aleksin, E. Shevelev, *op. cit.*).

involves a considerable strengthening of air defenses and ASW capabilities in the area, including the development of a system of underwater surveillance. Although the new concept is considered to be classified and has never been announced officially, its approval by the Russian leadership is indirectly confirmed by the fact that virtually all Russian naval innovations have recently been Arctic-oriented. For example, it was announced that the newest and largest missile cruiser "Pyotr Velikiy" would join the Northern Fleet (although previously it was supposed to be assigned to the Pacific); the only remaining Russian aircraft carrier, "Admiral Kuznetsov," has also been lately assigned to the North.[217]

In the Arctic, the Russian territory can be attacked by the Tomahawk-type cruise missile from the Arctic Ocean or the Norwegian Sea, where the aggressor can be countervailed only by submarines and naval aviation. Also, in accordance with the Russian defensive doctrine, the Russian navy should be capable of exercising naval supremacy in the offshore coastal zones, e.g. in the Barents and the Kara Seas. This is required to ensure combat stability, i.e. to protect Russian missile submarines from their destruction by the enemy. This mission cannot be effectively accomplished without an adequate submarine fleet.[218]

Additionally, the emphasis in Russia's new defense doctrine on the need for mobile rapid-deployment forces will nonetheless demand an adequate naval capability in view of the inherent flexibility and mobility of sea power. Much attention is consequently being given to developing rapid reaction forces composed of both airborne and naval infantry units.[219] A similar mission has also been assigned to the Northern Fleet, which should have, "within its structure, mobile forces, units of naval infantry, units of transport and ground support aircraft operating from aircraft carriers, supported by ASW ships, in order to be able to... deal with emergencies and to re-distribute troops swiftly and efficiently in local conflicts."[220]

Compared to 1989, the number of naval vessels in the Northern Fleet has declined by over 40 per cent. In addition, numerous ships have been mothballed, including many nuclear submarines. Still, those reductions have not resulted, as is claimed by the Fleet Commander,

---

[217] Georgi Sobolev, "Bezopasnost' Rossii budet opiratsia na 'Severnyi strategicheskiy bastion'," *Segodnia*, November 6, 1996, p. 3.

[218] Gennadyi Voronin, "Kakoi podvodnyi flot nuzhen Rossii?," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 29, 1994, p. 3.

[219] Roy Allison, *Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States*, Adelphi Paper No. 280, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 30-32.

[220] Oleg Yerofeev, "Reformirovat' nado. Razrushat' — nel'zia! Severnyi flot dolzhen byt' sokhranen kak moshchnoe operativno-strategicheskoe ob'edinenie," *NG — Nezavisimoye voyennoe obozreniye*, April 22, 1995, p. 4.

in a decline in its operational capabilities: For example, the number of ASW ships has decreased twice, but the effectiveness of the fleet ASW forces has increased 1.5 times due to the fact that only modern ships have remained. At the same time, due to arbitrary decisions made "at the top," the Fleet has lost a group of long-range ASW aircraft; there are indications in the media of a possible sale of the large ASW cruiser *Admiral Flota Gorshkov* to India; the issue of reducing another aircraft group with relatively modern planes is under consideration. What is probably even more alarming, is that during the past few years, the time of combat patrolling by the Northern Fleet submarines has decreased by a factor of four to five.[221]

The Northern Fleet, like the whole of the Russian armed forces, is plagued with persistent economic problems. It lacks the funds to carry out the necessary servicing and maintenance on its operational submarines; subsequently, many of them have to remain in port.[222] The Fleet Commander asserted that the lack of ship maintenance led to an inability to fulfill the Fleet tasks assigned by the present military doctrine.[223] In 1994, only 35% of the funds earmarked for the Northern Fleet, were actually transferred. In 1995, due to high inflation, its entire annual budget was spent within the first six months of the year, forcing severe cutbacks on the operation and maintenance of ships and naval bases.[224] In 1996, the Northern Fleet received only 14.4% of the earmarked budget funding.[225] Payment of wages was frequently delayed for several months, and this resulted in naval officers refusing to go to sea on patrol duty. At times, even the nuclear submarines had been sent out on patrol without the full complement of officers.[226]

At present, the Northern Fleet is unable to pay for the services formerly provided by the state. Many of the companies and shipyards servicing the Fleet receive no economic assistance from the state either, and are trying to survive according to the economic principles of the free market. Due to lack of financing, much of the former activity has come to a standstill. As a result, the yard infrastructure is slowly falling apart. Subsequently, safety levels in the maintenance of both operational and inactive submarines are being compromised. The

---

221 *Ibid.*

222 *The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination.* Bellona Report nr 2:96, Chapter 1.

223 Oleg Yerofeev, *op. cit.*

224 *The Russian Northern Fleet, op. cit.*, Chapter 1.

225 Olga Podkolzina, "Yadernymi otkhodami rossiyskogo Severa prikhoditsia zanimatsia vsem mirom," *Finansovye izvestiya*, May 20, 1997, p. VIII.

226 *The Russian Northern Fleet, op. cit.*, Chapter 1.

Northern Fleet total debt to the shipyards exceeds 200 billion rubles ($36 million)[227], and its overall indebtedness to nuclear industry for the utilization of radioactive wastes is over 153 billion rubles ($27 million).[228]

At times the economic problems of the military have come perilously close to sparking an ecological crisis. In September 1995, for example, the local power supply company in Murmansk Province cut off heating and electricity to protest the military's $4.4 million debt. With orders to use weapons if necessary, the soldiers forced engineers to restore power, narrowly averting an ecological disaster. Naval officials said the reactor on one of the fleet's nuclear submarines came close to a meltdown when the electricity, which powered a cooling system, was turned off and the submarine's on-board generator failed.[229] This event attracted a great deal of attention in Russia and abroad, and has been repeatedly invoked as a strong argument for raising the military budget in Russia.

Similar accounts are carried by the Russian media quite frequently. Even allowing for exaggeration, it is clear that the military sector is in even more dire circumstances than the Russian economy in general. The Russian Federation probably cannot afford to maintain a military capacity on a par with the former USSR, nor does it have the resources or (what may be more significant) an effective policy[230] to reconstruct its navy so as to ensure its environmentally safe and cost-efficient operations. Still, the new geopolitical setting of Russia will ensure that the degree of importance assigned to the Northern Fleet (compared to other maritime flanks) will be growing and that it will maintain, or even increase, its strategic significance. Consequently, it is possible to forecast that the military component of the integral notion of security will be playing a prominent role in the foreseeable future in the Russian Arctic, regardless of which scenario the events will follow.

The majority of legislators who participated in the July 1995 Federal Council discussions on the national security doctrine agreed that the major threat to Russia's security lies in its

---

227 *Ibid.*

228 O. Podkolzina, *op. cit.*

229 *The Boston Globe*, September 26, 1995.

230 A group of prominent Navy admirals has voiced concern in the media about the inadequacy of Russian military doctrine which does not reflect changes which led to Russia's losing supremacy in the Black, Baltic and the Caspian Seas, as well as in the major strategic regions of the world's oceans. The doctrine refers to naval issues only in the context of naval forces' reduction and limitation of naval activity, without even mentioning the necessity of maintaining the sea power of the state as an element of national security ("Admiraly obespokoyeny sud'boi rossiyskogo VMF," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, March 1, 1996).

economic weakness, an opinion shared by many academic security policy analysts.[231] Only by strengthening the Russian economy and responding to the basic economic needs of the population can Russia hope to achieve socio-political stability. Likewise, a sound economy is a necessary foundation for the development of international cooperation and integration on the regional level, and for securing the country's defense.

The Socio-economic Situation of the Northern Regions and the Role of the State

Since long ago, the development of the northern part of the Russian empire strongly depended on the specific features of its geographic and geopolitical situation - its extreme remoteness from the European core of the country and severe natural conditions. Apart from Sakhalin, large parts of the Far North and the Far East (Magadan, Chukotka, Kamchatka and northern Siberian coast) are virtually "islands" and can be supplied only by sea or by air. It could seem surprising, but the North, so rich in hydropower and fossil fuel resources, suffers from a lack of energy resources and depends on its supplies from other regions. It also strongly depends on the supplies (mostly during the brief summer season) of consumer goods from other regions and countries. These factors have resulted in the strong role of the state in the economy and the social life of the North and the need for huge investments into implementation of any economic project. History demonstrates that the economy of the North had been developing more rapidly in the periods of realization of large-scale state programs, such as the construction of the Baikal-Amur railroad. Hence the Russian/Soviet North represented a typical national periphery isolated from the world economy and politics.

During the Soviet period, the North has retained its colonial specialization in raw materials, despite the construction of several large manufacturing enterprises (primarily in the military-industrial complex), the establishment of new industrial centers and the relatively rapidly growing population. During the Stalin era, it became one of the major areas where a slave labor force of political prisoners was especially widely used in construction, mining, and the timber industry.

Currently, due to a severe economic crisis, the state is in the process of a withdrawal from the North, leaving it virtually to the mercy of fate. The socio-economic situation in the Russian Far North is close to catastrophic. The production assets in the oil and gas industry, which is vital for the well-being of the northern citizens, have not been renewed since 1988. 20 per cent of the northern oil wells are closed, geological prospecting is virtually non-existent. Unemployment rates exceed 30 per cent. As a result of the economic crisis, institutional

---

[231] See, e.g., A. Arbatov, 1994, *op. cit.*; V. Zagashvili, "Natsionalizm v geoekonomicheskoi politike," *MEiMO*, 1995, No. 3, p. 9, etc.

transformations and inflation, social privileges in Northern and Far Eastern regions have lost their significance; consequently, during 1991-1994, negative migration balance amounted to 600,000 people, and over 2 million people are intending to leave the Far North as soon as possible.[232]

At the federal level, the institutions involved in Arctic decision-making processes include practically all major agencies which are responsible for economic, military, environmental, and natural resource use areas of governmental policy (Ministry of Economics, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Fuel and Energy, State Committee on Environmental Protection, Ministry of Natural Resources, Department of Shipping in the Ministry of Transport, etc.). The role of each of these agencies in the development and implementation of Arctic policies could be basically identified as the "northern" extension of their regular responsibilities within the Federal administrative system. At the same time, since the late 1980s in the USSR (and later in Russia) it became evident that there existed a need for the establishment of a special governmental body responsible for integration (or at least coordination) of fragmented efforts in rebuilding the country's Arctic policy. The problems of environmental security in the Arctic, much better perceived by this time, and, to some extent, the problems of indigenous people of the North were the driving forces in the creation of the State Committee of the North (*Goskomsever*) in 1990. A transsectoral approach was fundamental in the establishment of the Committee.

The role of the State Committee on the North is most significant in terms of formulating policy on issues specific for the Arctic region. Each of the 27 northern provinces has its own territorial department of the Committee which reports to the federal agency. They are viewed as key instruments in developing and implementing governmental Arctic policy. The Committee was created in 1990, but for a short period of time (1994-1995) its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Nationalities and the Committee as such ceased to exist. However, the functions of the former Committee never became completely integrated with those of the Ministry of Nationalities, and a decision was finally taken to reshuffle the Committee and to re-establish it as a separate agency. The major program the Committee is focusing its efforts on is the so-called *severnyi zavoz*, or the annual supply of vital products to the Northern regions. Other supported programs include "Children of the North," the program on the indigenous peoples and the program aimed at assisting northern residents in resettling to other parts of the country. The Committee carries the major responsibility (within 27 northern provinces) for the implementation of the Presidential Decree "On the State Strategy

---

[232] *Finansovye Izvestiya,* No. 17, March 14, 1995; *Finansovye Izvestiya*, No. 43, June 22, 1995. In 1993-94, only in three macroregions, which together comprise the whole of the Russian North, a net migrational loss of population has been registered: Far East, East Siberia and the European North.

of the Russian Federation On Environmental Protection and Ensuring Sustainable Development."

The State Committee on the North plays a dual role. As a federal agency, it serves, by working with the Region's Administration, to facilitate implementation of federal policy and programs and to advise the federal government on policy development for the region. However, it also lobbies on behalf of the region for federal funds to implement regional programs. It does not carry any authority on the regional level in terms of policy implementation. Its policy-related activities can be executed only through the regional administrations. The regional branches of the Committee have little authority compared to other federal agencies focused on environmental issues, such as State Committee on Hydrometeorology, Committee on Water Management, Land Management Committee etc., since these have both the technical capacity and the authority to implement federal policy. At the same time, even these agencies have become more dependent on the regional Administrations which have de facto more power compared to federal ministries inside the northern regions of Russia. Although recently the regions have acquired more responsibilities in terms of policy implementation, they have gained neither sufficient resources nor the regulatory and legislative powers to effectively carry out their functions. Another problem is that certain policy issues are as yet inadequately defined. Northern administrations are basically more reactive than proactive and are not adequately prepared to address long-term issues, such as environmental security or sustainable development; at the same time, they tend to respond to day-to-day issues, such as lack of fuel, non-payment of salaries, etc. The problem of policy development for environmental security and sustainable development is not perceived as an immediate need.

The federal budget does not provide sufficient funds in loans needed for the "life support system" of the northern territories, primarily for the supply and deliveries of vital goods, which has brought about considerable delays in supplies and has already resulted in several crisis situations in the winter time, and even in the necessity to urgently resettle hundreds of people by plane.[233] In 1996, the federal budget allocated only 4,200 billion rubles ($764M) for the North out of almost 10,000 billion rubles ($1.8 billion) requested by Goskomsever (of these, some 3,600 billion had been intended as subsidies to cover the transportation costs of 10 million tons of oil and two million tons of food, and the remaining 600 billion rubles were to be spent on loans to provide community aid). However, even these reduced funds have been mismanaged and misappropriated: About one-third of budgeted funds never reached the

[233] In 1996, some northern regions received about 40 percent of the required coal stocks and less than 50 percent of fuel oil. The Chukchi and the Koryak autonomous districts had practically no stocks of coal (Andrei Ivanov, "Loss of Reindeer Herds Threatens Indigenous Communities," *in glas:ips.english*, 10 January 1997).

northern territories, having stayed in the safes of the so-called "authorised banks"; a substantial part of the remainder has been misused and spent on paying wage and pension arrears, or, quite often, on purchases of foreign currency, alcohol, tobacco, and automobiles. Moreover, these funds are shrinking with each year: The budget for 1997 allocates only 3,500 billion rubles, 25 percent less than had been spent in 1996, for the supply of basic commodities to the North.[234]

Without federal investments, it is impossible to tackle the restructuring of the Northern economy in order to gradually and carefully reduce the "excessive" population, to implement the conversion of military industries, to stop degradation of intellectual potential, to solve problems of energy supply, foodstuffs and infrastructure, to renew merchant and fishing fleets, to protect environment and to begin exploitation of new deposits of mineral and forest resources, etc. Since August 1993, the central government has several times radically increased railroad tariffs, which threatens to deprive the Northern economy of its traditional markets in the European part of Russia and the CIS and to separate the North as a whole from the "continent."

Not surprisingly, the economic vacuum is being filled by rapidly developing ties between the Northern and especially the most remote North-Eastern regions, on the one hand, and foreign markets, on the other hand. For instance, it has become more profitable for the Far Eastern regions to import coal from China and corn from Canada than from southern areas of Western and Eastern Siberia. Already in 1992, the Russian Far East received not less than 30 per cent of all consumer goods from abroad. Another reason for a much more intensive (compared to the Soviet times) involvement of most northern regions in international economic relations is the growing demand for their natural resources.

Striving for hard currency and consumer goods from abroad, trying to sustain their industries deprived of traditional economic ties with the "mainland," local economic and political elites are frequently eager to sell (even at dumping prices) any resources for which the demand exists and on any conditions, ignoring environmental constraints. For instance, in 1993 Japan paid 2.5 times less for Russian fish compared to other purchasers. The "doughnut zone" in the Okhotsk sea was virtually full of foreign ships that profited with impunity and next to destroyed the valuable fish resources. Only in 1994 did Russia begin to use frontier-guards and to arrest ships violating boundaries of the economic zone, which has provoked serious incidents in relations with Japan.

---

[234] Andrei Ivanov, "Moscow Promises to Put Right Its Arctic Chaos - Next Winter," in *glas:ips.english*, February 12, 1997; Irina Nagornykh, "Den'gami severnogo zavoza oplacheny dolgi po zarplate i vodka," *Segodnia*, May 26, 1997, No. 105.

Still, of course, it would be absolutely wrong to describe geographical and geopolitical consequences of economic transformations in the Russian North only in dark colors. Although transportation infrastructure continues to be inadequate for international co-operation, it is gradually improving. There are several impressive projects which, when realized, can change the geopolitical situation of vast areas - for instance, the construction of a bridge over the Bering strait or a railroad connecting the BAM to Chukotka via Yakutsk. The partisans of this idea argue that it will be cheaper to transport goods from the USA to Southern and South-Eastern Asia by such a transcontinental railroad.

Several northern regions - such as Tyumen *oblast* and its autonomous districts, the Krasnoyarsk territory, Magadan and Kamchatka *oblasts* - fare relatively well as to the rate of economic transformations: privatization of housing, industry, retail trade and services, establishment of independent farms, the number and role of commercial banks and joint ventures and, consequently, the level of well-being of the population. At the same time, in the majority of Northern regions, the subsistence level as a percentage of the national average significantly exceeds the per capita income also weighted by the national average.

The authors of the Russian State strategy of economic security have even included "the state of crisis in the northern territories" into the list of factors representing major threats to the country's economic security.[235] An extremely grave socio-economic situation in the greater part of the Northern regions directly threatens national security in general, because it decreases the presence of Russia in the Arctic, and in fact deprives Russian security strategists of the subject of defense and care - the people themselves. The North is probably the best example of the reduction in the degree of Russian economic autonomy, which is interpreted by the authors of the concept of national security as one of the major internal threats to national security.[236]

The Problem of the Integrity of Russia and the Arctic

Vital interests of Russia depend on the maintenance of its territorial integrity: This position is shared by almost all strata of the Russian society, and it was emphasized in the concept of "National Security Policy of the Russian Federation (1996 - 2000)." Although currently, as distinct from the early 1990s, a direct threat to the integrity of Russia does not exist, the federalization of Russia imposed, in contradistinction to the other countries, "from the top" and not initiated under pressure "from the bottom," inevitably gives rise to numerous conflicts

---

235 A. Zverev, "Ekonomicheskaya bezopasnost' v Rossii," *Ekonomika i Zhizn'*, No. 8, February 1995, p. 16.

236 "Politika natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii," *op. cit.*

and strongly influences the politics of Moscow in different regions and especially in the Arctic.

It has been estimated that national autonomies occupy 53 per cent of the territory of the Russian Federation; almost the whole of the Russian North lies within the two republics - Komi and Yakutia - and several autonomous districts (*okrug*), which, in their turn, make up a part of the respective territories (*krai*) and *oblasts*. Since the dissolution of the USSR, various institutions at different levels of the Federation's pyramidal structure have been struggling to gain more power relative to the federal authorities, which resulted in the emergence of a multitude of subjects of sovereignty in the Russian North. While the parliament of the Russian Federation has declared its property rights to all the resources found within its territory, continental shelf and the economic zone, the same claims have been asserted by many of the national-territorial formations within the Federation (republics, national districts, etc.).

The Russian Arctic, houses, among the two million total population, about 70 thousand representatives of 26 ethnic minorities. Their natural environment is being undermined, traditional life-styles destroyed, they are totally deprived when facing the federal authorities, the military or the oil industry, and it is difficult to guarantee their survival in the coming decades.[237] This statement is currently even more true than it was in the waning years of the USSR, since in addition to the long-standing issues, new problems have emerged, associated with high levels of unemployment, deteriorating living standards and health conditions, limited educational opportunities. The native lands of the Northern indigenous peoples are being annexed and barbarically destroyed by rapacious petroleum and mining interests, without any just compensation paid to the natives' organizations. Their political rights are being abused: In 1995, only two of their representatives have been elected to the Russian Federal Assembly compared to 18 native representatives in the Supreme Soviet in 1989-1991. The majority of autonomous districts are no longer capable of defending their rights and are experiencing an intense pressure from financial and industrial groups that promote policies incompatible with the interests of the Northern natives.[238] Thus, the introduction of more civilized norms of behavior in Russia, the establishment of a stable political participatory process with respect to the Arctic natives is still a long way off.

---

[237] Alexei Roginko, "Arctic development, environment and northern natives in Russia," in J. Käkönen (ed.), *Politics and Sustainable Growth in the Arctic*, Aldershot, 1993, p. 25-33.

[238] "Discrimination against indigenous peoples of the North in the Russian Federation: A Statement by Social Organizations and Movements of Indigenous Peoples of the North," in *glas:env.siberia*, May 19, 1996.

In this situation, implementation of any environmental protection programs, not to speak of coherent sustainable development policies, represents a difficult task at best. Many of the experts in the country are also in doubt whether the autonomous republics like Chukotka or even Sakha-Yakutia are capable of adequately managing their vast territories, developing natural resources, protecting the environment and providing the huge investments necessary for social programs, infrastructure, etc., independently, without the support of the center[239].

The claims of the northern republics to the federal authorities have always concerned control over natural resources and the regime of their exports - the main problem in relations of these subjects of the Russian Federation with Moscow. It is not by chance that it was Komi and Yakutia that were among the first Russian regions to sign treaties on the delimitation of competence with the Federal government. Local political elites are inherently interested in a more "open" regime for the Arctic offering more opportunities for a direct access to the world markets and the attraction of foreign investments.[240] It is necessary to take into account the fact that northern republics and districts (except Sakha-Yakutia) have always been among the most faithful strongholds of president Yeltsin and his team.

Several northern autonomous districts (Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Khanty-Mansi and Chukotka) declared their sovereignty back in 1991 and have claimed secession from respectively the *oblasts* of Arkhangelsk, Tyumen and Magadan. The major reason for the secession was the fact that these districts refused to share the local tax receipts with their *oblasts'* governments and would prefer to avoid them as intermediaries in their relations with Moscow. In an attempt to reach these objectives, political and economic elites of these districts, notwithstanding the fact that they had an extremely low share of "titular" (indigenous) population (for instance, 1.4% in the district of Khanty-Mansi and 4.2% in the Yamalo-Nenets district), have tried to profit from their status of national administrative units.

The problem of the districts' status is especially acute in the Tyumen *oblast* which is extremely rich in oil and gas resources. During the 1990 "parade of sovereignties," the Soviet of the Yamalo-Nenets district has declared its transformation into a republic. Earlier, the Tyumen oblast itself sought to become a republic. The authorities of the Khanty-Mansi district began to actively develop local by-laws regulating the ownership and the right of disposal of its lands, forests and later of its mineral wealth as well. The *oblast* authorities

---

239 See N. Mirovitskaya and A. Roginko, "Vozmozhna li ekologicheskaya bezopasnost' v Arktike?," *MEiMO*, 1992, No. 1, p. 135-136.

240 The President of Sakha-Yakutia, Mikhail Nikolaev, became one of the initiators and major proponents of the establishment of the Northern Forum which would provide for a subsequent integration of Yakutia into the international "northern" community.

struggled against separatism. They have considered several options: a possible establishment of a "Special Economic Region" by a resolution of the Federal government (summer 1991); the assignment of the status of "land" to the whole of the *oblast*, including its constituent districts (winter 1991); or the inclusion of the *oblast* into the hypothetical Urals Republic. The *oblast* authorities have succeeded in lobbying the draft federal law "On the Earth's interior" drafted by their compatriots and subsequently adopted in their interests. This law, *inter alia*, has fixed the distribution of tax receipts of districts in the following way: 50 per cent of these proceeds were now directed to the budget of a city or an administrative district (*rayon*), 30% to the district government, and 20% to the federal budget.

However, the Federal Treaty signed soon thereafter provided the districts with a right to manage the natural resources within their territories. The right to dispose of the mineral wealth became the stumbling point in the negotiations concerning the treaty "On the delimitation of competencies between the Tyumen oblast, Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets executive authorities." This treaty was signed in October 1992, but the formula which regulated the use of the mineral wealth and had satisfied all the parties had been arrived at only in May 1993[241].

Still, the districts have not abandoned their aspiration for a secession, attempting as they do to create local branches of federal institutions not subordinated to the *oblast* authorities. The unified vertical line of authority still exists only in the departments of security, civil defense, interior and statistics. Since January 1994, the districts have established their own departments of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The districts' administrations have no doubts that it is vitally important to regulate their own money circulation, but for Tyumen this event represents a further step to the loss of integrity.

Thus, the positions and the activities of regional authorities and their relationship with the Federal center and between themselves became a significant factor of Russian Arctic politics. But the number of actors in various fields is not limited to federal authorities, ministries and regional administrations: Large privatized industrial enterprises, joint ventures and foreign companies are playing an increasingly important role not only in the economy, but in regional politics as well. NGOs, including those representing the interests of the indigenous population, are becoming more involved in the decision-making process, or at least are allowed to supply modest inputs to this process. It is noteworthy that these organizations often start their activity under the slogans of environmental protection and the protection of the traditional way of life of the Northern indigenous peoples. Moreover, it is on the international

---

[241] *Politicheskiy almanakh Rossii, 1995* (M. McFaul and N. Petrov, eds). Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995.

arena that these new actors are becoming especially active, thus establishing a new dimension of the collaborative process in the circumpolar Arctic.

International Factors of National Security in the Russian Arctic

Although Russian security thinking and priorities in the Arctic are consistent with the security debate in the country as a whole, there are several distinct differences that set the Arctic context apart. Chief among these is the fact that Russia has distinguished itself as an active participant and even a leader in international activities and agreements concerning the Arctic, which are proving very beneficial for Russia. In political initiatives and intergovernmental bodies such as the Arctic Strategy, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, and the Northern Forum, Russian officials have asserted the country's importance and advanced its political ambitions by leading rather than reacting to international events.

Western and Russian participants in the growing process of Arctic cooperation are equally aware that most of the critical problems in the Arctic are concentrated in Russia, yet both sides hope to benefit from such cooperation in terms of protecting the environment, providing for military security, and enhancing economic cooperation.

International efforts that have been undertaken by the Arctic rim countries during the post-Cold War period to build an Arctic regime[242] - and perhaps particularly Russia's participation in these efforts - have established a very positive political, legal, economic, and humanitarian context that can foster a new security regime for the region as a whole. Despite the fact that the strong military presences of East and West still dominate the picture, all parties involved have become partners in designing and implementing institutional and practical arrangements for achieving solutions to their common problems.

For the first time since the Second World War, beginning in the late 1980s, cooperation began to prevail over confrontation in the Arctic. Whereas during the Cold War "security considerations were employed widely to reject international cooperation, even in areas not directly related to military security,"[243] during the past several years the political behavior of

---

[242] Oran R.Young and Gail Osherenko define regimes as "social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue ares" (*Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes*, ed. by Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, Cornell University Press, 1993, p.1).

[243] Rune Castberg, Olav Schram Stokke & Willy Østreng "The Dynamics of the Barents Region," in *The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe* (Ed. by Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander), Sage Publications, 1994, p.77.

states in the region has encouraged such cooperation, with environmental concerns "serving as a political dynamo"[244] of such cooperation.

Increasingly, the key Russian players are not limited to government officials from Moscow but include local and regional officials and local citizens, who enrich the process with their personal experience and gain experience in return. This human resources dimension is an extremely important aspect in the development of a cooperative approach to security in the Arctic. When people are involved in international cooperative efforts, they better appreciate the benefits of security and cooperation and better understand the tools that must be used to achieve these goals.

Perhaps the most promising of the new initiatives, in terms of security benefits in the region, is the process of institutionalizing cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, which culminated in the establishment of the Council for the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region on January 11, 1993. The major tasks of the Council include development of cooperation and coordination of domestic efforts in the areas of economic and natural resources development, environmental protection, expansion of infrastructure and the protection of the rights of the indigenous population. The Council also includes a Working group on NSR, established at the initiative of Finland. In the environmental field, the Council is especially concerned with the issue of radioactive contamination of the Barents and the Kara Seas resulting from military activities in the USSR/Russia. The region itself "is unique: First, it is the only region in Europe where Russia and NATO have a common border. Second, it is more heavily militarized than other cooperative regions."[245] The Council therefore represents the first authoritative international forum that operates in the most politically and environmentally sensitive region of the Arctic. Since the mandate of the Council includes a comprehensive coverage of the issues of both environmental security and navigation along the NSR, its activities may become most instrumental, particularly in providing institutional and financial bases to achieve the goal of comprehensive security throughout the Arctic region.

In recent years, Russian decision makers have been involved in a broad array of political arrangements with their Arctic rim neighbors, and environmental concerns have constituted a large component of their mutual concern (see Table 3). Even so, this does not mean that the

---

244 Olav Schram Stokke, "Environmental Cooperation as a Driving Force in the Barents Region," in *The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe,* (Ed. by Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander), Sage Publications, 1994, p.156.

245 Anders Kjolberg, "The Barents Region as a European Security-building Concept," in *The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe.*(Ed.by Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander), Sage Publications, 1994, p.187.

environmental or social situation in the Russian Arctic is improving, nor that there is recognition among the major Russian actors that these facts should be considered within the security thinking package.

Opportunities opening up with the use of the NSR as an international passage challenge the security thinking process in Russia. Will possible implementation of this ambitious program enhance security of the country or might it create new problems? How will the security of the nation be affected by the fact that one of the possibly most significant international shipping routes will run along its coast for thousands of miles? In what way will the interdependence of the countries involved modify international arrangements with these countries? To what extent might this project threaten the environment along the Russian coasts and to what extent Russian environmental problems jeopardize the project? How will Russian Navy and military circles react to the possible implementation of the INSROP? What economic consequences might this project entail for Russia? Will it enhance or jeopardize economic security? These are just some of the critical questions the Russian decision makers are facing in this regard.

As a first empirical step towards responding to these questions (see Table 4), we think that the implementation of INSROP may have significant potential economic benefits for Russia as a transit country (including not only the revenues from transit fees, but the opportunities for the development of infrastructure along the route[246], possible attraction of foreign investments to the Russian Far North, and a general enhancement of circumpolar economic links as well), and can certainly contribute to the strengthening of Russia's economic security, especially in a long-term perspective. True, an opposite viewpoint also exists in Russia, shared even by some prominent academics: According to it, a growing influx of foreign capital into Northern, Siberian and Far Eastern regions (and increasing foreign influence upon the society in general) tends to aggravate the trend towards their autonomization and "sovereignization."[247]

With regard to military security, several discussions with various Russian experts on this matter produced controversial results. While some hold the view that INSROP might jeopardize Russia's military security (primarily because of a possible "massive infiltration of foreigners" to strategically important and "sensitive" parts of the Russian Arctic), others suggest that INSROP can strengthen it. The authors of the current paper tend to share the latter position: First, the opening up of the NSR will most certainly revive domestic Arctic

---

[246] The authors of the Russian national strategy for economic security have included "underdeveloped transport infrastructure for export-import operations" into the list of major factors detrimentally affecting external economic security of the nation (see A. Zverev, 1995, *op. cit.*).

[247] See e.g. Grigory Agranat, "Nuzhny li Rossii ee prostory?," *Segodnia*, October 3, 1996, p. 5.

Table 4: Interrelations between INSROP and different components of Russia's security.

Issue	Possible effect by implementation of INSROP	Empirical assessment
Economic security	Strengthen Jeopardize Not clear	X
Military security	Strengthen Jeopardize Not clear	X
Environmental security	Strengthen Jeopardize Not clear	X

shipping capacity and thus contribute to the strengthening of the dwindling Russian sea power; second, improved infrastructure along the NSR will at the same time ameliorate the Russian military capabilities to control the coastal zones in the Arctic and the NSR itself; and third (which is probably most important), the opening of NSR for international navigation will have a tremendous confidence-building potential through increasing interdependence with other circumpolar countries and thus reducing the chances of a possible military confrontation.

There are as well many reasons to consider the effects of opening up the NSR on environmental security in the Arctic from several viewpoints: One of them is that the intensification of shipping traffic might increase the threat of accidental as well as operational pollution from vessels. According to the latest available estimates, in 1990 the total volume of oil spilled in the whole of the Arctic Ocean and its seas amounted to about 400 tons, of which the former Soviet Union accounted for about a half.[248] Even in the open areas of the Arctic seas off the Russian coasts, oil pollution levels, despite the reduction in the volume of shipping, have not significantly declined, approaching the national standards (MAC - maximum allowable concentrations) in the Kara and Laptev Seas. Pollution levels are significantly higher in the coastal and estuarine zones, with maximum local concentrations (e.g. in the estuaries of the Ob and the Yenisei rivers) exceeding MACs up to three times, and

[248] Futsaeter G. et al. "Report on Oil Pollution," in *The State of the Arctic Environment: Reports*, Rovaniemi, The Arctic Centre, 1991, p. 300.

in the coastal waters of the Barents Sea - up to 54 (!) times.[249] Furthermore, even if the operational pollution has diminished, this decrease in the nearest future can be offset by a predicted growth of shipping along the NSR.[250] This situation is aggravated by an almost total lack of waste oil reception facilities in place at Russian Arctic ports; nor have adequate oil spill contingency plans been established in the event of an accidental release along the NSR.[251] On the other hand, increased ship traffic along the NSR can probably bring about an improved clean-up and monitoring capacity in the Arctic, which would help to alleviate the increased pollution threat.

At the same time, the increased threat of vessel-source pollution is just one, and probably not the most difficult to countervail, environmental issue associated with INSROP. The more important environmental security implications of/for INSROP are related to the two major groups of factors - military, and especially nuclear waste-related activities in the Russian North, and the environmental effects of intensified economic activities - mainly mineral resources, and particularly oil production - that would be facilitated by INSROP development.

3. Environmental Security Issues in the Russian Arctic in the Context of INSROP

The major environmental problems that Russia faces in the Arctic include perhaps the worst air pollution in the world, land-based marine pollution, degradation of forestry resources, and the possibility of the spread of nuclear contamination from nuclear dumping sites and military facilities in the region. The European part of the Russian North (especially the Kola Peninsula) and the Norilsk area are probably the most environmentally devastated areas in the entire circumpolar Arctic. Norilsk alone, pouring annually about 2 million tons of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere, accounts for approximately nine per cent of the total industrial atmospheric emissions in Russia; as a result of this massive pollution, 351,361 hectares of forest around the Norilsk plant have been completely destroyed. Although the past three years (1992-1994) have seen a substantial (about 30%) reduction of atmospheric emissions across the whole of the Russian North, it is attributable only to a drop in industrial production and, in fact, has been occurring at a slower rate. Practically all of the Russian Arctic coastal areas are lacking adequate water treatment facilities: In Murmansk Province, only 30% of waste waters are treated to required standards prior to the discharge, while the corresponding figures are

---

[249] Gosudarstvennyi doklad o sostoyanii okruzhayushchei prirodnoi sredy Rossiyskoi Federatsii v 1994 godu, *Zelionyi Mir*, 1995, No. 31, p. 9.

[250] Futsaeter G. et al., *op. cit.*, p. 318.

[251] Latukhov S.V. "Transportnoie ispol'zovanie Severnogo Morskogo Puti i zagryaznenie Arktiki," in *Geoekologiya Mirovogo okeana*, Leningrad, 1990, p. 127-128.

33% for Sakha (Yakutia), 23% for Chukotka, slightly over 6% for Arkhangelsk Province, and 0% for Taymyr Autonomous District. As a result, the Arctic seas annually receive about seven cubic kilometers of polluted waste waters, over 25 per cent of the country's total.[252]

Environmental Threats Posed by Military and Naval Activities

As noted above, environmental risks posed by the continuing presence of military and naval forces in the Arctic represent by far the greatest environmental security threat to the Russian North. In this regard, three major issues should be outlined. First, there is the problem of the environmental consequences of day-to-day, "normal" military presence and military preparations in the Arctic. Even in peacetime, these activities present a threat to the fragile Arctic nature and human environment, and thereby to the everyday life of people, particularly the northern natives. Examples are such activities as military maneuvers disturbing fishing grounds and reindeer pastures and herds, noise from tree-top aircraft flights affecting people and animals, etc.

The second issue is a high probability of the most dangerous, fraught with dramatic consequences, category of military accidents - collisions, groundings, etc. involving nuclear-powered and/or nuclear-armed vessels. This probability is particularly high in the Arctic since certain areas of the Arctic ocean and its adjacent seas (the GIUK gap, and especially the Barents Sea) are literally "packed" with nuclear submarines.[253] This was proved in a dramatic fashion in April 1989 with the loss of a Soviet prototype *Mike*-class submarine *Komsomolets* in the Norwegian Sea, early in 1992, when the US and Russian nuclear submarines collided while on patrol in the Barents Sea, and one year later, in March 1993, when the USS *Grayling* collided with a Russian Delta Class submarine in the same area.[254] Similar accidents will almost inevitably continue to occur in the future because, despite the end of the Cold war, the Northern seas will long persist as the area of the US-Russian naval confrontation and SSBNs deployment: As long as Russia remains a nuclear power, there will

---

252 Gosudarstvennyi doklad..., *op. cit.*, *Zelionyi Mir*, 1996, No. 3, p. 11.

253 Lassi Heininen, "Environmental threats of military presence in northern waters and the Arctic," in *Arctic environmental problems*, ed. by L. Heininen, Tampere Peace Research Institute Occasional Papers No. 41, 1990.

254 Greenpeace Press Release, 24 March 1994.

be a need for such deployments in the Arctic.[255] In fact, the Northern seas will probably be the last area in the world where deployed nuclear weapons will be found.[256]

An especially high public concern in the Nordic countries has been generated by the *Komsomolets* accident, since, as predicted by many experts and widely publicized in the media, twelve kilograms of plutonium-239 contained in two torpedo warheads of the sunken submarine could have been in the near future eventually released into the marine environment if conservation (sealing) of the submarine had not been accomplished, which could in turn result in radioactive contamination of several thousand square kilometers of the seabed in the area which accounts for 80 per cent of fish catches in the Norwegian Sea.[257] At the same time, an authoritative international scientific conference on radioactive contamination of the oceans has concluded that submerged nuclear submarine reactors and weapons did not pose any "significant present or future threat to human health or the environment."[258] Still, taking into account a high degree of scientific uncertainty associated with long-term effects of low-dose radioactive pollution, and the ongoing appearance of widely divergent statements as to the prospects of radioactive leakages from the submarine and especially their aftermaths[259], the

---

255 Kroll, John A., "Naval arms control in the Arctic: Interdependence and security after the cold war," paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994.

256 B. Auffermann and J. Käkonen, "European disarmament and the Nordic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone - Is there still need for such a zone?," in *Arctic complexity: Essays on Arctic interdependence*, ed. by L. Heininen and J. Käkonen, Tampere Peace Research Institute Occasional Papers, No. 44, 1991.

257 It has been posited that plutonium in the warheads of *Komsomolets* torpedoes presents a much more potent environmental threat compared to cesium and strontium, released as a result of nuclear tests or radioactive wastes dumping in the northern seas; the latter have a much shorter lifetime and are relatively harmless with respect to overall background radiation levels. All the nuclear weapons tests conducted at Novaya Zemlia produced just 100 Cu of plutonium compared to 430 Cu contained in the submarine's torpedoes (A. Baiduzhi, "U Rossii ostalos' malo vremeni, chtoby predotvratit' yadernuyu katastrofu," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 1994, No. 74, April 20).

258 Press Release of the Conference on Radioactivity and Environmental Security in the Oceans: New Research and Policy Priorities in the Arctic and North Atlantic, 7-9 June 1993, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, MA.

259 For example, a publication in the official Russian daily *Rossiyskaia Gazeta*, quoting the Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry and the Arctic Center of Groningen University in Holland, stated that the richest fishing grounds in Europe would become closed for 6-7 centuries, and possible damage for Russian fisheries for the five-year period has been tentatively estimated by the Russian State Committee on Fisheries at about 3,500 billion rubles at 1993 prices (see A. Kurchatov, "*Komsomol'tsu* khotyat otsech golovu," *Rossiyskaia Gazeta*, October 11, 1994, p. 3).

continuation of technologically complex and extremely costly underwater operations aimed at containing possible leakages seems to be justified.[260]

The third military-related environmental issue is radioactive contamination from atmospheric nuclear testings conducted in the Arctic in the fifties and beginning of the sixties[261], and especially from a deliberate dumping of radioactive wastes in the northern seas by the Soviet/Russian military since the early 1960s. The White paper published by the governmental commission in 1993 admits that the biggest threat to the marine environment stems from the seven nuclear reactors containing processed nuclear fuel sunk in the Kara Sea during the 1960s. The authors of the report claim that metal containers encasing the reactors are subject to corrosion by sea water, and corroded containers can spring leaks after 10 years, while reinforced concrete containers last 30 years before being subject to leaking radionuclides into the sea.[262] Both operational nuclear facilities and coastal dumping sites are a part of a problem that has reached crisis proportions for Russia: a crippling lack of capacity for the handling of radioactive wastes.

The Kola Peninsula, the home base for the world's largest fleet of nuclear submarines, also has the highest concentration of nuclear reactors (both civilian and military) in the world, one per

---

On the other hand, a more recent report prepared by the Research Institute of the Norwegian Armed Forces asserts that radioactive leakages from the sunken submarine do not present any environmental threat (M. Zubko, "Zatonuvshiy *Komsomolets* ne opasen dlia okeana," *Izvestiya*, March 3, 1995).

260 According to Alexandr Kurchatov, the president of the "Eureka" Society, the sealing of torpedo tubes and the separation of the vessel's bow part with water-filled sacks, accomplished in the course of the 1995 expedition, cannot guarantee against further radiation leakages, especially in case of "underwater storms" and, moreover, prevent the capture of nuclear weapons by terrorists (Alexandr Kurchatov, "Yadernye arsenaly dlia terroristov," *Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 35, September 8, 1996, p. 23).

261 It has been made public in Russia that 77 nuclear explosions in Novaya Zemlya caused extensive contamination at the Chukchi Peninsula. The native Chukchi, whose diet almost exclusively consists of reindeer meat, have about one hundred times higher concentration of Cs_{137} compared to other population groups. The result is a higher (two to ten times) cancer mortality rate among them compared to the national average (D. MacKenzie, "Environmental issues surface at the summit of the world," *New Scientist*, 1989, Vol. 121, No. 1653, p. 29).

262 *Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation* (Materials for a Report by the Government Commission on Matters Related to Related Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea, Created by Decree #613 of the Russian Federation President, October 24,1992). Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 1993.

3,800 inhabitants; in fact, 18% of their world total number are situated in this area.[263] Moreover, they are poorly maintained and increasingly accident prone, due to the present financial problems facing the Northern Fleet. About 70 nuclear-powered submarines of the Fleet have been decommissioned (and another 30 are due to be decommissioned before the year 2000) and are awaiting "utilization" as the debate is going on how to finance the multi-million dollar cost of safely dismantling their nuclear reactors.[264] Many of them, after 32-35 years of service and for over ten years without any repairs, are rusting away in harbors close to populated areas. Most submarine reactors have contained spent nuclear fuel for 15 years or more; four submarines are equipped with damaged reactors, for which no safe disposal methods have yet been developed.[265] Russian naval commanders and the authorities of Severodvinsk shipyards have voiced fears that decommissioned submarines which are in poor condition and manned by unmotivated crews may sink at dockside and cause an ecological disaster.[266] On the civilian side, two of the four nuclear power plants on the Kola Peninsula are classed as "high-risk" and safety at all plants is regarded as poor by Western standards.[267]

Used uranium fuel and other nuclear wastes are accumulating rapidly at over ten naval bases more or less unchecked. Military storage facilities are already filled to capacity: Most of them date back to the 1960s and are physically and morally obsolete. The worst situation, according to a report by Norwegian environmental NGO *Bellona*, is observed at the Northern Fleet's main nuclear waste dump at Andreyeva Bay, on the Kola Peninsula 45 kilometers from the Norwegian border. Since 1962, the report revealed, large amounts of spent nuclear fuel have been held in the open at Andreyev Bay in some 30 makeshift containers, with a total of 200 to 220 fuel tanks, which are currently approaching the end of their technical life. As well as the possibility of leakage into the soil and water, nuclear experts commented, there was a significant danger that wastes would overheat and catch fire, releasing huge amounts of radioactivity into the environment. In all, the waste dump is estimated by Bellona to contain

---

263 The Northern Fleet has a total of 270 reactors in service or in storage; wastes from additional 90 reactor cores are stored under unsafe conditions at the naval base in Zapadnaya Litsa, and 18 reactor cores are stored under similar conditions on board storage ships and barges (*The Russian Northern Fleet, op. cit.*). According to the military's own forecasts, by the year 2000 about 200 decommissioned submarines would contain up to 300 tons of nuclear fuel (Victor Litovkin, "Yadernyi vzryv pod grifom 'sekretno'," *Izvestiya*, May 6, 1997, p. 5).

264 By 1995, only 18 submarines of the Northern Fleet had their active reactor zones unloaded (*Gosudarstvennyi Doklad..., Zelionyi Mir*, 1995, No. 35, p. 7).

265 *Ibid.*

266 V. Filippov, "Atomnye submariny vzyvayut o pomoshchi," *Izvestiya*, No. 93, May 24, 1995.

267 Greg McIvor, "Norway Nervous About Decaying Nuclear Plants," by *igc:newsdesk* in *glas:ips.english*, May 23, 1994.

between 30 and 40 million curies of radioactivity, a thousand times more than the amount involved in the largest of the recent French nuclear weapons tests.[268]

The nuclear contamination issue, and especially the one associated with radioactive dumping, is one of the most important environmental problems in relation to the Northern Sea Route, affecting both Russian and Western approaches towards INSROP and the development of the Russian Arctic in general. Moreover, this issue is directly relevant to the current study because the NSR traverses an area of several major dump sites, and Murmansk, the major port of the NSR, is heavily stocked with the nuclear wastes, including the reactors of nuclear submarines slated for decommissioning. Because of the immense transboundary environmental threats associated, its high political priority and visibility, as well as the security-related sensitivity, this problem deserves a more detailed evaluation.[269]

In November 1993, at the 16th Consultative Meeting of members of the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea (known as the London Convention, or LC), the decision was made to ban all dumping of nuclear waste into the oceans for a 25-year period. Russia, the principal recent "dumper" of radioactive waste into the oceans, has not agreed to accept the nuclear waste dumping ban as it applies to low-level radioactive wastes, although it has recognized a voluntary moratorium on such dumping since October 1993.[270]

Publication of information on Soviet and Russian nuclear waste dumping into the oceans and changes in Russia's approaches toward international cooperation in that field became possible only because of the recent dramatic changes in Russian society.[271] This information appears to

---

[268] See *The Russian Northern Fleet, op. cit.*, Chapter 4; Renfrey Clarke, "Russian Environmental Activist Held for "Espionage," by *austgreen* in *glas:env.cis*, February 8, 1996; N. Gorodetskaya, "Gosudarstvennye tainy Rossii neizvestny tol'ko rossiyanam," *Segodnia*, February 17, 1996.

[269] The text below is partly based on a condensed version of the article "Nuclear Legacy of the Cold War: Russian Policy and Ocean Disposal" prepared by C.D.Hollister and R.V.Vartanov (Woods Hole, 1996).

[270] At that time, just one month before the 16th LC Consultative Meeting, Russia had been forced to discharge the contents of a filled storage tanker in the Sea of Japan to avoid an uncontrolled release in its own shallow coastal waters (see "Radioactivity in the Oceans," Chapter 5 in J.M. Broadus and R.V. Vartanov (eds.), *The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives*, Washington, D.C., Island Press, 1994).

[271] The information was first published by a Russian environmental NGO called "Toward a New Earth" and by A.A.Zolotkov, an engineer in the Radiation Safety Service of the Murmansk Marine Shipping Company (see *Facts and Problems..., op.cit*).

have significantly influenced Russia's geopolitical agenda concerning the dumping of nuclear waste and encouraged Russian authorities to launch an investigation of the subject. At the 1991 and 1992 LC meetings, Russia was urged by the LC parties to present more complete information on the subject, and it undertook to do so.

It is clear now that it was not easy for the Russian government to disclose information on this sensitive matter. Most dumping was done illegally during the Cold War, during which all the relevant information was shielded from public scrutiny. According to the official report (the so-called "Yablokov Report") of the governmental Commission[272] that investigated this matter, for more than 20 years the USSR/Russia had been in violation of the LC when it dumped high-level radioactive waste in the Arctic and the Pacific. Even in the first years of *perestroika*, Soviet officials still claimed that the USSR had never dumped radioactive wastes into the sea, nor were they doing so at the time, nor did they plan to do so in the future.[273] Russia also misrepresented its activities concerning the dumping of low level wastes at a time when it was in fact violating the voluntary moratorium.

All radioactive wastes dumping by the former USSR off its Arctic coast was in direct contravention of the recommendations established by the IAEA. In addition, more than half of the total USSR/Russian dumping occurred after 1975, when the Convention entered into force and became binding on the USSR. The LC's decision in late 1993 to ban ocean dumping of radioactive waste was taken, at least in part, in response to the recent revelations of USSR dumping since the 1950s. At that time, Russia has stated that it could not comply with the recent ban on low-level radioactive waste dumping because of the lack of waste management facilities in the Arctic and Pacific areas, and has asked for international assistance to remedy this problem.

In response to Russia's request, the United States and Norway have undertaken close cooperation with Russia concerning the possible expansion and upgrading of a small liquid radioactive waste processing facility in Murmansk. In September 1994, President Clinton and President Yeltsin formally announced their intention "to undertake immediately, in cooperation with other interested countries, a step-by-step expansion in upgrading of a treatment facility for liquid low level radioactive waste in Murmansk." The Summit Statement concluded that "Russia intends to continue its present policy of voluntary

---

[272] *Facts and Problems.., op. cit.*

[273] *Ibid.*

commitment to the prohibition on dumping liquid radioactive wastes under the London Convention with a view to eventual formal adherence to this prohibition."[274]

The issue of nuclear contamination of the Arctic Ocean has become one of the most hotly debated topics in international forums, especially those related to interrelations among Arctic-rim countries.[275] Currently, the pressure on Russia to solve this problem is applied not only through the relevant international organizations (e.g., the LC, IAEA, and IMO) but also through other channels on a bilateral and multilateral basis. For example, in the Declaration on the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, the emphasis was placed on "the importance of international cooperation in the following areas: expanded monitoring of ecology and radioactivity in the Region; enhanced work on the operational safety of nuclear facilities; rehabilitation of the areas that have been polluted as a result of the operation of nuclear facilities."[276] The issues of nuclear dumping in the former Soviet Union also stay high on the agenda of the newly-formed Arctic Council.[277] For solutions of this kind, international financial arrangements in addition to national financial contributions, may be considered with a view to finding cost-effective solutions.[278] One example of such an approach might be an agreement on the establishment of a special fund to clear up nuclear waste at the Kola Peninsula between the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and President Yeltsin, reached in the course of his official visit to Norway in April 1996.[279]

Soon after Russia released the information on its dumping practices, many policy specialists believed that new opportunities for developing sound international environmental regulations would ensue. There was, perhaps, a naive impression that the major obstacles to international cooperation in the field of handling nuclear wastes were over with the end of the Cold War. Recent developments show, however, that in spite of these potential opportunities, several major new problems have arisen.

---

274 Joint US-Russian Announcement on Environmental Protection in the Arctic. Office of the Press Secretary. The White House, September 28, 1994.

275 See Broadus and Vartanov (eds.), *op. cit*; Olav S. Stokke and Ola Tunander (eds.), *The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe*, PRIO, 1994.

276 Declaration. on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Adopted at a Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kirkenes (Norway) 11.1.1993, 10 p.

277 See Stephen Dale, "New Arctic Body Grapples with External Pressures," in *glas:ips.english*, September 29, 1996.

278 Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, "Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk County," Bellona Report, Volume I, 1994, 162 pp.

279 Andrei Ivanov, "Researcher Faces Treason Charge Thursday," by *igc:newsdesk* in *glas:ips.english*, April 5, 1996.

Despite a willingness on the part of Russia to cooperate, there still exist serious problems in storing solid nuclear wastes as well as in handling liquid nuclear waste using adsorbents.[280] There are plans to build a geological repository either on the Kola Peninsula or on Novaya Zemlya, but construction has not yet started and estimates for the cost of one repository range from 100 to 200 million dollars. There are also plans (presently classified) to build cost-effective and environmentally safe repositories at Novaya Zemlya using underground nuclear explosions, but these have come into conflict with Russia's participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.[281] Periodic transportations of used nuclear fuel from the Kola Peninsula to the reprocessing plant Mayak in Siberia cannot solve the problem, since their number, due to financial and technical reasons, has been reduced to a minimum (3-4 compared to ten annual shipments until 1993), and they can fulfill only the acute needs for used fuel storage capacity.[282]

It is clear that Russia's strategy includes seeking funds from Western countries to provide assistance on this issue. The West, however, and especially the United States, has demonstrated a reluctance to shoulder the full burden, as it is believed that this would only serve to diminish what is substantially Russia's internal responsibility. It has been posited by the US representative to the LC that Russia still has enough resources to maintain and develop its nuclear naval capabilities on a high-priority level. The problem is seen by the US primarily as a matter of reallocation of Russia's priorities to "immediately build and quickly have in place adequate storage and processing facilities."[283]

As of today, because of the lack of such facilities, Russia is still unable to completely eliminate ocean dumping of nuclear wastes. According to several experts' assessments, the

---

[280] There is a pressing need to provide adequate modern equipment for the treatment of solid radioactive waste, including efficient compactors to reduce the volume of such waste. It is necessary to make urgent decisions about the siting and technical specifications for storage sites and disposal sites for radioactive waste of different levels of radioactivity. The absence of such decisions increases the potential risk for the uncontrolled release of radioactivity ("Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference on the Protection of Russia's Northern and Arctic Environment. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter," LC.2/346, 31 October 1994).

[281] See V. Litovkin, "Yadernyi vzryv...," *op. cit.*

[282] Igor Kudrik, "Nuclear wastes piling up at Kola," *The Russian Nuclear Fleet - updated: 05.03.97* (Bellona WWW Home Page).

[283] Remarks by Ambassador David A. Colson, United States Representative, London Convention. London, November 1993.

existing bilateral and multilateral programs can at best somewhat alleviate the severity of the problem. For example, Finland is supplying a mobile facility for the treatment of liquid radioactive wastes, to be installed at Andreev Bay in 1997, but its capacity does not exceed 100 cubic meters monthly; for comparison, the total processing needs of "Atomflot" and the Northern Fleet are in the area of 5,000 cubic meters annually.[284]

Still, as the events of 1995-96 have clearly demonstrated, a significant stumbling block on the way of dealing with the threat of massive radioactive contamination in the Russian North is of neither financial nor technical nature. Rather, it is related to persistent efforts by the Russian military (and especially by the commanders of the Northern Fleet), aided by the security forces, to plug any leaks of embarrassing information on the environmental situation in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk provinces and to intimidate ecoactivists into giving up their attempts to expose the fleet's neglect of nuclear safety.

The attempts to restrict public access to information on nuclear dumping in the North started almost immediately after major facts became public knowledge. While the authors of the governmental "White Paper" proposed future monitoring at the dump sites that could pose a threat of nuclear radiation leaks, Russian military circles, and in particular the Atomic energy ministry, have repeatedly tried to block further investigations, and succeeded in preventing international research expeditions from conducting further research on the dumping sites[285]. Also, after a four-year struggle between Russia's new nuclear inspectorate - Gosatomnadzor (GAN) - and the Defense Ministry, the military has finally succeeded in preventing GAN from having access to military nuclear sites dealing with nuclear weapons or nuclear powered submarines[286]. Yielding to military pressure, in July 1995 President Yeltsin issued Decree No. 350, relieving GAN of any responsibility for monitoring safety during the development,

---

284 Igor Kudrik, "Finnish processing facility to the Northern Fleet," *The Russian Nuclear Fleet - updated: 07.03.97* (Bellona WWW Home Page).

285 Judith Perera, "Battle over dumped Soviet radioactive waste continues," by *cdp:newsdesk* in *glas:ips.english*, September 16, 1993.

286 In 1991, President Yeltsin made GAN responsible for the safety of all nuclear enterprises and organisations, including those of the Russian Defence Ministry, and its very first inspections showed that there were serious problems at these sites, especially with respect to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, as well as the dismantling and disposal of decommissioned nuclear-powered ships and submarines. In 1993, GAN produced a damning report on conditions at nuclear submarine facilities in the Arctic. This resulted in the Defence Ministry refusing entry to any other facilities.

production, testing, maintenance, storage and disposal of nuclear weapons and military-related nuclear power units.[287]

These developments culminated in a campaign of harassment and intimidation by Russian security services against the Norwegian environmental NGO "Bellona" and its Russian collaborators, which started just the day after the former Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed a cooperation protocol on greater information sharing in nuclear matters with Norway. At that time, the attacks on environmentalists were only a part of a growing crackdown against critics of the government, resurrecting an ugly practice of arresting and prosecuting dissidents from the Soviet past.[288] In the course of this campaign, officials have been quick to cite "state secrets" as a reason for withholding information or persecuting people who reveal it - despite the fact that, according to the Russian constitution, information on emergencies and catastrophes that threaten the safety of citizens, as well as information on the environment, health and demography, may not be classified.[289]

The campaign has demonstrated that, charged with taking care of large quantities of dangerous nuclear waste, and denied adequate funds, the Northern Fleet commanders are increasingly inclined to defend themselves through free-lance acts of aggression against perceived enemies within the country - whether local electricity supply companies, or environmental activists. Most alarming of all, however, were two facts. First, the Russian government has initially turned a deaf ear to Nikitin's case, making no move either to deal with the threat of massive radioactive contamination or to end the menace to civil liberties, and was forced to release Nikitin on his own recognisance only under the pressure of international opinion. Second, neither the State Duma, dominated by Communists and authoritarian nationalists, nor the major part of the Russian press have shown a significant interest in the Nikitin case.[290] These facts amply demonstrated the lack of public and

---

287 See E. Nesterov, A. Ioirysh, Yu. Rogozhin. "Voyennyi atom na samokontrole," *Segodnia*, No. 199, October 14, 1995.

288 The espionage charges against nuclear safety campaigner Aleksandr Nikitin were followed by a flurry of restrictions on environmental activists. Four Norwegian *Bellona* members were banned indefinitely from entering St. Petersburg, two Norwegian journalists were denied visas to travel to Murmansk, and a shipment of 1,500 copies of the controversial *Bellona* report was seized by customs officials (R. Clarke, "Russia: Nikitin Freed, But Charges Remain," by *áustgreen* in *glas:env.cis*, January 11, 1997).

289 See R. Clarke, "Protests Follow Jailing of Russian Anti-Nuclear Researcher," by *austgreen* in *glas:env.cis*, February 27, 1996.

290 See R. Clarke, "Espionage Charges Laid Against Russian Eco-Campaigner," by *austgreen* in *glas:env.cis*, October 7, 1996.

governmental concern not only about the threat of radioactive contamination of the North, but about the defense of constitutional rights and ensuring public participation in decision-making processes as well.

Thus, with no quick solutions in sight, Russia may again resort to dumping nuclear wastes into the oceans. Whether this action might constitute a violation of international law has become the subject of active discussion among specialists in the field. In any case, such an action would again bring Russia under heavy international pressure from different governments, environmental groups, and the public to halt such disposal methods. It is unclear how Russian authorities would react, given the complexities of Russia's internal political situation.

Because of scientific uncertainty as to the nature, extent, and long-term environmental consequences of radioactivity in the oceans, it is difficult to predict whether the environmental threat associated with Russia's Arctic nuclear dump sites will materialize, undermining environmental security in the context of the NSR. At the present time this appears not to be the case, provided that no further dumping occurs (the last such incident was in 1992), no new striking revelations of the past dumping or current mishandling of radioactive wastes would surface, and that international and domestic efforts in handling nuclear waste will eventually succeed.[291] Nonetheless, it is clear that safe operation of the NSR will require adequate monitoring and scientific and ecological evaluation of existing sites, as well as close study of radioactivity levels in the deltas of some northern rivers, especially the Ob.

Environmental Threats Associated with Natural Resources' Development

In the course of a painful transition to a market economy, the commercial use of the Arctic (primarily fossil fuel) resources is clearly acquiring a higher priority compared to

---

[291] The evidence of the current environmental effects of nuclear wastes dumping in the Arctic seas is controversial. On the one hand, speaking at one of the scientific forums on nuclear contamination in the Arctic Ocean, Mr. T. Berntsen, Norway's Minister of Environment, noted that studies resulting from three recent joint Norwegian-Russian expeditions concluded that nuclear waste dumped east of Novaya Zemlya had little effect on the environment, and that contamination was limited to areas close to the dumped material and that there has been no impact on the main body of the Kara and Barents seas (OMRI Daily Digest, No. 163, 22 August 1995). On the other hand, the director of the Kola Research Institute of Marine Life, Professor Gennadii Matishev, claimed that the level of radioactive contamination in the Kola Bay is higher than in the area of the Norwegian Sea where the *Komsomolets* submarine sank, due to the fact that nuclear waste once dumped into the sea had accumulated in hollows on the bottom of the gulf, posing a serious threat both to marine life and to the local population (OMRI Daily Digest No. 171, 1 September 1995).

environmental and social aspects, because of the severe economic crisis in the country and the destructive character of economic "reforms" geared towards maximizing income from oil and gas exports to finance the budget deficit and luxury imports for the well-off at the expense of environmental devastation.[292] So, while the end of the cold war has brought unprecedented opportunities for addressing environmental problems in the Arctic, it has also given birth to new challenges to the Arctic environment connected with the increasing resource development as a consequence of the Russian push towards market economy and the new joint East-West ventures.[293] By facilitating access of Western companies to abundant offshore and onshore oil and gas resources of the Russian Arctic, particularly those in the Barents and Kara Seas, INSROP will at the same time tremendously increase technogenic pressure on the fragile Arctic ecosystems already functioning at critical levels and will further exacerbate the conflict between the vulnerable northern environment and the indiscriminate industrial development policies pursued for decades in the former Soviet Union.

The magnitude of environmental threats associated with this development has been vividly demonstrated by a series of disastrous oil spills in the Komi Republic, occurring because an oil pipeline was kept in service for 19 years - long after it was plainly in dangerous condition. Even when the pipeline entered a phase of rapid disintegration (by September 6, 1994, 62 holes had been discovered!), Russian and Western oil firms kept pumping oil through it at high pressure.[294] As a result, an estimated 90,000-120,000 tons of oil leaked from defective pipelines, polluting the Pechora River basin which flows into the Arctic Ocean and contaminating 45 to 65 hectares of pastures and swamps. The cost of the clean up operation ran into dozens of millions of dollars, financed by the specialized loan of $110 million from the World Bank, guaranteed by the Russian government and to be repaid within 15 years.[295] However, this loan is nowhere near enough, especially when compared with the $2.3 billion spent on the *Exxon Valdez* disaster in Alaska in 1989, which was a quarter the size of the

---

[292] The revenues from the export of the Northern resources still account for over 50 per cent of the total Russian hard currency earnings (M. Nikolaev, "Arktika vzyvaet k mirovomu soobshchestvu," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, October 20, 1994, p. 5).

[293] Caron, David D., "Toward an Arctic Environmental Regime," *Ocean Development and International Law* 1993, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 377-392.

[294] Renfrey Clarke, "Reform" as Ecocide: behind the Russian Oil Disaster," in *glas:env.cis*, November 11 1994.

[295] The privatized "Komineft" oil company which operates the ruptured pipeline is close to bankruptcy: Its outstanding payments to employees at the end of 1994 exceeded 25 billion rubles ($5.5 m), and there are indications that the World Bank loan money is being spent for purposes totally unrelated to clean up or the modernization of the dilapidated pipeline network (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 28, 1994; *Segodnia*, May 6, 1995).

Komi spill. Still, there were no signs that foreign oil firms using the pipeline at the time of the spill - firms that included Gulf Canada, British Gas and Conoco - were contributing to the cleanup effort.

At the same time as using worn-out pipelines, oil industry managers, needing to maximize export sales, have a strong inducement to keep pumping at full pressure. The multinational oil companies have negotiated a credit system whereby they get paid, barrel for barrel, for every drop of oil pumped into the head of the pipeline. The companies get their profits regardless of whether the oil reaches a refinery or is spilt into the environment. And as the pipeline is owned and operated by the Russian company Komineft, the multinationals can claim they have no responsibility for any of the spills.[296]

With the federal government, local authorities and oil company executives all sharing an interest in taking enormous risks, new disasters are inevitable. And as more and more pipelines reach a state of near-disintegration, the number of such catastrophes can only increase.[297] Ecological activists now regard Russia's decaying oil pipeline system as one of the major threats to the country's environmental security. According to various estimates, 25 to 70 per cent of pipelines in Russia are overdue for replacement or in a positively dangerous condition[298]; more than 10 per cent of them are over 35 years old, and 70 per cent are more than 10 years old.[299] The overall "technological" oil losses in Western Siberia alone are officially estimated at 1.8 to 15 million tons annually; of these, no less than 30 per cent end up in the aquatic environment.[300] The former chairman of the Interagency Committee on Environmental Security, Academician Yablokov claimed that the ferocious development of Tyumen oil fields has resulted in the flow of oil to the Arctic seas which exceeded the volume of oil spilled into the oceans as a result of all the marine accidents combined. Greenpeace cites figures indicating that as much as 8-10 per cent of the oil pumped into Russian pipelines pours out en route, with annual flows into the environment ranging from 25 to 50 million tons.[301] If this information is anywhere near correct, many hundreds of square kilometers of Russian territory are rendered lifeless each year.

---

296 "Multinational companies exploiting Russian oil," Greenpeace Press Release, 15 November 1994.

297 Clarke, 1994, *op.cit.*

298 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, December 28, 1994.

299 R. Clarke, "Thaw Brings New Phase in Russian Oil Spill Disaster," May 4, 1995 by *austgreen* in *glas:env.cis.*

300 Poryadin, A.F. "Sever: Zhizn' trebuet povorota k ekologizatsii politiki gosudarstva," *Zelionyi Mir*, 1995, No. 5, p. 4-5.

301 Clarke, 1994, *op.cit.*

Prior to the series of spills in Usinsk, the two largest oil spills have both occurred in Tyumen Province in western Siberia. In the south of the province in 1989 around 500,000 tons poured out. In May-June 1993 in the Khanty-Mansi National District an estimated 420,000 tons were spilt; much of this oil finished up in the Ob river, which flows into the Arctic Ocean. Neither accident was widely reported. Although the first of these mega-spills occurred during Soviet times, one could hardly suppose that the environmental havoc now being wrought by the Russian oil industry is essentially a remnant from the past. "To the grim environmental legacy of "barracks socialism," the "feral capitalism" of today is adding a new dimension of destructiveness."[302]

Whereas in the Soviet era the pressures from planning bureaucrats to maximize oil output were at least accompanied by relatively adequate funding, today investment in renewing infrastructure has fallen drastically, while the demands of the planners have been replaced by no less intense pressures from shareholders and tax officials. The tax burden, amounting to 89 per cent of the total revenues, is leaving the oil enterprises without the minimum funds they need for their functioning and development[303] and forces the managers in the industry to cut investment to the bone, with cutbacks often extended to failing to repair or renew existing infrastructure, including pipelines.

There is hardly any prospect of foreign investors paying for a huge program of renewing the Russian oil industry and replacing thousands of kilometers of pipelines. This is a task that will have to be carried out mainly on the basis of funds originating within Russia itself. But if this wealth is to be accumulated, and directed into essential investment, a different model of reform will be required, probably resting on a different disposition of political and social forces. The real cost of persisting with the present "reforms" may well turn out to be far greater: environmental destruction of unprecedented scope, with its consequences persisting well into the twenty-first century.

The new wave of industrial expansion into the Russian North, involving Western capital and Western companies, is already under way. US and Western European oil corporations are currently securing large contracts in the Russian Arctic. One reason for their enthusiasm for developing this area appears to be that this enables them to sidestep new strengthened US environmental regulations. In a recent call to Western oil and gas developers, World Wildlife Fund has urged companies to confine activities in the Russian Arctic to areas that have already

---

302 *Ibidem.*

303 B. Urigashvili, "Dyra v trube: Pripoliarnyi Usinsk na fone ekologicheskogo bedstviya," *Izvestiya*, No. 108, June 15, 1995.

been industrialized, rather than develop new oil and gas reserves in other pristine areas. No matter how "safe" these developments are, they might eventually destroy valuable natural habitat and fragile Arctic ecosystems.[304] This underlines the urgency of the need to improve safety standards for both environmental and human health at the international level in order to enhance environmental security in the Arctic.

Conclusion

The present-day understanding of national security in Russia has its deep ideological, geopolitical, social and economic roots, though this term itself has been introduced in the political discourse relatively recently. This notion is a product of a long evolution of political thinking and of a compromise between the views of a large spectrum of political forces. Some of its points are formulated in general terms, some are controversial, but it is important that national security is interpreted as an integrated notion combining not only military-strategic, but also economic, environmental and cultural, internal and external (international) components.

Whatever government comes to power in Russia, this approach towards its policy in the Arctic will remain valid, although the hierarchy of elements composing the national security package may change. It will necessarily be a result of the growing economic importance of the Arctic, the objective necessity to maintain and to increase the already achieved degree of openness in the region, in order to guarantee that the Arctic could retain its functions as one of the main suppliers of fuel and raw materials for domestic needs and exports, to restructure the economy of Northern regions, to stop further degradation of its environment threatening the global environmental situation, and, finally, to comply with international commitments. The composition of actors which influence the policy making in the Arctic region becomes more and more complicated, but in spite of new conflicts emerging from these developments, it will make Russian Arctic politics more balanced and foreseeable. The authors tend to hold the opinion that the probability of events developing according to the first, "optimistic" scenario is somewhat higher at the time of writing compared to the second, "pessimistic" option.

At the same time, despite the recent official adoption of the concept of national security, there is still no consensus among the Russian political elite as to the necessary elements of and the approach to security policy. It means that the security policy in Russia continues to depend on the ideological orientation of the administration in power and to be a matter of reaction to the perceived crises and priorities of international and domestic politics. The substance of the national security policy still depends upon uncertain relations among Russia's rapidly shifting

[304] "World Wildlife Fund Statement on Russian Oil Spill," in *wwf.news*, 26 October 1994.

and proliferating domestic political forces. For the foreseeable future, all parties will continue to be preoccupied with multiple domestic economic and social problems, such as Russia's worsening economic crisis, increasing rates of crime and poverty among a significant portion of the population, and the increasingly important role played by the Russian business elite which needs protection and support both domestically and in its international dealings.

Environmental concerns appear destined to play a much more prominent role in Russian security policy than ever before, but the relevant institutions must become much more firmly established and developed before they can do so effectively. This process is furthest advanced in the Arctic, especially in the European part of the Russian Arctic, where the environmental aspects of Russian security are becoming well recognized and policy formulation has benefited from a significant degree of international cooperation in recent years. Even here, however - and perhaps especially in this very heavily militarized and industrialized region - there is little prospect of the environment soon taking precedence over the traditional Russian/Soviet emphasis on the economic and military components of national security policy. The opening up of the NSR for international navigation presents a unique opportunity for Russian decision makers to bring together issues of economic, military and environmental security and to develop integrated approaches towards comprehensive security in the Arctic region.

CHAPTER 3

ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN ARCTIC WATERS: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

By Franklyn Griffiths

This paper is prompted by a need to anticipate and possibly respond to the environmental consequences of substantial year-round international shipping through Russia's Northern Sea Route (NSR). It seeks to develop a Canadian perspective on the question of whether or not to define and make use of a concept of environmental security. The Canadian Coast Guard is currently taking the lead in an international effort to harmonize national rules for ships and navigation in Arctic waters. If successful, these talks will help to secure Russia's Arctic marine environment against ship-related pollution in ways that are not now available. But, as will be seen, this was not what moved the Canadian Coast Guard to take the initiative. In fact, as of the late1990s hardly anyone in Canada is thinking about the use of Russia's Arctic waters for bulk transit between Europe and the Far East or, for that matter, between the Russian north and Western Europe.[305] This is neither a public policy issue nor one that is taking much official time behind the scenes in Canada. Nor, for that matter, have the Coast Guard and other relevant government departments — Environment, Foreign Affairs, National Defence — regarded environmental protection in the Arctic or elsewhere as a "security" matter. Mention the Arctic, and the reflexive Canadian response is likely to be framed in terms not so much of security as of sovereignty, this largely as a consequence of the long-standing perceived need to defend against incursions by the United States.[306] Mention "environmental security" in Canada, and almost always the response is, "What do you mean?" One analyst has offered a definition.[307] Another, a world leader in the international discussion

---

[305] A partial exception: John Hannigan, Jan Drent, and Oleg Shakov, "Commercializing the Northern Sea Route: Implications for Future Development of Shipping Along the Mackenzie River," *Occasional Paper* 2, Research Centre for Canada and the Soviet Successor States (Ottawa: Carleton University, December 1994).

[306] Shelagh D. Grant, *Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), and Gordon W. Smith, *Canada's Arctic Archipelago: 100 Years of Canadian Jurisdiction* (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1980). The Arctic security story is recounted in Ron Purver, "The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy, 1945 to the Present," in David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1995), 81-110.

of environment and security, avoids reference to the term, preferring "environmental scarcity" instead.[308] A senior official in the policy planning unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs regards "environmental security" as a flatulence that ought to be suppressed; his successor, however, is favourably disposed to consideration of the environment as "an element of security."[309]

In the Canadian case, there is no natural fit between the three words "environment," "security" and "Arctic." "Environment" and "Arctic" are wholly compatible. So also are "Arctic" and "security" in the military-strategic sense of security which is however declining in significance. But "environment" and "security" are a mismatch. The question for the inquiry that follows is not how Canadians might conceive of international efforts to secure the Arctic marine environment or the NSR in particular in the years ahead. The question is whether Canadians or for that matter anyone should be employing a discourse of security in seeking to understand and act upon environmental problems.

As of the late 1990s, Canadians speak with varying degrees of knowledgeability and frequency about civil, collective, common, comprehensive, cooperative, cultural, demographic, ecological, economic, energy, food, global, human, military, national, personal, political, regional, shared, and subregional as well as environmental security. A security perspective on the environment requires us to consider the environment as one of many but as yet unspecified interdependent variables whose interconnections are still to be determined. It also requires us to specify which human activities that have a bearing on the physical

---

307 Michel Frédérick, "La sécurité environnementale: éléments de définition," *Revue Études internationales* 24, No. 4 (1993), 753-765. Environmental security here (761) is "for the state, an absence of non-conventional threats to the environmental substrate that is essential to the well-being of its population and to the maintenance of its functional integrity." At Laval University, Paul Painchaud has spearheaded the creation of an International Institute for Environmental Strategies, an international consortium of some 70 universities. The Institute has held conferences on aspects of "environmental security" in various parts of the world, established regional seminars, and is bringing out a journal, *Environment and Security*. As well, at the University of Victoria, the Centre for Sustainable Regional Development has sponsored research on the regional dimensions of environment and security. Neither institution has yet made a discernible mark on the Canadian discourse.

308 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, interview at the University of Toronto, April 2, 1996. See also his "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," in *International Security* 19, No. 2 (1994), 5-40. Homer-Dixon is director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme at the University of Toronto. For discussion of his international role, see chapter 5.

309 Telephone conversations with Gary Soroka and Robert McRae, Policy Planning, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 13 September 1994 and 21 February 1996.

environment are to be understood as matters of security, which are not, and why. We could regard all of this as an invitation to enter an intellectual and policy bog, when all along the scientific and applied understanding of ecosystems and the accumulating practical experience with "sustainable development" offer a more promising way ahead. But let us not jump to conclusions. A reappraisal of the meanings of security is now under way in Canada and around the world. We may just gain something from the evolving discussion of security that cannot be had from other approaches to safeguarding the environment. We may learn something about security.

Canadian Security Perspectives, 1945-1997

If a concept of environmental security is to be of value in a Canadian setting, it should be fashioned in a way that resonates with established Canadian approaches to the pursuit of security. A summary account of security thinking in Canada since World War II might be rendered in five paragraphs as follows.

Not long after 1945, Canadians became heavily occupied with a military-technical or restrictive concept of national security.[310] Though also alert to sovereignty challenges from the United States in the Arctic and in other domains, the Soviet Union was soon perceived as the overriding security threat and a threat which was defined principally in military terms. Canadian international behaviour accordingly conformed to requirements of alliance, deterrence, and containment. This perspective, which may loosely be referred to as "collective security," proved to be exceedingly durable.[311] As of the early 1970s, Canadians became increasingly aware of the deterioration of the global environment. This was not however regarded as a "security" matter, nor were threats to the Arctic environment in particular. In 1970, nevertheless, the Canadian government performed what was *prima facie* an outstanding act of environmental security when it promulgated the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act which is discussed in some detail later in this essay.[312]

---

310 For background, see David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, "Canada's International Security Policy," and David G. Haglund, "Changing Conceptions and Trends in International Security," both in Dewitt and Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada's International Security Policy*, 1-30 and 31-50, respectively.

311 On collective security: Harald von Riekhoff, "Canada and Collective Security," *ibid.*, 227-250.

312 John Kirton and Don Munton, "The Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath," in Franklyn Griffiths (ed.), *Politics of the Northwest Passage* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 67-97.

What with the waning and then the abrupt end of the Cold War, Canadians began in the 1990s to incorporate hitherto unconventional threats — economic, environmental, demographic and so on — into what promised to become an extended national security concept.[313] At the same time, they became increasingly aware — or at least some of the attentive minority did — of interconnections among varied levels on which security-related phenomena and activities were manifested (global, regional, national, local).[314] Oil spills, global warming, ozone depletion, and other processes combined to accentuate Canadian awareness of the natural environment, the Arctic and indeed the circumpolar Arctic included.[315] Though "sustainable

---

313 See, for example, David B. Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific," CANCAPS *Papier* 3 (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1994); *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994); Franklyn Griffiths, "The Greening of Security Intelligence," *Policy Options* 12, No. 6 (1991), 17-19; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security* 16, No. 2 (1991), 76-119; and Kim Richard Nossal, "Seeing Things? The Adornment of 'Security' in Australia and Canada," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 49, No. 1 (1995), 33-48 which considers the bureaucratic interest of ministries of foreign affairs vis-à-vis defence ministries in widening the notion of security.

314 Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," is particularly emphatic on the significance of the regional level. See also Paul Painchaud, "The Problem of Levels of Analysis in the Study of Environmental Security," *Newsletter*, International Consortium for the Study of Environmental Security (Quebec: Laval University, October 1992), 2-3.

315 Leslie Beckmann, "Marine Conservation in the Canadian Arctic," *Northern Perspectives* 22 (1994), 33-39; Robert E. Bedeski, "Unconventional Security Threats: An Overview," NPCSSD *Working Paper* 11 (Toronto: NPCSD Research Programme, York University, 1992); *Canada's National Report on Climate Change: Actions to Meet Commitments Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994); Citizens' Inquiry into Peace and Security, *Transformation Moment: A Canadian View of Common Security* (Toronto: Project Ploughshares, 1994); David Cox and Tariq Rauf, *Security Cooperation in the Arctic: A Canadian Response to Murmansk* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1989); Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Report of Canada to the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994); Forum on Canada's International Relations, "Report of the National Forum on Canada's International Relations," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 2, No 1 (1994), 163-175; Timothy Goos and Geoffrey Wall, "Impacts of Climate Change on Resource Management in the North" (Downsview: Atmospheric Environment Service, 1994); Franklyn Griffiths, "Epilogue: Civility in the Arctic," in Griffiths (ed.), *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North* (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), 279-309; Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, *The Arctic Environment Strategy: An Action Plan* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991); John Lamb (ed.), *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1994); Min Yong Lee, "Resource Supplies and Dependence in the North Pacific: An

development" was now the preferred concept in dealing with environmental issues, the term "environmental security" also appeared from time to time as a buzzword in public policy discourse.[316]

As of mid-1994, Canadian thinking about security was very much in flux. The advocates of a particular Canadian perspective on "common security" had abruptly risen to prominence.[317] Others favoured "cooperative security."[318] Still others held to "collective security" and a traditional concern with multilateral political-military institutions in Europe.[319] Overall,

---

Ecological Analysis of Unconventional Security Issues," NPCSD *Working Paper* 10 (Toronto: NPCSD Research Programme, York University, 1992); and E. F. Roots, "The Arctic Region: Challenges and Opportunities," in *Arctic Challenges: Report of the Nordic Council's Parliamentary Conference at Reykjavik*, 16-17 August 1993 (Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1993), 143-154.

316 A.D. Bryce, "Environmental Security: Implications for Canada," *internal report* (Ottawa: Environment Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, June 15, 1994); A.-G. Elmekki, "Environment, Security and Foreign Policy" (Ottawa: IDRP, 1994); and Frederick, "La securite environnementale." Mention should also be made of Joan DeBardeleben and John Hannigan (eds.), *Environmental Security and Quality after Communism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Successor States* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), which is however a collection of disparate essays written without benefit of a common analytical framework.

317 See, for example, *Canada 21*. Security is seen to be common in that the wellbeing and safety of Canadians depend on the capacity to cooperate in resolving tightly interconnected military, economic, environmental, and other transboundary processes which serve to obliterate the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, and which necessitate new policy responses if Canadians are to make the most of their capacity to secure themselves by contributing to the safety of all.

318 Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security." Cooperative security focuses "on inclusiveness, preventive diplomacy, reassurance, confidence-building, functional cooperation, shared concerns, and the effort to build shared norms" in order to strengthen both military and non-military security and "to complement, co-exist with, and in some instances replace, bilateral security arrangements." *Ibid.*, 14 and 21.

319 For instance, John Halstead, "International Security Institutions: NATO and the CSCE," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 2, No. 1 (1994), 45-62. The term collective security has long served as a synonym for collective defence through membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. As such, it has drawn attention to multilateral military and other contributions to national security against identified and potential threats external to the Alliance. With the end of the Cold War, collective security shows signs of coming to mean joint enforcement and humanitarian intervention under the United Nations as well as NATO against threats to stability arising from *within* the framework of either organization. Von Riekhoff, "Canada and Collective Security," 228, and David G. Haglund, "Changing Concepts and Trends in International Security," also in Dewitt and

Canadian foreign political and economic relations were less and less oriented to Europe, and increasingly to continental North America and to the Asia-Pacific region where cooperative security thinking was most pronounced. Similarly, in contrast to their self-image as an Atlantic country, Canadians had become increasingly aware of themselves as inhabitants of a three-ocean land, this being due in part to the intrusive transit of the U.S. icebreaker *Polar Sea* through Northwest Passage in 1985, in part to the effort of the Conservative government in the late 1980s to justify the acquisition of a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines by reference to their capability for under-ice operation in a larger strategic interplay which is discussed in chapter 6. More important still, Canadians were witnessing a sea change in aboriginal participation in the policy process as seen in moves toward self-government in the Eastern Arctic (Nunavut), in aboriginal participation in Canadian delegations to intergovernmental meetings, and in the appointment of Mary Simon — a former president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference — to the position of Canadian Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs. In the Arctic, too, Canada had begun to act decisively on its earlier commitment to gain acceptance by other regional states of an Arctic Council or central intergovernmental institution for multilateral collaboration on civil or non-military issues of common concern.[320] Such issues, the environment included, were neither conceived of nor presented in terms of "security," which was reserved for military matters which the proposed Council was to steer clear of by common consent among the parties.

In these circumstances, the clear predominance of a restrictive national security concept seemed gone for good. But what would take its place was by no means certain. The government had initiated all-party parliamentary reviews of foreign and defence policy early in 1994. These yielded separate public reports in October and November of that year, and then in December a White Paper on defence which saw the government hold to a business-as-usual view of national security.[321] In the foreign policy White Paper which appeared in February

---

Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada's International Security Policy*, 36-40. In no way, again, should we assume the existence of hard and fast distinctions between common, cooperative, and collective security in Canadian thinking and practice. In particular, where cooperative and collective security were concerned, Canadians were likely to have had both in mind, the emphasis depending upon the circumstance.

320 *To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report* (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1991), and David Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council Security," *Policy Library* 1 (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1996).

321 *Security in a Changing World: Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994); *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future. Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's*

1995, the transition to an extended national security concept was affirmed in language that embraced the "need to adopt a broader concept of security encompassing both military and non-military factors."[322] And yet, no one could say just what the broader "concept" was, and how it related to the Defence White Paper's emphasis on multi-purpose combat-capable armed forces in making Canada secure.

Nor was the situation much clearer a couple of years later. As of spring 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was speaking of "sustainable human security," sometimes reduced to "human security."[323] Despite an apparent resonance with the thinking of the United Nations Human Development Program, these terms served more to focus and gain attention for an altered foreign policy agenda, than to convey any precise understanding of what the agenda was or of what was meant for "security."[324] Meanwhile, on the circumpolar front, the Arctic Council had now been established, in September 1996, with a mission to further the sustainable

---

Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994); and National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994).

322 *Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1995), 8.

323 "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Statement* 96/37, 24 September 1996; "Building Peace to Last: Establishing a Canadian Peace-building Initiative. Notes for an Address... at York University," *ibid.*, 96/46, 30 October 1996; "Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Notes for an Address... to a Meeting of the National Forum on Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, 96/57, 13 December 1996; and "Notes for an Address... on Sustainable Development in Canadian Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, 97/21, 17 April 1997.

324 For example: "The recent series of UN conferences in New York, Rio, Vienna, Cairo, Copenhagen, Beijing and Istanbul have served both to define the concept of sustainable human security and to bring home the growing challenges to the security of the individual. The road map is clear; we do not need to study it any further. Now is the time to move forward in a concerted, comprehensive way... Sustainable human security means providing basic needs in both economic and political ways. It means ensuring quality of life and equity, it means protection of fundamental human rights." "Notes... to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations." Or: "The basic premise behind 'human security' is that human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance and social equity are as important to global peace as are arms control and disarmament. In other words, that security should be measured in terms of the ultimate outcome for individuals and peoples, rather than in terms of the number of arms control agreements signed." "Notes... on Sustainable Development in Canadian Foreign Policy." What we have here is the work of the Minister's speechwriters, done without supporting analysis and integrative study such as had occurred within the ministry prior to the appearance of "cooperative security." Personal communication with the Office of the Minister, 1 May 1997.

development and environmental protection of the region, and with a proviso not to consider "matters related to military security."[325] As well, within Canada the rudiments of an inter-agency mechanism for Arctic policy coordination had been created with the formation in 1996 of an Interdepartmental Committee for Circumpolar Affairs.[326] Chaired by the Circumpolar Ambassador, this body had met only a few times as of March 1997, primarily for show-and-tell discussion at a junior level. On the other hand, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade was just about to publish a voluminous report on Canada's circumpolar relations which would recommend a very substantial expansion of the northern foreign policy agenda, and a series of supporting institutional developments within the country. Here, too, little would be said about security, and much about sustainable development.[327]

An account along these lines is certainly not without merit. But more needs to be said if we are to have much more than a surface understanding of Canadian behaviour. A first problem stems from the presentation of Canadian perspectives on international security in terms of progression from one kind of "national security concept" to another. This would imply a view of decision and decision-making in which those in authority not only act with a high degree of purpose, which of course they do, but are guided and even driven by abstract concepts. This however is not a fruitful way to look at the Canadian policy process.[328] Nor in reality are we

---

325 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," *WWF Bulletin*, No. 4, 1996, 4-5.

326 Staffed by the Circumpolar Liaison Directorate of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Interdepartmental Committee's purpose is "to provide the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs with an interdepartmental forum for advice and consultation on policy development and co-ordination concerning Arctic issues." As such, it is to "assist in the formulation and the development of the Canadian government's policy and strategy related to international Arctic issues; advise on domestic implications of international Arctic issues; provide a mechanism of consultation; and promote greater awareness of international Arctic issues and relations among federal departments." Its membership includes Heritage Canada, Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Health Canada, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Industry Canada, National Defence, Natural Resources Canada, Privy Council Office, and Transport Canada. "Interdepartmental Committee on Circumpolar Affairs: Purposes and Terms of Reference," Circumpolar Liaison Directorate, DIAND, no date. Departmental representation was to be at the assistant deputy minister level, but it had not turned out that way as of early 1997.

327 *Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-first Century*. Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (draft, February 1997).

328 Kim Richard Nossal, "Rationality and Non-Rationality in Canadian Defence Policy," in Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy*, 351-364.

talking about sharply delineated security "concepts" here. Rather, we are faced with conceptions, approaches, or orientations that defy succinct definition and uniform application, as for example from one region of the world to another. As well, Canadians have never been fully wedded to the primacy of a military understanding of security affairs such as is implied by the term "national security." Nor have they been inclined to think in terms of national security, preferring international security instead. In the Canadian case, we are better served by a mode of analysis which examines the content of the policy process in terms of change in the relationship among competing international security perspectives, as distinct from the evolution of a single line of thought among decision-makers, analysts, and the attentive public over the years.

Remoteness from the scene of warfare, comparative military inability, tension between two founding peoples, and the presence of an adjacent and friendly but potentially overwhelming superpower have all conspired to prevent Canadians from becoming resolutely attached to a military view of security. To enlarge upon a metaphor familiar to Canadians, they may not have been living in a fireproof house all these many decades, but they have been living right next to the biggest fire station in the world. How much fire insurance do you buy, year in and year out, when firefighters are permanently on duty but a step away? When you know with total assurance that they will see a fire on your premises as a threat to the fire station itself? Some insurance, certainly. But you are more likely to have problems with the firefighters as neighbours than with fire itself. And your attitude to security is likely to involve more than firefighting.[329]

Being an insular rather than a continental state, Canada has been spared the perennial experience of having to maintain vigilance against reversals of alliance, eruptions of crisis and war, or loss of geopolitical position through altered military balances or setbacks in remote conflicts. To be sure, World War II brought it home again that the country could not be indifferent to the consequences of war and antecedent processes on distant continents. Canadians also came to share in the common insecurity wrought by the appearance of thermonuclear weapons and the apparent lack of any defence against them save through

---

[329] The reference here is to the oft-quoted statement of Senator Raoul Dandurand, made before the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924: "We live in a fireproof house, far from flammable materials." What it was like living next to the fire station during the Cold War years is well captured by John Holmes: "Canada conducts a defence on two fronts. We are of course reluctant to equate the two threats and in fact we don't. The threat from an extra-continental aggressor may be greater to our personal lives, but the threat from the United States is greater to our national existence. The former may be more fatal, but the latter preoccupies us more. The acceptance of this paradox is surely the beginning of wisdom." John W. Holmes, *Canada: A Middle-aged Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 221.

deterrence. The United States provided a militarized, zero-sum language for the discussion of international security affairs after 1945, and Canadians came to speak it fluently. The text of their discourse was replete with attention to and anxiety over the consequences of action and inaction in matters of alliance and crisis, in helping through negotiation to rid the world of the peril of nuclear annihilation, and in working the policy ground between deterrence and reassurance among adversaries. One effect was to contribute to the appearance of the restrictive, oppositional, and Eurocentric conception of collective security. It is with us in the view that, "Diplomacy that is not backed by force will not work."[330] But if the text of Canadian discourse exhibited an affinity for national security thinking as it prevailed among the allies, the subtext was something different.

Together with a manifest notion of collective security, Canadians were also operating for many years with an alternative perspective which stressed dialogue among adversaries, non--military or civil dimensions of security, and participation in multilateral forums to offset and sometimes to moderate the enthusiasms of the firefighters to the south.[331] Canada was thus responsible for Article 2 of the NATO treaty, which casts the Alliance's security commitment in economic and social terms.[332] Ever since, Canadians have been pleased to take responsibility here. In the highly politicized realm of United Nations peacekeeping, Canada also performed an innovative role which helped to position the country in its own mind as a creative and independent international actor. For its part, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided Canada with opportunities, after 1973, to be highly active on behalf of human rights, democratic development, and good governance as dimensions of security. In the Arctic, Canadians fully acknowledged the need for continental defence arrangements with the United States against the military threat posed by the USSR which, however, broadly shared Canada's views on Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic

---

330 Halstead, "International Security Institutions," 47.

331 Holmes, *Canada as a Middle-Aged Power*; Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of the Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, No. 1-2, (1990), 77-98; Kim Richard Nossal, "A European Nation? The Life and Times of Atlanticism in Canada," in John English and Norman Hillmer (eds.), *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), pp.79-102; and Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 15, No. 4 (1982), 667-690.

332 "The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)," *NATO Basic Documents* (Brussels: NATO Publications Series, 1981), 10. For recollection and comment, see Lester B. Pearson, *Mike. The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson* 2 (University of Toronto Press, 1973), 91-97; Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); and John W. Holmes et al., *No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).

waters whose status in international law was challenged by the United States.[333] All the while rather eccentric in their subdued interest in civil differences among allies and in military commonalities among adversaries, Canadians seemed to have an alternative agenda in mind even as decision-makers and the attentive public alike were fully seized with the demands of alliance and deterrence.

As I see it, through to 1990 Canadians were operating not only with an explicit collective security conception, but with a latent alternative. It may be referred to as cooperative security. It was keyed to avoiding the marginalization of Canada among the powers, to securing a place for Canada at the table (including if need be the effort to help build the table in the first place), to providing backing for whatever Canada might say at the table, and above all to supporting and inhabiting multilateral forums so as to maximize the Canadian presence and offset the otherwise immense U.S. influence on Canadian life. If the heart of collective security thinking was oppositional in its fixation on preparation for and prevention of coalition warfare in Europe, cooperative security was positional in its drive to secure for Canada a favourable place among the liberal democracies principally, and in time of peace.

Remaining rather more a diffuse attitude than a conception during the Cold War years, cooperative security was crystallized by officials within the Department of External Affairs in

---

[333] Franklyn Griffiths, "Beyond the Arctic Sublime," in Griffiths, *Politics of the Northwest Passage*, 253. Not too much should be made of the coincidence of Canadian and Soviet interests in the regulation of international legal issues relating to the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route or Northeast Passage. Interests did indeed coincide to the point that while on a stint as senior policy advisor to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1986-1987, it was clear to me that legal officers in the department would strongly favour the presence of a Soviet jurist on a panel of judges if ever the Canadian claim came to international adjudication. Nevertheless, Canada was a NATO ally and the USSR was an adversary with nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of traversing the Canadian Archipelago to reach cruise-missile launch points in the Atlantic Ocean without running the GIUK gap as discussed in chapter 6. Responding to Cox and Rauf, *Security Cooperation in the Arctic*, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared in November 1989 that Soviet Submarines "do not enter the waters of the Canadian archipelago." Purver, "The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy." 99-100. Whatever the value of this statement, a non-prejudicial agreement between Canada and the United States in 1988 had effectively shelved the Arctic sovereignty issue for surface ship transits, but said nothing about possible subsurface use of Canadian waters by U.S. submarines. Christopher Kirkey, "Smoothing Troubled Waters: The 1988 Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement," *International Journal* 50, No. 2 (Spring 1995), 401-426. See also D.M. McRae, "Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction?," *Northern Perspectives* 22, No. 4 (1994-1995), 4-9.

the spring of 1990.[334] Presented in some detail to the United Nations General Assembly later that year, it was already being sidetracked into the parochial job of positioning Canada as a potential trading partner in the Asia-Pacific region.[335] The articulation and then the marginalization of cooperative security thinking in Canada were the responsibility of the Conservative government of the day, which went down to defeat in October 1993. Its Liberal successor came in with a passion for distance from anything closely associated with Conservative rule. This applied to cooperative security, although the new Minister of Foreign Affairs would on occasion be supplied by his officials with speeches containing a fair bit of cooperative security content.[336]

As of mid-1993, Canadian thinking about international security was in irons. It was flapping this way and that as collective security was increasingly regarded as inadequate, as cooperative security had in the words of a supporter been "ghettoized" to the Asia-Pacific, and as the country seemed adrift in a rapidly changing world. It was in this context that common security burst forth in January 1994 as an alternative perspective in Canadian policy debate.

Early in 1993, it had been evident that a new Liberal government would order parliamentary reviews of foreign and defence policy. What with the near certainty of a Liberal electoral victory, a window was opened for a major reassessment of Canada's international security policies. More important, this was obviously a situation that could be influenced. Specifically, an opportunity was about to appear for those who believed (1) that in the post-Cold War setting Canada was for the first time in a position to choose the kinds of military capabilities it wished to maintain, and (2) that the country should opt for forces keyed to defence of

---

334 The key document is *Cooperative Security: A New Security Policy for Canada*, Department of External Affairs, 16 April 1991.

335 "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at a Luncheon Hosted by the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo, July 24, 1990," in Canada on Asia Pacific Security in the 1990s, CANCAPS *Papier* 1 (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1994), 3-9, and "Notes for A Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, U.S.A., September 26, 1990, *ibid.*, 13-22. Clark wishing to make an Asia-Pacific initiative in 1990, officials responsible for the region persuaded him to make use of "cooperative security" against the wishes of those in the department who had formulated the new approach to international security affairs. Telephone conversation, 19 September 1994, with Professor Paul Evans, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, York University.

336 See, for instance, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable Andre Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vancouver, British Columbia, September 8, 1994," *Statement*, Government of Canada, 8 September 1994.

sovereignty and international peacekeeping operations at the lower end of the spectrum of violence. In short, this was a moment to generate ideas that legitimized change in Canada's international security policies. With the active support of a charitable foundation, a non-partisan panel of eminent private citizens was brought together. It commissioned a set of background papers. It prepared a report, *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century*.[337] And it published the report with considerable fanfare across the country in January 1994, just as the foreign and defence reviews were getting under way. For a time, *Canada 21* succeeded in defining the issues, shaping the expert agenda, and capturing ministerial as well as public attention to a degree unprecedented for a private policy effort.

As indicated, the new claimant for attention in Canadian policy debate was clearly committed to an extended notion of security. In contrast to the Palme Commission's original view of common security in 1982, which centred on political and military-technical routes to military security, the standpoint of the Canada 21 report was as follows:

> In the new era of globalization and growing interdependence, the distinction between foreign and domestic policy has little meaning. What happens beyond our borders significantly affects what we can do at home, and what we do at home determines what we can do abroad. We require an international setting that is consistent with our fundamental values, for only in a civil world can we maintain and secure a civil community at home. Our security is necessarily common.... Challenges to common security are likely to arise from conflict triggered by involuntary migration, resource scarcities, and ethnic clashes. Canada must therefore develop policies to address the underlying causes of conflict through preventive action.[338]

The central problem was still human conflict. But the solutions were substantially demilitarized relative to cooperative security thinking, to say nothing of collective security. And where cooperative security grew out of a concern to position Canada in a Cold War setting, common security thinking seemed intent on repositioning Canada in a new context of globalization and mounting interdependence. Perhaps most important, it aimed to bring the country to greater awareness of the need for choice in defence and foreign affairs. But would

---

337 *Canada 21*. Support came from the Walter and Duncan Gordon Charitable Foundation, of Toronto. It should be made clear that I provided a background paper for this project, "Canada as a Sovereign State," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 2, No. 1 (1994), 15-43.

338 *Canada 21*, 11-12. For the Palme Commission, see Olaf Palme et al., *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

the country not only come aware but stay aware once all the reviewing of international security policy was done?

As with any people, Canadians are slow to change. If NATO, like the Soviet Union, were formally to be disbanded, it and a collective security outlook would continue to figure for a while in Canadian thinking. It would be rather like a phantom limb after an amputation. Evidence of something like a phantom limb effect after the loss of the Cold War is to be seen in the November 1994 report of the parliamentary review of Canada's foreign policies in a world of change:

> Policies on the environment, trade and development assistance relate directly to our security. They are significantly distinct, however, to warrant specific treatment rather than lumping them indiscriminately in the security basket. We therefore think it would be wise to draw a clear distinction between traditional security concerns, involving the use or threat of force, and the new global security concerns, involving non-military factors that may cause harm to the interests of others or cause instabilities that could lead to violence... Nor would it be helpful to argue about security labels, such as collective, cooperative and common security. The task is collective — all states to agree to renounce the use or threat of force among themselves and to assist any member under attack. The methods must be cooperative... And the results should be shared in common — security as one dimension of the "global commons."[339]

The residual and deep-seated readiness of Canadians to see the world in collective security terms shows though despite the mushy language used here. Alternative security conceptions are reduced to the status of "labels." Unconventional aspects of security are to be segregated, rather than being together with the all-important traditional concerns. And yet there is an undeniable truth here: As long as the various elements of an extended understanding of security are "lumped" together and their interconnections not properly understood, there will be a powerful inclination to segregate and marginalize the unconventional agenda.

---

[339] *Canada's Foreign Policy*, 22. The reference to "lumping" evidently comes from Denis Stairs, "Contemporary Security Issues," in Special Joint Committee... Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities. Position Papers* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994), 5, where opposition is registered to "lumping our alliance policies into the same pot as our approach to the international regulation of the use of pressure cans or refrigerator gasses."

As it happened, the government committed itself in 1995 to language that authorized an extended view of security, but also made clear Ottawa's view that "only multi-purpose combat-capable forces can form the solid base necessary for successful peacekeeping, *and it* will guard against undue fine-tuning of Canadian Forces capabilities..."[340] In the late 1990s, therefore, common security thinking had entered the Canadian discourse but, despite a spirited challenge, had not displaced the collective security outlook. As to cooperative security, it continued to be sidetracked and was no way in a position to contest the persistent if diminishing Eurocentrism of Canadian security policy. Nor was the outcome here only the result of politics within the country. Cooperative security thinking turned out to be more than Canada's partners in the Asia-Pacific region are willing to entertain. The prevailing framework in this part of the world tends to be "security cooperation," not cooperative security.[341] Furthermore, in its analytical and policy implications, common security thinking, as will be seen, is significantly more venturesome than its cooperative security counterpart. Both cooperative and common security, the former to a lesser extent, were ahead of their time — not a bad place to be, but not a good place to be alone in.

All things considered, there is more continuity than change in Canada's thinking about international security between 1945 and 1997. Canadians did not at some point adopt an extended understanding of international security. They always had one. Nor did they surrender a restrictive one. It persisted throughout the period to the present. What did change was the transformation of a latent cooperative security perspective into an explicit conception in 1990. What also changed was the correlation between collective and cooperative security as tendencies in Canadian thought and action: The former concept now had competition. Change also came with the appearance in 1994 of common security, and possibly of human security in 1996, as further challenges to received thinking. Overall, there is evidence of increasing commitment to an extended or multidimensional view.

Needed now is progress in specifying interconnections among the diverse elements of an extended international security practice. Until advances are made on this front, collective security thinking will continue to benefit from the choice between segregating the unconventional dimensions of security or merging them into a mass of considerations with

---

340 *Government Response*, 21.

341 Whereas cooperative security emphasizes inclusiveness in the understanding of threats to security and participation in multilateral forums to deal with them, security cooperation stresses military threats, favours bilateral defence relationships, and resists the thought of developing CSCE-type security processes in the Asia-Pacific region. Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific," 10-12, 14; and Paul M. Evans, "The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific: Context and Prospects," CANCAPS *Papier* 2 (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1994), 13-14.

little guidance value. All of this has a direct bearing on the way a concept of environmental security might be constructed by Canadians.

Cooperative and Common Security as Frameworks

A conception of environmental security cannot be elaborated in isolation from the larger discussion of international security affairs, any more than the environment can be treated separately from economics, technological development, demographics, and so on. If Canadians are to be in earnest about environmental security and not to employ it merely as a rhetorical device to gain attention for an international environmental agenda, they will have to take the trouble to weave the notion into established patterns of thinking and practice. Collective security not being all that well disposed to extended conceptions of security, we need consider only the set of frameworks offered by cooperative and common security, leaving aside "human security" on grounds that it is not sufficiently elaborated to permit discussion in detail. We are looking now for clear direction in deciding what to expect of a concept of environmental security in particular. To begin, we need guidance on how to conceive of the interconnections between the environment and other security-related phenomena. If there is no reasonably coherent way of dealing with these interconnections, we may be best advised to forget about environmental security, leave international security affairs to the constituency for collective security, and talk about sustainable development and — my preference thus far — civility.[342] Secondly, we need ways of ordering a discussion of interconnected levels of analysis from the personal through the national to the global. My guess is that if there is a prospect of solving the problem of interconnection among the disparate dimensions of security, the level-of-analysis problem should prove tractable. The same applies to a third task, which is eventually to constitute an integrated security concept in which the interconnections among alternative dimensions and levels are increasingly well understood.

In principle, interconnections of the kind we are considering here can be made in two ways. The first is substantive. It relies on empirically verifiable causal knowledge of social and physical phenomena. It is rare. It can produce statements such as, "The six major global environmental problems, in order of priority for Canada, are: scarcities of agricultural land, fresh water, forests, fish in poor countries, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global climate

[342] Griffiths, "Epilogue: Civility in the Arctic." Civility is treated here as a widespread but latent value that connotes an emerging sense of community around the Arctic. It is defined as a predisposition whereby southern majorities, and the governments that speak for them, accord progressively greater respect and consideration to one another, to their circumpolar environment, and to their Arctic populations — aboriginal populations first and foremost. See also the discussion in chapter 1 of the present volume.

change."[343] The difference between the foregoing and an opinion to the same effect is that it can be evaluated by reference to supporting research on the basis of which further understandings can be built.

Alternatively, interconnections may be made to persuade. In this case, they derive not from detached inquiry, but from what it takes to deal with others. The process here is obviously political. Knowledge is of course valued, but positions have to be taken and decisions made in the absence of reliable understandings of cause and effect. The guiding requirement in what is said is to sway others and to create consensus among parties with diverging perceptions, priorities, and set ways of doing things. Consider, for instance, the following observation:

> Canada's prosperity calls for a modern economy which has to be increasingly integrated into a prosperous global economy. Even in terms of nature's resources, where Canada is better off than most countries, it is still dependent on collective action to safeguard the environment. We will have shared security, shared prosperity and a healthy environment for all, or none of us will have any in the long run.[344]

We are in the presence here of common sense, rule of thumb, and imminent conventional wisdom about the interconnections among dimensions of security. This way of talking is of course entirely appropriate in politics. But it is different from talk based on claims to substantive knowledge.

Ideally, the substantive and the political join to yield increasingly reliable consensual knowledge.[345] In reality, the political has overwhelming force in Canadian discourse. Moreover, political statements about the interconnectedness of things frequently take the form of axioms, when in truth they amount to hypotheses in need of testing. To provide a fuller sense of the setting in which a concept of environmental security may have to find its way, I offer the following series of statements (all but the last two being taken from official sources) on the dimensions of security and their interrelations:

---

[343] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental and Demographic Threats to Canadian Security," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 2, No. 2 (1994), 10.

[344] *Canada's Foreign Policy*, 9.

[345] Following Ernst Haas, consensual knowledge is "the sum of technical information and theories about that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal." Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*, April 1980, 367-368.

Unequal levels of economic development threaten political security, just as conflict is the enemy of prosperity and growth.[346]

Challenges to the collective economic security of whole societies are also challenges to global economic security and to what was once a much narrower and specialized definition of security.[347]

In a world where the frontiers of States may be secure but the air, land and water is being poisoned, environmental action is also a fundamental security question. And in a period of burgeoning population and rapid industrialization, where winds and water know no borders, environmental security will only be achieved through co-operation.[348]

Therefore, the best way to avert war is to address the sources of insecurity. The more we learn about these sources, about the linkages between them, about the way they build towards crisis and conflict, the more we must adjust our security policies and institutions to address them early on.[349]

Co-operative security accepts that links exist between threats. It recognizes that few threats can be managed satisfactorily without also addressing others. That peace requires prosperity, that stability requires justice within and between states, that democracy, development and disarmament are all related.[350]

When security includes economic, environmental and cultural security — as well as security from attack at home and abroad — the tight connections among generally separated policies become clearer.[351]

---

346 "Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Colloquium on North-Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue in Victoria, British Columbia, April 6, 1991," in *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, 27.

347 "Notes for... Ouellet," 3.

348 "Notes for... Clark," in *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, 16.

349 "Notes for... Ouellet," 6.

350 "Notes for... Clark," in *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, 20.

351 Janice Gross Stein, "Canada 21: A Moment and a Model." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 2, No. 1 (1994), 11.

> It will not be good enough to dwell on trade, investment, and financial concerns with all, ecological, environmental, and demographic concerns with some, while reserving military security issues for a few more privileged and like-minded number.[352]
>
> On the surface, then, Canadians make connections among the dimensions of security in pragmatic fashion. But is it all rather anecdotal. Circularities abound. Fortunately, there is more to go on than this when we take a closer look at cooperative and common security as frameworks in which a concept of environmental security might be housed.
>
> As mentioned, the intellectual origins of cooperative security thinking are to be found in a tacit dissent from collective security and its preoccupation with Canada's alliance-worthiness in the tenser years of the Cold War. Then, as the East-West conflict wavered as of the 1960s, cooperative security thinking drew further strength from the CSCE experience.[353] The articulation of an explicit cooperative security conception in 1990-1991 may be seen in large part as a Canadian effort to codify and apply to another region, if not globally as well, what had been learned about security in the European theatre. Though the provenance of cooperative security discourse made it less than fully portable, a good deal of creative thinking occurred in the Department of External Affairs as the 1990s began.

Cooperative security starts by accepting the reality of conflict among states.[354] The problem of security continues to be the primordial one: war. Cooperative security responds by seeking to build interdependence, as distinct from acting on extant or supposed interdependencies among states. A thickening web of common interest and collaboration is to choke the way to war. Ultimately it is to lead to community. Two-track diplomacy is the means to increased interdependence. In the first place, states are to create multilateral processes and institutions in which they begin to talk and cooperate in dealing with civil as well as military threats. Such

---

352 Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," 20.

353 See the discussion in Roy Rempel, "Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War: The Implications for Europe," *Occasional Paper*, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1994), esp. 29-30.

354 The following draws principally on "Cooperative Security," *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, and Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security."

threats are seen to be interlinked. In the process of collaborative action, states begin to replace security based on fear with stabilizing cooperative security arrangements based on shared interest. Meanwhile, and in a departure from the CSCE experience, states are to encourage non-governmental or "track two" dialogue on matters of common concern.[355] Here we observe what amounts to a commitment to informal prenegotiation — to the clarification and coordination of differences and commonalities away from the negotiating table and to the point where interstate bargaining may become appropriate. Throughout, there is an overriding belief in the value of multilateral conversation, in the "habit of dialogue." All the while, of course, Canada is positioning itself for advantage in trade and other relationships.

For the practitioner of cooperative security, interdependence is not to develop spontaneously. Like Lenin with revolution, its coming is to be hastened. From this perspective, interlinked military, economic, political, and also environmental matters are not so much substantive problems of security in themselves. Rather, they are substances with which to weave webs of war-preventing and security-enhancing interdependence. In fact, they are habit-forming substances whose ingestion in multilateral dialogue serves not so much to settle particular matters, as to raise the level of trust and confidence among the parties. This, after all, was the way it was done in Europe. This also is part of the reason why the CSCE process so often seemed vacuous. In cooperative security thinking we find an instrumental approach to security issues, one that on balance would short the interest of those wishing to deal with environmental and security matters on their merits. But we also find a solution to the crucial problem of establishing interconnections between various dimensions and indeed levels of international security.

Cooperative security thinking turns out to be more interested in serviceable truths than in substantive knowledge. Truth tests are encountered in interstate interaction, and in track two dialogue. The parties themselves decide what the issues are, how to define the interconnections among them, and how best to act — bilaterally or multilaterally; on a local, subregional, regional or global basis; officially or unofficially. The key to an understanding of interconnections in this extended security conception lies in political process, in what it takes to maintain a dialogue and to move toward consensus. Substantive knowledge surely helps, but it is not of the essence: When for example certain parties decline to discuss human rights and democratic development as elements of security, these issues are simply not part of the conversation unless someone is prepared to force the question. This surely is an imperfect solution to the problem of defining interconnections, of identifying relationships between the environmental and other dimensions of security. It can be improved upon. But it is a solution.

---

[355] Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," 20. The reference is to international conversation among "experts from the academic, foundation, private economic, and other sectors." Officials acting in their personal capacity may also take part.

Aside from relying on political process to produce pragmatic understandings of linkage among security-related issues and levels of interaction, cooperative security *thinking has* something to say about interconnections which stems from experience gained in the handling of issues. First, military and civil issues of security may be interconnected so that civil security cooperation attenuates military-political conflict.[356] For example, a bilateral transport agreement may contribute to security by reinforcing a larger "understanding that sees our collective futures as inextricably linked."[357] Second, multilateral dialogue may serve to reduce conflict and lend stability to bilateral relationships. The connection in this case is one where conversation among the many "can provide a broader context for a wide range of intersecting bilateral relationships... and can bring consistency and coherence to these bilateral relationships."[358] Third, there are linkages between intergovernmental and track two interaction. Away-from-the-table talks on civil and military matters may serve as "confidence-building measures" for states as yet unprepared to discuss and negotiate at the intergovernmental level.[359]

Finally, cooperative security is implicitly attracted to the idea of subsidiarity in considering interconnections among alternative levels on which security issues may be approached. As Canada's Foreign Minister summed it up in 1994, "Sensitivity to local dynamics is paramount in our considerations."[360] By the same token, a preference can be observed for initial collective action at the subregional and regional rather than the global level.[361] Not only is it possible to "build" global security by starting at the regional level, but in a recent view we may now be entering an "era of regionalization of security politics and political security."[362] A regional emphasis, for its part, is of course well suited to a consideration of environmental security in an Arctic context.

---

356 Stewart Henderson (then Policy Planning staff, Department of External Affairs), "Canada and Asia Pacific Security. The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: Recent Trends," NPCSD *Working Paper* 1, January 1992, in *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, 39.

357 "Notes for... Ouellet," 2.

358 Henderson, "Canada and Asia Pacific Security," 39.

359 Gary J. Smith and Jill E. Sinclair (then Asia and Pacific Branch and International Security Branch, respectively, Department of External Affairs), "Arms Control and Security-Building in Asia-Pacific: A Canadian Perspective," in *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, 60.

360 "Notes for... Ouellet," 2.

361 "Notes for... Clark," in *Canada on Asia Pacific Security*, 17, and "Notes for... Ouellet," 5.

362 Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," 19.

Taken as a whole, cooperative security does have something to offer in helping us imagine how an environmental agenda might be threaded into an extended discourse of international security. In a nutshell, the solution is to let the parties figure it out for themselves in two-track dialogue. Parties would come equipped with their best intelligence on the matters at hand. Substantive discussion would be plentiful, and it would be capable of generating its own momentum irrespective of underlying political agendas. As well, I would add that there is no way of determining with precision the substantive interconnections among all main dimensions of security that bear on a particular policy problem in time to do something about it. Nor do these interconnections exist independently of their perception. They are not, as it were, waiting to be found somewhere out there if only the due diligence can be applied. In the cooperative security perspective, scientific exactitude is on balance less useful than what makes for consensus among interested parties.

And yet, detachment and exactitude do thave their place. Issues do need to be addressed on their merits and not mainly as tools in bringing parties together for other purposes. Security needs to be viewed in terms of evolving substantive requirements, to say nothing of distant threats whose substance is difficult to assess in unsettled times. A concern for a greater measure of not merely substantive but consensual knowledge brings us to Canadian thinking about common security.

Whereas cooperative security seeks to move states from here to there — as it were, from Cold War through detente and thickening interdependence to community on a distant day — common security thinking suggests we have already moved some distance beyond the era of the Cold War.[363] The critical task is not so much one of transition by building perceived interdependencies. It is to recognize and act effectively in the novel situation of interdependence that *is already* upon us. The situation is such as to demand qualitatively new choices. To be sure, interstate conflict persists. But it has diminished significance relative to new commonalities in the situation of all:

> Threatening Canada's well-being and security is an unprecedented conjunction of demographic, economic, and environmental stresses. Challenges to global security are most likely to arise from conflict triggered by population growth, poverty, involuntary migration, resource scarcities, and ethnic clashes. To understand the urgency of making hard choices, we need only look at the threat to the security of our maritime population that has arisen from the depletion of fish stocks. At home and abroad, the environment, the economy, and security are inextricably

[363] The principal source here is *Canada 21*.

> linked. In the search for environmental security, we cannot solve our problems alone. The major problems Canada faces directly — degraded water supplies, depleted commercial fishing stocks, acid rain, and toxic waste — require cooperation from other states to ensure that Canadian communities are sustained.[364]

Applied not only to Canada but extended to all countries, these comments report the onset of a qualitatively new security situation.

Though there is some uncertainty on this, in common security discourse the prevention of large-scale human violence ceases to be the central problem. Economic, demographic and other stresses will continue to evoke internal and international warfare. But, for a country such as Canada, the need to be ready for large-scale violence at short notice is giving way to far less pointed but no less grave threats with long lead times to presentation and prevention alike. In the circumstances, thinking about security is in need of demilitarization. Insecurity takes on a new form in the very conjunction of highly varied civil as well as military threats. Equally important, perhaps, distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs have virtually vanished, thereby altering the calculus of security in unfamiliar ways.

In common security thinking it is pointed out that capital, labour, information, technology, pollution, and countless other items now cross the frontiers of fully independent states virtually with no resistance. Governments everywhere exhibit a diminishing ability to act effectively. International relations increasingly escape them as the proportion of the non-governmental to the governmental increases in the total volume of cross-border transactions. For the common security advocate, security increasingly exhibits not only a non-military but a non-governmental quality. The dwindling role of the state, in this context, is selectively to coordinate ever less controllable activity — purposive human operations and involuntary fluxes of information, energy, and material — for the benefit of its people and their physical environment, both of which are ever more inseparable from their surround.

All said and done, the case for common security comes down to the necessity for choice in a novel security environment where governments can accomplish less and less on their own and need to be increasingly selective in what they attempt to do with others. But in order to make choices in acting on the new international security agenda, governments cannot simply bunch all the issues into a security basket. Again, they need knowledge of the interconnections. What does common security have to say on this account?

---

[364] Stein, "Canada 21," 10.

Canada 21 asks the Canadian government to identify complementarities, define priorities, and to focus resources so as to be able to contribute across the board in common security affairs. Further, the government is asked to establish, at the sub-Cabinet level, an intelligence and policy analysis group to integrate action on common security issues. On the pattern of G-7 deputy minister meetings, it is also to build international linkages on a core agenda for common security. In view of the growing role of knowledge relative to material strength in Canada's future, the government is as well asked to lend new support to applied research, and to set up a Common Security Council. Functioning at arm's length from government, such a body would report to the Canadian public and endeavour to maintain balance in the resources assigned to the creation of knowledge on the various dimensions of common security. As for research, *Canada 21* stresses the need for greater funding by the private sector and by different levels of government within the country. A series of centres is proposed which would be linked by state-of-the-art communications technology, integrated projects, and professional networks. Broadly, then, the interconnections among dimensions and levels of security are to be specified through vigorous national research and dialogue on the substance of the issues, and only secondarily in interstate interaction.

Turning to a comparison of the two orientations, we may note that cooperative security has been around for years in one form or another, and has gained from government funding since 1990. Common security, in contrast, is a relative newcomer on the scene, and has yet to be worked out in equivalent detail. It is also the case that cooperative security has been presented in a form designed to persuade internationally, and must therefore be ready to deal with procedure including the handling of linked issues. Common security discourse, on the other hand, has thus far been concerned more to redefine Canada's security situation to Canadians, than to specify how an array of interlinked security variables might in practice be dealt with by states and other agents acting together. Nevertheless, in the Canadian context, cooperative and common security represent complementary approaches to the generation of consensual knowledge of the interconnections among various elements of security in a post-Cold War era. Where cooperative security is stronger on political process in the creation of shared international understandings, common security thinking militates for considerably closer consideration of the substance of the issues than has been ventured thus far. Each holds a part of the security puzzle in its hands. They surely ought to be merged into an integrated non-traditional orientation to the substance and procedure of international security affairs.

A number of conclusions flow from this review of Canadian thinking about security as the 1990s draw to a close. First, environmental degradation, remediation, and protection being linked as they are to so many phenomena, we need a way of understanding and acting not on the "environment" as such, but on the linkages or interconnections themselves as is suggested by common security thinking in particular. Second, cooperative security does provide the elements of a way of acting on perceived interconnections, indeed of perceiving them in the

first place. Third, there is something to be said for extricating cooperative security thinking from the Asia-Pacific context by applying it to the problems of another region. Finally, whether the country settles on cooperative, common, human, or a hybrid notion of extended security, recent developments in the Canadian discourse suggest that Canada is an unlikely place for significant pioneering in the elaboration of "environmental security." If the term is to gain currency in Canada, it is more likely to be a carry-forward from acceptance elsewhere than from home-grown innovation.

This said, the fact that Canada is only part-way into the transition to an extended security concept gives reason to pause. Existence has outpaced consciousness. As I see it, the country as a whole is back in the 1980s where the collective understanding of security is concerned. Other countries seem in similar or worse shape, with the result that we are more in the business of building interdependencies than of acting on those already in place. My thought on these matters is perhaps typically Canadian. I think we should consider using a concept of environmental security as a way of demonstrating the utility, interior interconnections included, of an extended understanding of international security. In short, at a time of uncertainty and change in the meanings of security, the elaboration of a viable concept of environmental security could help drive home the value of the extended view in Canada. A demonstration project should not however be confined to Canada. Nor should it be conducted on the official level only.

We stand to benefit from an international track two dialogue on environmental security. Consistent with cooperative security thinking, it should have a regional focus. It could test the potential for a transnational community of practitioners, analysts, and influentials to generate consensual knowledge of the term, thereby shortening some otherwise necessary process at the national level in the countries concerned. It would also see to it that a concept of environmental security was defined in terms of substantive requirements, not overmuch as a tool to achieve wider political purposes. A track two pilot project along these lines might well be concerned with environment and security in Arctic waters.

Securing the Arctic Marine Environment

In the repertoire of Canadian practice with a bearing on what could be called "environmental security," the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) of 1970 stands out.[365] Other Canadian contributions ranging from those made by individuals and small communities up to

[365] For detail, see Kirton and Munton, "The Manhattan Voyages," and D.M. McRae, "The Negotiation of Article 234," both in Griffiths, *Politics of the Northwest Passage*, McRae at 98-114.

and including the federal state are available for consideration, for example the process surrounding the Berger inquiry into northern pipeline construction in the 1970s. But if security is broadly the condition of being free from danger, the threats that gathered around Canada's Arctic marine environment, and also the creativity that was shown in dealing with them, make the AWPPA experience a promising point of departure in considering what "environmental security" might mean in practice. To show how the experience of various Arctic countries as represented in a track-two working group might be used to delineate a concept of environmental security, let us assume for the moment that this particular Canadian experience is in fact representative of everything we want to get at.

The dangers were substantial and varied in 1969-1970 and for some time thereafter. Canada's Arctic marine environment was threatened by the prospect of accident and pollution in the course of transits by oil tankers through some of the many waterways which constitute the Northwest Passage, and through the approaches to the Passage in international waters to the east and west. The prospect seemed already to be materializing in the form of the American tanker S.S. *Manhattan*, which conducted exploratory voyages in Canadian Arctic waters to test the potential of the Passage for bulk shipping of oil during the summers of 1969 and 1970. EXXON, the owner of the ship, sought permission to make use of Canadian waters and complied with most Canadian government regulations in trials that were conducted with Canadian icebreaker assistance. But the U.S. icebreaker escort for the *Manhattan* was something else. It constituted a direct threat to Canada's Arctic sovereignty. Permission for a state ship to enter the Arctic Archipelago was not sought because the United States viewed the waters in question as an international strait where rights of innocent passage prevailed.

In addition to these pointed environmental and legal threats, there was a political danger to the Canadian government in that both the Canadian public and the Nixon administration became aroused to a point where Ottawa faced clear risks whatever it did or failed to do. Further, in the strategic military domain there was the allied perception of Canadian actions as threatening the mobility of navies by creating precedent for the closure of international straits. This applied, among other things, to U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines and their ability to traverse various archipelagos of the world, no doubt including the Canadian archipelago for transit to and from the Arctic Ocean. The effect in Ottawa was to raise additional risks of allied opposition to legitimate Canadian measures to safeguard the country's marine environment and to defend sovereignty over the varied waterways of the Archipelago. If all of this were not enough, lack of international support for the Canadian view of the status of its Arctic waters in international law, and for Canada's right to enact and enforce legislation there, meant that effective action for environmental and sovereignty objectives would almost certainly be unilateral in nature. For this reason, too, there was a risk of international challenge. Finally, to act unilaterally and indeed with a unilateral exemption of Canada's Arctic waters claim from the purview of the International Court of Justice, would represent a

major departure from the perennial Canadian commitment to the rule of international institutions and law in world affairs. All in all, the perceived situation was one of considerable and multifaceted insecurity in which the danger posed to Canada's Arctic marine environment formed part of a larger set of closely interconnected security threats.

Canada's response was first to enact the AWPPA, thereby unilaterally establishing a pollution prevention zone seawards over ice-covered waters out to 100 nautical miles from the nearest Canadian land, except where equidistance lines prevailed. Canada then gave force to the Act in a set of increasingly elaborate regulations governing everything from shipping safety control zones (16 of them) and hull construction requirements, through prescribed Coast Guard escort and navigational equipment, to oil transfer guidelines. Further, it became Canadian policy to write the main principles of the AWPPA into the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which was being negotiated in the 1970s. As it happened, the Act was quietly objected to by Canada's allies, but not effectively challenged. Nor was there any lasting upset in Canadian-American relations in particular. By 1976, the principle of non-discriminatory coastal state regulation over ice-covered waters had been incorporated into Article 234 of the draft sea-law Treaty. In 1988, Canada and the United States in effect shelved their differences over the legal status of Canada's Arctic water where surface transit was concerned.[366] The instrument in this case was a non-prejudicial agreement which in effect gave access to American commercial and state surface ships in return for a U.S. undertaking to receive permission to enter and to observe the provisions of the AWPPA. With the entry into force of UNCLOS III in November 1994, Canadian efforts to safeguard the marine environment of the Arctic Archipelago completed a long transition from *unilateral* measure far in advance of what others would accept, to binding international law on the protection of offshore ice-covered waters anywhere.

An act that had widely been viewed as illegal in 1970 had become conventional a quarter of a century later. To be sure, Canada's sovereignty problem had not been solved, especially where submarine transits of the Archipelago were concerned. Nor did Article 234 stand alone in a Treaty which included constraining provisions. Nevertheless, the actual and potential benefits to the Arctic marine environment were significant. They would almost certainly not have been achieved, had not Canada proclaimed an Act that was well ahead of its time in 1970. The AWPPA and what followed thereafter add up to a creative and perhaps a formative experience. They warrant a closer look for indications as to just what might be meant by environmental security.

---

[366] Kirkey, "Smoothing Troubled Waters."

First, as was increasingly true of thinking about security in the 1990s, the practical problem for Canada in 1969-70 and thereafter was multidimensional. Environmental concerns were embedded in a larger set of issues. They did not stand out as clearly preeminent among the legal, political, military, and economic threats and opportunities. Had circumstance conspired to present the problem as one of federal regulation to prevent pollution by foreign and Canadian vessels in waters universally recognized as Canadian, a pollution prevention act, had there been one, would almost certainly have been confined to the Canadian marine environment and no more in the early seventies. Incentives to project functional responsibility seaward to 100 miles would have been hard to find. The same applies to the persistent effort required to lodge the Canadian initiative in UNCLOS III.

The point here is that the existence of interconnections among diverse dimensions of security may be not so much an analytical complication as a practical advantage in bringing about effective international action to protect the environment. If so, and we need to know when indeed this is the case, it may be counterproductive to define an environmental problem narrowly in environmental terms. To the extent that the AWPPA and the following effort are prototypical, the job of environmental protection is best viewed through an extended security optic from the very outset. Conversely, to the degree that the problem at hand is pure and simple an environmental or ecological one, it perhaps should not be regarded as an environmental security matter. In short, multidimensionality would seem to be an attribute of environmental security if this particular Canadian experience is taken as representative. Without multidimensionality, we are very likely talking about environmental protection, monitoring, or whatever in operational-technical fashion.

Further implications for the design of a concept of environmental security arise from the temporal dimension of this case. For one thing, there is a strong inference here of the need to look beyond the relatively short time frames to which we are accustomed. Greatly to elongate the temporal aspect of security-related behaviour is, however, to transform the notion of dangers or threats that are to be met. It is to question governing assumptions about danger which have driven the main body of security thinking. In deriving a concept of environmental security that was abreast of considerations such as these, a track two working group might begin to influence the wider discourse by demonstrating how the very quality of security may now be changing.

It took a quarter-century for the substance of Canada's unilateral action to be codified internationally. No way were Canadians moved by the sense of a clear and present danger throughout this period, or even in the first half-decade. To be sure, there was a sharp threat at the outset. Without it, little would have been accomplished. But the process acquired a momentum of its own as the ingenuity of Canadian decision-makers and then negotiators yielded in importance to the forces which finally brought UNCLOS III into port. In Canada

and throughout the circumpolar countries, the thought of international acceptance of coastal-state rights of pollution prevention in adjacent ice-covered waters could only have seemed fanciful as the 1960s ended. A particular combination of threats brought Canadians to care deeply for a moment, and to set in motion a process which continued long after their own attention had drifted elsewhere. From a mid-1990s perspective, however, it was vital for Canadians to have been ahead of their time and, moreover, for a few in the Department of External Affairs to have stayed the course. This they did even as the sense of danger dissipated, reassembled with the uninvited transit of the *Polar Sea* through the Passage in 1985, and then dissolved again.

The AWPPA experience may therefore be taken to suggest that the sense of immediate danger is not necessarily an attribute of behaviour conducive to environmental security. Nor again might a security perspective rightly be invoked in the case of what might be termed minor threats — for example, the local Arctic community which insisted on flushing sewage into the bay — or threats that can be resolved in short order — the building of a berm to contain an oil spill on a riverbank. The AWPPA case suggests something different. It suggests that action for environmental security is centred on that class of situation where (1) the possible adverse consequences of something going wrong are great, (2) the likelihood of things going badly wrong is ordinarily perceived to be low or uncertain, (3) the lead times for preventive or remedial action are long, and (4) the economic and other costs of an effective response are seen to be high. Let us call these situations of indeterminacy. Examples in the environmental realm are global warming and what to do about it, or the potential consequences of and appropriate response to a vigorous Russian effort to open all or part of the Northern Sea Route to year-round international shipping.

Great difficulty attends the elaboration of consensual knowledge and preventive or remedial action in situations of indeterminacy. Increasingly, however, these are the situations we face. Warfare and the danger of surprise attack continue of course to be widespread in large parts of the world. A case for environmental security may not get much of a hearing here. But among the great powers, the danger of war with conventional weapons, and of nuclear-missile attack with warning time measured in minutes, has mercifully receded. Instead, the security agenda of the industrial states is centered increasingly on what has been called "the preventive management of security conditions."[367] Prevention means going to source, not only in space but in time. It entails pro-action, as distinct from reaction. It means paying less attention to immediacy and what's obvious, more to what might be called "invisibles" — far-away threats now assembling out of sight. It asks of us that we look farther and farther into the future in

---

[367] "The Concept of Cooperative Security," in Janne E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 3.

considering the implications of current actions and inaction. Some of these potentialities are so far out that they cease to be threats in the ordinary sense of the word. Security becomes less threat-driven and more attuned to distant opportunities for prevention as well as dangers. In the case of sustainable development, the proposed temporal framework is already intergenerational. In the Mohawk tradition, an individual was appointed to speak for the seventh generation when significant decisions were being made. But how are we to focus the political, intellectual, and material resources for preventive action and indeed pro-action in conditions of indeterminacy?

The case of the AWPA suggests that the widening and the elongation of perspective on environment and security matters may be mutually supportive in certain circumstances. The farther ahead we must look, the easier it may be to see when the threat is not singular but multidimensional in jeopardising a broad array of interests. The effect here is one where a substantive widening of perspective aids political processes of precautionary action in a situation of indeterminacy. Similarly, the more we consider security problems in their interconnectedness and as wholes in order to stay engaged, the easier we may find it to discover new causal understandings which yield an improved ability to anticipate, including early warning indicators of need to act. On this account, however, the AWPPA experience has little to offer. New consensual knowledge was neither applied nor generated in the first place. The whole business was done by practitioners acting naturally. The AWPPA case accordingly points up an area of inquiry that might well be addressed by a track two working group on environment and security in Arctic waters: to determine whether a multidimensional security perspective on environmental problems marked by indeterminacy is conducive not only to political support, but to the generation of causal knowledge capable of helping us do better at being ahead of our time together.

This much allowed, let us relax the assumption that the AWPPA and what followed are prototypical of environmental security. Among the obvious eccentricities of the case as reported here is the apparent assumption that no one lives in the Arctic. To be sure, the potential effects of tanker traffic on Inuit offshore hunting were taken into account by officials. The perceptual standpoint and even more the locus of decision were decidedly southern. This may have been appropriate for most Canadians in the early 1970s, but awareness of the North has since grown throughout the circumpolar countries. Arctic residents and viewpoints, especially aboriginal, are now being incorporated into policy processes affecting the Canadian and international North to a degree quite unforseen at the outset of the AWPPA experience. The same applies to Arctic international cooperation — for example in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and negotiations on Canada's Arctic Council initiative. Needless to say, the Arctic countries vary in their approach to these matters with Denmark/Greenland leading the way as discussed in chapter 6. In greater or lesser measure, all acknowledge a need to move the initiative northwards even as the nation-state

retains ultimate responsibility for foreign rights and obligations. What is happening here is significant.

If multidimensionality and indeterminacy might be two attributes of environmental security problems and their solutions, subsidiarity and the lack thereof is a possible third. By subsidiarity I mean in this case political arrangements whereby those most directly affected are enabled to participate directly in the design and implementation of collective action, preferably to the point of controlling the action in conjunction with central authority. As an attribute of environmental security, subsidiarity suggests that the collectivity is insecure when affected localities are marginalized or excluded from decision-making, and secure when those closest to the problem on the ice or in the water have a prime say. The underlying issues here extend well beyond equity and responsiveness in government. They are issues of democracy and democratization which, in Canadian thinking on cooperative security, are essential. For that matter, they also bear on the character of a track two project itself.

Specifically, a venture of this kind should be made as representative as possible from the start. As such, it would more likely be sensitive to the needs of northerners and to their understandings of the Arctic living and physical environment. Quite simply, it would display civility as discussed above and in chapter 1. Northerners will moreover have ideas of their own on security including its military dimension. By virtue of their traditional ecological knowledge, Arctic aboriginal peoples will also have special contributions to make in seeing ahead to security in conditions of indeterminacy, in seeing "invisibles" as distinct from clear and present dangers.

The underlying thought here is that the AWPPA experience is centred too much on the state and inter-state relations to be treated as fully representative of what may happen when environmental security is created. As such, the case tells us little about interconnections among different levels of analysis from the individual to the global. Essential pieces of the puzzle of environment and security are missing, though we do learn of possible advantages in linking a particular national interest in pollution prevention to a global negotiation, UNCLOS III in this instance. It is also the case that human frontiers and jurisdictions are granted primacy over natural processes and ecosystems when a state-centric view is applied. Inevitable as it may be, this is a retrograde way of looking at things. It needs to be offset. These and other deficiencies figure in what turns out to be a continuing Canadian effort to internationalize the AWPPA in the 1990s.

In March 1994 the Canadian Coast Guard hosted a meeting in Calgary on the harmonization of polar ship rules.[368] An "outside working group" or informal gathering held with the blessing of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), this event was attended by officials and private persons from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The initiative was Canadian. The Canadian purpose was to economize on the financial and human resources required to maintain and update the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR pursuant to the AWPPA) in a setting where counterpart national agencies were not talking to one another.[369] The formal aim was international agreement to establish coherent and compatible systems for enhanced safety and environmental protection in all aspects of Arctic marine operations. Canada was thus seeking further multilateralization of the provisions of the AWPPA and implementing regulations. Beyond this, there was a larger ambition: to contribute to the development of a comprehensive regime of environmental protection for the Arctic Ocean, such as had been proposed by Norway in PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment), a component of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy which is also considered in chapter 5. In an acknowledgment of indeterminacy, Canada was of the view in the Harmonization Talks that the "low level of activity in Arctic shipping is the "right time" to work on precautionary (prevention by agreed standards) measures that are certain to take many years to implement."[370] Pro-action is evident here.

At subsequent meetings, notably in Alesund, Norway, in November 1995 and St. Petersburg in October 1996, substantial progress was made on ship structure and ice navigation requirements.[371] Recognition of the particular interests of the Arctic countries was ensured

---

368 Canadian Coast Guard. *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).* Protection of the Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, *Arctic Shipping* (Ottawa: Ship Safety Northern, Transport Canada, 1994). For the ASPPR, see Canadian Coast Guard, *Proposed Revisions to the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations* I & II (Ottawa: Ship Safety Northern, Transport Canada, 1989).

369 Interviews, 16 September 1994 and 7 March 1996 in Ottawa, with Victor Santos-Pedro, Director Ship Safety Northern, Transport Canada. Though the Canadian initiative is clearly animated by practical requirements of improved Arctic ship safety, judging by the reference to UNCLOS Article 234 in "Arctic Shipping," it also seeks in passing to bolster the article by further international agreement. The main axis of cooperation in the talks saw Canada and Russia provide much of the momentum from the outset. Interview, September 13, 1994 in Ottawa, with John Karau, Chief Marine Environmental Division, Environment Canada.

370 "Arctic Shipping."

371 International Maritime Organization, "Harmonization of Polar Ship Rules (Code of Polar Navigation)," *document* DE 39INF.4, 1 December 1995. See also "Summary Minutes" from the Ålesund meeting, 20-22 November 1995, available from Ship Safety Northern, Transport

through the presence of members of the Circumpolar Board of Navigation (representatives of the marine administrations of the eight ice states), who had an unspoken veto over the proceedings. Agreement on polar ship rules was envisaged for 1998, a date set for the participants by the IMO. Consensus on harmonization could be expressed in stand-alone resolutions or a new code of polar navigation for adoption by the IMO, or in Arctic-specific wording incorporated into one or more of the global conventions of the organization. Whatever the modalities, and they would now seem to favour an IMO navigational code, we have here an anticipatory effort to secure the circumpolar marine environment against potential harm from shipping. It raises questions that could be of interest to a track two demonstration project on environment and security in Arctic waters.

Should talks on the harmonization of Arctic ship rules be regarded as an "environmental security" exercise? If multidimensionality, indeterminacy, and subsidiarity were to be taken as attributes of environmental security, what might we say about these talks? Indeterminacy is present and acknowledged. But multidimensionality and subsidiarity are not so well accounted for. Economic, environmental, and legal implications of administrative rationalization are there, but seemingly not that well elaborated in a gathering of marine officials, insurance underwriters, and oil company personnel. Nor is there much subsidiarity in a meeting of persons who with the best of intentions as individuals represent central agencies and distant users of Arctic stock and flow resources. No doubt the negotiation has gone well because it has been depoliticized to the maximum extent possible. Given the discussion to this point, the answer to the question of whether these are environmental security talks would seem to be either that they are not dealing with an environmental security matter, or that the parties have not framed the problem properly and could pay a price later. The latter would seem to be the case.

Russia may agree to a new Arctic shipping regime in due course, but it has to be asked now whether Russia has the ability to implement such an undertaking unaided, assuming that the agreed standards had not been lowered in anticipation of the Russian disability. To the extent that aid proves necessary from other countries, quiet talks on a technical agenda may not be the best way of building a basis for commitment. Conversely, if Russia is to comply without outside assistance, ways will have to be found to generate the will in Moscow to commit new resources, and to follow something like a coherent line of policy without international

---

Canada; "Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Arctic Shipping Regulatory System: Final Report" (Montreal: NKF Services, Ltd., December 1995); and "The International Protection of the Arctic Ocean" (Montreal: NKF Services, Ltd., January 1996). As of spring 1997, a draft code had been prepared: *International Code of Safety for Ships Navigating in Polar Waters (Code of Polar Navigation)*, Draft 2, February 29, 1997, available from Transport Canada, Prairie and Northern Division, Marine.

management. Linking to a wider set of issues and to a wider variety of political constituencies in all the circumpolar countries could prove necessary if these talks are to realize their potential. If so, the negotiation of a more comprehensive, multidimensional Arctic marine environmental agreement may be required to generate a framework for collective action that really makes a difference, that gets away from the practice of working out circumpolar arrangements which are technical successes but turn out to lack the political profile and budget to deliver on early promise.

Nor should we omit the subsidiarity principle. As matters stand, the Inuit of Canada's eastern Arctic are said to have an "intense" interest in the control of tanker traffic which, however, was excluded from the Nunavut self-government agreement of 1990 on Ottawa's insistence.[372] The same certainly applies to Greenland, as discussed in chapter 6. Equivalent attitudes are likely to be found among other aboriginal communities whose culture and livelihood depend directly on the use of Arctic waters and their living resources. In acknowledging the right of aboriginals and other northerners to be heard, the Harmonization Talks would not so much be avoiding trouble down the road. Rather, the parties would be acting on principle, widening the support base for eventual agreement, and opening the way to improved quality of agreement through access to traditional ecological knowledge.

All said and done, this discussion of what might be derived from only one set of experiences of only one Arctic country suggests that the Arctic marine environment does offer a promising focus for an international effort to articulate and test the value of environmental security as an ordering concept. Certainly there would be no dearth of questions for a track two interaction on environment and security in Arctic waters. Aside from past experience, opportunities abound to consider prospective developments such as intensified use of the Northern Sea Route in the light of current thinking about security throughout the Arctic countries. What we need above all now is authority, and therefore a degree of consensus among influentials, in determining whether and if so how to begin the elaboration of a concept of environmental security as a guide to collective action.

A Way Ahead

The term "environmental security" has been in circulation for long enough now to warrant international judgment, as distinct from a continuing sequence of individual opinions, on what it might mean and whether or not to make use of it. A properly derived concept might well help us to be more pro-active in situations of indeterminacy. Properly derived means arrived

---

[372] Interview, 13 September 1994 in Ottawa, with Leslie Beckmann, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.

at through a process which starts to create consensual knowledge of the concept and of causal connections among its terms. It means clearly delineated in terms of the situations and activities to which the concept would refer and not refer. It also means being clear about the niche that is to be occupied relative to other concepts and ways of doing things — sustainable development, ecosystems management, and the wider body of thought about security.

A track two demonstration project on environment and security in Arctic waters therefore seems to be in order. It should aim to put "environmental security" to the test. As I see it, the test is the utility of the concept in (1) developing new understandings of interconnections among relevant phenomena, (2) suggesting better policies for new or familiar goals, (3) enabling pro-action, and (4) contributing to security writ large. Provided that a track two working group was equally well connected to the local setting and to high politics, it could find a way to construct a notion of environmental security flexible and strong enough to survive the test. Such a notion could soon begin to show its worth in polar extremities. It could also point a way ahead for other regions of the world, for local communities, and for those engaged in global-level interaction. Above all, to the extent that a track two working group can begin to demonstrate how dimensions and levels connect in applying an extended understanding of security to a particular set of Arctic environmental issues, it will advance the case for extended security in other settings whether or not Arctic-specific solutions are transportable in their details. And if the demonstration cannot be made — an outcome which has to be recognized from the outset as a real possibility — a pilot project on environment and security in Arctic waters could nevertheless expect to render an authentic contribution to the wider discussion of international security affairs. The fact that thinking about security is in such ferment today may be taken as evidence of historic and enabling change in our circumstances. The ice is breaking up. Ways are opening for those who would innovate in the understanding and pro-active practice of security. A working group on environment and security in Arctic waters should seize the opportunity to seek out a way ahead.

CHAPTER 4

NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY: THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE NSR

By Willy Østreng

Since the creation of nation states the intrinsic nature and goal of security policy has, irrespective of regime, historical context and cultural heritage, been *the pursuit of freedom from threat.*[373] As a political act security is the call for exceptional measures to block undesirable developments.[374] This aspect of security seems to stand firm against the ravages of time, whilst the *elements of danger* and *modes of protection* are circumstantial, dynamic and partly embedded in the varying "security logics" inherent in alternating international political orders.[375] The focus of this chapter will be on the changing features of the northern dimension of Norwegian security policy as it emerges in the systemic transition from Cold War bipolarity to the increasing multipolarity of the present.

Changing Norwegian Perceptions of Threats to National Interests

In 1974 the Norwegian Defence Commission, mandated to give an overall assessment of Norway's security situation, concluded that "a direct threat to Norwegian sovereignty and freedom of action can only be posed by countries able to exert and apply physical power in our

---

373 Barry Buzan: *People, States and Fear - An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 18.

374 Ole Wæver: "Security, the speech act: analysing the politics of a word" *mimeographed article* in Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, 1989

375 See Anders Kjølberg, "Konsepter for europeisk sikkerhet etter den kalde krigen - konsekvenser for Norge," in *Europeiske sikkerhetsspørsmål* (Oslo: the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,September 1995). The reasoning here is that any international order contains its own peculiar "security logic," affecting and restraining the foreign policy options of states, in particular small states. As an example, *bipolarity* often results in løng-lasting alliance formations, whilst *multipolarity* demand more flexibility and result in looser alliances; *collective security* is only possible if the tone-setting great powers cooperate and do not form alliances, whilst *Center-periphery* orders imply that the security of small states are dependent on the interests and mood of the hegemon state.

part of the world."[376] That was to say: Security is conceived of purely in military terms, the enemy identified is the Soviet Union and the North is a possible theater of war. As with most Western security assessments at the time, environmental degradation was not part of, or even looming, as a prospective issue in the collective mind of the Commission, either in general or in the Arctic or in relation to the NSR. The Commission contented itself with stating that extraction of resources was a potential measure to improve Norway's military capabilities[377] and not a problem of security - extended or restricted - in its own right.[378]

Twenty years later, the Foreign Minister of Norway, Bjorn Tore Godal, pointed out that the concept of security had been altered in a fundamental way in the post-Cold War period: "Our (i.e. Norway's) security rests on many more pillars than the military. This is what the concept of extended security is all about... Our security today can not be attended to by military means alone. A comprehensive and composite number of security challenges demand a much broader set of political and institutional measures."[379] This extension of policy has, according to the late Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst, also had its bearing on the security conceptions of the Arctic: "The most pressing challenges in the Arctic are not confined to military issues, but include also environmental problems, management and utilization of natural resources, and jurisdictional issues. The end of the Cold War has eliminated many of the obstacles to a common security approach to the challenges of the Arctic."[380] He also stressed that unless the Arctic states successfully addressed these new challenges, they will not be able to stimulate the growth of a sustainable international security order, the premise being that no country in the Arctic can escape the consequences of environmental problems, and that large-scale international assistance and cooperation are imperative in order to cope: "Common security means common responsibility."[381] From the point of view of security he also addressed the significance of the NSR and welcomed a comprehensive study of the political, administrative and commercial aspects of this waterway.[382] Judging from these political statements Norwegian security policy in the 1990's has been extended to reflect and comply with the new political

---

376 "Forsvarskommisjonen av 1974. Utredning fra et utvalg oppnevnt ved kongelig resolusjon 31. mars 1974," *Norges Offentlige Utredninger* 9 (1978), 38.

377 *Ibid.*, 36.

378 *Ibid.*, 37.

379 Bjørn Tore Godal, "Norge, NATO og det Transatlantiske samarbeidet," lecture in Oslo Militære Samfunn, October 2, 1995, *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift* 164, No. 11 (1995), 1.

380 Johan Jørgen Holst, "Security and Defence in the Arctic Region," *speech* at the Nordic Council's Parliamentary Conference in Reykjavik 16 - 17 August 1993, 1.

381 *Ibid.*, 12.

382 *Ibid.*, 38. The study referred to was the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP)

circumstances of the post-Cold War era and to include a broad range of Arctic-specific issues, including the environment and the NSR.

This notwithstanding, a recent study on Norway's defence-and-security policy concludes that: "The Norwegian defence plans for the first half of the 1990's are by and large built upon the same conceptual basis as those of the Cold War. They are made to keep the defenceline in Troms until reinforcements arrive. ...Russia is the only direct challenge being identified in these plans.... A conception of Norwegian security policy like (this) does not reflect the basic changes in the nature of politics that we are facing in the aftermath of the Cold War."[383] In other words: Norwegian security policy does not, according to its critics, comply with the new security demands of the new international order, and authoritative political statements saying otherwise are nothing but political rhetoric. The bottom line is that Norway no longer has a clear security policy.[384] It is out of touch with fresh realities.

The purpose of this chapter is to look into these partly contradictory positions with the aim of assessing the totality, reality, rhetoric and operational problems of Norwegian security policy as it has developed in the transition period from the Cold War to the present. A main focus will be on the significance of the Arctic and the polar environment in national security deliberations and planning. The overall aim is to relate these features of Norwegian security policy to the concept of extended security and to assess their bearing on the utilization of the NSR.

The Basic Elements of Norwegian Security Policy in the Post-World War II Period

Throughout most of the post World War II period, Norwegian security policy was founded on and based in Arctic military conditions and developments.[385] In many respects it has been shaped in the interaction between what happens in the four geographical areas of the "Barents Quadrangle": the Kola peninsula, North Norway, the Barents Sea and the archipelago of Svalbard (see figure 1). During the Cold War, four different, but interrelated policy components relating to this quadrangle shaped and directed the content of this policy:

---

383 Iver B. Neumann and Ståle Ulriksen, "Norsk forsvars-og sikkerhetspolitikk" in Torbjørn Knutsen, Gunnar M. Sørbø and Svein Gjerdåker (eds.), *Norges utenrikspolitikk* (Oslo/Bergen: Christian Michelsens Institutt/Cappelen Akademiske Forlag,, 1995), 80. The citation is translated from Norwegian by this author.

384 *Ibid.*, 103

385 See the geographical extent of the Arctic region as defined in the Introduction at page 6 in this book.

Figure 1: The strategic geography of the Kola Inlet and the Barents quadrangle.



- geopolitical realities,
- a self-imposed security regime,
- the international Svalbard-regime,
- certain political rules of conduct.

Geopolitical Realities

Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia face the Barents Sea and share a common border in the Arctic. This geopolitical reality strongly influenced the Norwegian decision to join NATO in 1949. The interest of the Soviet Union derived from this fact has been tersely formulated by Admiral Arseny Golovko: "Without the Kola inlet the Northern Fleet cannot exist - the Kola inlet is necessary to the State."[386] Norway has since 1949 been sitting on the banks of this gateway (see figure 1), posing through her membership in NATO, a potential military problem to the Soviet Union. In this way the regional geopolitics have created a tacit and long lasting interactional system of security defining important parameters in the security posture of both countries.

After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the USSR launched an ambitious development program aiming at strengthening her Navy. The aim was to enable the Soviet Navy to match forces with her American counterpart wherever and whenever the need may arise. The build-up continued with undiminished energy throughout the 1970's and by the mid-1980's the objective had been reached; some would add: with a good margin. At that time there was hardly any ocean in the world with a higher density of naval vessels than the Barents Sea. To Norway this meant that the most modern of the four Soviet fleets, the Northern Fleet, employed the near seas off the Norwegian coast for training, operational purposes and as a thoroughfare. In the mid-1980's the Northern Fleet ranked second to none with regard to strategic retaliatory capability. It made use of 66 percent of the Republic's total number of nuclear-ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), 67 percent of its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 76 percent of its warheads and 73 percent of the mega-tonnage assigned to each of the four fleets.[387] The protection of the strategic submarines was also given much attention. Approximately 60% of the Kresta cruisers and 70% of the newest hunter-killer submarines armed with cruise-missiles were stationed at the Kola peninsula.[388] In other words: The Northern Fleet was a formidable *strategic submarine fleet*, i.e.

---

386 Arseny Golovko, *With the Red Fleet. The War Memories of Admiral Golovko* (London:1965), 40.

387 Thomas Ries, *The Soviet Military Operational Command Structure and its application to Fenno Scandia* (Oslo: NUPI, 1986), 61-61 and 64.

388 *The Military Balance 1984-85* (London: IISS, 1985). The figures referred are taken from the Norwegian Edition issued by the Norwegian Atlantic Committee in Oslo.

the SSBN's constitute the centrepiece of armaments, and the remaining vessels were and still are, to a large extent, employed as a support for these.[389] Thus, by the mere fact of geography, the Barents Sea and the Kola Peninsula were bound to serve *strategic* as well as *defensive* purposes of supreme importance to the Soviet Union.

In Norway there was broad agreement that this naval power was not primarily directed against or built up because of Norway. It reflected the USSR's global engagement, and formed a pivotal part of the nuclear deterrence between the superpowers. On the other hand, it was also widely acknowledged that Norway could not remain indifferent to this development, as it took place in close proximity to Norwegian territory. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Knut Frydenlund, described the Norwegian position thus: "If a mouse goes to sleep beside a bear at night - no matter how benign the bear may be - the mouse cannot know what it will look like in the morning, should the bear happen to turn over in its sleep."[390] The security problem facing Norway was to determine what movements the bear was inclined to take during the night. Or more precisely: to prepare for the worst-possible situation. No doubt, the Soviet capacity to take military action against Norway was in place. In the Murmansk region, the Soviets had established an amphibious brigade, counting 2500 troopers. In an emergency, one of the infantry brigades stationed in the region could also be brought in by sea on board one of the 32 amphibious vessels of the Northern Fleet. As seen from the Soviet point of view, their massive strengthening of the Arctic fleet made it imperative to control the areas further north - among them the Norwegian territories of Finnmark, Svalbard and Jan Mayen (see figure 1). A Soviet attack against the northern parts of Norway might have been justified in order either to spread the Kola base complex or to establish a buffer zone to the west into Norwegian territory.[391]

The Self-Imposed Security Regime

The Norwegian government reacted to the military build-up across the border by a mix of military and political measures founded in two partly contradictory principles: *deterrence* and *reassurance*. Deterrence was to be achieved by two means: Norway's membership in NATO and a national defence capability sufficient to hold off any military invasion until such time as NATO reinforcements arrived. The purpose was to make the costs of attacking Norway so high as to convince the aggressor to hold its horses. To downplay the aggressive impression attached

---

250 The term is used in Willy Østreng, "The Soviet Union in Arctic Waters. Security Implications for the Northern Flank of NATO," *Occasional Paper,* 36, Law of the Sea Institute (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1987), 1.

390 *Arbeiderbladet* (Norwegian daily), October 19, 1981, p. 17

391 Jan Ingebrigtsen: "Norskehavets strategiske betydning som funksjon av Sovjetunionens Nordflåtes operasjoner," in *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 1, 1976

to deterrence, the latter was supplemented with reassurance in terms of self-imposed military restrictions. Early on, the Norwegian government decided not to allow foreign troops to be stationed on Norwegian soil in peacetime as long as the country was not attacked or being subjected to threats of hostilities. In the late 1950's the government added to this policy by prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil in time of peace. Arctic-specific measures were also integrated into this policy. Among other things, the government decided to base the bulk of her northernmost military forces in the county of Troms and not in Finnmark - the bordering county to the Soviet Union. Restrictions were also imposed on NATO manoeuvres in that they never took place in Finnmark and that allied military aircraft and ships were not allowed to cross longitude 24 degrees East. These restrictions were puristically practised and strictly watched by Norwegian authorities, probably to the annoyance of its western allies (see below).

The coexistence of the two principles made it impossible for either of them to be exercised to their full intentional capacity vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Deterrence was reduced by reassurance and reassurance by deterrence. This counter-balancing effect can be regarded as a version of *non-provocative defence* (NPD), which is integrative in that it incorporates elements of both national and international security strategies. On the national side, it responded to the need for a credible defence policy that could be achieved by the state's own capabilities. On the international side, it showed sensitivity to the security needs and perceptions of others without at the same time appearing weak or lacking commitment.[392] The regional NPD policy of Norway undoubtedly reduced the tension-generating effects of the Soviet *security dilemma* in the area, i.e. a state's inclination to define and prepare for its own national security in splendid isolation from, and without paying due regard to, the actual security needs and threat perceptions of other states.

The International Svalbard Regime

This regime is embodied in the *Svalbard Treaty of February 9, 1920*, of which three elements are most relevant in the context of regional security; First, when the Treaty was signed in Versailles in 1920, the states with major interests in Svalbard[393] agreed, in article 1, to recognise Norway's full and unrestricted sovereignty over the archipelago. This made Norway the prime and responsible actor to oversee and manage developments in the archipelago, including those relating to the security interests of the adhering parties. Second, the signatory powers reserved their right both to access and sojourn in the islands irrespective of purpose, and to conduct most kinds of economic activity on an equal footing with Norwegian nationals (the principle of

---

[392] Barry Buzan: Op. cit. p. 379

[393] USA, France, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway

access). This restriction on Norwegian sovereignty provided the legal basis for the Soviets to establish their own mining communities in the islands, which were ideal platforms for inspection activities. The Russians are the only nationality along with the Norwegians that have sustained a permanent foothold in Spitsbergen since the 1920's. Last, but not least, Norway had, in accordance with article 9 of the Treaty, to pledge herself not to establish - or allow the establishment by other nations of - any marine base or fortification in the Svalbard area. The archipelago, which was thus partly demilitarised, was never to be used for warlike purposes (the demilitarization principle). In other words, and partly at variance with article 1, Norway received a special and highly restricted sovereignty over the islands.[394] In terms of security, however, it has served Norwegian interests well in that it has had a reassuring effect in counteracting the disadvantages stemming from Russia's general geostrategic position as a major seapower.

Russian shipping is to a large extent dependent on free passage through various straits and confined sea areas in order to reach the high seas. This applies to all four base areas: the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific. A feature common to all these passage areas is that states or groups of states which traditionally had strained political relations with the Soviet Union could maintain a close watch on them, thus keeping naval movements under surveillance and providing a steppingstone to cut off the access to the high seas - a scenario painfully experienced in Russian history (see chapter 2). In this connection, the unique features of the Kola inlet explain why the Northern Fleet gradually gained in prominence relative to the other Soviet fleets; *climatically*, the ports and the waters of the North are icefree year round, which is not the case in the Baltic, Black Sea and the Pacific; *geographically*, the Kola inlet is the widest of Soviet naval gateways to and from home territory and the hardest to block for naval passage; *politically*, the regional security dilemma of the Soviet Union was to a certain extent taken account of in Norwegian regional NPD-policy; *militarily*, the armed preparedness to act against Soviet naval movements from the banks of the Kola inlet, i.e. Norwegian territory, is much lower than from the banks of the other passage areas.[395] These features of the Kola inlet all relate to the situation in Svalbard.

Historical evidence suggests that Soviet policy in the period from 1950 to the mid-1980's consistently reflected an apprehension that Svalbard might be used as a base for acts hostile to the Soviet Union. Two aspects of this fear have been expressed:

1. that Svalbard might be used as a base for controlling the Kola inlet; and
2. that the islands might be used as a base for hostilities against Northwest Russia.

---

394 For a most comprehensive and thorough discussion of this regime see Geir Ulfstein: *The Svalbard Treaty. From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty*, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, 1995, pp. 81-464

395 Trygve Lie: *Hjemover*, Oslo, 1958, p.158

In the period after Svalbard was included in the military command structure of NATO in 1951, the Soviet government time and again emphasized that it could not accept any radical change in the status quo in the area. At the same time, the Soviets were in a position to satisfy themselves on this point, thanks to their permanent presence in the archipelago. Since the 1920's the Soviet mining settlements have become accustomed to a high degree of self-government and lived more or less unaffected by Norwegian jurisdiction up to the mid-70's. This was both a reflection of Norway's early policy to keep her jurisdictional dealings with Soviet settlements in the islands low-key, and of the Soviet resistance to accepting Norwegian jurisdiction to its full extent in their own townships. The combined effect of these policies provided the Soviet Union with a high degree of freedom and elbow-room to roam the islands for the sake of preserving her security interests.[396]

Within this "liberal" framework, two measures were applied - one Norwegian and one Soviet. First, when Norway took steps to improve on the civilian infrastructure in the islands, the authorities practised an *open-door policy* inviting Soviet experts to confirm on the spot by self-sight that the installations, i.e. the ESRO-station, airport etc, were not used for military purposes as alleged in Soviet diplomatic notes.[397] Second, the Soviets could keep a close watch on developments not only through their settlements but also through their scientific expeditions, which are allowed to move freely throughout the archipelago, and by aerial and seaborne reconnaissance. At regular intervals the Soviet residents in Svalbard also visited foreign expeditions with opportunities to inspect their equipment and learn their purpose. Norwegian authorities for their part made it clear that no country other than Norway can "exercise any form of authority in Svalbard, not vis-a-vis its own nationals either."[398] The high profile and visibility of these Soviet encroachments on Norwegian sovereignty was obviously meant to serve the purpose of keeping Norwegian authorities on their jurisdictional toes in matters relating to article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty.[399] Historical evidence shows no peacetime example of the Norwegian government ever having violated the demilitarized status of the islands. In 1977 the Norwegian Foreign Minister publicly acknowledged that the Soviet engagement in Svalbard not only had an economic motivation, but also reflected "...the strategic position of Svalbard and a

---

396 See Willy Østreng: *Politics in High Latitudes*... pp. 26-100

397 Willy Østreng: *Politics in High Latitudes. The Svalbard Archipelago*, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1978, pp.44-60

398 *White Paper no. 39, 1974-75, relating to Svalbard*, p. 8

399 For a thorough discussion of these aspects see Willy Østreng: *Politics in High Latitudes. The Svalbard Archipelago*, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1978, pp. 44-60

wish to ensure that nothing happens in the archipelago that could be detrimental to Soviet interests."[400]

The Svalbard regime interacts systemically both with the Norwegian mainland regime and the strategic interests attached to the base complex at the Kola peninsula. As strategically interlinked components framing regional military activities the three separate parts make up, and act as an *overall regional security regime* (ORSR) applying geographically to the Barents quadrangle.[401] The ORSR is a tacit regime in that the rules and principles of interactive state behaviour have not formally been agreed upon by the two governments. Rather its working and functioning has been manifested and observed as tacitly agreed upon "rules of the game" over an extended period of the Cold War, providing stability and tranquillity to the region. This happened despite the fact that parts of the waters and ocean-floor concerned were, and still are, disputed between the two governments. Three issues, which carry the potential to unbalance the stability of the ORSR, remain unresolved: The two first concern what regime should apply to the 200-mile zone and the continental shelf around Svalbard, and the third relates to how, and on what legal basis the shelf and ocean space between Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea shall be partitioned (see figure 2).[402] These issues and their solutions relate directly to the need of predictability in security matters: *Who is in charge where, on what basis and in what connections*. In waters of high military sensitivity like the Barents Sea one may expect clarity in jurisdictional matters to be of paramount importance to preserve the balancing and reassuring effect of any security regime. Turbulence rather than stability was to be expected. The legal uncertainties prevailing can thus be regarded as a litmus test on the robustness of the ORSR and its overall security message, namely that *the northern and southern banks of the Kola Inlet do not constitute an immediate threat to the free passage of naval vessels or to the survivability of the Kola bases in times of peace.*

---

400 Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund's Foreign policy statement in the Storting June 6, 1977 to be found in *UD-informasjon*, no. 25, 13 June 1977, p. 15

401 See Willy Østreng: *Politics in High Latitudes*... Op.cit.

402 For a detailed account of the positions of the two countries and security interests involved in these negotiations at the time see Willy Østreng: "Soviet-Norwegian relations in the Arctic," in *International Journal*, vol. XXXIX, no. 4, 1984, pp. 866-887.

Figure 2: Outstanding questions of delimitation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea.



To underscore the credibility of this message Norway was in need of some latitude to handle regional affairs in relative independence from her allies. The government saw "...it as an important task to contribute to a harmonious and peaceful development in the North aiming at avoiding new sources of tension."[403] A too strong Western salience in the region could be such a source and tip the balance of the ORSR. At the same time, Norwegian authorities realized their inability to successfully handle a situation of systemic malfunctioning of the ORSR in splendid isolation from their allies. Thus, in practical politics the Norwegian government sought the balancing act of keeping her allies involved in regional affairs, but at arm's length. An instance of the consistency and delicate oddity of regional policy may serve to illustrate the situation: In the late 1980s, NATO commanders paying official visits to the Kola peninsula were not, in reference to Norwegian self-imposed military restrictions, allowed to land in the Finnmark township of Kirkenes, whilst Russian generals, who were not subject to these restrictions, could avail themselves of such permissions as observers to NATO exercises.[404]

Norwegian Political Rules of Conduct

In 1949 the Norwegian government was invited to enter into a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union modelled on the same premises as the one Finland had accepted one year earlier.[405] The prospect of being tied up in a system of bilateral consultations with the big neighbour was not overwhelmingly tempting as seen from a Norwegian point of view. And as it turned out, the Soviet invitation facilitated the Norwegian decision to join NATO later the same year. By this move Norway opted for a *strategy to multilateralize her relationship with the Soviet Union.*[406] Several years later the Norwegian Foreign Minister explicitly stated the reason and content of this policy: "Norway's freedom of action eastwards depends on her connections westwards."[407]

The Soviet government took the opposite approach, urging the two states to *bilateralise their relations in the North.* The first step in this direction dates back to November 1944 when Foreign Minister Molotov asked for a revision of the Svalbard Treaty because it conflicted with

---

403 *UD-informasjon*, no. 30, 1977, p. 26

404 Nils Morten Udgaard: "Russisk søkelys mot Finnmark på ny," in *Aftenposten*, February 13, 1996, p.18

405 See Magne Skodvin: *Norden eller NATO. Utenriksdepartementet og alliansespørsmålet 1947-49,* Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1971, ss. 106-110 and 333-336

406 Bo Svensson: "National Interests and Transnational Regionalisation - Norway, Sweden and Finland Facing Russia," in Margaretha Dahlstrøm, Heikki Eskelinen & Ulf Wiberg (eds): *The East-West Interface in the European North*, Nordisk Samhellsgeografisk Tidsskrift, Uppsala, 1995, p. 63.

407 ibid.

the security interests of the Soviet Union. He wanted Svalbard to belong to both countries as a condominium and Bear Island should "once again" be Soviet property.[408] A solution of this kind would, according to Molotov, solve Soviet security interests in the Arctic once and for *all and* alleviate the overall geographical handicap of the USSR as a major seapower.[409] Recently it has been revealed that the Soviet government actually contemplated setting up a naval base at Bear island with the objective of defending Soviet rights in Svalbard and securing free passage of warships belonging to the Northern Fleet (see figure 1).[410] In line with this, Soviet diplomats also suggested the establishment of Soviet military bases in North Norway, i.e. in the townships of Kirkenes, Vardø, Vadsø and Tromsø to secure safe passage of this thoroughfare in the future.[411] The question of revising the Svalbard Treaty was discussed between the two governments on and off in the period between 1945 and 1947. In these deliberations the Norwegian government expressed an accommodating attitude to the Soviet position. The Norwegian Storting, however, put their foot down and refused to go along with Molotov's proposal in 1947, and for reasons that are not entirely clear, the Soviet government refrained from reiterating the case from that time on.

The political core value of this move, however, prevailed throughout the Cold War in that the policy to bilateralise relations was presented in different wrappings and fashions time and again. The Soviet government made no secret that it wanted a say through bilateral consultations in all important questions concerning Svalbard. Initiatives of this kind were declined by the Norwegian side on the grounds that the Soviet Union had no role in exercising sovereignty over Norwegian territory and that a consultation-agreement would violate the principle of equal treatment granted to all 44 parties to the Treaty.

---

408 Trygve Lie: *Hjemover*, Oslo, 1958, p. 158

409 The geographical interconnectedness between the four basic areas in Soviet thinking was illustrated during the meeting when Molotov suddenly placed his fist on a map of the Dardanelles and said: "We're bottled up here." He then moved his hand across to Øresund: "We're bottled up here. Only in the North is there an outlet, but this war has shown that the line of communication with the North can be cut or threatened. This must not be allowed to happen again in the future." For further reading see: Trygve Lie: Op. cit.

410 Excerpts from Deputy Foreign minister V.G. Dekanozov's memorandum, to Foreign Minister V.M.Molotov concerning Spitsbergen and Bear Island of 11 November 1995, published in Sven G. Holtsmark (ed): *Norge og Sovjetunionen 1917-1955. En utenrikspolitisk dokumentasjon*, Cappelen, Oslo, 1995, pp. 339-340

411 Memorandum from M.S. Vetrovs & T.L. Zjdanovas to Deputy Foreign Minister Vysjinskij and Lozovskij concerning the necessity to establish Soviet Military bases in North Norway of 3 July 1945, published in Sven G. Holtsmark (ed): Op. cit. p.359-360

Soviet authorities also suggested the establishment of a bilateral condominium to govern the disputed area between the two countries in the Barents Sea (see figure 2). As late as January 1988, the Soviet Prime minister Nikolay Ryzhkov stated that regional security and stability in the region could not be secured by simply drawing a line of delimitation on a map. The establishment of a Norwegian/Soviet zone of confidence and cooperation covering the whole of the disputed area, would, according to Ryzhkov, be a most constructive measure to preserve regional tranquillity. In conformity with traditional Norwegian policy, this proposal was declined.

The two opposite positions in this respect were not all-out confrontational. After all, bilateral cooperation existed in issue areas and sectors that were strictly bilateral in character and which in no reasonable way could call for the involvement of extra-territorial states. The management of joint fish stocks within the auspices of the *Mixed Soviet/Norwegian Fishery Commission* and the *Grey Zone-agreement of January 11, 1978*, are illustrative examples. As bilateral instruments they worked, by and large, fairly smoothly,[412] producing results benefiting fishermen coming also from third countries. The assumption is that these arrangements may have satisfied the minimum needs of the Soviets in their endeavours to bilateralize relations in the region. Fishery cooperation represented open channels and regular contact, and "thus in itself contributed to the maintenance of low tension in the area."[413]

To sum up, Norwegian security policy, as expressed in all the four military arenas of the Barents quadrangle, was based on interactive political and legal principles, strengthening the stabilizing effect of mainland *deterrence* and *reassurance*. The reassuring or soothing effect of *the demilitarization of Svalbard* was enhanced by the *principle of access* to the islands and the Norwegian *policy of openness* in archipelagic affairs, whilst the *policy of regional multilaterality* added to regional deterrence. This process of interaction had some subtlety to it, complicating the delicate balancing by Norwegian authorities between contradictory principles. At one and the same time, Norway was in need of a certain independence both from her allies and the Soviet Union to buttress the credibility of the policy; too much extra-territorial interference in regional affairs could have tipped the perceived equilibrium of deterrence and reassurance and worsened the security dilemma of the Soviet Union, whereas a too close relationship with the Soviet Union might have enhanced reassurance at the expense of deterrence. Thus, to have the

---

412 In the early 1980's there were incidents where Soviet Coast Guard vessels inspected third-country ships which had been authorized by the Norwegian government to fish within the zone. Such incidents were protested through diplomatic channels.

413 Brit Fløistad: *Fish and Foreign Policy. Norway's Fisheries Policy Towards Other Countries in the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea*, The Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper, no. 37, Honolulu, 1991, p. 55

principles work in an interactive manner a mandatory measure in Norwegian policy was to achieve a *relative latitude* in relation to and a *moderate balancing* of Western and Eastern interests in the region. The policy principles of deterrence, reassurance, openness and multilaterality interacted with the demilitarization clause and access principle of the Svalbard Treaty in a seemingly comprehensive, dynamic and stabilizing way for the region as a whole - together they made up the ORSR within the Barents quadrangle. In addition, and most importantly, the effect of Norway playing on different ORSR stages in different issue areas, made Norwegian policy in the North evolve to become an early version of comprehensive security. The handling of the full bundle of Svalbard-related issues, the Grey Zone Agreement and the bilateral fishery and environmental cooperation, made an implicit, if not explicit security concept that embraced plenty of civil activity, which was, however, subordinated to prime geopolitical and military requirements. The Barents Euro Arctic Region (BEAR), which was established in 1993, thus could feed on a long Cold War tradition of extended regional security (see below). A supplementary mechanism working for regional stability was that Norway was perceived as a most friendly neighbour by Soviet officials, and more so than was the case for the other Scandinavian countries. As expressed by Nikita Khrushchev to the Norwegian Prime Minister in 1955: "We (i.e. the Russians) hate NATO, but we are fond of you (i.e.the Norwegians)."[414] The mechanism at work for regional stability was Soviet hate and fondness, and Norwegian deterrence and reassurance with Norway playing an active and instrumental part by applying various policy principles and extended security to the Norwegian arenas of ORSR (see figure 3).

New Times - New Policy?

As shown in the introduction to this chapter, official statements maintain that Norwegian security policy has been expanded *geographically* as well as *thematically* in the post-Cold War period.

The "Geographical Expansion" of Security

During the Cold War an often repeated, if not absolute, pattern of behaviour existed between various categories of states in the realm of international security. Small states mostly devoted their resources and attention to regional affairs, great powers engaged continentally, whilst the superpowers took a global approach. This division of engagement has become increasingly blurred in the 1990s. The new interdependent system of multipolarity and the violent and flaring

---

414 Sven G. Holtsmark (ed): *Norge og Sovjetunionen 1917-1955. En utenrikspolitisk dokumentasjon*, Oslo, Cappelen, 1995. The citation is taken from Tom Hetland: "Slik tenkte russerane," in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, vol. 165, no. 2, 1996, p. 31

Figure 3: The complexity and coherency of the ORSR within the Barents quadrangle during the Cold War.

Policy principles	Measures	Prime Area of application (Barents quadrangle)	Interactional pattern between policy principles
Deterrence	NATO/Norwegian military forces	North Norway Kola Peninsula	Multilateralization
Reassurance	Self-imposed military restrictions + bilateral cooperation	North Norway, Barents Sea, Svalbard, Kola Peninsula	Policy of openness, demilitarization of Svalbard, principle of access to Svalbard
Open-door-policy	Openness	Svalbard	Demilitarization of Svalbard, principle of access to Svalbard Reassurance
Multilateralization	"Keep allies involved at arms length"	Barents Sea	Deterrence

Presumed effect

Regional peace and tranquility

hostilities of national and international politics of the present have induced small states to take upon themselves a more continental and even global responsibility in peace-keeping and peace-restoring operations. When NATO in 1991 designed a strategy to form a Rapid Reaction Force (IRF) to reinforce all parts of the alliance territory at short notice, Norway followed suit and formed the Telemark battalion named after a county in the *southern* part of Norway. The NATO decision in 1992 to use allied forces for operations consented and requested by the UN and/or the OSCE, has increased the likelihood that Norwegian forces will be engaged in combat outside Norwegian and NATO territory. To comply, the Storting recently increased the number of troopers from 1300 to approximately 2000 to be placed under UN command. Even though Norway has a long record in UN peace-keeping operations from the times of the Cold War, the new version of UN collective security - based on "contracts" with regional defence organizations like NATO, rather than on superpower vetos - will most likely increase the risk of more and severe casualties and place a heavier and different burden on the forces than before. Since Norway all along has been engaged in UN peacekeeping in distant places (i.e. Congo and the Middle East), this is not, primarily, a change in geographical extension, but rather one of current political willingness to engage Norwegian forces in combat roles and peacekeeping globally. In actuality, the announced security change is thus not primarily one of geography but one of capabilities, commitments and budgets. Conceptual disagreements and/or preciseness aside, the renewed political emphasis on far-away security, poses a national dilemma of resource restrictions and allocations.

Along with the political commitment to world security, Norwegian forces have been assigned more duties in relation to regional fishery surveillance, coast guard obligations and rescue

operations without any increase in budget and resources. Against this backdrop, the Norwegian Military Commander in Chief is making a plea to strike a realistic balance between the new military obligations of collective security and the traditional defence duties applying regionally in the North. The feeling is that Norway is spreading her resources thinly, and that the need exists for a small state like Norway to concentrate efforts in one area at a time (more on this below).[415]

The Thematic Expansion of Security

During the Cold War the security relationship between the Soviet Union and Norway basically concerned the question of war and peace. As of now, political statements indicate that this concern has been supplemented and broadened by challenges related to the sustainability of

- *the environment* (the fear of radioactive leakages from nuclear reactors, civilian as well as military, and harmful effects of Russian sea transport in the Barents region and along the NSR),
- *biological resources* (depletion of fish stocks),
- *Russian society and economy* (the fear of social unrest and mass migration across borders),
- *law and order in Russian society* (fear of the unstabilizing and corrupting effects of Russian organized crime).

In principle, this author disagrees with the contention that a thematic expansion of Norwegian security is something novel associated with the post-Cold War period. As discussed, Norway practised a tailor-made and low-key version of extended security comprising military as well as civil issue areas in her dealings with the Soviet Union throughout most of the post-World War II era. What we are now witnessing is a national security adjustment of degree, not a change in principle calculated to meet the new challenges of changing political circumstances.

The present redefinition of extended security applies to Norwegian policy in general, but the North is still, not least by the Ministry of Defence, being singled out as a main theater of security and Russia as a prime party of concern (for a discussion of this aspect, see below). The four components of the Barents quadrangle shaping and directing Norwegian security policy during the Cold War have both been moderated, adjusted, supplemented and partly altered, among other things due to this explicit change in content of extended security.

---

[415] Commander in Chief, General Arne Solli: "Det nye forsvaret," in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, vol. 169, no. 12, 1995, p. 8

New Geopolitical Realities?

The most drastic changes are to be found in the geopolitical realities of Russia. Those changes are both of a military and geographical character. As shown in chapters 1 and 2, there has been a decline in the naval and military capability of the Northern Fleet, and the enemy images of the Cold War have been officially laid to rest by both parties. Thus, at first glance the immediate military dangers stemming from the Kola peninsula can undoubtedly be played down. As put by the Norwegian Commander in Chief: "Perhaps the most acute threat from the East against us (Norway), as well as against our eastern neighbours themselves, is possible ecological catastrophe. Civil and military reactors and nuclear weapons, nuclear- and chemical waste deposits, are under doubtful control."[416] However, armaments are not the sole factor affecting the geopolitics of this neighbourhood. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that most ports in Europe now belong to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia on the Baltic Sea and Ukraine and Georgia on the Black Sea. In the Baltic, Russia has only two major ports left - St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, the latter being separated from Russia by Lithuanian territory, and Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in the North. Links by way of railways, motorways and pipelines between Russia and Western Europe pass through Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. In her centuries-long struggle to reach the high seas, Russia has taken a long step back and is now more shut off from the sea than she was in the time of Peter the Great. Russian authorities, not least the Admiralty, are painfully aware of this fact, which has been met with a sigh: "To be sure, (the remaining) outlets are not closed to Russia, but they have become less amenable to control and more costly. Therefore, in order to maintain reliable and effective links with Europe, Russia must of necessity give added attention to the Northern seas."[417]

This Russian geographical setback may affect Norwegian security in a medium and long term perspective in at least two ways. First, no one is at present in a position to preclude a new dictatorship in Russia, hostile to the West on grounds of nationalism. History shows that domestic instability often makes stable relations with neighbouring countries difficult. Refugees may cross borders and the unstable competing elites within Russia today are now bolstering their domestic positions by cultivating nationalism and gradually also foreign threats. In terms of legitimacy of political institutions and stable socio-economic relations, Russia has become a weak state. Second, at the same time she is still a most powerful possessor of military might (see

---

416 General Arne Solli: Militær stabilitet i nord - Hva kreves?, in *Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek*, nr. 4, 1996, Den norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo, pp. 14-15

417 Alexander Granberg:"The Northern Sea Route and the Policy of New Russia," in *International Challenges*, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Journal, vol. 12, no. 1, 1992. Special Issue on the Northern Sea Route, p. 9

chapter 2). In spite of an overall decline in military capabilities in recent years, indications are now that the Kola peninsula is gaining in relative importance and assigned the highest priority in Russian defence planning. The implications are that regional force reductions are being compensated for by an updating of the remaining units.[418] After many years of visible reductions, the number of naval exercises in the Barents Sea was stepped up again in 1995. The implications are that Russia's most important strategic retaliatory force is regaining some of its former energy and preparing once more to take station in Arctic waters, where they are less vulnerable to western ASW counter-measures (see chapter 1).[419] Equally important is the results of the CFE conference that recently decided, on the basis of Russian pressure and US support, to revise the flank paragraph - also called the "Norwegian paragraph"- of the CFE-Agreement. The negotiators agreed to shrink the areal extent of the northern and southern flanks of Europe and to allow for a higher number of armored vehicles than was originally agreed upon in the CFE accord to remain on the flanks for an additional period of three years. Norway first rejected any talk of revision, and then, on grounds of real politics, reluctantly accepted to go along. But as was stated by the Norwegian daily Aftenposten: "This is not in the Norwegian interest, because the existing piling of weapons on the Russian side in the North is so preponderous already that any change that does not imply reductions is bad for us. ...Our NATO allies should not be allowed to lose sight of the Northern flank."[420] These events explain why the basic parameters of Norwegian defence plans from the Cold War still apply today, and why the Commander in Chief urges Norway's allies to deviate as little as possible from their Cold War security guarantees and commitments to Norway.[421] To counter the Norwegian insistence to keep a sufficiently high allied guard in the North, a repeated refrain in NATO quarters has long been that the "Norwegians are Kola fixated."[422] The pedagogical challenge is for Norway to convince her allies that the Norwegians are not "the last Cold Warriors" reluctant to realize that the world has changed, and to explain that there is a potential for regional conflicts that can involve Norwegian territory in the Arctic.[423] Against this backdrop, NATO is, in the mind of the Norwegian Commander in Chief, more important to Norway today than to any of the other small countries within the alliance.[424] His perception is that a politically weak Russia with strong military muscles makes a capricious neighbour. With the economic development of

---

418 *Militær-balansen, 1995/96*, IISS, Norwegian edition by Ellmann Ellingsen (ed) of The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo 1996, p. 184

419 Ibid., p. 186. Author's translation.

420 Editorial: "Vår flanke," *Aftenposten*, 03.07.96, p. 2

421 Arne Solli: Op. cit. p. 8

422 Iver B. Neumann & Ståle Ulriksen: Op. cit., p. 99

423 Arne Solli: Op. cit. p. 8. Author's translation.

424 Ibid. p. 10

today, his reasoning goes on, it will take 5 to 10 years before Russia's military capacity is broken down to become insignificant, and: "You do not take the combat potential away from 1000 tanks if you stock them in materialtechnical warehouses for some years."[425] Even the critics of Norwegian security policy, accusing Norwegian authorities of being out of touch with security realities, acknowledge that the North, despite recent dramatic changes in international relations, is still geopolitically important to Russia and, as a consequence, to Norway.[426] Thus, military-strategic factors are still priority items on the extended security agenda of Norway.

The term Norwegian as a collective term of government is, in this context, not precise by any yardstick. The defence establishment, i.e. basically representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed forces (the strategists), are those mostly concerned with geostrategic continuity, whilst representatives of the foreign policy/security establishment, primarily representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Storting (the security analysts), are more preoccupied with structural change and policy adaptation. As a division of labour this is both reasonable, functional and constitutional. The strategists have a legitimate and useful specialist perspective on military affairs, whilst the security analyst has a far more wide-ranging agenda to fit into the narrower specialist contributions of the former.[427] Judged from the public debate, reading of documents and political statements, the impression left, however, is not one of pure division of functional labour, but rather one of supercilious refusal to deal with the "ugliness" of the Cold War. The new and extended aspects of Norwegian security are getting the most positive attention by security analysts, whilst the strategists are left somewhat alone by their security policy-masters when it comes to shouldering the burden of addressing the Cold War continuity problems. This discrepency in policy emphasis is also present at the level of Ministers. In December 1996 the Foreign Minister stated in a public address that: "Our allies now put less emphasis on the traditional security challenges of the North. We (i.e. the Norwegian government) do the same. Today there is no danger of military conflicts in our neighbouring areas. But new challenges have emerged." [428] A month later, in January 1997, the Minister of Defence made a public statement in the same forum: "We (i.e. the Norwegian government) in the northern part of Europe have naturally concentrated our efforts on the challenges in our neighboring areas, towards Russia, the Baltic, the Nordic area and the Visegrad-countries."[429] The strategic sector is thus getting the "taint of being accomplices to

---

[425] Arne Solli (1996) Op. cit. p. 14

[426] Iver B. Neumann and Ståle Ulriksen: Op. cit. p. 90

[427] Barry Buzan: Op. cit., p.25

[428] Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal: "Det nye NATO," in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, vol. 166, no. 1, 1997, p. 5

[429] Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo: "Nasjonale og internasjonale utfordringer for forsvaret," in *Norsk Militært tidsskrift*, vol. 166, no. 2, 1997, p. 5

militarism,"[430] whilst the sector responsible for security is given credit for being progressive innovators. What we are witnessing is probably not a full-fledged split of government when it comes to content of policy, but rather a government where the principals (read: Foreign Ministry) feel more politically comfortable leaving the "ugly stuff" to their subordinate expert ministries. This difference of inclination and attitude is not, however, clear-cut. The complexity of the matter, varying responsibilities and the differences in "hats" worn, show that strategic assessments differ even within the armed forces. The Commander in Chief in southern Norway recently stated that the Norwegian defence posture is "Troms-fixated" [431] and based on the premises of the Cold War. He contended that other parts of Norway are suffering a "defence vacuum," and that southern counties - hosting 90 percent of the population - is where Norway has most to defend, not least her offshore oil installations. [432] This alternative strategic analysis immediately received political support from the chairman of the Defence Committee in the Storting, hoisting the flag of security.[433] What the whole thing boils down to is that strategic analysis is too narrow in its expertise and outlook to be able to encompass the broad security agenda either comfortably or well. When security and insecurity are seen to rest on much more than military factors, then strategic analyses will be able to pursue its specialized military agenda unencumbered by distorted images and inflated expectations.[434]

As long as Norway is faced with reductions in allied security commitments and guarantees, Norwegian defence authorities will have to take more of a responsibility to meet various future contingencies in their planning. The critics of Norwegian security policy do have a most important point, however, when underlining the systemic linkage between regional military problems and the new international peace posture of Norway. By contributing relief help, participating in peace operations and providing good offices to parties in need of a mediator, Norway attracts international attention and counteracts the impression that Norway is, as it was during the Cold War, a net consumer of allied security guarantees - a freerider in national security.[435] Or put differently: By making Norway visible in international peace-making contexts, one may hope for allied attention to Norwegian strategic problems in the Arctic. Thus there is a linkage between the regional and international postures of Norwegian security policy. The Minister of Defence acknowledges that the challenges of Norwegian defence planning is to

---

[430] Barry Buzan: Op. cit. p. 25

[431] Troms is the county in northern Norway being designated the prime deployment area of Norwegian forces.

[432] *Aftenposten*: "Viseadmiral Bjornar Kibsgaard: - Forsvaret er "Troms-fiksert," p. 5

[433] Ibid.

[434] Barry Buzan: Op. cit. p.373

[435] Iver B. Neumann & Ståle Ulriksen: Op. cit. p. 103

see the various tasks in context, so that the endeavours abroad and at home are mutually reinforcing, and "not regarded as contradictory."[436] Norway's ability to be on top of the NATO agenda and in the forefront of NATO attention depends in the end on what Norway does in active participation, and not on the formula of the Cold War: the country's "geographical position or who we are."[437] A more visible merging of all aspects of Norwegian policy by all branches of government will make policy more clearcut and highlight the varied problematique facing Norway in this period of systemic change. The likelihood of this to come through is closely related to the power structure of Norwegian defence and polar politics as they merge in the North. A brief sketch of the internal decision-making structure for these issue areas is therefore appropriate.

Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian security policy applied to the Arctic was based in a mix of military and political premises. In actual politics, the latter, as shown above, got the upper hand at the expense of the former. Political interests prevailed over the needs of military strategy. As such, Norwegian security policy deviated from the pan-Arctic trend to have it the other way around (see chapter 1). Thus, security policy formation within the Norwegian government, basically was shaped by an interactional tug-of-war situation between the Foreign and Defence Ministries. Other ministries were put on the sideline as more or less interested bystanders. However, in the shaping of civil polar politics, not explicitly touching upon regional security interests, the decision-making structure was heavily decentralized. Many ministries took part, with little or no coordination. Norwegian polar politics thus were incrementally built and composed - it became atomised with little or no inter-ministerial interferences.[438] Gradually, it dawned upon the government that the independent ministrial handling of civil polar affairs could have a negative and unintended bearing on the extended security practised by Norway within the Barents quadrangle. To cope with this dilemma and to be able to handle events of inter-ministerial disagreements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the latter part of the 1970s informally assigned a supranational role, exercising a tacit veto if the need was felt. Basically, this is still the case. Even though the Ministry of Justice has been assigned the formal coordinating body in government polar policy formation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still "the power behind the throne" when it comes to policy decisions at the interface between polar politics and security matters. The reality of this situation posed a problem of some delicacy. For obvious reasons, many ministries do not regard it as an acceptable national arrangement to have a Foreign Ministery vested with the authority to administer Norwegian soil. Three of the corners of the Barents quadrangle - Svalbard, North Norway and to a certain extent also Norwegian

---

436 Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo: Op. cit. p. 10

437 Ibid.

438 Odd Gunnar Skagestad: *Norsk Polarpolitikk. Hovedtrekk og utviklingslinjer 1905-1974*, Dreyer, Oslo, 1975, pp. 145-160

waters in the Barents Sea - should constitutionally belong under respective "domestic" ministries. Thus, to avoid a too visible foreign policy management of national territory, the Foreign Ministry assumed a withdrawn position, contributing to decision-making as a prompter helping out the actors at stage from its stage concealment. At the same time, no-one could deny that most security and polar issues affect Norway's relationship to other states. It was therefore important to have the foreign affairs expertise alert and vigilant at all times. From its stage concealment both needs can and will be taken care of.[439] If the historic and contemporary working of this structure is applied to the differences in policy emphasis between the two ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds a strong hand vis-à-vis Defence in setting future security priorities.

Changes in the Self-imposed Security Regime

An important part of Norwegian security policy is still based in Arctic conditions and designed on the basis of a modernized version of deterrence and reassurance. The self-imposed restraints will be adapted in such a way as to retain the main lines of policy concerning the activities of foreign military forces on Norwegian territory. The base and nuclear policy will be maintained, and the following guidelines will apply to foreign military activities in Norway:

- measures will be taken to ensure that it will remain possible for NATO to come to the assistance of Norway in the event of a crisis or war,
- the authorities will strive to have full knowledge of and control over foreign military activities on their soil,
- the authorities will pay due regard to the strategic situation in the North and not permit military activities that can reasonably be perceived as provocative, or create tension vis-à-vis Norway's neighbours.

The special restraints for the county of Finnmark will be eased and the routines simplified. Contrary to traditional policy, small allied and other foreign military units will be permitted to conduct exercises and training in the county, particularly in connection with Partnership for Peace (PfP). In this respect, it is explicitly stated that countries other than Norway's allies may be allowed to carry out military activities on Norwegian soil as well. In principle this also includes Russia as a most prominent member of PfP. It is further stated that large-scale Allied exercises in Finnmark are not on the agenda but that Allied aircraft will be allowed to fly over Finnmark in connection with visits to and inspections in Russia. Furthermore, a zone will be established close to the border of Russia, in which foreign combat aircraft will not normally be

---

439 Willy Østreng: "Næroppgaven i norsk utenrikspolitikk, med spesiell vekt på nordområdene," in *Norsk utenrikspolitisk Årbok 1977*, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo 1977, pp. 9-31

permitted. The intention is that all military air traffic will be subject to strict Norwegian supervision.[440]

These are adjustments to make the self-imposed security regime meet the requirements of the new times and a signal to put the Cold War behind in bilateral relations. The opening up of Norwegian soil to PfP and OSCE military activities is to take one further step in normalizing regional military activity in accordance with the model set by the naval exercise *Pomor* in the spring of 1994. The purpose of that exercise was to train naval forces from Russia and several NATO countries, including Norway, for peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the UN.[441] Thus, regional military dispositions jointly exercised by Norway and Russia are strung together with their new extra-regional and multilateral security obligations. In May 1997 the neutral countries, Finland and Sweden are scheduled to conduct a joint military exercise with Norway in the county of Troms "in the spirit of PfP." This is the first formal contact with Finland in this respect.[442] But in the public debate controversial new thoughts concerning Finland and Norden have been launched by official representatives as well as from members of the research community. The Norwegian Commander in Chief has in writing uttered the "heretical" thought that Norway in the future may have more security interests jointly with Finland than with her own ally, Denmark. This is, in his mind, so because the two countries are alone among West European countries in bordering on Russia in the North.[443] An equally "heretical" idea has been proposed to establish a joint military Command structure for the whole of the Nordic area in order to vitalize and save Nordic cooperation as a political project.[444] On the official side it has been decided that, for the first time in the history of the Nordic Council, security and defence policy issues will be on the agenda of her summer session of 1997. This, according to the Norwegian Defence Minister, renders visions of a closer cooperation between the Nordic countries in the fields of defence and security in the future.[445]
These concrete measures and ideas of integration are brand new and a manifestation of the new times in regional affairs. The Russians, however, seem to be both vigilant and sensitive to changes in status quo. In accordance with the adjustments of the self-imposed military restrictions, 18 US Marines were permitted in early 1996 to conduct military exercises in Finnmark. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately expressed its concern stating

---

440 See *Fact Sheet*, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, no. 2, October, 1995

441 *UD-Informasjon*, no. 13, 1994, p. 14

442 General Per Bothun: "Fra kald krig til nye utfordringer," in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, nr. 6-7, 1996, p. 2

443 Arne Solli (1996): Op. cit. p. 10

444 Iver B. Neumann: "Bør vi få felles nordisk militærkommando?," in *Aftenposten*, April 15, 1996

445 Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo: Op. cit. p. 11

that the US presence shows the real intention of the changes in Norwegian policy. The Commander in Chief of the Northern Fleet took an even stronger position publicly objecting to what he perceived to be an abolishment of the ban on NATO-military exercises in Finnmark. He also strongly objected to Norwegian endeavours to monitor naval movements electronically in the Barents Sea. The Admiral made it abundantly clear that he did not regard these activities as constructive handshakes to preserve regional peace and stability.[446] The NATO-exercise *Battle Griffin* that took place in the counties of Troms and Nordland in March 1996 was received with the same Russian regrets and criticism. To a certain extent this is a recurrence of the old Russian reaction pattern to western presence and activities in North Norway. In the Russian perception, the ORSR, that has provided regional stability for decenniums, is being tampered with. This adds to regional uncertainty and reduces predictability at least in an interim period, until the new practice has settled and the new ramifications have been formatted. Interestingly enough the Admiral, in his tirade of criticism of Norwegian policy, gave high ratings to joint naval exercises like the POMOR. As stated by a prominent Norwegian commentator, it seems as if the vigilance of Moscow in the North is increasing while Russian military might is decreasing.[447] The political sensitivities rooted in geography and history seem to reemerge as a topic in regional high politics. The regional need is for evolutionary rather than revolutionary steps in the process of policy changes. Continuity in the core features of the ORSR seems to be an important prerequisite in order not to challenge regional stability. From an international systemic point of view, this shows that regimes formulated and implemented under certain historic periods and specific political circumstances may prevail and function also under systems very different from their circumstantial origins. Continuity and change are two sides of the same coin.

Changes in the International Svalbard Regime?

The regime as defined in the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 has not been altered. The same goes for the geostrategic location of the islands. Nevertheless, both parties have adjusted their political priorities and practical implementation of the regime in accordance with the new circumstances.

Norwegian policy in Svalbard has for many years and to a large extent had the significant Soviet presence in the archipelago as a basic reason and prerequisite. This premise has gradually become an object of change. Since 1993 the Russian population in Svalbard has been gradually reduced. Economic indications are that this trend will continue and that the population in a long-term perspective may be reduced to the hundreds and concentrated to just one settlement, as compared to a stable approx. 2000 dispersed to two settlements, Barentsburg and Pyramiden, during the Cold War (see figure 4). Two scenarios can be developed on this premise; The

---

446 Kjell Dragnes: "Russerne liker ikke norsk snusing" in the daily *Aftenposten*, 13.12.95, p. 3

447 Nils Morten Udgaard: Op. cit.

Figure 4: The archipelago of Svalbard with Russian and Norwegian settlements.



traditional interpretation has been that the Soviet Union, in her reluctance to submit to all parts of Norwegian jurisdiction within the Soviet settlements, has *restricted* Norwegian policy in Svalbard. On this backdrop it can be argued that the new situation provides opportunities to underline and strengthen the jurisdictional aspects of Norwegian sovereignty vis-à-vis the Russians. In this scenario, Norwegian authorities will have improved the ground to secure Svalbard's position as "Norwegian land" without drawing on her NATO allies to buttress the execution of Norwegian sovereignty. This perspective is probably an overly narrow one, which leads us to the second scenario.

During the Cold War, Norwegian security policy was supported by western countries. The hegemonic features of the East-West conflict promoted an alliance-solidarity to be applied also in Svalbard. In the continuation of this reasoning it can be argued that the Soviet presence and policy did not only have a restrictive effect on Norwegian jurisdiction. The confrontation between the superpowers provided Norway with a large degree of backing from the West. In this perspective Norway achieved significant *freedom of action,* and a western foot in the doorway of

Soviet settlements, to exert pressure for complying with Norwegian laws and regulations. As of now, when the alliance cohesion of the Cold War is less effective, the national interests of the western countries will be given higher priority and Norwegian interests in Svalbard may receive less western support than before. This creates a pan-Arctic paradox: As the Arctic in general has become an arena for increased *international cooperation* (see chapter 1), Svalbard may become an arena for increasing *conflict of interests*. Norway may experience that the allied support was not provided to Norway as the possessor of sovereignty *per se*, but to Norway as the western guard on one of the smaller arenas of the East-West conflict. Other states will now apply different criteria in their judgement of Norwegian policy than they used to do. The recent conflicts with Spain and Iceland on fishery rights in the zone around the archipelago and generally in the high seas of the North Atlantic, are an indication of the new circumstances Norway is encountering also in the North. The Norwegian daily, Aftenposten pinpointed the problem accurately in a recent article, stating that Norway in these respects *finds enemies in all quarters, in particular among her own allies.*[448] Western multipolarity as a measure in Norwegian Svalbard policy is no longer anything to be automatically reckoned with in the years to come. This is an unplanned change in the security equation of Norway in the archipelago.[449] In a medium and long term perspective this may turn out to be an unpleasant development given the added significance of northern waters to Russia and the possibility that this may further enhance the geostrategic importance of Svalbard. The possible lack of multipolarity as a backup vehicle in Norwegian jurisdiction in Svalbard and as an overall instrument of regional security may partly be compensated for by the institutionalization of multipolarity in the *Barents Euro-Arctic region* (BEAR).

Changes in the Political Rules of Conduct

The BEAR, which was founded on the *Kirkenes Declaration of January 11, 1993*, is a formalized cooperation between the governments of Russia, Sweden, Finland and Norway and their 8 northernmost provinces[450] plus representatives of indigenous peoples. The designated area of cooperation is restricted to a *core area* comprising the 8 provinces (see figure 5), and an *unspecified ocean area* restricted to the field of environmental management (see figure 6). The

---

448 *Aftenposten*, February 3, 1996, p.6

449 For a thorough discussion of this scenario see: Henning Simonsen, Arild Moe, Willy Østreng, Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas: "Norge utenfor Fastlands-Norge: Nye Utenrikspolitiske Rammebetingelser" *Report* commissioned by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, March 1995.

450 The provinces referred to are the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark in Norway, the counties of Norrbotten in Sweden and Lappland in Finland, and the oblasts of Murmansk and Archangelsk and the Karelian Republic in Russia. Approximately 4.5 million people live in the Barents Region - one million on the Nordic side.

Figure 5: The 9 Provinces of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.



Source: *Barentsprogrammet*, 1994-95.

size of the cooperative land area is approximately 1.2 million square kilometres. About 80 percent of its total population of 4.4 million people live in Russia. A minority of between 59,000 and 66,000 indigenous Sami people are living within the BEAR area. [451]

The initiator of the BEAR, Foreign Minister of Norway Thorvald Stoltenberg, stated two intertwined objectives for this unique transregional, intergovernmental cooperation: First, the eight peripheral provinces concerned should be transformed into growth-resistant entities based on their own initiatives, resources and prerequisites. Second, the confrontational security strategy of the Cold War should be replaced by a security strategy of cooperation: "We (i.e Norway) wish to weave Moscow and Northwest Russia into a web of stability promoting arrangements of cooperation as a countervailing measure against, and gradual replacement of,

[451] Margaretha Dahlstrøm, Heiki Eskelinen & Ulf Wiberg:" East Meets West in the North," in Margaretha Dahlstrøm, Heikki Eskelinen & Ulf Wiberg (eds): Op. cit. p. 3

the strong militarization of the area. In a region where tanks previously threatened to cross national borders, thoughts and ideas shall flow. Through a new type of relations we wish to increase Norwegian security in a new era."[452] In other words: The civilian societies of the North shall by way of their non-military cooperation contribute to economic growth and sustainability as well as to international security comprising the whole of the region. The single most important objective is to integrate Russia into this web of interdependence for at least two reasons. First, Finland, Sweden and Norway are already providing for each other's individual and collective security through their long-standing security community, i.e. a community between states where it is unthinkable that conflicts will be resolved by military arms. Second, the more alarming security problems of the region stem from the Russian side. Some examples are political instability, serious environmental problems, not least the uncertainties related to the storing of radioactive waste, the Kola military bases, organised crime and possible threats of mass migration. To cope, the Norwegian government opted for a security arrangement in the broadest sense of the word through confidence-building and multi-faceted interdependence [453] This is not to say that the BEAR will escape conflicts. By giving the states involved a broader agenda of issues over which their interests may differ the number of conflicts is more likely to increase than decrease. However, where interdependence is strong, disruption of relationships is costly, which should reduce incentives to resort to armed force.

Although the initiative to this sub-regional cooperation was taken by the Norwegian government, the political prerequisites for the very establishment derive inspiration and backing from two dominant ongoing international processes and geographical areas; from the Arctic and its post-Cold War endeavours to form cooperative regimes, and from Continental Europe and its Cold War processes to regionalize civil interactions. The Arctic contributions to BEAR are to be found in the four northern processes of reconceptualization of security, civilianization, regionalization and mobilization. Those processes provided the correct sub-regional atmosphere to give a harmonious birth to BEAR (for a detailed discussion of those processes see chapter 1). Actually, the continental European processe was invoked by the initiator as more important to the paternity of BEAR than those of high latitudes. The establishment of BEAR was primarily justified by reference to the European regionalization processes that commenced in the 1970s. In this context, the Barents region is to be regarded as a northerly post-Cold War expression of this

---

452 Thorvald Stoltenberg, *speech* to Landsdelsutvalget for Nord-Norge, November 17, 1992

453 Bjørn Tore Godal: "In Nansens's Footsteps. The Barents Cooperation: A Vision for a better Europe" lecture at the Royal Geographical Society, London, 5.10.95, in *UD-informasjon*, 13 October 1995, no. 32, p. 24

Figure 6: The Barents Euro-Arctic Region and alternative extensions of the ocean area of environmental cooperation.



southern trend, integrated as it is in the endeavours to build a new international order of cooperation and security.[454]

As seen from a Norwegian point of view the background, initiative and designated strategy of BEAR by consequence extends regional security in three different manners: First, it makes the principle of multipolarity prevail in the southern part of the Arctic; second, it extends further the concept of security to embrace more than military issue areas; third, it involves subnational and

[454] For a more detailed discussion of the buffering and supporting effect of those processes on BEAR see Willy Østreng: "The Barents Region: A Lasting Contribution to the Post-Cold War Order?," in a forthcoming issue of *Arctic. The Journal of the Arctic Institute of North America*, 1997.

trans-regional actors as instruments of high politics. Let us address these three extensions of security in more detail.

I. The Multipolarity of the EABR:

In taking this initiative Norway made every effort to ensure that her relations with Russia should be part of the western countries' relationship with Russia in the North. Political backing from western countries is still mandatory. The invitation to take part in the formative meeting of the BEAR was issued to all states having an interest in the region, and not only to those having territory there. At the meeting official representatives from USA, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland and Japan were present. Never before had Norway succeeded in visualizing the western interest and role in the region more clearly than on this occasion. This political manifestation has subsequently been substantiated by economic investments and interests. During the Cold War the western presence in the Russian part of the BEAR was negligible due to the high degree of militarization. Today 450 western companies or joint ventures are active in the area employing 16,000 persons and exporting for a total value of 125 million US dollars. Of these firms the majority are Nordic - approximately 200 Finnish, 100 Norwegian and some tens belong to Swedish companies. Great Britain and Germany each provided about 10 percent of the total export volume to the Murmansk oblast in 1995.[455] Plans to improve on and provide better conditions for furthering these intra-regional activities have been launched for the period up to 1999. They include 84 different projects of widely varying character and scope, and the total budget suggested is approximately USD 26 million. In 1995 four interregional programmes were launched - two of them including enterprises across the Russian border.[456]

It has correctly been stated, however, that the cooperation may end up in *formal multilateralism* and function on the basis of *real bilateralism* between Norway and Russia.[457] There are two reasons why this may happen. First, Norway and Russia are the most prominent parties in the cooperation; out of 9 participating provinces, 7 belong to these two countries.[458] As of now, the Norwegian government has shown the most pronounced interests in providing grant finance to support the process of transformation to market economies, democratic societies and ecological

---

455 Sverre Jervell: "Barentssamarbeidet februar 1996. Hvor står vi, hvor går vi?," *lecture*, Pax Nordica, University of Umeå, 29 February 1996, p. 2

456 *The Barents Programme 1994*, Barents Secretariat, Kirkenes.

457 John Kristen Skogan: "Det nye samarbeidsopplegget for Barentsregionen" in *Norsk utenrikspolitisk årbok*, Oslo, 1993, NUPI, p. 25

458 Ulf Wiberg: "The Idea of Pluralistic East-West Integration and Policy-Making for the European North," in Margaretha Dahlstrøm, Heikki Eskelinen & Ulf Wiberg (eds): Op. cit. p.82

sustainability in northwest Russia. Finland and Sweden are practising a more general support towards the neighbouring areas in the former Soviet Union and they have been slow in fulfilling their financial obligations to the BEAR. Second, Russia and Norway are those countries most affected and concerned when it comes to security in the region. They were during the Cold War, and they continue to be. The question of formal and real bilaterality in the regional relationship between Russia as a great power and Norway as a small state will remain a challenge in Norwegian foreign policy also in the years to come.

II. The Extension of the Concept of Security:

As of the latter part of the 1990's, Norwegian policy makers openly conceptualize security in the context of the BEAR as a matter transcending the boundaries of specific issue areas. In the political rhetoric military threats are being played down. The emphasis is on ethnic conflicts, economic disparities and environmental hazards - on the non-military threats to regional stability and cooperation.[459] Security, as defined within the BEAR, concerns issue-areas traditionally seen as "low politics," and security as such is treated as a *dimension* cutting across several issue areas, primarily civilian. Furthermore, the number of states involved indicates that the Barents scheme is preoccupied with the security of a grouping of states, or the *common security* of the states belonging to this specific sub-region.[460] The extension of security also comprises a heterogeneous array of actors and polities, i.e. entities of various kinds combining community and government.

III. Various Polities in Regional Security Policy:

A basic premise in the Barents-scheme is that the cooperation shall be based in the region itself, i.e. societal as well as subnational and transregional actors are the nucleus and the driving force carrying the prime responsibility to promote regional integration. The organizational apparatus to operationalize this responsibility has been assigned to the *Regional Council*, which hosts representatives of the 9 provinces and the Nordic Sami Council. A *Secretariat* based in Kirkenes supports this Council in preparing and implementing the decisions made. Representatives of the governments meet in the *Barents Council*, whose primary function is to define the framework to promote and ease cooperation. The Council consists of an *Inner Circle* of regional states - Russia, Sweden, Finland and Norway, which alternate to chair the meetings, and an *Outer Circle*

---

459 Johan Eriksson: "Security in the Barents Region. Interpretations and Implications of the Norwegian Barents Initiative," in *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1995, pp. 266-267

460 For a most interesting and thorough discussion of the security implications of the BEAR see: Johan Erikson: "Security in the Barents Region. Interpretations and Implications of the Norwegian Barents Initiative," in *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 30, no.3, 1995, pp. 259-286

of states supporting the principles of the Kirkenes Declaration. Denmark, Iceland and the EU-Commission belong to this category of state-actors[461] (See figure 7). In all, the BEAR comprises actors or polities at no less than six different levels and/or types:

- *external polities* (EU, external states);
- *regional territorial states* (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia);
- *subnational regions/actors* (Troms, Finnmark, Nordland, Norrboten, Lapland, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Karelia and Nenets autonome district);
- *structural actors* (Secretariat, Regional and Barents Councils);
- *transregional actors* (Samis);
- *societal actors* (companies, universities, cultural organizations etc).

This multi-level and multi-player setting gives rise to a series of very important questions having been labelled the "polity puzzle" both of the BEAR and the overall security agenda of the post-Cold War era.[462] To illustrate the intricacy of the challenge let us briefly touch on some of them. The mix of central and local authorities poses either of two questions: What is the division of labour between the two levels of governments?, or, what is the role of central government in a cooperative scheme rooted and shaped in local interests and designated primarily a local responsibility? First, the Barents Cooperation crosses national borders, and central governments are the only parties that according to international law may enter into binding transnational agreements. Thus, cooperation between counties in several countries requires the participation of central governments. Second, interests of high politics are at stake in the region and security policy is constitutionally the sole responsibility of central government. Thus, what the governments have invited their counties to do is, through their civilian societies, to *contribute* to the creation of a new security order in their own neighbourhood, *together* with governments. In the context of security the BEAR is, according to the Norwegian government, solely a government-governed partnership between counties and governments across borders. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of governments will use their participation to guide the counties to navigate around the most dangerous minefields of foreign policy. In the general literature on European regionalization a different kind of implication has been identified in the security interaction between central and local governments: "...the net effect on security may be positive,... to the extent that regional power can allay local anxieties and neutralize potentially violent separatist groups. In doing so, regions relieve pressure on national governments. It is not by chance that regional power has grown with the willing assent of the state - although it has

---

461 Utenriksdepartementet: *Barentsregionen. Et regionaliseringsprosjekt i det nordligste Europa*, Oslo, 1993, no. 1

462 Johan Eriksson *Euro-Arctic Security: The Policy Puzzle,* Lassinantti, G, ed., Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War: The Baltic Sea Region and the Barents Sea Region. Olof Palme International Centre, Stockholm, 1994.

Figure 7: The Euro-Arctic Barents Organization.



Source: *Ministry of Foreign Affairs,* Oslo, 1994.

grown in some places because national governments could not deter it by any acceptable means."[463] The cooperative challenge of this scheme is that the division of labour is not defined in the Kirkenes Declaration and there is no subordination of the Regional Council to the Barents Council. At the interface between these two councils friction and tug-of-war situations may arise, both within and between states. This tension was felt at the meeting in the Regional Council in February 1994 when the Governor of the Murmansk oblast urged the other heads of delegations to request their respective governments to speed up the negotiations on the delimitation line in the Barents Sea. He also suggested that the parties should consider establishing a Russian/Norwegian condominium for the disputed area. This proposal was declined by the Norwegian side with reference to the fact that this was something to be decided bilaterally between the two governments and not multilaterally at the county level.

In Norwegian politics, the concept of regionalization is a key word, underscoring that political decisions are to be taken at the lowest possible level. According to one observer this should imply a new security role for provinces and interregional institutions in that the Contracting parties agreed, in the Kirkenes Declaration "to secure a peaceful and stable development in the Region."[464] Representatives of local governments participating in the Regional Council, when directly asked emphasized that they are not simply acting in the interests of their provinces but also in the interests of their national societies.[465] The problem illustrated here is that the polities

---

[463] John Newhouse: "Europe's Rising Regionalism," in *Foreign Affairs*, no. 1, vol. 76, 1977, p.74

[464] Johan Eriksson: Op. cit. p. 270

[465] Johan Eriksen: Op. cit. p. 271

either overlap or are included in each other as is the case with central and provincial governments.[466] In this way regional politics have become part of the state's foreign policy - a version of what has been termed "decentralized foreign and security policy."[467]

To complicate the matter even further, the transnationality of the Sami representation in the Regional Council also carries an element of *non-state security* in the organizational apparatus of the Barents Cooperation (see introductory chapter). Apart from the states, the Samis are currently the only separate "nation" within the framework of the BEAR. Even though they do not struggle for a sovereign state they sometimes speak of Sápmi as their homeland cutting across well-defined national borders in the North. At the same time they claim rights, not least when it comes to management of resources, similar to those of a state. Their previous demand for representation in the Barents Council was a move for achieving recognition as a nation comparable with that of a nation state.[468]. Indicative of the delicacy of this demand, the Samis only obtained representation in the Regional Council - the forum for interregional cooperation between subnational entities. The Sami identity is also strongly related to the landscape and consequently to environmental threats. Damage to the environment (i.e. blocking of reindeer paths by pipelines, nuclear contamination etc.) can threaten their culture and very existence. The Samis are still struggling with the consequences of the Chernobyl accident nine years ago. In this way the Sami people have a strong urge to secure environmental sustainability and actually to pool resources with central governments to achieve environmental security.[469] In this way the "two nations" - the state and the Samis - have strongly interlocked security concerns.

The tension still existing between centre and periphery of BEAR may even give room for cross-national identification among the regional actors - transregional as well as subnational. The heavy emphasis on the provinces in promoting cooperation may actually facilitate transnational coalition building not necessarily benefiting the interests of central government. The opening of the borders provided by the BEAR has led to a dramatic increase in the interaction between the provinces in recent years. During the Cold War the Norwegian/Russian border was in principle closed. As an illustration, in 1983 there were 1,500 border-crossings. After one year of Barents

---

466 Johan Eriksson: "Euro-Arctic Security: The Policy Puzzle," in G. Lassinantti (ed): *Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War: The Baltic Sea Region and the Barents Sea Region.* Olof Palme International Centre, Stockholm, 1994, p. 55

467 Thorvald Stoltenberg: "Barentsregionen: En ny dynamisk ramme for samarbeidet i nord," speech at the Conference *Fra Nordkalotten til Storkalotten,* in Rovaniemi on 21 October, 1992, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo

468 O.E. Magga: "Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region," *speech* given at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Kirkenes, January 13, 1993

469 Johan Eriksson (1994): Op.cit. p. 63

cooperation the number had risen to 55,000 and in 1995 to 66,000. In the course of two years the number of motor vehicles crossing increased more than 100 percent - from 8,800 in 1993 to 16,900 in 1995.[470] This pattern of interaction will probably become even more distinct in the years to come and it undoubtedly carries the potential for coalition formations. The same applies to the endeavours to create a "BEAR identity" - a sense of transregional community feeling and common interests. Exchange of students, the Barents Festival in Kirkenes and the publication of Barents newspapers - Barents-Nytt and Barents Perspektiv - are explicitly aimed at legitimizing the BEAR "and stimulating the development of a transnational Barents identity. "[471]

As has been pointed out: "These trends make room for political authority and community in other forms and on other levels than the state. Nonstate polities are increasingly claiming to be points of identification, as well as demanding greater political autonomy, or even political independence... Hence, the security mechanisms of the state are in jeopardy, or at least in a fundamental process of change."[472] What this boils down to is that provinces, interregional institutions and indigenous peoples, indirectly, consider themselves to have some security roles to play. The polity puzzle confronting the Norwegian government as well as other governments is that serious uncertainty exists about the security function of the various polities.[473] In the Norwegian case, however, these vaguely defined roles are considered as complementary rather than as challenges to the security role of the state.[474] A different perspective should be that transnational politicization stimulates mobilization from below that will not necessarily be given the consent of central government because the role of the state as a non-disputed supreme security subject is being challenged.[475]

The complexity of the Barents scheme makes the BEAR a composite laboratory-test of the operationalization of the extended concept of security - thematically, geographically and otherwise. Interestingly enough, the Barents cooperation has not designated any of its many committees for security deliberations. Security is thus a topic not to be addressed directly within the cooperative apparatus but rather a public goal to be achieved indirectly mostly through the civilian activities conducted by "non-security actors," which might have varying security agendas. Actually, here the BEAR complies with the trend of Arctic regionalization and civilianization: Military matters have been excluded from all the agendas. Some would say this

---

470 Sverre Jervell: Op. cit. p.2

471 Johan Eriksson (1994): Op. cit. p.65

472 Johan Eriksson (1994): Op. cit. p. 55

473 Johan Eriksson (1994): Op. cit. p. 55

474 Johan Eriksson: Op. cit. p. 272

475 Ibid.

is a matter of burying one's head in the sand, complicating security matters and planning even further. Others again will assume this to be a political prerequisite for regionalization and civilianization both in general and in the case of the BEAR. Both positions are probably right, but combined they make the Arctic security equation more abstract and harder to resolve.

The Barents Initiative, Extended Security and the NSR

In political statements, the Barents region is connected southward to Europe, eastwards to the NSR, but just vaguely northward to the regionalization- and civilianization processes of the high Arctic. A small comment to this effect is needed.

The Kirkenes Declaration states that the Barents initiative is part of the evolution process to construct a new cooperative and security system for post-Cold War Europe. Time and again the Norwegian government has declared that it feels a continuing responsibility for ensuring that the Barents Cooperation makes a valuable contribution to this overall objective.[476] This policy is in absolute accord with the visions drawn up for Europe and the Arctic in the Murmansk initiative, which also identified the NSR as a new prospective issue-area to further international cooperation (see chapter 1).

The Barents Council has assigned NSR matters to a special committee, responsible for assessing the route's significance for the Barents Cooperation. This is interesting for at least three different reasons. First, because the cooperation has so far been defined as exclusively landbased due to the unresolved dispute between Norway and Russia on the partition of the ocean space between their continental shelves and economic zones in the Barents Sea (see figure 2). The only exception to this rule concerns environmental cooperation which has been extended to cover the oceans as well. Secondly, the NSR does not geographically overlap with the Barents region. Novaya Zemlya, which is part of the Arkhangelsk oblast and consequently part of the area of cooperation, coincides with the delimitation of the NSR westwards. This implies that it is easier to include out-of-the-region ocean areas in the cooperative structure than the nearby Barents Sea. The political message is clear: Until Norway and Russia have solved their legal differences in the Barents Sea, the latter will be kept outside the multilateral cooperative realm of the Barents. The reason for including the marginal seas of the NSR in the scheme is that they may prove vital to economic growth and regional trade in a region deprived of apt infrastructure in terms of civilian airports, railroads and roads. The sole immediately available and readily adaptable infrastructure of any size and transnational significance to be found in the region is linked to seaways - the NSR. The coastal areas of the region have a good many naval and merchant seaports. Narvik, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk all have export ports of a standard satisfying

[476] Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal: *"In Nansen's Footsteps..."* Op. cit. p. 32

international requirements.[477] Moreover, much of the Russian Arctic fleet is currently lying idle. Out of a fleet of approximately 700 vessels, an average of 200 on an annual basis are engaged in cargo shipment along the NSR. The remaining 500 may at relatively short notice be rendered operative for freight assignments between the counties of the Barents region. The BEAR is the geographical extension of the NSR westward - an "entrance and exit" for continuous sea transport between the Pacific and the Atlantic and between western Europe and Northern Russia. The development of the two interrelated but separate regions seems to some extent to depend upon their mutual indispensability. Alexander Granberg, previous advisor to President Boris Yeltsin, puts it this way: "The development of the Northern Sea Route and its economic zone is harmoniously integrated into the system of cooperation of northern regions in neighbouring countries, by which I mean primarily contacts between northern regions of Nordic countries and Northern Russia." [478] The integration referred to by Granberg is functional, in that the servicing of the NSR is taken care of outside of the NSR itself, among other places in the BEAR. The whole Russian icebreaker fleet and much of the ice-strengthened merchant fleet have Murmansk oblast as their home base, where bunkering, shipyard and repair facilities for these fleets are found. It is from here that Murmansk Shipping Company operates and through its staff for Marine Ice Operations in Dickson carries the operational responsibility for the western stretch of the NSR. The Murmansk oblast has since the 1930s acted as the operative and logistics centre for the busiest part of the NSR. One reason is the Gulf Stream, which keeps Murmansk's ports ice-free and provides a relatively favourable climate the year round. Such conditions have made it possible to establish major urban centres with relatively stable populations and capacity to yield well-qualified and continuous support facilities for the Russian Arctic fleet. No other settlement along the NSR can take over the role of Murmansk in this context. Many thus perceive Murmansk as the start of the NSR at the Western end. Since the Far Eastern Shipping Company, based in Vladivostok, operates the eastern part of the NSR in a similar manner, it is not unusual to define Murmansk and Vladivostok as the actual end-points of the NSR. The development of the NSR has thus come about as a function of activities taking place in areas outside its own confines - the BEAR being the most recent and important. Some even regard the coast of North Norway (Finnmark, Troms and Nordland) to be part of it.[479] Therefore it seems more accurate to use the term the North East Passage, which is the NSR plus the BEAR, rather than the Northern Sea Route. In this perspective the NSR stretches from the Bering Strait in the East to the westernmost boundary of the BEAR in the West, i.e. the county of Nord-Trøndelag

---

[477] *Report on Infrastructure*, Expert Conference on the Barents Region, Kirkenes, 26-27 September, 1992

[478] Alexander Granberg: "The Northern Sea Route and the Policy of the New Russia," in *International Challenges*, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 10

[479] ARCTEC - Foundation for Arctic Trade and Industry Development: "NSR - The Northern Sea Route. Consequences for Northern Norway," 25 November 1991

on the Atlantic coast of Norway (see figure 8). The Barents region and the NSR are thus integrated regions in a geographic, perceptive as well as functional sense, and they depend on each other for their respective developments.[480]

As of today, the acknowledgement of this potential and functional integration has yet to be utilized by governments, regional authorities and societal organizations in the region. By neglecting these assets of the two "regions" the pace of civilian integration will be slower and the achievement of comprehensive security hampered, not only within the BEAR but also in the wider context of pan-Arctic developments.

By leaving the Barents Sea out, some of the richest resources of the North will not be utilized for promoting the integration of the BEAR. The only bodies available at present to include the Barents Sea in regional confidence-building and functional cooperation are the bilateral Commissions on fishery and environmental cooperation between the two countries. In other words: In an area where Norway has consistently striven to multilateralize relations, fisheries are still considered best taken care of in a bilateral setting. The intricacy of this policy may explain why many still insist on calling the BEAR: *the Barents Sea Region.*[481]

The inclusion of the NSR in the cooperative scheme of the BEAR should by implication mean that the security logic applied to the region also would spill-over to the route. The late Foreign Minister Holst put it this way: "In considering the desirability of opening this waterway and its hinterlands for international shipping and related activities the littoral states will take into consideration also their long-term national security interests."[482] This appears to be a solitaire political statement. Judged from the work of the NSR-Committee, indications are that the level of knowledge, engagement and leadership is scant among the participants, and many even question the Committee's very existence. Undoubtedly, the NSR's present role within the cooperation is one of low priority and lack of functional urgency. As such, the security spill-over effect most likely will be negligible.

---

480 For a discussion of the interlinks between the NSR and the Barentsregion see: Willy Østreng: "The Northern Sea Route and the Barents Region," in Olav Schram Stokke & Ola Tunander (eds): *The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe*, Sage Publications, London, 1994, pp. 159-172

342 See Willy Østreng: "Organiseringen av den Euro-arktiske Barentsregionen: Formål, funksjon og potensiale," *mimeographed article* at the FNI to be published in the spring of 1996. Even a recently published book uses the concept "The Barents Sea Region." See: G. Lassinantti(ed): Op. cit.

482 Johan Jørgen Holst: Op.Cit.

Figure 8: The Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the NSR as functional regions.



As shown above, the Kirkenes Declaration does not primarily connect the Barents Region northward to the civilianization and regionalization processes of the high Arctic (see chapter 1). The linkage to Europe was its main concern and motivation from the very commencement. In the opinion of Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst it would, however, be expedient if the rest of the Arctic states took an active part in the cooperation of the Barents Region to weave it into the broader global processes of cooperation. This linkage would in the opinion of the government, not suffice. It also took the position that the plethora of regional initiatives and cooperation fora concerning the Arctic region should be aligned and coordinated in order to maximize impact and efficiency. Institutions should be made interlocking and reinforcing. A certain amount of overlap was inevitable and desirable but the danger of competitive institutional proliferation should be recognized and avoided.[483] To leave out any of the Arctic states in any of these cooperative fora, not least the Arctic great powers - USA and Russia - might prove detrimental to regional developments.[484] The ensuing Norwegian endeavours to further coordination between all Arctic regimes and to bring all littoral states into the Barents Cooperation have, thus far, failed to yield any tangible results. The political priority is simply not high enough.

The aim to link the BEAR with High Arctic, European and global processes to establish an all-embracing system of international security and cooperation is at best a long term objective, some would even say utopian. Even the most entrepreneurial and optimistic of politicians will have to admit that the measures and political will to merge these processes still have a long way to go before they have matured sufficiently to leave the drawing boards of political architects. As the initiator of the BEAR, Norway, not being a full member of the European Union, is one of the Arctic states being in a self-interested position - both from an economic and security point of view - to promote such a process of linking. For Norway to take upon itself such a responsibility would make good sense for several reasons. First, the Barents region is geographically a part of both Europe and the Arctic. Second, it is also part of the cooperative structure that has developed regionally after the Murmansk speech, which formed the political foundation for the establishment both of the region and the other cooperative arrangements in the high North. The Barents region is thus both an element in the regionalization of Europe and of the corresponding processes going on in the Arctic. As such the Barents region - functionally as well as geographically - is located as a "border region" between the Arctic and Europe, which can be used to facilitate and further the harmonization of processes going on in a parallel but

---

483 Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst:" Security and Defence Issues in the Arctic Region..." Op. cit. pp. 39-40

484 Ibid.

uncoordinated fashion both in the North and South.[485] If the Arctic states pull together like this they may be obliged to harmonize their Barents policy with those of the other Arctic regimes and in a long term perspective possibly succeed in stepping up the pace of pan-Arctic integration and security. In this respect environmental preservation is the most likely issue area of cooperation, coordination and integration.

The New Overall Norwegian Security Posture: A Summing up

There is a noticeable degree of continuity in Norwegian security policy from the Cold War and up till today. This is due to relative stability in the significance of geostrategic conditions. There are also policy changes of far reaching consequence. This is mostly due to changes in the threat posture, which is much more benign today than it used to be. In the interface between continuity and adjustments Norway has been trapped between strategic worries of old vintage and new challenges of comprehensive security. The new circumstances have made Norway's allies seek new roles and functions in preserving international peace and stability. This has left Norwegian defence authorities with a lurking fear of being marginalized and left "alone" to handle regional military affairs up North. The Norwegian "Kola-fixation" is not only a rigid repetition of old conceptions, as alleged by the critics, but also a measure to attract allied attention to Norwegian priorities and long term strategic worries. The image of the Norwegians as the "last Cold Warriors" is felt, by the defence authorities, to be unwarranted in actual policy, which has been *modernized* (self-imposed military restrictions), *extended* (geographically), *broadened* (number of issue areas) and *deepened* (number of polities). At present, Norwegian security policy is struggling to straddle the demands of *continuity*, *adjustments*, and *innovation*. Basically, the interaction of policy and legal principle within the ORSR of the Barents quadrangle is still intact and functioning as it did during the Cold War. Some of the policy principles have been strengthened, as the principle of multilateralization within the framework of BEAR, some have been adjusted like the restrictions on military manoeuvres in the county of Finnmark. But in essence, the ORSR has a remarkable continuity in functioning from one international order to another. It seems not to be very "order-dependent" (see figure 9). The problem is not, as contended by some of the critics, that Norway no longer has a clear security policy,[486] but rather that she is over-stretching her capabilities and differs from her allies in perceptions of reality. Arctic conditions are still providing important contributions to the value foundation of Norwegian security policy. But the preoccupation with military threats is now supplemented, broadened and deepened with a number of new political and civilian instruments assumed to

---

485 For a more comprehensive discussion of this aspect see Willy Østreng: "The Barents Region: A Contribution to European Security and Cooperation?" *in International Challenges*, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute Journal, vol. 12, no. 4, 1992, pp. 13-21

486 Iver B. Neumann & Ståle Ulriksen: Op. cit. p. 103

Figure 9: The complexity and coherency of the ORSR within the Barents quadrangle after the Cold War

Policy principles	Measures	Interactional pattern of policy principles	Elements of continuity	Elements of change	End result
Deterrence	Modernized Nato/Re-structuring of Norwegian military forces	Multilateralization	Core reasoning	Adaption of Nato and military forces to new circumstances + formalized multilatera-lization (BEAR)	Modernized and adjusted continuity of policy
Reassurance	Adjusted selfimposed military restrictions + bilateral cooperation + Military cooperations PFP&OSCE+BEAR	Policy of openness, demilitarization of Svalbard, principle of access to Svalbard	Core reasoning	The Finnmark-policy	
Open-door policy	Openness + increasing interaction and cooperation	Principle of access to Svalbard Demilitarization of Svalbard, Reassurance	Same	None	
Multilaterali-zation	Formalization in BEAR	Deterrence + Reassurance	Same	Strengthened	

sustain regional stability. The closest one comes to formulating a policy of extended security is within the Barents Region. In the very concept of the BEAR, security is extended from the Cold War version to comprise a whole bundle of new civilian issue areas, different levels of public policy, transregional non-state nationalities and common security across national borders. The complexity and number of polities and the institutional innovation of the BEAR is sometimes referred to as decentralised foreign policy, leaving uncertainty about the security function of the various players high.

One of the problems in making civilian issue-areas into a dimension of national security is that conflicts relating to a specific area may be resolved by the traditional means of armed force. This will in turn result in more suffering over a wider range of issue areas than would otherwise be the case. The purpose of extending security is to achieve freedom from a variety of threats by the application of exceptional but adequate measures to hinder undesirable developments. In most instances of international conflicts the use of physical power and the waging of war are undesirable developments in themselves and not adequate measures of protection. Apart from armed force and economic sanctions, new measures of protection to prevent new undesirable developments within the new sectors of security have not yet been identified and/or operationalized. The concept of security concerns the extreme values of national politics in its claim for priority over all other issue areas in government attention. By extending the concept of security beyond the military and economic sectors, more issue areas get their status and prominence elevated from low to high politics but without possessing what really counts in the realm of national survival: *issue-specific measures of an exceptional character*. This absence of

adequate issue-specific measures also applies as a problem in the extension of Norwegian security policy.

Lack of integration also seem to be a problem. As of now, the various issue areas belong under their appropriate Ministries which implies that there are many cooks liable to spoil the broth of national security as a coherent and consistent vehicle of national protection. In line with this reasoning, many of the new issue areas, not least environmental protection, have undoubtedly become part of Norwegian security in the political rhetoric, but not fully in deed and organization. A potential to develop adequate measures in a medium term perspective rests in the acknowledgement that security is *relational, international and interdependent* - in the efforts to overcome the conceptual pitfalls of the security dilemma. Here Norway has a long tradition of practice in the North - the ORSR as practiced within the Barents quàdrangle. By applying this northern geostrategic experience together with the multinationality of the BEAR, an organizational framework exists to start the mind-bending process of operationalization.

Among the civilian issue areas included in the concept of extended security, environmental protection ranks high on the Norwegian agenda. But as pointed out "the concept of security is a naturally integrative idea."[487] Neither military, economic, political or environmental security can be fully understood apart from each other. From this perspective, the sectors appear more useful as viewing platforms from which one can observe the security problem from different angles, than as self-contained areas for issue-specific policy formation. In the rhetoric, Norwegian security politics sometimes addresses and reflects the integrative aspects of security, sometimes it confines itself to individual issue areas. What is lacking is a governmental apparatus designed to promote integration and operationalization of the extension of security (see chapters 6 and 7).

The representation of the Northern Sea Route in Norwegian security deliberations is negligible. It holds an organizational position within the framework of the BEAR, but even in that respect its profile is kept low and is uninfluential on developments. In bilateral Russian-Norwegian relations, however, there are references made to the INSROP-programme in official communiques following official visits between the two governments. Recently, the Norwegian Foreign Minister referred to the NSR as a topic within the framework of BEAR possessing great future visions and perspectives. Progress in this respect, however, awaited the scientific results of INSROP-research.[488] Apart from this, the NSR is a highly marginalized topic in security deliberations.

---

[487] Barry Buzan: Op. cit. p. 368

[488] Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal, speech to Finnmark fylkesting in Vadsø, June 6, 1996. Available from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CHAPTER 5

ENVIRONMENT IN THE U.S. DISCOURSE ON SECURITY: THE CASE OF THE MISSING ARCTIC WATERS

By Franklyn Griffiths

As the new century approaches, we find the United States seemingly embarked on a transition to a new security praxis or reciprocal interaction of thought and practice. By no means closed to ideas and information from abroad or to concepts derived by non-state actors within, the U.S. government shows signs of adapting to a post-Cold War environment in ways that accentuate pre-existing American inclinations to articulate and employ extended notions of security. Received thinking which emphasizes the national interest, self-help, the military instrument, and an opposed-forces view of the world now finds itself challenged. New thinking on security, as Emma Rothschild puts it, extends the frame of reference in fourfold fashion: (1) upwards from the state to the global and planetary level; (2) downwards to the individual, (3) sideways to non-military or civil concepts of environmental, economic, and social security; and (4) in all directions where responsibility, and I would add the need for cooperation, in ensuring security is concerned.[489] A formidable array of private analysts, NGOs, foundations, think tanks, and officials as well as a few political leaders have started to generate and, to a far lesser extent, to institutionalize new ideas about extended security. The result, even at this early point, is a vigorous intellectual and political process whose complexity cannot but daunt those wanting to estimate where the U.S. might be headed on matters of security. And yet there is a need to know. Whether or not we happen to approve of state-centered conceptions of politics, the world's security praxis will be heavily influenced by the discourse and the policy priorities of the lead state in the international system.

As also occurs with global warming or Russia's transition to "democracy," the U.S. move towards an increasingly extended security praxis is accompanied by much uncertainty as well as complexity. Indeed, the whole project has a futuristic air, insofar as it is a purposive venture. To help situate an inquiry that otherwise risks becoming vaporous, this chapter asks whether and if so how the United States might employ new understandings of security in the management of Arctic waters issues, and in responding even more particularly to the prospect of intensified use of Russia's Northern Sea Route for the transport of hydrocarbons and other

[489] Emma Rothschild, "What Is Security?" Daedalus 124, No. 3 (Summer 1995), 55.

bulk cargo. Here, too, the subject is futuristic in that there is little or no American interest in the circumpolar North. By no means is this to suggest that the United States is not an Arctic country. Decidedly it is. But Americans are quite unaware of their capacity to act in this part of the world.[490] The Arctic Ocean, for its part, is missing in the American view of the globe, and hardly anyone has even heard of the Northern Sea Route. Appropriately enough for an inquiry into the evolution of extended U.S. security praxis, in the Arctic we find ourselves at the beginning of a process in which ideas drawn from other places and issue-areas seem likely to predominate in improvised responses to unexpected problems.

Tendencies in U.S. Security Discourse Since 1945

There is little need to document the militarization of U.S. national security thinking and practice during the Cold War. The process may be said to have begun with the reassertion of the phrase "national security" by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal at a Senate hearing in August 1945.[491] Bolstered by realist conceptions of international affairs, the Cold War orientation of United States security policy crystallized in the National Security Act of 1947, and then in the National Security Council paper NSC-68 of 1950 which saw the country effectively committed to two generations of global containment of communism primarily but not exclusively by military means.[492] In the Arctic — governed as it was by a succession of interactions among strategic bombers, air defences, land- and then sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic anti-submarine warfare including the forward maritime strategy, and air- and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles — the net effect of Cold War and containment was clear.[493] Both the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the NATO Arctic members on the other, adopted what has been termed a "fully integrated multidimensional

---

[490] U.S. capabilities for Arctic scientific research and understanding of the physical environment, for example, exceed those of any regional country and indeed most of them combined. See *Arctic Research of the United States*, a series sponsored by the Inter-Agency Arctic Policy Group and issued by the Office of Polar Affairs, National Science Foundation.

[491] Quoted in Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 2.

[492] On NSC-68, see Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* 4, No. 2 (Fall 1979), 116-158. The reference to "realism" here pertains to political realism as a worldview which reduces international relations to the interaction of sovereign states pursuing the national interest defined in terms of power. The classic formulation is Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978).

[493] On the militarization of Arctic waters in particular, see Steven E. Miller, "The Arctic as a Maritime Theatre," in Franklyn Griffiths, ed., *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North* (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), 211-236.

security concept."[494] Though it is debatable whether the Arctic states had an explicit concept of regional security, or operated according to a set of extra-regional imperatives open to interpretation that they had one, the practical result was to subordinate any thought of non-military or civil cooperation to the task of gaining and maintaining global strength in relation to the principal adversary. But considerably more interesting than much of this was the latent awareness all along in the United States, and increasingly the practice by the U.S. government, of what amounted to extended security including on matters of containment.

From the start it was clear that national security took into account "our whole potential for war, our mines, industry, manpower, research, and all the activities that go into national civilian life."[495] Hence, in due course, the National Defense Highways Act, the National Defense Education Act, the growth of government support for research and development, the concern for balance of payments, strategic materials, foreign economic assistance, even for the Soviet grain harvest, and so on — all understood as matters of national security. The point here is twofold. While requirements of protracted conflict clearly predominated in the orchestration of national security policy, security was never seen in purely in military-strategic or even political-military terms. To the contrary, it was extended horizontally to include many and diverse civil matters. Secondly, in what may be termed an introversion of national security policy, all manner of actors right down to the level of the individual bought into civil dimensions of security ranging from scientific research to highway construction. Meanwhile, even within the military-strategic domain extended notions of security had their say. In the growing practice of summitry, arms control, and detente as of the mid-1950s, Americans were introduced to the seemingly unnatural act of collaboration with the enemy for joint gains. Further, the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 saw the United States engage in its first major act of what could later be termed environmental security by abating nuclear fallout and global public concern over the health effects of nuclear testing. Finally, if regional and global awareness is a hallmark of upwards-extended security, the Cold War national security policies of the United States displayed not a little of it in meeting the worldwide political as well as military requirements of containment. To be sure, the state and a realist policy perspective reigned supreme in all of this. Nevertheless, through the troubled renewal and revocation of detente in the 1970s, the United States exhibited a manifold but as yet inarticulate propensity to act on extended notions of security.

---

494 Willy Østreng, "Political-Military Relations Among the Ice States: The Conceptual Basis of State Behaviour," in Griffiths, *Arctic Alternatives*, 33.

495 Quoted in Romm, *Defining National Security*, 3.

Lester Brown and other precursors aside, Richard Ullman's 1983 piece in *International Security* marks the start of the articulation of a case for an extended security concept.[496] By that time Rachel Carson had long since written and been followed by the Club of Rome, Barry Commoner, Garrett Hardin, and others including the Palme Commission and U.N. studies on security and the relationship between disarmament and development.[497] Also by that time the United States had witnessed Earth Day 1970, the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the environment, the oil price shocks of the mid-1970s, and the appearance of a Japanese challenge to American competitiveness. Though Ullman may have failed to impress the U.S. national security establishment, he was the first to have put the pieces together in arguing for a horizontally extended concept to the community of analysts concerned with international security affairs. By the time Jessica Mathews wrote in 1989, continued evolution of the intellectual and policy climate had made it somewhat easier to impress.[498] What with the advent of "new political thinking" in the Soviet Union after 1985, the assertion of sustainable development in the Brundtland report on environment and development, and then the end of the Cold War, the scene was set for an outpouring of U.S. comment on extended security which before long would have visible effects on the thinking of officials and political leaders.[499] Meanwhile, though new potentialities for an extended security praxis in the Arctic

---

496 Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), 129-153. Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr., reports that Ullman's statement caused "hardly a ripple" in official thinking at the time. See his "The Insecure State: Reflections on 'the State' and 'Security' in a Changing World," *Daedalus* 124, No. 2 (Summer 1995), 186. Prominent among Ullman's precursors were Robert McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Lester Brown, "Redefining Security," *WorldWatch* Paper 14 (Washington, D.C.: WorldWatch Institute, 1977); and Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Legitimate Claims of National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 52, No. 3 (April 1974), 592-594.

497 Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162 (1968), 1243-1248; Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology* (New York: Bantam, 1971); Donnella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: New American Library, 1972); Independent Commission on Defence and Security (Palme Commission), *Common Security* (London: Pan, 1982); and United Nations, Department of Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General, *Concepts of Security* (New York: United Nations, 1986).

498 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, No. 2 (Spring 1989), 162-177.

499 World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), *Our Common Future* (London: Oxford University Press, 1987). On Soviet new thinking, see Franklyn Griffiths, "Current Soviet Military Doctrine," in Murray Feshbach, ed., *National Security Issues of the USSR: Workshop 6-7 March 1986, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium* (Dordrecht: Martinus Hijhoff, 1987) 241-258, and Eduard Shevardnadze "Ekologiya i diplomatiya" [Ecology and Diplomacy],

had unexpectedly been created by Gorbachev's Murmansk speech of October 2, 1987, the opportunity went virtually unnoticed in the United States.[500] Throughout the period to 1989, however, American analysts preferred on balance to articulate the need for new and better adapted national security *policies*, as distinct from new conceptions of security per se.

As of 1996, thinking about security was very much in flux as Americans grappled with the need for a coherent response to a markedly changed international environment.[501] In fact, the U.S. no longer had an integrated national security concept. Population specialists and politicians could refer to population as a global security issue, but no one spoke forcefully for demographic security as such. Economists and others identified all manner of economic threats to U.S. national security, but they were not arguing for economic security as a framework for understanding and action in meeting the challenges of the "new battlefield" of economic competition among the industrialized countries. Energy security was also a continuing concern, but it did not claim attention equivalent even to the global warming effects of energy consumption. Terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration were clearly regarded as security problems along with other non-military or civil threats such as industrial espionage, but they too were not reconceptualized. Meanwhile, in the area of political-military affairs, the Brookings Institution made a powerful case for cooperative security along lines similar to the Palme Commission.[502] Thinking was extended in this instance by virtue of the perceived need for the United States to act in concert with others to achieve national security objectives. And yet the Brookings report was resolute in resisting any significant horizontal extension of security discourse into the civil domain. What with the rapid proliferation of the security-related agenda, and the continuing attachment of many to threat-and-use-of-force notions, any effort to generate consensus on an integrated post-Cold War security concept could only have been judged premature as of mid-decade.

Literaturnaya gazeta, November 22, 1989. The subsequent U.S. cascade is evident in the some 500 items listed in the first report of the Environmental Change and Security Project, *Environment and Security Debates: An Introduction* (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, Spring 1995).

500 Mikhail Gorbachev, *The Speech in Murmansk* (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1987). The original is in *Izvestiya*, October 2, 1987.

501 Romm, *Defining National Security*, provides an overview of several of the issue-areas (the economy, the environment, energy, drug trafficking) in the U.S. discussion. On population, see for example Alex de Sherbinin, "World Population and U.S. National Security," *Environment and Security Debates*, 24-39.

502 Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994).

The transitional character of current U.S. security praxis is well captured in the 1995 *National Security Strategy* paper issued by the White House. It is worth excerpting at length:

> Protecting our nation's security — our people, our territory and our way of life — is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty. The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century — the threat of communist expansion — is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions...
>
> Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy. In addition, an emerging class of transnational environmental issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges to U.S. strategy...
>
> Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference... In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on what best serves our own long-term interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defence and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the security of values achieved through the expansion of the community of democratic nations.[503]

Though "environmental security" is cited here, "sustainable development" has pride of place in a document which clearly authorizes action on new dimensions of security while continuing to regard military threats as fundamental. The linear thinking of an earlier era is giving way to the variable geometry of a horizontally and vertically extended security praxis that increasingly admits the necessity for cooperation.

---

[503] *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995), 1 and 7. The 1996 *Strategy* was not substantially different.

The United States has thus been working with extended conceptions of security throughout the period since 1945. The story is not one of military thought and action giving way to extended security. Throughout the period to the 1970s, U.S. national security policy was dominated by militarized and realist conceptions to which diverse civil security matters were effectively subordinated but also acted upon. Thereafter, the correlation began to alter. Horizontal extension brought civil concepts and, as will be seen, practices increasingly into their own. It also began to displace military-strategic and realist considerations. Further, an enlarged interest in vertical extensions of security to the global and individual levels served to dilute the strength of state-centric security thinking and policy. Civil security considerations began to break free of their long subordination to political-military requirements. But while the extended security praxis of the United States showed clear signs of being demilitarized where ideas were concerned, the innate complexity of new thinking about security was such that new practices could be institutionalized only with difficulty and in *ad hoc* fashion. Nor did the vertical extension and the diffusion of awareness of responsibility for security cooperation seem likely soon to supplant the primacy of the national interest, the state, and self-help in the security-related behaviour of Americans. Though the old no longer held, a new extended security praxis seemed destined to a long and difficult birth.

Change in the correlation of civil and military in U.S. security policy obviously owed much to the waning and then the end of the Cold War. It also owed a lot to what the Soviets used to call objective realities — new civil security threats that demanded attention and new opportunities to address these threats. Nor should we omit domestic politics, notably the election of a Democratic administration in 1992 and the Republican sweep of the Congress in 1994, which served to end the boomlet of expansive thinking that was ushered in by the end of the Cold War. At a deeper level, the altered threat assessment of Americans may be said to reflect change in American preferences of how they are to live as a society. The thought here is that the choice of threats to regard as uppermost is inseparable from the choice of how to live.[504] Whereas the communist menace once provided a good deal of the answer, the growing force of civil considerations in U.S. security discourse suggests that Americans may be embarked upon an endeavour to redefine civility and the civil society. If asked to state which of the varied dimensions of security now being discussed is most likely to perform a

---

[504] Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). A brilliant reading of the Soviet threat in American Life is to be had in William Pfaff, "Reflections: The Soviet Myth," *The New Yorker*, November 6, 1978, 172-178. Following the collapse of socialism, Martin Malia sees in the ecological cause a new candidate for millennial utopianism complete with central ecoplanning for the collective planetary interest of humankind. Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 519-520.

pathfinding function in generating concepts that show the way forward for an extended U.S. security praxis, it is the environment and security discourse that gets my bet.

Environment and Security Debate in 1997

To the extent that U.S. government action on Arctic waters issues is shaped by considerations of security, it will be influenced more by the course of tendency conflict between the old and the new on extended security within the United States, than by developments as they occur in the Arctic. This is because Arctic events will be perceived, assimilated, and acted upon not *ab initio*, but in accordance with an evolving security praxis. As of 1997, extended security remains far more a matter of conflicting ideas, than of interaction between resolved thinking and coherent practice. At this early point it is by no means a foregone conclusion that Americans will ultimately choose to define their international environmental agenda in security terms. Nor is it at all clear that environment should be treated as a matter of security. The environment and security debate may nevertheless hold the key to the evolution of U.S. security-related activity in Arctic regions which are of particular interest to us here. Before considering main trends in the debate, we should try to be as clear as we can about the magnitude and the meaning of what is being discussed.

In the U.S. debate we observe a rapidly expanding bibliography that now includes hundreds of articles, chapters, and books which are explicitly and, more often, implicitly associated with a security perspective on the environment.[505] Large-scale collaborative research and networking ventures have also been launched. Chief among these are the Project on Environment, Population and Security which is funded by the Global Stewardship Initiative of the Pew Charitable Trusts and operated by the Program on Science and International Security of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in conjunction with the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Toronto; the Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and University of Toronto's Peace and Conflict Studies Program; and the Environmental Change and Security

---

[505] See *Environment and Security Debates*, 92-105. Reviews of the U.S. discussion are to be had in Geoffrey D. Dabelko and David D. Dabelko, "Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinition," *ibid.*, 3-13, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, "Ideas and the Evolution of Environmental Security Conceptions," paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 16-20, 1996. Also Geoffrey D. Dabelko and P.J. Simmons, "Environment and Security: Core Ideas and U.S. Government Initiatives," *The SAIS Review* 17:1 (Winter/Spring 1997); Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" *International Security* 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995); and the rejoinder to Levy from Thomas F. Homer-Dixon," *ibid.*, No. 3 (Winter 1996), 189-194.

Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.[506] As well, under a variety of initiatives sponsored by the Executive and by the Congress, a broadening array of environmental tasks have been taken on by government institutions having national security responsibilities. Specifically we are talking about the U.S. Navy which has released ice-pack thickness data and made submarines available for scientific research on climate change; the CIA and other intelligence agencies which have also cooperated with scientists studying environmental degradation; the National Security Council at which a global environmental affairs directorate has been created; the Department of Defense which has established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security and entered a trilateral venture with Russia and Norway on Russian nuclear waste management in Arctic waters; the Department of Energy which now has farflung environmental responsibilities including nuclear safety in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union; and the State Department which has gathered international environmental and associated matters under the office of an Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs.[507] Note also the July 1996 Memorandum of Understanding on cooperative action for environmental security which was agreed to by the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and which received the endorsement but not the participation of the State Department.[508] Put all of this together, and it might seem that the United States is starting to move towards intellectual and policy convergence on "environment and security," if not "environmental security," as a frame of reference and action for the environmental components of an extended security praxis. This however would be to overstate the coherence of current U.S. discourse, let alone U.S. practice.

A quick scan of the spring 1995 report of the Wilson Center's Environmental Change and Security Report finds private analysts attempting to make sense of a set of variables whose only order at this point can be alphabetical:

---

506 Discussed in Dabelko, "Ideas and the Evolution of Environmental Security Conceptions."

507 *Ibid.* See also the statements from various agencies including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Environmental Protection Agency, as cited in *Environment and Security Debates*, 83-86, and, on Russian nuclear cleanup in Arctic waters, Kent Butts, "National Security, the Environment, and DOD," in *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, Issue 2 (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, Spring 1996), 26.

508 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Agreement Reached on Environmental Security Plan," *News Release* 430-96, July 18, 1996. See also the letter from the three agency heads, July 18, 1996, conveying the MOU to Secretary Warren Christopher, and his reply of August 8, 1996 to Carol Browner of the EPA.

> acid rain, biodiversity, civil strife, cleanup and remediation, counter terrorism, deforestation, economic competitiveness, ecological security, environmental scarcity and stress, environmental security, ethnicity, failed states, fossil fuels, free trade, genetic engineering, greenhouse warming, global security, humanitarian relief, infectious diseases, international civil society, intra-state violence, limits to growth, migration, national security, natural disasters, nuclear waste, oil crises, overpopulation, poverty, resource scarcity, sea-level rise, soil degradation, sovereignty, stratospheric ozone depletion, sustainable development, transboundary pollution.[509]

Similarly, the Wilson Center report has U.S. government agencies indicating operational interest in, *inter alia*:

> agricultural yields, biodiversity protection, biological and chemical warfare, the clean car initiative, climate change, democratic institutions, dependence on imported oil, desertification, disaster relief, drought, drug interdiction, empowerment of women, environmental health, environmental security, environmentally-responsible military activity, ethnic conflict, family planning, flooding, hazardous waste, infant and child mortality, long-range transboundary air pollution, natural and technological disasters, nuclear dumping, ozone depletion, pesticides, pollution prevention centers, population growth, public health, refugee flows, renewable energy resources, resource scarcity, state failure, sustainable resource use, technology transfer, terrorism, urbanization, vector-borne diseases.[510]

These two arrays, impressionistic as they are, strongly suggest that the United States is opening up for itself a vast and at present unmanageable agenda that will soon need preliminary sorting if the discussion of environment and security is not be sidetracked as a focus for policy development.

At its most elementary, a policy may be taken to consist of (1) a set of goals, (2) an understanding of the situation in which goals are to be pursued, and (3) a set of routines for goal-attainment in the situation as understood. Though some form of policy on many of the specifics cited is certainly within reach if not already to some degree in hand, an integrated set of routines based on a systematic causal understanding of the totality of variables in play is far off. In fact, it is not on and not the way things will be done in a pragmatic political culture accustomed to acting before all the physical and social science results are in. It would seem,

---

509 *Environment and Security Debates*, 3-39, and 63-78.

510 *Ibid.*, 47-58 and 83-86.

therefore, that today's environment and security debate is primarily about goal-changing as Americans grope towards an understanding of what is of uppermost importance to them in an altered world. Goal-changing occurs as the rhetoric of security is used to attract attention to new concerns, as government and non-governmental institutions respond to situational change in *ad hoc* but incremental fashion, and as new values are internalized in security policy-making.[511] In due course, Americans may be expected to cut through the vast knot of environment and security variables with rough and ready understandings of what is going on and how best to act. How this is done may in turn depend substantially on interaction between different schools of thought on environment and security as together they succeed or fail in generating guidance for policy inside and outside of government.

Following Geoffrey Dabelko in a rough and ready classification, we may identify three broad viewpoints — ecological, health, and military — in the current U.S. discussion of environment and security.[512] We may also note that aside from debates over environment and security, there are significant differences among Americans over the redefinition of security as such. Broadly, the course of environment and security debate would now seem to be favouring what Dabelko terms "military" thinking and practice at the expense of the ecological and health perspectives.[513] As to a redefinition of security, it is unlikely to be with us any time soon. Throughout, there is no agreed U.S. understanding of what "environmental security" might signify, considerable reluctance to employ the term,[514] and, again, little likelihood of early consensus.

The ecological perspective is keyed to understanding and addressing global environmental problems at the level of causes rather than symptoms.[515] Concentrating on planetary issues

---

511 Ken Conca, "In the Name of Sustainability: Peace Studies and Environmental Discourse," Peace and Discourse," in Jyrki Käkönen, ed., *Green Security or Militarized Environment* (Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994), 7-24.

512 Dabelko, "Environmental Security: Parameters."

513 *Ibid.*

514 For example, the Secretary of State avoided the term altogether in a major statement of U.S. policy at Stanford University, April 19, 1996. "American Diplomacy and the Global Environmental Challenges of the 21st Century," in *Environmental Change and Security Report*, Issue 2, 81-85.

515 Al Gore, *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992); Dennis Pirages, *Global Technopolitics* (Pacific Grove: Brooks-Cole, 1989) and Pirages "Social Evolution and Ecological Security," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 22, No. 3 (Summer 1991), 329-334. Tim Wirth, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, also shares an ecological perspective: *Congressional Record — Senate*, June 28, 1990, S-8936-8938, and "Sustainable

such as climate change, deforestation, ozone depletion, overpopulation, and other consequences and causes of environmental degradation which exceed the bounds of national sovereignty, the varied exponents of this standpoint are inclined to mute the prevailing emphasis on the national interest and to emphasize the individual, non-governmental, *transnational*, inter-governmental, regional, and the global as points of reference. By the same token, they may be strongly averse to opposed-forces, military, and statist notions of security. Preferring to treat the environment and security agendas holistically, some see the underlying problem not so much in terms of sustainable development as of a fundamental transformation in the relationship of humankind to Nature.

Health conceptions of security and environment may share some of the ecological inclination to redefine security, but the aim is more to react to the human consequences of environmental degradation than to anticipate and address its causes at source. The main focus is on the health effects in the United States of past military and defence-industrial activity, as in (1) the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program which entails defence-related environmental compliance, remediation, and information-gathering and analysis; (2) the Defense Department's Defence Environmental Restoration Account of some $5 billion which is applied to toxic cleanup at military sites; and (3) the Department of Energy's commitment of roughly one-third of its annual appropriation to cleanup of the environmental aftereffects of nuclear-weapons production.[516] Being problem-driven as they are, these programmes represent a significant dimension of current U.S. practice on environment and security, but are not accompanied by much in the way of conceptual argument.[517]

Third, in military conceptions of environment and security we encounter a viewpoint that is most in keeping with received state-centric and conflictual views of national security. It is not surprising therefore that this standpoint should be found congenial by policy-makers. The analytical emphasis here is on the environment as a source of violent conflict in Third World societies. In practice, however, the analysis tends to be used to draw attention to the symptoms of environmental degradation which are seen to constitute a new category of threat to U.S. national security. Though many have contributed to this discourse, the work of

---

Development: A Progress Report," July 12, 1994, excerpted in *Environment and Security Debates*, 54-55.

516 Dabelko, "Ideas and the Evolution of Environmental Security Conceptions."

517 See however Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., *Ecocide in the USSR* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), Laurie Garrett, *The Coming Plague: Emerging Diseases in a World of Balance* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1994), and Garrett, "The Return of Infectious Disease," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996) which cites change in the ecological relationship between microbes and humans, 72-73.

Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto stands out in Dabelko's and most anyone's assessment.[518] Prior to Robert Kaplan's publication of an article on "The Coming Anarchy" in *The Atlantic Monthly* in February 1994 which drew attention to the studies of Homer-Dixon, the latter was invited to brief the associate directors of the National Security Council. In due course, Homer-Dixon established a relationship with Vice President Gore, was cited favourably by President Bill Clinton, and found his ideas being taken up by U.S. national security agencies.[519] Within the U.S. government, however, the political effect has been to add environmentally-related Third World conflict to the list of concerns of interest to U.S. military planners and intelligence analysts. In Dabelko's view there is an irony here in that Homer-Dixon's policy agenda centers on international assistance to Third World peoples subject to environmental deprivation, not on national security and military planning. Still, if any one individual stands out in the U.S. discussion of environment and security, it is Homer-Dixon, a Canadian. As might be expected, he has another take on what's been happening.

Homer-Dixon broadly agrees that his work is being used by the U.S. National Security establishment for purposes other than he intends.[520] He is also surprised at the interest shown by U.S. policy-makers in his ideas, by their readiness to listen and adapt their thinking. But he

---

[518] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, *International Security* 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), 76-116, and "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," *ibid.*, 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), 5-40. Homer-Dixon headed the Project on Government, Population and Security, and was principal investigator for the State Capacity Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences while then, as later, Director of the Program on Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto.

[519] President Clinton commented, "[W]hen you look at the long-run trends that are going on around the world — you read articles like Robert Kaplan's article in *The Atlantic* a couple of months ago, that some say it's too dour — ...if you really look at what's going on, you could visualize a world in which a few million of us live in such opulence we could all be starring in nighttime soaps, and the rest of us look like we're in one of those Mel Gibson "Road Warrior" movies... I was so gripped by many things that were in that article, and by the more academic treatment of the same subject by Professor Homer-Dixon..." Also: "To bring about shared prosperity, as Professor Homer-Dixon has written, the nations of world simply must move forward on many fronts at one time." Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences, June 29, 1994, in *Environment and Security Debates*, 51-52.

[520] Interview, Toronto, April 2, 1996. In his view, the project on Environment, Population and Security is now driving the U.S. debate. Papers produced by the project and sent out to a list of 1500 officials and others are all written by Canadians. For a critique of thinking that would replace communism with "chaos" as the prime concern of U.S. foreign policy, see Jeremy D. Rosner, "The Sources of Chaos: The Latest Bad Foreign Policy Idea," *The New Democrat*, November 1994, 20-22.

adds that from the start he intended to make a somewhat subversive contribution and told the Vice President so when they met. In linking "environmental scarcity" and violent conflict he seeks to force a broadening of American horizons and eventually a pro-active U.S. commitment to humane development. This he sees as inescapable: Given that the United States cannot wall itself off from the rest of the world, the logic of the situation is such that U.S. policy-makers will sooner or later be driven to recognize that action is excessively costly and problematic if left to the point where violent conflict has already broken out and military intervention is required to serve the American interest.

Homer-Dixon's aim has thus been to deploy a discourse of environmental scarcity and security against the conventional U.S. security praxis, and on behalf of greater U.S. *pro-action* — a consideration that will figure prominently when we turn to the Arctic. Such success as he has had to date also indicates that contributions from outside the United States can make a difference to the course of policy debate in a country that is omnivorous where new and workable ideas are concerned.

In addition to interaction among ecological, health, and military perspectives, there is considerable disagreement on whether or not to link environment and security in the first place. Some argue that collective action on environmental issues will only suffer if it is militarized.[521] Others insist that the national security establishment and the military in particular have little or no business in dealing with international environmental affairs and should stick to what is most important.[522] Either way, there is a reluctance to link environment

---

[521] Conca, "In the Name of Sustainability," which offers a critique of "ecological security," and Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium* 19, No. 2 (Winter 1990), 461-476.

[522] C. Boyden Gray and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "A 'No Regrets' Environmental Policy," *Foreign Policy* 83 (1991), 47-65; and Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, No. 2 (Winter 1991), 211-239 who, aside from a brief reference to economics, made the point simply by defining security in military-political terms. This however is a waning position. Gary D. Vest, Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary in the Department of Defense, reports that, "DOD's view of environmental security is comprised of the following: (1) ensuring environmentally responsible action by military units wherever they may be; (2) ensuring adequate access to land, air and water to conduct a defense mission; (3) protecting DOD's war-fighting assets (people, equipment, facilities); (4) understanding where environmental conditions contribute to instability, and where the environment fits into the war and peace equation; (5) bringing defense-related environmental concerns to the development of national security; (6) studying how defense components can be used as instruments of U.S. global environmental policy." *Environment and Security Debates*, 83. See also Kent Hughes Butts, "Why the Military Is Good for the Environment," in Käkönen, *Green Security*, 83-109.

and security into "environmental security." Homer-Dixon, for example, refuses to speak of environmental security on grounds that it invites sophistic discussion of terms and meanings. Still others see little utility in the term when it embraces everything from sustainable development to the environmentally detrimental effects of military operations.[523]

If budgetary allocations are the measure of success in discourse on environment and security, health concepts are clearly the winner in the United States and should not be downplayed in their future implications. Ecological thinking, though not without support, seems most at variance with received precepts, most open-ended in its budgetary implications, and therefore most likely to encounter difficulty. Military concepts keyed to violent conflict and environmentally responsible defense activity, on the other hand, are most in keeping with received thinking and entail the least outlay of funds barring a readiness to address the issues at source. Remember, too, that there is still a heavily institutionalized Cold War and realist tendency to subordinate the civil dimensions of extended security to conventional geopolitical requirements, and to regard the extension of security as so much "globaloney."

How then might all of this be brought to bear in considering U.S. government behaviour in matters of environment and security where Arctic waters are concerned? Several implications come to mind.

In the absence of new Arctic marine disasters or a surge of interest in the shipping of Alaskan hydrocarbons, U.S. Arctic policies are likely to be conservative. The current correlation of tendencies favours a traditionally restrictive view of the civil dimensions of security, a new awareness of the need for environmentally responsible national military activity, and an interest in the violent conflict potential of environmental degradation. Uncertainty over Russian political and military development may be expected to brake the decline of traditional security praxis in this region of the world as compared to others. The lack of significant potential for environmentally-conditioned intra-state violence in the Arctic outside of Russia will also serve to limit the extension of U.S. national security interests to include the region. At the same time, in pursuit of environmental responsibility, military engagement in monitoring and cleanup of nuclear pollution in the Russian Arctic may continue to be of interest.[524] Overall, U.S. efforts on behalf of environment and security in the Arctic will be heavily conditioned by the evolution of the bilateral relationship with Russia.

---

[523] See Hans Bruyninckx, "Environmental Security: An Analysis of the Conceptual Problems in Defining the Relationship Between Environment and Security, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, March 1993.

[524] U.S. Department of Defense, "Report on a Joint U.S.-Russia Ecological/Environment Seminar," Washington, D.C., May 15-19, 1995. See also Peter Gziewski and Alan Chong, "Military Activity: The Case of Radioactivity in the Arctic," in Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew,

Second, the force of health conceptions of security in the United States is suggestive insofar as more active U.S. intervention in Arctic affairs is to be encouraged. Though health has long been the subject of non-governmental collaboration in the circumpolar North, the potentialities of this theme in animating the U.S. government are far from being fully explored, much less tested in practice. The difficult requirement, as for example with the dumping of radionuclides in Russian waters, would be to substantiate the links between the health and humanitarian interests of Americans on the one hand, and the presence of environmentally-based Arctic health threats on the other.

Third, of the three orientations to environment and security that have emerged to date, the needs of the Arctic are best met by an emphasis on ecological concepts of security which currently stand at the bottom of the U.S. preference order. The Arctic is, after all, a region whose physical and social processes, especially for native peoples, are heavily influenced by transboundary fluxes and require cooperation on civil agendas among non-governmental and territorial actors as well as states at all levels from the local to the global.[525] Paradoxically, the relative lack of U.S. national security interests in the Arctic could prove to be an advantage in widening the U.S. commitment to an ecological practice in this part of the world: Arctic actors and active minorities in Washington and the metropoles of other regional countries may be in a position quietly to extend the range of regional civil collaboration as long as core strategic military interests are not brought into play. Indeed, rather than risk engaging the U.S. national security establishment needlessly by seeking greater Arctic policy intervention in the name of environmental "security," it could be tactically advisable to decouple environment from security and drop all reference to security if a reactive and symptoms-driven military understanding of the environment were clearly to become paramount in Washington.[526]

Finally, if debate over environment and security is indeed to perform a pathfinding function in the further extension of U.S. security praxis, a more enabling internal political setting will be indispensable. Notwithstanding Republican strength in Congress, a renewed Clinton Administration could move beyond a "military" stance on the environment and open the way for an ecological conception of security. If so, it would make sense for Americans and others to persist in viewing the environment through a security optic. As of early 1997, however, the

---

eds., *Contested Ground: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (Albany: SUNY Press, forthcoming).

525 *Arctic Systems: Natural Environments, Human Actions, Nonlinear Processes* (Oslo: IASC Secretariat, 1996).

526 On decoupling, see Franklyn Griffiths, "Epilogue: Civility in the Arctic," in Griffiths, *Arctic Alternatives*, 279-309.

Administration had not moved. On the contrary, the outgoing Secretary of State had once again chosen to discuss environmental issues without reference to environmental or ecological "security."[527] It seems that the late 1990s are not yet the time for Americans to decide whether to treat ecological and health matters purely on their merits, or to persist in including them directly within an extended security framework.

Arctic Waters in U.S. Security Policy

To test the potential of an environment and security discourse in truly difficult circumstances, I now ask whether and if so how an improved performance might be evoked from the United States on a particular set of issues with the use of an environmental conception of security. International cooperation in the management of Arctic waters is the set of issues in question. The question in turn implies a deficiency in U.S. performance to date. The deficiency is twofold. On the one hand, from an external perspective and from that of some of the few Americans who are paying attention, the United States is not playing the leadership role it could and should in the affairs of the circumpolar North. Secondly, from a purely internal U.S. perspective, the fact is that the United States is at present not interested in playing any such role. So the question is whether an environmental and particulary an ecological conception of security, articulated in preliminary fashion within the United States and by other regional states and non-governmental actors might do two things: (1) assist the United States in redefining its Arctic interests, and (2) add to the force of civil considerations in the extension of U.S. security policy writ large. If the answer is on balance positive, we should think about what to do. If clearly negative, there would be reason for Americans and others to consider abandoning a security perspective on the environment.

During the Cold War the United States did not hesitate to play a leadership role on Arctic issues in relations with fellow NATO members — Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway — in opposing the Soviet Union and dealing with the two Arctic neutral states — Finland and Sweden. U.S. leadership was however mainly derivative of the global struggle with communism. It had little to do with the Arctic as such. Governed by the perceived need to subordinate civil collaboration to the wider requirements of political-military security, it allowed for little or no multilateral interaction on issues specific to the region. But with the waning and then the end of the Cold War, a leadership role could be maintained only by taking the initiative on Arctic-specific matters. This the United States declined to do. No

---

527 Warren Christopher, speech to Woodrow Wilson Center environmental breakfast, January 14, 1997. Text to appear in *Report* 3 of the Center's Environmental Change and Security Project. As with Christopher's Stanford University address of April 1996, many good things are announced or set in motion under the heading of "environmental diplomacy," but the interconnections between environment and "security" are, as such, only very loosely recognized.

longer seized by the Soviet threat, it was left with no substantial perceived interests specific to the region. Washington's problem in the Arctic became *cooperation*, specifically requests from other Arctic states for multilateral civil collaboration for which the U.S. had and continues to have little appetite.

Only with difficulty was the United States drawn into the multilateral process which created and now constitutes the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) — an evolving multilateral regime that joins the eight Arctic states and other participants in a variety of efforts to monitor and protect the region's environment.[528] Similarly, the longstanding Canadian initiative to establish an Arctic Council or central intergovernmental forum for multi-purpose regional cooperation on civil issues ran into considerable U.S. resistance that ended only with the Council's creation in 1996.[529] In September 1994 the United States announced a new post-Cold War Arctic policy which emphasizes environmental protection, environmentally sustainable development, and the role of indigenous peoples while also separately recognizing U.S. national security interests.[530] It is as well concerned with the need

---

528 The negotiation that produced the AEPS began in 1989, on a Finnish initiative, and ended with a multilateral declaration in June 1991. For the founding document, see "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *Arctic Research of the United States* 5 (Fall 1991), 29-35. Whereas other states sent delegations ready to do business at the first negotiating session, the United States was represented by junior staff from the embassy in Helsinki. Subsequently the U.S. commitment to the talks lagged well behind that of other participants. On the negotiations, see Oran R. Young, *Creating International Regimes: Arctic Cases, Generic Processes* (forthcoming), esp. ch 4. Whereas the AEPS takes the form of a standing conference or process, two Arctic multilateral organizations were also created in the early 1990s: the International Arctic Science Committee (1990), a non-governmental body representing national science establishments; and the Northern Forum (also 1990), which unites territorial governments from around the circumpolar North and as far south as Sakhalin.

529 "Canada Hosts Inauguration of Arctic Council," Government of Canada *News Release*, No. 166 September 19, 1996. The Arctic Council proposal was floated as a what-if proposition by the Canadian Prime Minister in Leningrad in November 1989, and announced as a commitment by the Minister of External Affairs in a speech made in Ottawa in November 1990. For background, see Arctic Council Panel, *To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report* (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1991). For recent comment, see Oran R. Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1996); and David Scrivener, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council," *Security Policy Library* 1 (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1996).

530 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Statement by Christine D. Shelly, Acting Spokesman: United States Announces New Policy for the Arctic Region," September 29, 1994. See also Robert Senseney, "U.S. Arctic Policy Aims for Circumpolar Cooperation," *Witness the*

for scientific research and affirms the importance of international cooperation in achieving Arctic objectives. The new policy signified that between 1989 and 1994, multilateral cooperation had to some extent come to be accepted as routine. And yet Washington continued to be exceedingly restrictive in making new Arctic international commitments. The sources of U.S. reluctance to lead are evident in the way policy is made on Arctic affairs.

The key individual in the policy process for international relations in the circumpolar North is the Polar Affairs Chief in the State Department's Office of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. This is the person who does the hard work of coordinating departmental positions and also such non-governmental views as may be brought to the table in the Inter-Agency Arctic Policy Group. The Polar Affairs Chief also carries the U.S. position out into major international Arctic venues and brings issues back into the policy process. Circumstances are such that in my view he has something of a free hand and yet not much of a hand at all in the making of U.S. policy on Arctic multilateral civil matters.

Interviews with the previous (1986-1994) and current (1994-) Polar Affairs Chiefs confirm the impression that U.S. policy on Arctic international issues is ordinarily made at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy without benefit of active political guidance or substantial input from non-governmental actors.[531] President Clinton (and with him the Secretary of State) was drawn into the Arctic Council negotiation momentarily in February 1995 at a meeting with the Canadian Prime Minister in Ottawa. Vice-President Gore has been engaged in a variety of Arctic-related issues on an intermittent basis, though these again are extensions of broader U.S. interests such as global science or bilateral relations with Russia as in the Gore-Chernomyrdin talks.[532] As a rule, however, the White House and also the National Security Council are "not interested" in Arctic multilateral affairs.[533] Within the State Department, Arctic issues do not generally get up to the Assistant Secretary level. On the contrary, active engagement by senior management has been "real low."[534] The Polar Affairs Chief therefore runs with the issues himself in the midst of a fair amount of benign neglect at higher levels of government.

Arctic 3, No. 2, 1995, 1-2. *Witness* is published by the Arctic Research Consortium of the United States, at Fairbanks, Alaska.

[531] Interviews with Raymond V. Arnaudo, former Polar Chief, in London, May 11, 1995, and with Robert S. Senseney, current Chief, in Washington, D.C., November 1, 1995.

[532] The release of ice-thickness data was very largely the doing of then Senator Gore in 1991. Dabelko, "Ideas and the Evolution of Environmental Security Conceptions."

[533] Arnaudo interview.

[534] *Ibid.*

As to other agencies, the Department of Defense is "the biggest player" of all.[535] Indeed, it has been described as an 800 lb. gorilla which no one wants to see entering their office. Where Arctic waters are concerned, DOD means the U.S. Navy and its overriding strategic military interest both in global freedom of navigation and in regional submarine and anti-submarine warfare operations.[536] Not to be limited, DOD representatives at inter-agency Arctic sessions to 1993 made a point of emphasizing the paramount importance of military-strategic considerations as meetings drew to a close.[537] Legal officers of the Department may be particularly interested in Arctic marine matters.[538] Their job is presumably to guard against commitments that might serve to impede the free movement of submarines and surface vessels not only in the Arctic but, by precedent, in any of the world's oceans and straits. Whatever the reason, DOD "doesn't see" the significance of Arctic environmental issues.[539] As to the U.S. Coast Guard, while it can be "very active" as on emergency response in U.S. Arctic waters, Arctic issues are handled at a low level in the service.[540] Where "*environmental* security" is concerned, I would add that there is no way the Department of Defense could assent to it as a governing concept for ocean operations in particular without opening the door to significant departures from the Navy's traditional mission. By the same token, the Coast Guard is said to be reluctant to endorse discussion of "environmental *security*" since it could authorize the intervention of the Navy into what the Coast Guard regards as its own preserve of marine environmental "safety."[541]

To continue this *tour d'horizon*, back in the early 1990s the Environmental Protection Agency had to be "dragged" into the preparation for the AEPS or Arctic Environmental Protection

---

[535] Interview in Cambridge, U.K., February 17, 1996 with Lawson W. Brigham, former Commander and head of policy planning, USCG. Brigham retired in 1995, having skippered the *Polar Sea* to the North Pole the year before.

[536] *Ibid.*

[537] *Ibid.*

[538] Arnaldo interview.

[539] Brigham interview. To "see" the point here would be to endorse the value of international regulation of the Arctic marine environment. Nevertheless, the Navy does assist global scientific research in the Arctic, as has been indicated. As well, the Office of Naval Research manages the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program in cooperation with Russia and several other countries. "ANWAP Prepares Risk Assessment," *Witness the Arctic* 3, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), 10.

[540] *Ibid.*

[541] Brigham Interview. Also interview in Washington, D.C., at U.S. Coast Guard HQ, November 2, 1995, with Lt. Commander Stephen M. Wheeler, Ice Operations Division. Whether or not to refer to "environmental security" is seen by Brigham as a problem in the "tactics of terms."

Strategy. Even now it has no unit for the Arctic.[542] For its part, the Department of Energy is occupied with Arctic-related issues but in the Alaskan context and internationally as a function primarily of relations with Russia and offshore oil and gas development. Insofar as DOE is also occupied with international concepts, it would seem to favour stability, rather than security, for sustainable economic and technological development.[543] The Alaskan Senators, though very powerful, have broadly been content to receive consultation from State and do not as a rule pressure the Polar Chief who may feel he's doing well if there are no complaints from this quarter.[544] The Alaskan delegation on the Hill is now, however, showing increased interest in the AEPS and in the Arctic Council as a means of securing greater recognition for Alaska's objectives within the Congress.[545] As to the Alaskan Governor's office, roughly a dozen Alaskan native organizations, the shipping sector, and some two dozen southern-based environmental groups, they have until recently not so much sought access but on the contrary have been invited into the policy process by State.[546] Their participation is however beginning to take hold. As of 1996, Athabascan and Aleyut native organizations are actively engaged on the Arctic Council issue; the Governor is prepared to commit resources for the Council's secretariat when it comes time for the U.S. to host the operation; and environmental NGOs are showing more interest in Arctic affairs as the Antarctic agenda shrinks following the institution of the environmental protection regime there.[547] Meanwhile, the Northern Forum — a transnational association of territorial governments from around the region whose creation was spearheaded by the Alaskan Governor in 1990 — was also invited by the Polar Chief to take part in the work of the Inter-Agency Group and is now increasingly interested in Arctic cooperation at the inter-governmental level.[548]

It is fair to say that while things are changing, nobody has really been beating on the Polar Chiefs's door. He does as he thinks best under broad guidelines from on high and with a determination to consult as widely as possible within and outside government. On the inside, he is faced with a powerful aversion to any U.S. international commitments that entail new

---

[542] Arnaudo interview. Arnaudo is also of the opinion that the Arctic has stood "at the bottom" of the U.S. pollution prevention agenda.

[543] Interview with Gene Delatorre, International Affairs Director, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, in Washington, D.C., November 1, 1995.

[544] Arnaudo interview.

[545] Senseney interview.

[546] Arnaudo interview.

[547] Senseney interview.

[548] Arnaudo and Senseney interviews.

spending. At the same time, he is likely to be told there is no time for "great ideas," and to come back to the IAPG or individual departments "when real money is being talked about."[549] If there is any explicit conceptual guidance, the relevant notion is sustainable development and not environmental security, much less ecological security. The U.S. position on the mandate of an Arctic Council, for instance, is solid in support of sustainable development — indeed, an Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative — and environmentally-conscious resource exploitation.[550] As to environmental security, the term is not frequently encountered and, when it is, causes "a bit of heartburn" owing to its lack of clear meaning.[551]

U.S. Arctic policies are caught between a block of drifting ice and a hard place. On the one hand, we have the expressed intent of other Arctic countries to pursue a civil collaboration that cannot go far without the United States. On the other, we observe a state that is reluctant to support active engagement in multilateral civil cooperation, has little awareness of the Arctic as a region, and is without an overarching sense of purpose or unifying concept to mobilize and lend direction to collective action. One major result is significant rigidity in U.S. multilateral negotiating behaviour which is formulated and altered at lower levels of the bureaucracy only with considerable difficulty. Another result is institutionalized aversion to international arrangements that would treat the Arctic as a region and thereby offer others added opportunities to seek collaborative action on issues in which the U.S. has little perceived interest. The U.S. has indeed yielded to the entreaties of others, but grudgingly and in a manner that falls far short of its potential to offer leadership in circumpolar affairs.

At this point in our inquiry it would seem that as compared to sustainable development, any concept of environmental security is sufficiently far away from acceptance as to be of little use in moving the United States to greater pro-action and leadership in Arctic cooperation. Indeed, the problem is one of interests and lack thereof, not one of concepts. But before we come to conclusions, let us further tighten the focus by taking a look at some of the issues associated with the international management of Arctic waters in particular. The key items here are (1) PAME or Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, which is a working group

---

549 Arnaudo interview. Arnaudo also reports that in preparing the 1994 Arctic policy statement the money people caused him "much grief."

550 Senseney interview. See also "U.S. Discussion Paper: Sustainable Development," paper dated November 1, 1995, Office of the Polar Affairs Chief.

551 Senseney interview. Michael Schneider, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, suggests that environmental security need not compete with or take away from sustainable development: Whereas the latter is a core belief with sweeping implications, the former connotes regulatory action by diverse government agencies to defend and protect the environment. Interview, Washington, D.C., November 1, 1995.

of the AEPS; (2) the talks stemming from a Canadian initiative to harmonize the rules for Arctic shipping under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization which are also discussed in chapter 3; and (3) the question of increased use of Russia's Northern Sea Route (NSR) in whole or in part. The question is whether a concept of ecological security might be of use in evoking political intervention from on high into the making of U.S. Arctic policies, and in obtaining a more effective adaptation of these policies to the particular requirements of the Arctic marine environment.

PAME gathers representatives of the Arctic states plus observers from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), Northern Forum, Saami Council, and other non-governmental organizations.[552] Canada is now the lead country and the State Department and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are the lead agencies for the United States. PAME's mandate has been to assess the status of the Arctic marine environment and the applicability of existing international legal or regulatory instruments for purposes of pollution prevention. Among its concerns are land-based industrial activity, the dumping of wastes at sea, and shipping operations as they relate to the dissemination of persistent organic pollutants, radionuclides, heavy metals, oil, and to a lesser extent acidification and noise pollution. As is true of the AEPS as a whole, PAME entails the coordination of existing scientific, legal, and other assets of the Arctic countries so as to achieve shared gains without the commitment of significant new money. As such, it passes muster as an initial stock-taking exercise in Arctic marine pollution prevention. But sooner or later, possibly sooner, the Arctic countries will face the need for at least incremental new funding if marine environmental protection is to be pursued in earnest. They will also have to face the opposition of the U.S. Navy to international regulation of Arctic waters as it may affect regional and global freedom of movement for submarines and surface vessels.

In preparation for an AEPS ministerial meeting in March 1996, the PAME participants issued a draft report which indicated that there was no urgent need to develop new legal instruments for the protection of Arctic waters against pollution.[553] Leaving considerable scope for action at the national level, it also affirmed the need for international coordination on selected matters and called for an Arctic regional action plan to address marine pollution from land-based sources in particular. Of relevance here, in Russia alone, are urban settlements; the

---

[552] Terms of reference for PAME are to be found in "Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy." See also "Report to the Arctic Ministers: PAME Working Group Publishes Findings," *Arctic Bulletin*, No. 1, 1996, 5-6. The *Arctic Bulletin*, published quarterly by the World Wide Fund for Nature, is a useful source of comment on the AEPS.

[553] AEPS. Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), *Draft Report to Ministers*, November 27, 1995 (Oslo: Ministry of the Environment, 1995).

mining industry; oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation; nuclear activities; industrial complexes; ports, harbours, and coastal development; and the forest industry.[554] To talk land-based sources is to talk money. It is also to talk about the dimension of Arctic marine pollution whose regulation may be least threatening to the interests of the U.S. Navy. Interestingly enough, the Navy's aversion to international regulation of the Arctic marine environment may actually bolster land-based pollution prevention activity.

When ministers and officials met for the third AEPS Ministerial Conference at Inuvik, Canada, they chose to mute PAME's attention to the offshore.[555] True, they mandated the development of guidelines for offshore petroleum operations. But they declined to seek designation of the Arctic Ocean as a "special area" or "particularly sensitive sea area" under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78).[556] Instead, they ordered PAME to collect information on current and future shipping activities and their associated environmental effects, and to maintain an overview of the effectiveness of existing international instruments bearing on Arctic marine pollution. Most important, PAME is now to develop an Arctic Regional Programme of Action on marine pollution resulting from land-based activities for consideration by the next Ministerial Conference in 1998. Here, too, the 1995 PAME Draft Report indicates that the problem will be approached gingerly through improved reporting, development of guidelines for technical assistance, use of traditional indigenous knowledge, creation of a database on current research, identification of areas of common concern, and harmonization of environmental standards.

Though PAME has been explicitly occupied with threat assessment, its reports have not referred to environmental or ecological security, preferring instead to hold to a discourse of pollution prevention and environmental protection. It has thus far been addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of marine environmental degradation. If PAME is to see substantial new funds committed by the United States and other Arctic countries for land-based pollution prevention, it may have to bring new Arctic marine threats to the attention of publics and policy-makers to the south. In principle, a concept of ecological security could be of use in driving home to those who are currently unconcerned in the United States and elsewhere the need for pro-action in getting to Arctic marine environmental threats at source. To begin, such a concept would be largely rhetorical. There is nothing wrong with this since everything cannot be figured out at once. But having adopted a discourse of security, the

---

554 "Report to the Arctic Ministers."

555 "Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development in the Arctic," Government of Canada, *Communique/News Release*, March 21, 1996.

556 This opinion was offered for consideration in the *Draft Report to Ministers,* 11, 94-96. See also Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic*, 10-12.

United States and other participants in PAME and the AEPS would have to give it substance by working out a shared meaning based on threats met and tasks being performed. In effect, the elaboration of a security concept for the Arctic marine environment would become a collective endeavour. Everything we know about the U.S. Arctic policy process today indicates that the initiative would not stem from the American side. But if taken by other Arctic countries, the U.S. could be expected to respond.

The point being made here is potentially significant and suggests a larger change of perspective on the praxis of environment and security. It is that the development of an environmentally-related security concept that is not only of use to the United States, but also effective in providing for joint management of environmental issues, may more readily be achieved internationally in a process actively shaped by U.S. interests and thinking, than in a process confined to the United States alone. If security is to be cooperative, the elaboration of an environmental security concept should itself be a cooperative venture.

Turning now to the Harmonization Talks, we encounter an even more tightly focused technical effort, in this case to generate by 1998 an Arctic shipping regime that is responsive in all environmental aspects. Specifically, the talks are aimed at a set of rules to limit ship discharges and to provide for the implementation of common standards for ship construction, crew certification, navigation control, and emergency response.[557] Led by the Canadian Coast Guard, meetings are attended by representatives of most of the region's coast guards, government and private R&D organizations, marine consultants, insurance underwriters, and at least one oil company (AMOCO). The countries represented in various capacities include Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States where the Coast Guard has the lead. There is no representation from national departments of the environment, environmental NGOs, or international native organizations. Keeping things very quiet, practical, and as simple as possible has made for very good progress to date. In common with PAME, however, the Harmonization Talks will sooner or later run into the need for new expenditure, for instance in securing real-time ice information capability or as a consequence of new restrictions on the use of cargo vessels with limited ice resistance. But as distinct from PAME, funding requirements may be modest in what is essentially a rationalization of existing standards and capabilities that ends with agreement on a common code. In fact, the talks may just succeed without attracting political attention.

---

[557] Issued as Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Protection of the Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, "Arctic Ocean Shipping Regime," September 1995. See "Discussion Paper on the International Integration of Arctic Rules," prepared for working group meeting, Calgary, March 21-22, 1994, and "Summary Minutes: Polar Code Drafting Plenary Session, St. Petersburg, October 15-18, 1996." Both documents originate with Transport Canada, Prairie and Northern Region, Marine, Ottawa.

Even if raising the profile of the Harmonization Talks turned out to be desirable or unavoidable, the U.S. Coast Guard as lead agency would be neither a willing nor an able advocate for a discourse of environment and security. Owing no doubt in part to a reluctance to favour the Navy with a security perspective on the marine environment, consideration of environmental, much less ecological "security" has been virtually non-existent in the deliberations of the service's strategic planning staff. Moreover, the Coast Guard is "not focused" on the Arctic.[558] Illegal immigration by boat, drug interdiction, marine safety, and so forth in U.S. coastal waters are the priority concerns. The situation could change if and when marine transportation of Alaskan oil and natural gas became a serious proposition. But until then it is the pressing issues of the day that get the attention of flag officers who have no time for "aetherials."[559] It is safe to say that like the State Department, the Coast Guard will not lead on a security-related Arctic environmental discourse unless all boats are lifted on a rising tide of U.S. concern with Arctic environmental threats, with environment and security, or both.

Finally, increased activity along the Northern Sea Route is sufficiently far from being an issue of concern in Washington that it is difficult at present to see what or who could benefit from the use of an ecological security perspective if one were to be clarified. Attention, much less interest, is hard to find. This too could change, for example with a major Russian effort to increase the volume of shipping which could create a perceived need to act. Nevertheless, the NSR has been discussed in the Inter-Agency Arctic Policy Group and at Alaska Senators' meetings without anyone being persuaded that the prospects are real enough to be worth spending much time on.[560] Though the Northern Forum once had an active interest, it appears to have subsided. Nor has the shipping sector or for that matter the Department of Defense paid much attention.[561] The State Department's perspective on Russian oil and gas transportation by marine mode currently favours a sustainable development approach in which resource exploitation proceeds with full attention to the protection of Arctic ecosystems and populations.[562] As to the potential lead agency, the U.S. Coast Guard is "not interested," and has "nobody" working on NSR matters at present.[563] To associate considerations of

---

558 Brigham interview.

559 *Ibid.*

560 Arnaudo interview.

561 *Ibid.*

562 Senseney interview.

563 Wheeler and Brigham interviews.

environment and security with possible development of the Northern Sea Route at this time is to be way out ahead of the game where the United States is concerned.

Pro-action on the part of the United States in the international management of the Arctic marine environment can only be had by raising the issue-area to the political level in the U.S. policy process. Barring the appearance of Arctic marine threats that bear directly on the U.S. interest, it is the Senators from Alaska who are in the best position to move the Administration. They, however, are embroiled in a perennial dispute with the White House over the development of North Slope oil reserves and are not much taken with environmentalism. A coalition of environmental and native NGOs, scientists, and other interested parties, even if one could be formed,[564] seems very unlikely to capture the Administration's attention, much less that of officials. Otherwise, greater awareness of the need to act could in principle be injected by foreign governments approaching the United States up to and at the highest level. What with the inclination of other Arctic states to handle the AEPS at the bureaucratic and technical level, they, too, seem to be far removed from attaching any great significance to Arctic marine environmental issues. In these circumstances, the outlook for greater pro-action in U.S. Arctic waters policy can only be termed bleak.

As to the potential of an ecological or environmental security discourse in assisting the United States to redefine its Arctic interests, and in adding to the force of civil considerations in the extension of security policy writ large, it is decidedly unpromising in current conditions. There is no felt need for a discourse of environment and security in dealing with Arctic issues. In any case, there is no consensus on how to integrate considerations of environment and security in a way of doing things that yields more than rhetorical policy effect. It seems to be a Catch-22 situation. As long as agreement lacks on what is being talked about, there is no way for a security-related approach to Arctic waters problems to yield early returns in the wider U.S. discussion of environment and security. But the thought of working now for returns down the road is something different.

Conclusions

The subtext of this chapter is very largely one of timing. To discuss the potentialities of a security-related concept of the environment is not unlike talking about the character of a child

[564] Environmental NGOs such as the Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the World Wildlife Fund have joined with U.S. native and health groups in an Arctic Network to shape government policy on some of the AEPS working groups. The Network issues a newsletter entitled *Leads: Arctic Network News Summary* from Anchorage. Young, *Creating International Regimes*.

before it has been conceived. In fact, it is like part of the decision on whether or not to conceive. To press the imagery, there is much intercourse among Americans on environment and security these days, but the moment of conception, if there is to be one, is still some time off. Whether or not the act of conception is a decision or an unintended outcome, it will be done by Americans, in the light of perceived U.S. interests, and without decisive input from abroad. Nevertheless, at the margins and over time, outsiders may expect to make focused contributions to the extension of a U.S. security praxis that will inevitably affect them. They should explore the potential. The United States, after all, will not stop thinking and acting for security. Nor will the new break free from the old in U.S. policy on security and environment alike. These things are certain. So also is the openness of the United States to ideas that work. At issue is whether and how a security perspective might benefit the environment more than another, for example sustainable development or environmental protection. This will not be known until the elements of a new security perspective have been clarified, tested, and begin to yield a basis for judgment on their application.

The fundamental problem in the U.S. discussion of environment and security is the lack of agreement on a concept that has demonstrated utility. Such a concept, if one can be achieved, will not be a literary construct divorced from practice. Rather, it is likely to emerge from intense interaction between practitioners and analysts. Even modest progress in this area could make a significant contribution in focusing the wider U.S. debate and providing guidance for practice. Demonstration projects are in order to lend precision to the meaning of environmental or ecological security, and to show what may be accomplished internationally with such a concept that cannot already be done. Ventures of this kind could of course be confined to U.S. citizens. But they could also be international in character. The advantage of an international demonstration project lies in the pooling of insight and the generation of findings that are likely to be actionable in inter-governmental negotiation.

I therefore conclude that an international demonstration project such as is described in chapter 3 should be set up to assess the merits of a security perspective on the Arctic marine environment. It should evaluate not only the cost-effectiveness of an inter-governmental effort to engage in a follow-on venture, but yes-or-no the utility of a security discourse for international environmental cooperation in the years ahead. If the answer is affirmative, the missing Arctic waters may just be found. Ways will have been invented to raise Arctic marine issues to the political level and, which is the same thing, to prompt the United States and other regional governments to redefine their interest in multilateral environmental cooperation so as to favour pro-action. Compelling environmental threats to the national interest being in short supply in this part of the world, the value of an environmental or ecological security concept will lie mainly in its capacity to fit the pieces of the policy puzzle together in ways that produce results cheaper and faster than current practice allows. And if the answer is negative,

there will be cause to set aside a security discourse on the environment, to cast the issues in ecological terms, and to continue doing what can be done at the technical level.

CHAPTER 6

DANISH SECURITY POLICY: THE ROLE OF THE ARCTIC, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARCTIC NAVIGATION

By Willy Østreng

The Danish Realm is composed of three parts that are widely dispersed geographically: Denmark proper in the South, the Faeroe Islands in the north Atlantic and Greenland in the Arctic. The distance from the capital city Copenhagen to Thule in Greenland is more than 3900 km. In terms of size, population, climate, economy, culture and constitution the three parts differ widely. The mainland of Denmark covers some 43,000 square km and has a population of approx. 5 million, whilst the biggest island in the world - Greenland - occupies some 340,000 square km of the earth's surface and sustains a population of some 53,000; The Faeroe Islands are spread over 1,400 square km of ocean expanse and are home to a population of about 43,000. Significant contrasts in climate and topography have made Denmark a modern industrial society and the two other parts mono-economies depending almost exclusively on fishing; At the same time three separate nations are embedded in the kingdom: the Danes, the Faeroese and the Greenland Inuits; Constitutionally, both Greenland and the Faeroe Islands have attained home rule in the post war period, but foreign and security policy still rests as an exclusive obligation with Copenhagen.

These differences have taken root also in politics. In the post-war period a "division of labour" has gradually developed between Denmark on the one hand and the USA and NATO on the other for purposes of safeguarding the security interests of the component parts. Danish defence resources have mainly been concentrated "on southern Denmark," while the security of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland have been left to Denmark's allies, basically the USA.[565] Of the Faeroes and Greenland, the latter is by far the most important in a geo-strategic context. It belongs to the western Hemisphere and has for more than fifty years been of vital importance to the defence of the United States and Canada. As a consequence there has been a long-standing consensus among the main political parties in Denmark to keep Greenland out of the public debate on security.[566] This in turn has resulted in different strategic roles for the three parts, and has, according to security analysts, created an acute problem when endeavouring to formulate a

[565] Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen: Op. cit. p. 49

[566] Nikolaj Petersen: *Grønland i global sikkerhet*, SNU, Copenhagen, 1992, p. 52

Figure 1: Greenland and the Eastern Canadian Arctic



consistent and coherent Danish security policy.[567] In 1988 analysts pointed out that "Until recently, Danish security policy was formulated almost exclusively with the defence problems of Denmark proper in mind, the defence of Greenland and the Faeroes being largely left to allies, i.e. the United States and NATO (SACLANT)."[568]

---

567 Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen: "The Far North in Danish Security Policy," *paper* for panel on "Resources and Security Issues of the Far North" I.S.A. 29th Annual Convention, St. Louis, March 29- April 2, 1988, pp. 2-3 and 49.

568 *Ibid.* p. 2.

As a consequence the foreign policy unity of the realm has been somewhat diluted[569], and Danish Arctic security policy has been "reactive and low-profile," which is "nowhere more pronounced than in the defence area"[570] On this backdrop, the geographical focus of this chapter will be on Greenland - the only part of the kingdom that is truly Arctic.

The thematic purpose of this chapter is to address the relations between the home rule and central government in security matters pertaining to Greenland in the systemic transition from Cold War bipolarity to the increasing multipolarity of the present. A main focus will be on the content of security policy with the object of assessing the degree of representation of environmental factors in Arctic security deliberations and planning. The overall aim is to relate these features of Danish security policy to the concept of extended security and to assess their bearing on Arctic navigation in general and the utilization of the NSR in particular.

The Basic Elements of Danish and Greenlandic Security Policy in the post World War II Period

The very term "Denmark proper," which is frequently used in Danish security analyses, is a perceptive illustration not only of the subdivision as such but also of the differences applying in military-strategic assessments of the various parts. In the mind of central government, southern Denmark derives its strategic importance from being:

- a *passage area* between the Baltic and the North Sea.
- a *barrier* between the two seas.
- a *staging and basing area* for operations in adjacent areas.
- a *surveillance base*.[571]

In a geostrategic perspective the Danish Straits are perceived of as "the cork in the Baltic bottle" as the Kola Inlet (Svalbard passage) is "the cork in the Barents bottle" (the first element above). In that context the territories of Denmark and Norway are regarded as potential stepping stones for military acts in the respective waters (the three last elements above). The difference between the two countries' situation, however, is that in the Norwegian security equation the Arctic territory of Svalbard is an integral part of the overall regional security regime (ORSR) and the Barents quadrangle, whilst Greenland is more or less excluded from the security challenge confronting Denmark proper in the south. Actually, as will be shown below, Greenland is more

---

569 Ibid., p. 2.

570 Nikolaj Petersen:" Denmark, Greenland and Arctic Security," in Kari Mottola (ed): *The Arctic Challenge. Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region*, Boulder & London, Westview Press, 1988, p.68.

571 Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen: Op. cit. p. 3.

of a geostrategic element in the Norwegian ORSR (the Barents quadrangle) than in the Denmark proper regime (see chapter 4).

The main elements in the strategic situation of Greenland as opposed to Denmark proper have for the last fifty years been related to five factors:

- the political atmosphere and relationship between the dominant powers in international politics at any point in time, i.e. between the superpowers,
- developments in weapon technology and procurements,
- its geo-strategic position in between the superpowers as a part of the North American continent,
- the consensus between the most important political parties in Denmark to exclude Greenland from the public agenda and debate on security matters,
- the gradual development of a Greenlandic security perspective partly deviating from the US and Danish perception of Greenland's role as a strategic base.[572]

The two parts of the Danish kingdom are subordinated to different geostrategic contexts and factors of military security. The linkages between the disparate security parameters are weak and of an overall political nature. One linkage is through a common set of security principles: *deterrence* and *reassurance.* Another is through a close cooperation with the USA and NATO (the Danish Greenland Command belongs directly under SACLANT in the NATO Command structure). These linkages combined, largely explain the depoliticisation of Greenlandic security in Danish politics; the bases in the island represent Denmark's most important contribution to the NATO alliance - a contribution that was perceived by Danish political parties to compensate for the policy of banning foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Danish soil.

As is the case with Norway, deterrence is sought in the combination of membership in NATO and Denmark's own military forces, whilst reassurance is achieved through self-imposed military restrictions: a unilaterally declared ban on deploying nuclear weapons and stationing foreign troops (base-reservation) on Danish soil in peacetime and through bilateral and multilateral endeavours to promote stability, detente and arms control measures. The addressee of Danish deterrence and reassurance is, as in the case of Norway, the former Soviet Union and today, Russia.

Deterrence in Greenland was provided for in an agreement of April 27, 1951 where the Danish and US governments agreed on the joint defence of the continental island. Following the agreement, three US-operated defence areas were established - in Qaanaaq (Thule), Sondrestrom and in Narssarsuaq, which was given back to Denmark in 1958. For nine years starting from

---

[572] *Nikolaj* Petersen: Op. cit. pp. 51-53.

1983 Thule and Sondrestrom belonged to the US Space Command and remained under US command in times of war. Of the two bases Thule was the most valuable providing space and operational facilities to the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). In September 1992 the US further reduced their presence in the islands declining to foot the bill for the operations of Sondrestrom and handed the facilities of the base over to Denmark/Greenland. The Thule base is thus the only military installation left in Greenland operated by the USA, which is still in need of warning against missile attacks, and tracking and surveillance of the increasing numbers of manmade space objects.[573] The scaling down of the US presence in Greenland adds an aspect of reassurance to the overall security situation in the area.

Reassurance in Greenland is promoted through two measures; first, in that the stationing of nuclear weapons on Greenlandic soil is officially banned (see below), and second, that military forces in Greenland are small indeed even though the base reservation of Denmark proper does not apply to Greenland. The Thule base is virtually undefended and the Danish military presence is by most yardsticks modest. To increase reassurance the Danish Parliament in 1985 adopted a resolution directing the government to make sure:

"1. that the warning installation at Thule is not used offensively;

2. that it cannot be used in connection with SDI systems or an ABM system;

3. that the Danish and Greenlandic authorities receive continuous information on developments relating to the Thule radar station;

4. that the United States and the Soviet Union are requested to reach agreement on the interpretation problems relative to the ABM Treaty concerning warning installations like the one at Thule;

5. that a request is made in NATO and in direct negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union that the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty should be upheld." [574]

Greenland's Military-strategic Use and Potential

Greenland's strategic role in the post-World War II period can be derived from the interaction between geography, weapon technology and procurements, and the political relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union/Russia. Its location on the attack routes followed by intercontinental bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs between the superpowers predestined Greenland to assume a pivotal role in the strategic calculations of the Cold War.

---

[573] On the Defence of Greenland see Clive Archer: "Greenland and the Atlantic Alliance," *Centre Piece*, no. 7, 1985, University of Aberdeen, Centre for Defence Studies.

[574] *Folketingstidende 1986-87*, Folketingets forhandlinger, col. 8342, March 5, 1987

Figure 2: BMEWS and DEW-line stations in the Arctic.



Greenland as a Protective Shield

In the 1950s and 1960s Greenland played a strategic offensive as well as defensive role in western defence. In case of nuclear war the US bases in Greenland were designated to support the manned bomber operations of the Strategic Air Command and for mid-air refuelling of B-47 and B-52 aircraft. The USA ceased its airborne alert operations after the crash of a B-52 bomber carrying 4 hydrogen bombs on the ice near Thule in 1968. Gradually, and partly as a consequence of the crash, the strategic defensive role of Greenland was upgraded. The first indication of this occurred in 1959-60 when the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line was extended from Canada across Greenland to counter the Soviet bomber threat to North-America. Later on in the 1960s the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was erected to provide warning against the emerging Soviet ICBM threat. The hub of this system was Thule, which thus integrated Greenland strategically as a pivotal part into the defence of the United States and the North American continent as a whole (see figure 2). In the subjective mind of most Danes the role of Greenland in early warning provided the US-owned Thule base with a defensive and stabilizing, and thus, politically speaking, acceptable function in the Cold War.[575]

However, in concealed but actual reality, it was recently revealed that Greenland had a much more offensive role in strategic deterrence than the Danish public was led to believe. In the

[575] *Ib* Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen: Ob. cit. p.7.

Figure 3: The SOSU Chain and the Arctic.



Source: *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1979,* SIPRI, Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell, inst. ed., 1979, p. 429.

period 1957 to 1968 the USA stationed and kept 48 nuclear warheads in secret at the Thule-airbase. This was in direct violation of official Danish policy to ban nuclear weapons on Danish soil, Greenlandic included. In the interpretation of the US government, however, storing of nuclear weapons in the island would not violate the wording of the US-Danish defence agreement for Greenland of 1951. This agreement allowed the USA to establish bases, meteorological- and/or navigational stations in the island, and without restrictions to bring in all material deemed necessary for the stay and its purpose. On this backdrop and the actual geopolitical situation at the time, the then Prime-and Foreign Minister of Denmark, H.C. Hansen, tacitly agreed to allow the breach of public nuclear policy. A likely implication of this Prime Minister-consent, is that US nuclear bombers used the air space of Greenland for strategic purposes regularily for no less than 11 years of the Cold War. After the B-52 accident in January 1968, the Danish government hastened to enter into a secret agreement with the USA having the latter to accept not to act in a way violating Danish nuclear policy.[576] But US offensive plans for Greenland extended even further.

---

[576] Jørgen Taagholt: "Grønlands Sikkerhetspolitik i et Historisk Perspektiv," *paper* to be published by the Danish Atlantic Committee, fall 1997, pp.18-19.

Figure 4: Soviet Perceptions of the Barrier-Strategy by NATO in the GIUK-Gap.



Source: Joel S. Wit, "Advances in anti-submarine warfare," in *Scientific American*, February, 1981, p. 41.

In the beginning of the 1960s, the USA conceived in secrecy a plan to utilize the inland ice to cover and protect launching facilities for up to 600 intermediate missiles. The project, labelled "Iceworm," was a scheme to make a network of thousands of kilometers of tunnels below the inland ice to combine the launching facilities with the American military bases. The idea was eventually dropped, partly for geophysical and partly for political reasons.[577] What these new historic facts show is that military needs stemming from the geostrategic location of an area, in times of strained political circumstances, may create military actions and plans extending far beyond any reasonable compounds of declared public policy. During the Cold War Greenland was such an area.

However, the strategic assets of Greenland were not restricted to the airspace alone. In the 1980s, the surrounding waters attracted increasing attention by the US Navy in connection with the implementation of the new Maritime strategy.

[577] Ibid. p. 20.

Greenland in the Maritime Strategy

In the 1970s naval developments in the North Atlantic made Greenlandic territory interesting for strategic purposes in three intertwined ways: First, Greenlandic waters, i.e the Denmark strait, being part of the Greenland-United Kingdom-Iceland (GIUK) gap were employed for anti-warfare purposes (ASW) (see figures 3 and 4 and chapter 1)). Second, Soviet SSBN technology was developed to a point as to allow for launch position to be assumed by SSBNs in Greenlandic waters north of the GIUK-gap, i.e. in the Greenland Sea, the Arctic Ocean and in Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait (see figures 1 and 5). Third, due to these developments and uncertainty about the future of the US-base at Keflavik in Iceland, Greenlandic soil was perceived as a suitable platform for conducting ASW-activities in the North Atlantic.

These three developments stringing Greenland to contemporary naval developments were all related to the *barrier strategy* of the US in the GIUK-gap. This strategy, also pursued by the Soviet Union wherever possible, consists of placing listening devices on the sea-bed in relation to socalled "strangulation points" through which the submarines are forced to pass. The American SOSUS underwater surveillance system covering large sections of the Norwegian Sea possesses the capabilities to trace effectively Soviet submarines in the relevant areas (see fig.4).[578] At the points of strangulation, anti-submarine weapons such as aircraft, surface vessels and hunter-killer submarines are concentrated, all specifically constructed for the purpose of fighting enemy submarines in times of war. Apart from the Kola Inlet, the GIUK-gap is the only area in the North Atlantic providing the geographical preconditions of strategic strangulation (see chapters 1 and 4). The old generation of Soviet SSBNs - the Yankee-class - were equipped with short range SLBMs, forcing these vessels to transit the GIUK-gap. Consequently, the very survivability of the sea-based portion of the Soviet strategic retaliatory arsenal was in serious jeopardy in this area. This threat was accurately perceived by the Admiralty of the Northern Fleet (see figure 4), who acted in accordance with their repeated pattern of Cold War-reactions: Soviet naval policy at the time was formulated as a response to the superior naval capacity of the West.[579] That is to say that the barrier-strategy in the GIUK, comprising the Denmark strait between Iceland and Greenland (see figure 4), conditioned the procurement and deployment of Soviet naval vessels. Or as put by Clive Archer: "The significance of Greenland in submarine warfare was as the westernmost pillar of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom anti-submarine picket, the duty of which would be to prevent a significant number of Soviet hunter-killer and

---

[578] For a more detailed discussion see Willy Østreng: *The Soviet Union in Arctic Waters. Security Implications for the Northern Flank of NATO*, Occasional Paper n. 36, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1987.

[579] Michael McGwire (ed): *Soviet Naval Deployment: Capability and Context*, New York, 1973, p. 405.

Figure 5: Area from which Delta-class submarines equipped with SS-N-8 SLBM would be able to reach any target in North America and Western Europe.



strategic submarines from exiting into the Atlantic either to harass the maritime link between North America and Western Europe or to threaten the USA with SLBMs."[580]

In 1972 the Soviet Navy managed to respond adequately to and avoid the GIUK-threat: A new generation of SSBNs, the Delta-class equipped with the long-range SS-N-8 SLBM missile could reach any target in Western Europe and North America from launch position in the Arctic. As a consequence, waters north of GIUK and to the east, west and north of Greenland could be employed as stationing areas for SSBNs (see figure 3). Now, Greenlandic waters in general, and not only the Greenlandic portion of the Denmark strait, could be host to Soviet submarines and U.S. ASW-forces. This geographical expansion (point 2 above) gave a renewed credence and validity to the old Soviet threat to apply the *Hudson-Bay approach* for attacking North-America by way of Greenlandic waters.

The Hudson Bay approach north of Greenland seems to have been the first course of attack through the Arctic Ocean that was considered by Moscow.[581] In the late fifties and early sixties

---

580 Clive Archer: "Greenland and the Atlantic Alliance," *Centre Piece, no. 7, Summer 1985*, Centre for Defence Studies, Aberdeen, p. 46.

581 *Montreal Daily Star*, 18 August, 1959: "Reds Issue Hudson Bay Threat," and *Ottawa Evening Journal*, 11. August, 1958:"New Danger in the North".

Soviet military writers discussed this approach in some detail.[582] Moscow Radio even warned the United States that missile-bearing Soviet submarines could enter Hudson Bay from under the Arctic ice and bombard the industrial heart of North-America.[583] If one considers the time at which this threat was issued - 1959 - it could hardly have been anything but pure propaganda. Even if the Soviets had had an operational nuclear submarine at that time, they almost certainly did not have a SLBM long-ranging and accurate enough to be able to carry out such a threat. The air distance from Hudson Bay to for instance Ottawa is about 1000 miles, fully 400 miles short of the prime target, New York. And so, the Hudson Bay approach as a course of attack could at best have been a Soviet prospect or futuristic dream. It could not in fact have materialized until the deployment of the SS-N-6 in 1969. As a precautionary measure, however, Canada staged her first major ASW-exercise in Hudson Bay as early as in 1961.[584]

In the mid-1970s Danish observers concluded that the deployment of Delta had increased the importance of the Greenland Sea in that the ice provided shelter for Soviet submarines. Under the NATO Conference in London May 10, 1977 the Danish Ministry of Defence expressed the belief that Soviet submarines navigated the passage between Ellesmere Island and Greenland and that Soviet submarines station themselves under the sea ice canopy of the Arctic Ocean.[585] The press even quoted NATO sources as saying that the Soviet icefloe research station, North Pole 22, was used for intelligence gathering, and that one of the hypothesised functions of the station lay in guiding Soviet submarines to US waters.[586] Danish observers speculated that the same approach could be used by US hunter-killer submarines employing the shortcut through the narrow strait between Greenland and Ellesmere Island from the North American continent to counter Soviet SSBN's in the Arctic Ocean.[587] Danish activities in the northern part of Greenland increased visibly in the late 1970's and the assumption was that this was due to the need to counteract submarine presence in the offshore waters.[588] An incident in the summer of

---

582 Gordon Brown: "Arctic ASW," in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 88, no. 3, March 1962.

583 *Montreal Daily Star*: Op. cit.

584 Willy Østreng: "The Strategic Balance in the Arctic Ocean - Soviet Options," in William Gutteridge (ed): *European Security, Nuclear Weapons and Public Confidence*, Macmillan Press, London, 1982, pp. 125-154.

585 *CBS Report* from London at the NATO Conference, 10 May, 1977 at 6.30 P.M. Atlantic Time.

586 International Herald Tribune, Paris, 27 June, 1977. For a general discussion of this point see Carl G. Jacobsen: "Soviet Strategic Interests and Canada's Northern Sovereignty" *Orae Extra-Mural Paper*, no. 4, February 1978, department of National Defence, Ottawa, pp. 72-87.

587 Erling Bjøl: "The Arctic in Danish Perspective," in C. Bertram and J.J. Holst: *New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p. 88.

588 Erling Bjøl: Op. cit, p. 89.

1983 added credibility to the assumption that some submarine activity was going on in Greenlandic waters. At that time a submarine, believed to be of Soviet origin, was spotted in Baffin Bay near the village of Akunnaaq when it surfaced next to a native Greenlander who was hunting seal from his little boat.[589] In the late 1980's the Conservative Canadian government followed suit, putting efforts into justifying the need to acquire a fleet of nuclear hunter-killer submarines because of their capability to operate beneath the ice of the Arctic Ocean (see chapter 3).

These developments, assumptions, speculations and perceptions added to the security importance of Greenland and resulted in a temporary upgrading of the land-based US installations to improve surveillance and communications for the improvement of North American defence in general and for making the US deterrent more credible. In the mid-1980s Greenland's naval significance had increased for two reasons. First, the shores of Northern Greenland provided part of the ice cover under which submarines could transit, and, secondly, the island assumed a renewed importance as an anchor point for ASW activities[590]: Greenlandic territory was considered for a bigger role in the barrier strategy of the GIUK-gap (point 3 above).

The focus of the Maritime Strategy on the Norwegian Sea and the possibilities of ASW-operations against SSBN-bastions beneath the ice of the Arctic Ocean put Greenland on the renewed strategic spot. Even though Greenland's role in that strategy was never clearly defined, which may reflect the fact that East Greenland is a most difficult area from which to conduct operations, both Station Nord and Thule were used by US military expeditions in support of ASW related research in offshore areas. The concentration of these research efforts was on the "marginal ice zone," i.e. the interface between open water and ice cover in northern waters, including the Greenland Sea, which were regarded as potential operational areas for American hunter-killer submarines.[591] In compliance with this the Head of the Danish Greenland Command, publicly stated in 1987 that ASW-aircraft can be stationed both at the US-bases in Greenland and at the Danish locations of Station Nord and Mestersvig in respectively Northeast and East Greenland. The American interest in this respect concentrated on the potential of Mestersvig bordering the Denmark strait. As a consequence, a feasibility study under the

---

589 Lars Toft Rasmussen:" Greenlandic and Danish Attitudes to Canadian Arctic Shipping," in Franklyn Griffiths (ed): *Politics of the Northwest Passage*, McGill- Queen's University Press, Montreal, 1987, p. 148.

590 Clive Archer (1985): Op. cit. p. 48.

591 G. Leonard Johnson et al.:"United States Security Interests in the Arctic"in William E. Westermayer & Kurt M. Schusterich (ed): *United States Arctic Interests. The 1980s and 1990s*, New York, 1984, p. 291.

auspices of NATO was conducted to see if a reserve and relief base for the Icelandic Keflavik base could be established in this location. This base should also function as an operational base for ASW- and air defence operations north of the GIUK-gap.[592] Negotiations to this effect between the Danish and US governments resulted in an agreement which was accepted both by the home rule and Danish governments. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War the US interest to set up an air base in Mestersvig for implementing the Maritime Strategy in northern Waters gradually cooled off and was later tacitly dropped. This was probably not only due to the structural changes in international relations following the Cold War, and to the declaration of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in November 1989 that Soviet submarines "do not enter the waters of the Canadian archipelago" (see chapter 2 and 3), but also a reflection of the stable political relationship gradually developing between Washington and Reykjavik after the political turbulence of the 1970s.

As early as in 1973, when the Icelandic government threatened to shut down the Keflavik base as a repercussion of the never ending "Cod-War" between Iceland and Great Britain, rumours were that the United States and NATO seriously considered to move the base from Iceland to East Greenland.[593] During the same "war" the tiny Norwegian island of Jan Mayen - 600 kilometers east of Greenland in the Norwegian Sea - was also considered as a supplementary and/or relief base to Keflavik.[594] In 1980 a new resource war broke out between NATO-allies in the Atlantic - this time between Norway and Iceland on the establishment of 200 mile zones overlapping between Jan Mayen and Iceland. During that conflict labelled the "capelin war" in the press, Norway was under pressure from both the U.K. and the U.S. to arrive at an agreement favourable to Iceland.[595] Again, the likelihood that the Icelandic government would play the "Keflavik card" to hurt the effectiveness of the GIUK barrier strategy if Norway did not give in, was what worried NATO and the US. The two parties finally found a solution and in the agreement Norway showed an accommodating attitude towards the Icelandic position.[596] Apart from the pressure exerted by the U.K. and U.S. to have this conflict brought to an end, the Norwegian government may also have felt a bit uneasy about the possibility of involving Jan

---

592 Nikolaj Petersen (1992): Op. cit. pp. 38-39.

593 Moses Olsen: "Greenland and EF," *Demos Debate 2*, Copenhagen 1972, p.8.

594 See Willy Østreng: "Reaching Agreement on International Exploitation of Ocean Mineral Resources (With Special Reference to the Joint Development Area between Jan Mayen and Iceland)," in Mark J. Valencia (ed): *Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Development*, Pergamon Press, New York, 1985, pp. 555-572.

595 John Fairlamb: *The Evolution of Icelandic Defence Decision-making 1944-81*, PhD dissertation, University of Southern California, 1981. See also Fairlamb: "Icelandic Threat Perceptions," in *Naval War College Review*, no. 5, September/October 1981.

596 For a more thorough discussion of the capelin war see: Willy Østreng (1985): Op. cit. pp. 555-572.

Mayen as a supplementary base to Keflavik if Iceland withdrew from NATO and renounced the Keflavik agreement with the US. In an article in the Soviet daily *Izvestiya* the author reflected on the consequences of an Icelandic withdrawal from NATO. According to the author this would place Norway in a precarious position, as it might mean that Keflavik would be transferred to Jan Mayen, which would, according to the newspaper, be a breach of Norwegian base policy (see chapter 4).[597] The political message of these resource "wars" between allies, however, was that Keflavik is vital to the barrier-strategy of the GIUK, and that alternative territories, Greenland in particular, still hold strategic interest of high US priority if political circumstances so dictate. As has been said: "If Thule should be part of a protective system against third country attack, Greenland's strategic significance will again increase."[598] This is due to Greenland's geostrategic location close to the North-American continent and in between the rival protagonists of the Cold War. As such Greenland has for the last 50 years been an integral part of the global security play between the superpowers.[599]

The above discussion also shows how elements in the Overall Regional Security Regime (ORSR) of the Norwegian North (the Barents quadrangle) relate to Icelandic and Greenlandic affairs (see chapter 3). The balancing of the various security elements and interests involved in the North Atlantic, including the GIUK, is so delicate and interrelated as to make up an overall security regime in itself. The rigidity of the interaction pattern between the components of this regime has been drastically reduced after the Cold War illustrated inter alia by the U.S. renouncement of Mestersvig as an airbase for implementing the Maritime Strategy. In this context, the security thinking of the Norwegian ORSR relates more directly to the strategic situation of Greenland than does that of Denmark proper to Greenland. Military-security and strategic considerations have been the dominant factors in the integration of Greenland in international politics. In the 1980s, however, a genuine Greenlandic perspective on security has gradually developed partly deviating from the island's traditional role as a strategic base in great power politics.

---

597 See the Norwegian daily *Aftenposten* July 12, 1980: "Keflavik til Jan Mayen?" and *Aftenposten*, August 8, 1980: "Sovjet-kommentar til konflikten Island-Norge."

598 Nikolaj Petersen (1992): Op. cit. p. 51.

599 H.C. Bach and Jorgen Taagholt: "Gronland og polområdet - sikkerhetspolitisk set. Perspektiver for forsvarets opgaver," *Serien: Forsvaret i samfundet, FKO Pub 493-73*, Vedbæk, 1976.

Greenlandic Security Politics

The Decision-making Competence and Structure

Legally speaking there is a clear division of competence between the Home Rule and Danish governments in foreign and security policy matters. The Home Rule Act, chapter 3, section 11 states that:

- foreign- and security policy are the sovereign domain of the Danish government which cannot be transferred to the Home Rule government,
- home rule is at all times subordinated to those obligations stemming from international treaties/conventions and other international legal instruments binding on the whole of the Danish Realm,
- treaties, to be approved by the Folketing, that in particular concern Greenlandic interests, shall be put before the Home Rule government for reaction and comment, before entering into force.[600]

Among the more important areas of responsibility under Home Rule are culture and education, taxation, fishing, social welfare, hunting and sheep-breeding, district planning, labour market affairs, organization of local government, legislation governing trade and competition, and most important in our context *environmental preservation.* This clear-cut division of responsibilities does not imply that there is no security policy interaction between the two governments. Nor does it mean that Greenlandic politics are indifferent to the island's utilization for more than 50 years in the power game and high-politics of the great powers. If viewed historically, the Greenlanders have been seeking increased autonomy through such devices as home rule arrangements, statutory guarantees of self-determination and legal support for tribal sovereignty.[601] Actually, the establishment of home rule in 1979 and the changes in the island's strategic role in the 1980's, have in combination initiated a process formulating what may turn out to be a specific Greenlandic perspective on foreign- and security policy.

The home rule security posture as it appears at present is composed of at least four elements:[602]

- an urge for a greater say in security and other foreign policy issues relating to Greenland,
- the Inuit tradition,

---

600 For a most thorough discussion of this division of competence see Fredrik Harhoff: "Grønland og Færoyenes stilling i dansk utenrikspolitikk" in Nikolaj Petersen & Christian Thune (eds): *Dansk udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1990*, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Gylling, 1991, pp. 57-68.

601 Franklyn Griffiths and Oran R. Young (1989): Op. cit. p. 11.

602 Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen (1988): Op. cit. pp. 40-44.

- polarization of Greenlandic politics,
- increasing pragmatism.

A Greater Greenlandic Say in Foreign- and Security Policy

There is broad consensus in Greenlandic politics that central government should inform the Home Rule government of all foreign-and security policy questions pertinent to Greenland, whether or not they are covered by the Home Rule Act. The urge is for a greater Greenlandic say and more influence in these matters. This demand has to a large extent been met in actual politics by the Danish government. Foreign and security policy questions are now on the agenda of the "Realm-meetings" conducted regularly between the Danish Prime Minister and the Head of home rule governments in Greenland and the Faeroes.[603] In the fall of 1995 a Danish-Greenlandic senior civil servant Committee on foreign and security policy was established, and the Danish Foreign Minister is annually conducting a foreign policy meeting with the Home Rule Government. On the basis of this development, observers are inclined to conclude that Greenland's influence in foreign policy issues is growing and becoming more independent and pronounced, not least in questions pertinent to foreign trade.[604] Leftist organized voices in Greenlandic politics are not, however, entirely happy about the state of affairs in this respect and demand various forms of co-determination and even control over military activities in the island.

The home rule administration has also been interested, and partly successful in establishing foreign contacts without direct participation of the Danish government. First, Greenland held a seat in the European Parliament filled by direct election until she left the EC January 1,1985. Later in the spring of the same year Greenland also obtained observer status with the Nordic Council, which was formed in 1952 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Finland joined in 1955). Here any issue area of joint interest with the exception of security matters may be discussed. 1985 was also the year when Greenland became a founding member of the Parliamentary Council of Western Norden, in which political parties from the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland are represented. Greenland celebrated its first national day in the summer of 1985, and for the first time flew its own flag. Further, the Home Rule Government is a member of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), which organizes the Inuits in Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Even international agreements have been entered into by the Home Rule government. This happened in 1989 when Canada and Greenland concluded an agreement about scientific monitoring of the fish stocks of beluga and narwhale that are shared by the two countries in the Davis Strait and Melville Bay (see figure 1). The Home Rule government has also taken an active stand in the civilianization process of the Arctic when it comes to the

603 *Gronlandsposten*, no. 22, 1995.

604 Jørgen Taagholt(1997): Op. cit. p. 33.

preservation of the environment. The highlight in this respect was the international agreement on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a result of the Rovaniemi process which the Home rule government worked hard to achieve in 1990. One year later AEPS was co-signed by the Home Rule minister of public health and environment together with the Danish minister of education. Last but not least, the Home Rule Administration has expressed an interest in having honorary consulates established in Nuuk, sometimes against the preferences of the Danish government.

On this backdrop, informed observers, do not disregard the possibility that in the future some kind of veto power over Greenlandic-specific foreign policy to be exercised by the home rule government will be raised.[605] Former Prime Minister of Greenland, Jonathan Motzfeldt, asserts that the Home Rule Act, which was a significant breakthrough and a milestone in Inuit government in 1979, now may be regarded as a stumbling block to further development, especially in two areas: *underground resource exploitation* and *security policy.*[606] What we are witnessing here is a political process that in all likelihood has not yet reached its final stage when it comes to Greenlandic involvement in foreign and security policy matters. The trend seems to be that the Home Rule Government is gaining in influence. At the same time, the Danish government has assumed a long record in complying with Greenlandic foreign policy demands and needs (see below). Irrespective of what the letter of the Home Rule Act is, Danish foreign policy touching on the interests of Greenland are gradually becoming harmonized with and shaped in the melting pot of the Home Rule Government. At the same time, the decreasing geopolitical significance of Greenland in the post-Cold War era, has made the US influence in Greenlandic affairs less pronounced. This leaves more freedom of foreign policy action to the growing cooperative alliance between Copenhagen and Nuuk.

The Inuit Tradition

There is a widespread feeling of alienation among the Inuits when it comes to military matters. As expressed by the former mayor of Qaqortoq, Henrik Lund: "...we Greenlanders are a-military. We cannot accept attitudes which may lead to the eradication of life, which may threaten our entire people. We are not part of the 'cause'."[607] The cause referred to concerns the power game of international affairs, the application of weapons of mass destruction and the ultimate means of politics: war.[608] The corollary of this is that the exploitation of Greenland as a

---

605 Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen (1988): Op. cit. p. 40.

606 Jørgen Taagholt (1997): Op. cit. p. 32.

607 Henrik Lund: "Introduction," in Paul Claesson (ed): *Gronland - Middelhavets perle. Et indblik i amerikansk atomkrigsforbredelse*, Eirene, Copenhagen, 1983.

608 Ibid.

strategic base in the U.S. warfighting strategy opposes the core values of Inuit tradition. As pointed out by Finn Lynge, "military culture is totally unknown in Greenland,"[609] one of the very few countries in the world never to have been torn by a war and whose youth has never been subject to any sort of military conscription: "...the idea of creating a corporate discipline for the purpose of stalking and killing other people is totally foreign to Greenlanders. Patriotism is not manifested in military parades. This is a soldierless society."[610] In his study *Eskimo Life*, Fridtjof Nansen as early as in 1889 noticed that the concept of war was not part of the Greenlandic language, and that the Greenlanders regarded war as something incomprehensible and revolting.[611] At the outset, the Greenlanders did not come to grips with their homeland's involvement in big power strategy during the Cold War. To most Greenlanders this was a most abstract unreal situation.[612]

Time and again these values have been voiced by the governing Siumit party and the leftist party Atagatigit in and through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC). In the course of the 1970s and 1980s the ICC has passed resolutions *against the military use of the Arctic, supporting the establishment of a nuclear-free zone covering the homelands of the northern indigenous peoples*, and even a resolution mandating the ICC *to develop an Arctic foreign policy of its own.*

What has been expressed as the content of an alternative Arctic foreign policy is very close to what we in the introductory chapter defined as *civility in utilization.* The ICC in 1986 called for the promotion of environmental and social impact assessments in the North for any projects, inclusive defence-related plans, that might cause adverse impacts on the Inuit homelands.[613] This expresses the core of civility that no one will act in a way that will disturb beyond repair the functioning of the Arctic environment: "For the Greenlanders what matters is to survive, to manage difficult natural conditions," whilst "...war is historically alien to him and... as a means outside daily life,..."[614]

To a certain extent these attitudes have also been expressed by the national assembly of Greenland, *Landstinget*, which in 1983 passed a resolution demanding "that Greenland shall

---

609 Finn Lynge:"Greenland. Its people and society" *Speaking Notes* for the International Court of Justice. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Danish Delegation, The Hague, January 12, 1993, p. 34.

610 Ibid. p.35.

611 Fridtjof Nansen: *På ski over Grønland. Eskimoliv*, Aschehoug Forlag, Oslo, 1942, p. 58.

612 Jørgen Taagholt (1997): Op. cit., p.13.

613 *Inuit Circumpolar Conference*, vol. 1., no. 1, June 1987, p. 12.

614 Henrik Lund: Op. cit.

remain nuclear-free," and that the traversing of Greenlandic air and sea territory by nuclear-tipped delivery vehicles both in peacetime and in wartime, should be banned.[615] That this resolution also was supported by the rightist Atassut party implies that the content enjoys widespread support in Greenland. The interpretation of this attitude, however, is that "it is probably just as rooted in environmental concerns as in specific security policy beliefs."[616] If this interpretation is accurate, we are here reverting to civility in utilization as a core value in the Inuit tradition. Their foreign and security behaviour expresses - directly as well as indirectly - a particular concern for the sustainability of their homelands - for the Arctic environment upon which they are entirely dependent. This is why private ownership of land is not allowed in Greenland. This is a necessity of practical importance to the hunters and fishermen who need to move freely around in order to make their living. Native communities are based on a collective social organization. Patriotic culture in Greenland is manifested in art - music, painting, poetry and drama. In this respect it is interesting to note that whilst most modern western song texts are focused on romantic love, Greenlandic song texts often deal with the love for the land.[617]

Representatives of the Inuit have labelled their security alternative: *sustainable security*. Since the coming of Europeans to Greenland and North America indigenous people have, according to Dalee Sambo, found themselves struggling to regain the sustainable security they once knew and by which they live. [618] Sustainable security in Inuit tradition is stated in comprehensive terms, comprising many elements, of which the following are regarded as essential:

- recognition of the principle of self-determination,
- full respect for land and resource rights,
- recognition of the right to development and the right to peace,
- direct participation in international, national and regional processes that affect indigenous communities,
- respect and recognition of native rights,
- recognition as distinct societies,
- security in hunting and fishing rights,
- the right to a safe and healthy environment and
- removal of threat of environmental destruction.[619]

---

615 Svend Adsersen:"Den gronlandske sikkerhetspolitiske debate" in *Flåtestrategier of nordisk sikkerhedspolitik*, vol. 2, Det sikkerheds-og nedrustingspolitiske Udvalg, Copenhagen, 1986, p. 36.

616 Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen (1988): Op. cit. p. 42.

617 Finn Lynge: Op. cit. p. 35.

618 Dalee Sambo:"Sustainable security: An Inuit perspective," in Jyrki Kakonen (ed): *Politics and Sustainable Growth in the Arctic*, Dartmouth Publishing Company, Dartmouth, 1993, p. 51.

619 Dalee Sambo: Op. cit. p. 62.

This operationalization of Inuit sustainable security leans heavily on the necessity to sustain a healthy environment, or as it has been expressed: "The profound relationship Native peoples have to the environment is a matter that cannot be sufficiently underscored."[620] Inuit tradition, however, is not the only factor influencing and shaping Greenlandic foreign and security policy. Influences adopted by Greenlandic political parties from the South, are also making their mark on developments.

Polarization of Greenlandic Politics

Political life in Greenland is organized by political parties based on ideology, rather than on culture, tradition and nationality. The division between left and right in politics - basically a "Southern" or in the context of the Realm a Danish model - make up the structure of Greenlandic politics. This division is increasingly colouring political perceptions, attitudes and behaviour at the expense of the core values of Inuit tradition, not least in security policy.[621] Thus, the split between ideology and culture has given rise to tensions between Nuuk - the political center - and outlying communities - the bearers of Inuit tradition and culture - in particular regarding resource issues (see below). Modern politics, thus contribute to generate center and periphery relations within a culture that has been homogeneous for centuries.

The leftist parties are critical to the present security policy applying in the island and act to increase Greenlandic influence and insight, whilst the conservative Atassut party opts for status quo. In between the two extremes the governing Siumut party is to be found. Throughout the 1980s this party has gradually exhibited a more pragmatic course of action and policy. This is due to the fact that the success of home rule does not depend so much on its influence in the field of security as on its results in economic policy.[622]

Increasing Pragmatism

The increasing pragmatism of Greenlandic politics mirrors among other things the fact that US military installations offer jobs to the local population. Here native economy and superpower security walk hand in hand. The tendency throughout the 1980s was that the attitudes of political parties evolved from being very sceptical to the US bases, to an increasing acceptance of their presence and role for Greenlandic society. At the same time prominent Greenlandic politicians have gradually become aware of the island's strategic importance which has made them realize

---

620 Dalee Sambo: Op. cit. p. 54.

621 Ib Faurby and Nikolaj Petersen (1988): Op. cit. p. 42.

622 Nikolaj Petersen (1992): Op. cit. p. 45.

that NATO-countries may be willing "to pay a price for stable political relations with the island."[623] This was not least demonstrated when the home rule government opted to leave the European Community (EC) in 1984. According to one EC diplomat: "The security aspect was never openly mentioned at the negotiating table. But it certainly was informally discussed in the coffee breaks and during cocktail hour. Although no one would doubt Greenland's commitment to NATO, even in the event of unilateral withdrawal from the EC, it is in the long-term interest to maintain friendly relations. It is a small price to pay, security being infinitely more important than fish."[624] For security reasons the USA also took an interest in the matter. During the negotiations there were consultations between the EC and the United States and the latter recommended that a deal be reached.[625]

The fact that this was the tacit perception of the EC negotiators, made Greenlandic politicians benefit indirectly from the perceived effects of a negotiating card that was never played at the negotiating table. In many ways the *Thule card* of the Home Rule Government seems to have been just as effective as the *Keflavik card* has proved to be to the Icelandic government in times of resource conflicts. Strategic importance in terms of geographic location has in both cases paid off economically in that Iceland "won" the Cod-war and Greenland acquired the economic and political benefits of *Overseas Countries and Territories status* (OCT) vis a vis the EC. This allowed free access for fishery products to the European market and a financial compensation in return for granting the EC most favoured status in the allotment of fishery quotas from Greenlandic waters. Security has thus far paid both entities well in economic gains. Here again economy and security walk hand in hand. In both cases the USA involved herself on the grounds of security.

Greenlandic pragmatism also played a role in the levelling of Inuit values and economic benefits when it came to Arctic navigation and resource extraction.

Greenlandic Attitudes to Arctic Shipping.

One of the major reasons why Greenland left EC in 1985 was a widespread desire to gain control over and to avoid over-exploitation of their fish resources. During Greenland's membership in the EC the Home Rule Government went to great lengths to protect their renewable resources and to protect the subsistence culture and fishing on which the Inuit seek to base their livelihood. Since 1972, fishery management to set Total allowable catch (TAC) and quotas in Greenlandic waters was the responsibility of the EC Commission. In the mind of the

---

623 Lars Toft Rasmussen: Op. Cit. p. 148.

624 Cited from Lars Toft Rasmussen: Op. cit. p. 148.

625 Ibid.

Home rule government this created a long term problem of non-sustainability: TAC's and quotas were often set too high, not following the recommendations of biologists.[626] The assumption of Greenlandic authorities was that this exploitation was conducted by southern corporations or government agencies largely for the benefit of southern societies. Thus, the roots of the most serious threats to a sustainable livelihood in Greenland were of a southern rather than northern origin. As a consequence and from "the perspective of the peoples of the Arctic, the resultant extractive industries generally (took) the form of exogenous forces controlled by outsiders whose decisions are not responsive to the concerns of the small communities they affect."[627]

Ever since the 1972 referendum about whether or not to join the EC, Greenlandic politicians opposed to the EC have argued that Greenland's strategic significance to the US had increased in spite of the reduced military importance of Sondrestrom and Narsarssuag. This was so because of the enormous quantities of oil and mineral deposits found in Canada and Alaska. At the same time it was argued that exploitation of Greenland's own resources would imply that Greenland "would function as a "calm" resource source for US consumption."[628] Four years were to pass before Greenlandic politicians were put on the spot to handle a challenge of this kind.

In 1977 the *Arctic Pilot Project* (APP)[629] - a venture sponsored by Petro-Canada - gave rise to a conflict of interests between the Inuit hunters of the North and the industrialized societies to the south: APP preconditioned year-round icebreaking tanker traffic in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait for transportation of oil and gas from the Canadian North to the markets in the South. The Greenlandic press soon discovered the plan indicating that the tankers in certain locations would be as close as 25 kilometers from their coast. This posed a potential threat to the subsistence economy. According to one newspaper: "Greenlandic society cannot tolerate that its two most important productive trades (sealing/whaling and fishing) are threatened by reckless shipping by foreign wealthy nations who need to satisfy their extravagant consumption of energy."[630] In a short period of time opposition to the APP rose to unexpected heights touching powerful emotions within most Greenlanders. The Home Rule Government even refused to see and speak with representatives of the APP, who wanted to present their case to the Home Rule Government. In the summer of 1983 - after five years of fierce opposition - the APP quietly

---

626 Finn Lynge: Op. cit. p. 27.

627 Franklyn Griffiths and Oran R. Young: "Sustainable Development and the Arctic," Working Group on Arctic International Relations, Impressions of the Co-Chairs, Second Session Ilulissat and Nuuk, Greenland, 20-24 April 1989, *Reports and Papers*, 1989 - 1, p. 11.

628 Moses Olsen: Op. cit. p. 8.

629 For a thorough discussion of this project see Jennifer Lewington: "Lessons of the Arctic Pilot Project," in Franklyn Griffiths (ed) (1987): Op. cit. pp. 163-180.

630 Cited from Lars Toft Rasmussen: Op. cit. p.150.

passed away. The prime reason was falling oil prices and bad planning.[631] However, it is reasonable to assume that the intensity of the Greenlandic opposition also had some influence on the decision to drop the case.[632] The outcome to a certain extent proved that the commonly expressed assumption that Arctic peoples can expect only to be interested bystanders and, potentially, innocent victims to the exploratory activities in the North, is not correct in every respect. To alienate peoples in important military-strategic locations to external powers provides the former with explicit and implicit bargaining chips. There are no indications, however, that Home Rule authorities actually played the Thule-card, but it may have lurked in the minds of influential outsiders not wanting to provoke a united Greenlandic population. If so, indigenous peoples controlling assets of high politics important to southern great powers possess measures to be employed for safeguarding these small nations' interests.

Neither the Inuit of Greenland nor the Danish government have ever taken an active stand when it comes to the utilization of the Northern Sea Route. The segmentation of Arctic politics (see chapter 1) carry some, if not all of the blame for this non-engagement in an issue of potential Greenlandic interest. Another explanatory factor is the hegemonialism of the Cold War (see introductory chapter) which shut the aboriginals of the former Soviet North effectively off from regular contacts with native peoples living in other Arctic countries in all matters of common interest, Arctic transportation included. Thus, exchange of experiences and the possibilities to pool resources within the ICC to formulate a pan-Arctic native policy on polar navigation was long restricted to the native populations of the west Arctic countries. With the new political system in Russia this situation may be changing as Russian natives are now allowed to interact with their kinsmen in other Arctic countries within and between organizations like the ICC, the Saami Council (SC), Aboriginal Leaders Summit (ALS) and the Association of Aboriginal Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (RAPON).

Today certain comparisons can be made between the impact experienced by native communities in the Republic of Sakha along the NSR with those perceived to be of importance in the case of APP. The similarities - positive as well as negative - are striking. Six key problems resulted directly or indirectly from development of the NSR for the Republic of Sakha:

- *Aggravation of social conditions.* Demographic as well as environmental changes altered vital social relationships and activities. This was also feared to happen to the society of Greenland.

- *Environmental damage.* The use of the waterway negatively affected the traditional economy, eliminating and degrading reindeer pastureland, fish stocks, flora and fauna. This was a basic argument against the APP in the public debate in Greenland.

---

631 Jennifer Lewington: Op. cit. pp. 178-180.

632 For a more extensive discussion of APP see Lars Toft Rasmussen: Op. cit. pp. 149-155.

- *Injury to the traditional economic base* resulted from intensive exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources. The same scenario was depicted strongly in Greenland and by the Home Rule Government.

- *Lack of involvement of indigenous peoples in the northern work force.* This has not been the experience of Greenlandic Inuit. Quite the contrary, the US-bases in Greenland have been absorbent in employing the local population. As a consequence, this was not raised as a primary reason to oppose the Canadian APP in Greenland.

- *Destruction of cultural values.* The opening of the NSR has brought the indigenous population of Sakha to the threshold of de-ethnicization, and the smallest minorities close to extinction. There is no reason to assume that the magnitude of this problem would be repeated in Greenland, but, as has already been experienced in Greenland, foreign utilization of indigenous resources, alter local lifestyles and affect the value base of the culture.[633]

Joint perceptions and experiences like these may make organizations like the ICC, SC and RAPON a most effective pan-Arctic measure to oppose the disrupting effects of Arctic shipping to subsistence economy. As shown in the introductory chapter, Arctic governments are now cooperating in many fora to sustain the welfare and way of life of Arctic populations. The native say and influence in Arctic affairs has thus a better political base for success today than in previous years. Many of the principal positions of these organizations have been incorporated in the AEPS with many references to traditional (native) ecological knowledge and the need for indigenous involvement at all levels of decision-making.[634]

The critical question, however, is whether Arctic transportation in its very nature is bound to produce a clearcut conflict of interest between northerners and southerners, or whether an interface exists where the two positions interact to the benefit of both. The Home Rule Government has actually been accused of exercising too much pragmatism when it comes to Arctic transportation. Some go even further and state that pragmatism, which in general has a negative connotation in Greenland, has taken the upper hand to subsistence values in Home rule policy.[635]

---

633 Institute of Humanitarian Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Sakha: "Influences of the Northern Sea Route on Social and Cultural Development of Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic Zone of the Republic of Sakha," *INSROP Working Paper, Project IV.4.1.* pp. 64-65.

634 Davis Scrivener: "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council," *Security Policy Library*, no. 1, 1996, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, p. 18.

635 Lars Toft Rasmussen: Op. cit. pp. 155-157.

Greenland's own APP

The above headline was used by the Greenlandic press in connection with the oil prospecting taking place in Jameson Land in East Greenland in the beginning of the 1980's - at the peak time of the APP controversy. The prospects of obtaining new revenues from petroleum if found in sufficient quantities, made the Home Rule Government in principle accept oil transportation by icebreaking tankers passing through the biologically rich and highly productive waters of the hunting community of Itteqqortoormiit (see figure 1). This posed the question: In terms of harmful environmental effects stemming from year-round icebreaking on Inuit communities, what is the difference between a tanker licensed by Canadian authorities or one licensed by Greenlandic authorities? The question was not answered by the authorities to the full satisfaction of all Greenlanders. Many felt the very basis of Inuit values and subsistence economy to be in jeopardy. Undoubtedly, Greenland's own APP implied a willingness on the part of the Home Rule Government to sacrifice the interests of Itteqqortoormiit by putting the area's environmental sensitivity and biological productivity in peril. This sacrifice would make Greenland economically more independent of Danish subsidies and control and therefore politically more autonomous.[636] Here Inuit culture in the periphery collided with the pragmatism of modern politics in the center: NUUK against Ittoqqortoormiit. Even leftist parties opposing the development of Jameson Land - i.e. the Inuit Ataqatigiit party - called their resistance off when invited to form a coalition government with the Siumut party. Following this event, the Premier of the coalition government said that "...there has been no change in the government's position on oil development." [637] In other words: What was unacceptable in the context of the Canadian APP, was acceptable in the context of the Greenlandic APP.

The possible contradictions in the government's policy can be explained in several ways. First, Arctic navigation would apart from reducing the economic and political reliance on Denmark proper also improve the material well-being of the local villages in providing equipment, clothing and food and regular transportation to desolate areas. Second, Greenland was not alone in promoting a discriminatory policy between her own and foreign plans of identical transportational content. The Canadian government in 1969-70 strongly opposed the presence of the US supertanker Manhattan in the Northwest Passage. Environmental concerns was one of the main reasons cited by Ottawa in opposition to this project and the whole controversy resulted in a unilateral Canadian adoption of the *Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act* to apply within a 100 nautical miles zone north of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. This opposition, however, did not prevent the Canadians from launching a transportation scheme (APP) resembling the one they so fiercely opposed vis a vis the USA. Thus, both Greenland and Canada carried the same

---

[636] Lars Toft Rasmussen: Op. cit. p. 155-157.

[637] Ibid. p. 157.

policy of inconsistency. Neither party could blame the other without blaming itself. What this boils down to is that all three schemes would unilaterally promote national economic interests. When the Home Rule Government opposed the Canadian APP, the preservation of the environment won the day in Nuuk. When it launched its own APP, national interests dictated economy before environment. When Canada opposed the Manhattan journey she worried about the environment and sovereignty; when she launched the APP economy had the upper hand. The very nature of national interests are circumstantial, changing and adaptive.

It should be recognized, however, that these varying and partly contradictory priorities do not necessarily contradict the coherency of policy. As long as your own government is in control of all aspects of a developmental scheme the contradictions appear to be more fictional than real. The logic applied runs like this: When government X put economy before environment in her own backyard the feeling is that the necessary steps will be taken to safeguard the latter as a supplementary national interest to the former; When foreigners prioritize economy before environment in the same backyard, you automatically suspect environmental concerns to yield in order to maximize revenues. In popular psychology - right or wrong - foreign investors are under suspicion of being unidimensionally preoccupied with economic revenues only, whilst your own government is obligated and self-interested to take care of many interests at the same time - economic, environmental, social etc. In other words: Don't trust the assurances of foreign investors when they claim to apply a comprehensive and multidimensional approach in preserving your environment when they primarily opt to exploit your resources. Your own government is the only one fully responsible and liable for all parts of societal life, and very important: You can punish them at the next election by ousting them from power. In politics, realities count, perceptions decide. This also applies to Greenland.

For whatever reason, the Home Rule Government clearly demonstrated that it would not readily accept all-year navigation in Baffin Bay and the Davis strait; only on the East coast, implying that the government is not totally opposed to Arctic navigation as such. The possibility that this could also bring benefits to native communities was realized by the Home Rule Government. In a comparative perspective this has actually been demonstrated by the effects of the NSR on the northern regions of Yakutia.[638] Four benefits have been identified:

- the NSR ended the transport isolation of Yakutia by opening the possibility of navigation on the Republic's northern rivers.
- the NSR increased the material well-being of native populations.
- increased extraction of coal and timber occurred.
- the NSR provided the basis for gold and tin mining.

[638] Gail Osherenko: "Social and Cultural Impact of Indigenous Peoples of Expanded Use of the Northern Sea Route," in H. Kitagawa (ed): Op. cit. pp. 343-344.

In relation to the two last points prominent Greenlanders have stated that: "Greenland is a large country with great resources, although utilization of the natural potential of land and sea poses extraordinary problems. The challenge of the future is to reach an uncontested international understanding of resource access and to find the means to utilize the potential which is there."[639] As was said in the aftermath of the grounded APP: "The Arctic's hour will come. Its energy resources will be needed."[640] The perception that the Danish colonization of Greenland was the first step to gradually eliminate the Inuit culture, still has its vivid supporters. The sad evidence of this is to be found in many parts of the Arctic. The argument running counter to this assumption is that it is unrealistic to assume that the Inuit society could have existed in splendid isolation from the rest of the world for ever. Human history is the history of societal interactions. They may be stopped for periods, but they are always resumed. Thus, the crux of the matter is not related to the very existence of inter-societal interactions, but to their qualities and properties as measures for development or unjust exploitation. One of the proposed developmental philosophies projected for Greenland is based on a continuing, but subdued and calm cooperation with Denmark combined with an exploitation of Danish and international expertise for economic development. At the same time Denmark is seen as the guarantor to cope with and control foreign political and economic interests in the island.[641] In other words: What is needed is civility in utilization to achieve sustainable security of which economic development is an integral part.

Judged from the Greenlandic reaction pattern of the two APPs and the concept of sustainable security, five preconditions seem imperative in order to obtain the acquiescence of the Home Rule Government in Arctic navigation connected to exploitation of resources:

- the scheme should be controlled and managed by Greenlandic authorities;
- the economic revenues should be channelled to the benefit of the island society at large;
- foreign involvement is acceptable on preconditions defined and strongly influenced by Greenlandic authorities;
- subsistence economy shall prevail in a parallel fashion, implying that the navigation scheme should have no severe negative repercussions on the Greenlandic way of life apart from the local adjustments necessary to fit into the scheme;
- strict environmental safeguards and precautionary steps should be applied and enforced.

---

639 Finn Lynge: Op. cit. p. 32.

640 Jennifer Lewington: Op. cit. p. 179.

641 Jørgen Taagholt (1997): Op. cit. p. 33.

Under these conditions Greenland may reap some of the benefits of industrial society without sacrificing the core values of Inuit traditions. Due to Greenland's secret weapon: *the island's strategic location*, the Home rule authorities are probably better equipped to "dictate" conditions in this respect than most Arctic people, deprived as they often are of the economic and political resources needed to effect significant changes in the behaviour of advanced industrial societies.[642] In Arctic navigation the most likely opponents to Greenlandic wishes and interests are Canada and the United States. Under certain scenarios those countries may opt to put pressure on Denmark to force her former colony to accept tanker traffic in waters adjacent to the island. A scenario of this kind will put three vital relations to the test; First, Denmark's commitment to promote Greenlandic interests and her own security dependency on the USA; Second, the US need for Greenlandic soil in strategic surveillance and, third, the need of Home rule for foreign economic support related to OSTC status vis a vis EU and the Thule base. In other words: How strong will the Thule-card be in all these intertwined relations in the future? Or rephrased: Can the various parts of the Danish Realm pool political resources to strengthen their future bargaining position vis a vis Greenland's two developed neighbours if long-term navigation once again should involve the use of Greenlandic waters? Indications are that this might happen under certain preconditions defined by the concepts of sustainable security and civility.

Environmental Security and the Danish Realm: Possible Implications for Greenland.

In the Foreign Ministry's statement on Danish foreign policy towards year 2000, four areas are singled out as being of particular interest in the policy implementation for the Realm as such:

1. Common Security,
2. Democracy and human rights,
3. Economic and Social development,
4. Environment.[643]

At first glance, all of these points seem to relate favourably to the concept of sustainable security. The Danish government acknowledges that security in the post Cold War era is extended to comprise military as well as non-military issue areas. Poverty, environmental damages, violation of human rights and nationalism are among the many new security threats identified. These issue areas of security are identical with the priority foreign policy objectives referred to in points 2 and 3 above. As stated: "To confront these new (security) risks a much

642 Franklyn Griffiths and Oran Young: Op. cit. p. 11.

643 Foreign Ministry: *Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik - Dansk udenrigspolitik på vej mot år 2000*, Copenhagen, June 1993, front page and p. 19.

broader array of means (than military) has to be applied."[644] The concept of common security is the ramification chosen in point 1 above, to countervail the novel threat structure of the 1990's. In theory this concept is, according to the Palme Commission, an explicit commitment to work towards joint universal survival against threats of any kind in order to ensure the fulfilment of the aspirations of humanity as a whole.[645] Thus, by definition, the concept is *all-embracing* and *relational* in that it applies to all organisational levels of politics - be they local, national, regional or global - and work in the horizontal and vertical planes between the various levels. To build common security, the state - the prime actor of international politics - will have to act on the basis of the integrated security interests of the entire population, comprising all nationalities and localities within its national confines. In this respect the Danish Realm is confronted with a dual challenge: First, she needs to integrate the security interests of a widely dispersed multinational population and, second, to adapt her policy to the varying circumstances of common security prevailing in the regions where the Faeroe islands, Denmark proper and Greenland lie. In the North American Arctic, Canadian, U.S., Danish and Greenlandic interests will all contribute to the web of regional preconditions forming the parameters of common regional security. As was demonstrated by Greenlandic reactions to the two APPs, environmental preservation and resource management - key components in Inuit tradition - stood out as primary national interests carrying the potential to unite the majority of the Greenlandic population against "hostile" actions of external actors. Here the Greenlandic population declared environmental factors to be the priority of high politics. In order for the Danish government to succeed in integrating the Realm in the sphere of common security, Danish foreign policy in the region cannot circumvent the environmental interests of Greenland. Environmental security defined as *the reasonable assurance of protection against threats to national well-being ...associated with environmental damage* may be an optional measure to integrate the two Danish nationalities (see introductory chapter). At the fundamental level, these Greenlandic and Danish priorities do not conflict with the premises of the new US Arctic policy. This policy emphasizes environmental protection, environmentally sustainable development and the involvement of indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them, along with the national security requirements of the present time (see chapter 5).[646] Which of these policy objectives that will take centre stage in situations of international conflicts depends on the circumstances and on which US interest group has the upper hand in domestic politics at the time.

---

644 Udenrigsministeriet:"*Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik*": Op. cit. p. 8.

645 *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament.* Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, Pan Books, London, 1982, p. 294.

646 *Fact Sheet: U.S. Arctic Policy*, Department of State published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. 5, no. 52, December 26, 1994. For a discussion of this policy see: Robert Senseney: "U.S. Arctic Policy Aims for Circumpolar Cooperation, in *Witness the Arctic*, vol. 3, no. 2, authumn 1995, pp. 1-2. In chapter 5 of this book, Franklyn Griffiths make an indepth discussion of this policy and its impact on Arctic developments.

broader array of means (than military) has to be applied."[644] The concept of common security is the ramification chosen in point 1 above, to countervail the novel threat structure of the 1990's. In theory this concept is, according to the Palme Commission, an explicit commitment to work towards joint universal survival against threats of any kind in order to ensure the fulfilment of the aspirations of humanity as a whole.[645] Thus, by definition, the concept is *all-embracing* and *relational* in that it applies to all organisational levels of politics - be they local, national, regional or global - and work in the horizontal and vertical planes between the various levels. To build common security, the state - the prime actor of international politics - will have to act on the basis of the integrated security interests of the entire population, comprising all nationalities and localities within its national confines. In this respect the Danish Realm is confronted with a dual challenge: First, she needs to integrate the security interests of a widely dispersed multinational population and, second, to adapt her policy to the varying circumstances of common security prevailing in the regions where the Faeroe islands, Denmark proper and Greenland lie. In the North American Arctic, Canadian, U.S., Danish and Greenlandic interests will all contribute to the web of regional preconditions forming the parameters of common regional security. As was demonstrated by Greenlandic reactions to the two APPs, environmental preservation and resource management - key components in Inuit tradition - stood out as primary national interests carrying the potential to unite the majority of the Greenlandic population against "hostile" actions of external actors. Here the Greenlandic population declared environmental factors to be the priority of high politics. In order for the Danish government to succeed in integrating the Realm in the sphere of common security, Danish foreign policy in the region cannot circumvent the environmental interests of Greenland. Environmental security defined as *the reasonable assurance of protection against threats to national well-being ...associated with environmental damage* may be an optional measure to integrate the two Danish nationalities (see introductory chapter). At the fundamental level, these Greenlandic and Danish priorities do not conflict with the premises of the new US Arctic policy. This policy emphasizes environmental protection, environmentally sustainable development and the involvement of indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them, along with the national security requirements of the present time (see chapter 5).[646] Which of these policy objectives that will take centre stage in situations of international conflicts depends on the circumstances and on which US interest group has the upper hand in domestic politics at the time.

---

644 Udenrigsministeriet:"*Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik*": Op. cit. p. 8.

645 *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament.* Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, Pan Books, London, 1982, p. 294.

646 *Fact Sheet: U.S. Arctic Policy*, Department of State published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. 5, no. 52, December 26, 1994. For a discussion of this policy see: Robert Senseney: "U.S. Arctic Policy Aims for Circumpolar Cooperation, in *Witness the Arctic*, vol. 3, no. 2, authumn 1995, pp. 1-2. In chapter 5 of this book, Franklyn Griffiths make an indepth discussion of this policy and its impact on Arctic developments.

The second challenge, to adopt Danish security policy to the regional context of North America may under certain conditions strain the relationship both to Nuuk, Washington and Ottawa. A scenario where either the USA and/or Canada will bring pressure to bear against Denmark to convince the Home Rule Government to play down its environmental concerns for the benefit of economic activity in the region, can in no way be ruled out for the time being. This would either put the Danish commitment to Greenland or the Danish security dependence on the USA to the test. In such a scenario the Home Rule Government may see it in her interest to play the Thule-card as a last resort to influence the course of events. As long as the reduced strategic significance of the island prevails, the political effect of this card is at best arguable. These speculations can be multiplied and refined. Without any further ado, what can be concluded is that the regional security equation by most yardsticks is a complicated one providing no simple answers or political outcomes.

The new international ramifications have made the central government decide that Danish defence efforts in *adjacent geographical areas* will be given lower priority. Multinational UN- and CSCE efforts to resolve international conflicts and emergency situations have been prime recipients of Danish military and civilian resources throughout this century.[647] In this respect the Danish response to the post-Cold War circumstances is in line with the general reaction pattern of small states: Their military/political engagement takes on a more global role and responsibility (see chapter 3 and 4). Their traditional arenas of foreign policy projections are being more actively extended beyond the region to which they belong. Post-Cold War changes in enemy images and weapon procurements have made the geopolitics of adjacent areas to Denmark proper less worrying from a military point of view. The uncertainties stemming from the on-going structural changes of the international system may threaten the stability of international relations in such a way as to affect also the security of small states. Here Denmark takes her share of global systemic responsibility. This is not to say that the security-political importance of adjacent areas in Danish foreign policy has been reduced.

On March 6, 1992, the Danish government took a most important initiative to establish the Baltic Sea Council as an organisational tool for the cooperation between the rim states to the Baltic Sea. This initiative was a continuation of the regionalization of European politics that had been going on for more than 50 years in Western Europe. However, the Baltic Sea Cooperation (BSC) introduced a new item to this long-lasting process of regionalization by cutting across the ideological boundaries of the former East/West divide inviting Poland and Russia to become

647 Ibid. p. V.

founding members of BSC.[648] Norway, not being a littoral state to the Baltic Sea, was also invited to take part in the BSC as a part of the Fenno-Scandinavian peninsula. By so doing, and by having Finland, Sweden and Denmark as members of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, a political link has been established between the two cooperative initiatives in northern Europe. The fact that they are also based on the same security-political idea makes them informally interlinked and supplementary:" The Baltic Cooperation as a whole is *essential* in regional security, *significant* in economy and *strong* in its cultural dimension."[649] In this way the BSC will feed on and contribute to the stabilizing effects of BEAR in the North and vice versa. If formal links are being developed between the two arrangements in the future - which for the time being is not on the political agenda - the stabilizing impact may increase to further benefit the whole of what could be labelled the Baltic-Barents region.
Such a linking of Arctic regionalization and civilianization to European processes of security and cooperation may have a buttressing effect on international stability at large.[650]

By the BSC initiative, Danish authorities have made a real effort to reduce the involvement of military forces in the adjacent areas to Denmark proper. Also in Greenland and her adjacent areas the numbers of armed forces have recently been reduced. On the other hand, armed presence is the only security measure still applying in the region, and the majority of them are flying the American, not the Danish, flag. In this comparative perspective, Greenland and her adjacent areas are further from realizing extended security than is Denmark proper. In this respect, Greenland still upholds a military security posture resembling the one applying during the Cold War, although on a lower level reflecting the island's reduced strategic significance.

It has been pointed out that when the Danes talk about the Arctic they basically refer to Greenland.[651] As discussed in chapter 1, one of the problems of the Arctic is its geographical *segmentation* into national compartments. This national-geographic orientation to devote the bulk of her political energy and resources to her own Arctic territory, is still a basic characteristic

---

[648] See Willy Ostreng:"Organiseringen av den Euro-Arktiske Barentsregionen: Formål, Funksjon og Potensiale, *mimeographed article* to be published in 1996, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1995, 10 pages.

[510] Hans Henrik Bruun: "Dansk udenrikspolitik efter den kolde krig med sFrligt henblik pD Ostersjoperspektivet," *Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek*, nr. 11/1993, Den norske Atlanterhavskomiteen skrifter, p.11. Italicized by this author.

[650] For a discussion of this aspect see Willy Ostreng: "Organiseringen av Den euro-arktiske Barentsregionen: Formål funksjon og potensiale" in Nils Chr. Stenseth & Ingunn B. Lid (eds):*Barentsregionen - Europas spiskammer*, Notam Gyldendal, to be published in 1997 .

[651] Ib Faurby: "Dansk udenrigs-og sikkerhedspolitik i et nyt Europa" in Det kgl. norske utenriksdepartements serie *Aktuelle utenrikssporsmål*, nr. 1/92 - April 1992, p. 30.

of Danish Arctic policy. The effects of the ongoing processes of Arctic *regionalization* seem only to have had a moderate influence on Danish policy formulation for the Arctic as a whole. The statement on Danish foreign policy towards year 2000 referred to above makes this point clear. Of the more than 200 pages long account, in sum no more than a couple of pages deal directly with Arctic affairs in general. The direct Danish interest in the establishment of BEAR is explicitly stated to be "primarily related to Greenland and the Faeroe islands," because both nationalities have fishery rights in the Barents Sea. Therefore, a prime Danish interest is "...to preserve the environment in the area."[652] As a matter of fact, concern for the sustainability of the polar environment is, in general, the single most important issue area attracting the most attention by the Danish government. This became evident in the Danish efforts to relate the severe environmental problems of Russia within BEAR to the Rovaniemi-process and to have them discussed at the Ministerial conference in NUUK in September 1993.[653] Pan-Arctic cooperation to sustain and protect the Arctic environment is a declared objective in Danish foreign policy to be strengthened in the years to come.[654] This priority concurs with Greenlandic interests and should therefore form a fruitful basis for joint policy formulations in the regional context of the North American Arctic. At Nuuk, the Ministers also urged governments to find ways of supporting ICC, RAPON and SC to determine how best to participate in the AEPS. Here the Danish government took an active part and offered to house and finance the establishment of the AEPS Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat in Copenhagen, and consequently, made an important contribution in supporting the on-going pan-Arctic processes of *mobilization* and *civilianization*.[655]

The Danish government has also taken an active stand together with Canada and Norway to give "sustainable utilisation" a key place on the agenda of the Arctic Council. This seems to comply with the operationalization of Inuit sustainable security and with the political message stemming from the experience of Greenland's own APP.

Conclusion

In 1985, Clive Archer concluded a study on Greenland saying that: "The defence issues and the existence of the US installations in Greenland are interwoven into the relationship of the Home Rule authorities and the Danish government and that of the Greenlandic leaders with the Inuits in Canada and Alaska."[656] This conclusion is in essence still valid, but should be broadened by a

---

652 Udenrigsministeriet: Op. cit. p. 83.

653 Ibid. p. 191.

654 Ibid. p. IX.

655 Davis Scrivener: Op. cit. p.18.

656 Clive Archer (1985): Op. cit. p.57.

couple of more post-Cold War developments. First, the strength of the Inuit, or native card in Arctic affairs, organizationally, communicationally and in terms of participating numbers, has been increased due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The gradual inclusion of Russian natives in the management of the Arctic has made ICC, SC, ALS and RAPON more representative forums for exchange of experiences, for pooling of resources and for designing and formulating an Arctic foreign policy articulating the pan-Arctic needs and interests of the indigenous peoples. Thus, this development has provided a strengthened instrument to be applied for the promotion of native interests, Greenlandic included. Second, the Thule card has for the time being weakened due to the decline in the strategic utility of Greenland in international military affairs. Third, the Home Rule Government has gradually acquired more "autonomy" in foreign and security policy dealings.

These developments may in the long run contribute to alter what seem to have been the balancing factors in the traditional interaction pattern between the Danish, Greenlandic and US governments in their tripodal relationship in Greenland: The Home Rule Government has dealt with defence-related issues *sensibly*, the Danish government has shown *sensibility* to Greenlandic needs and the United States has demonstrated *sensitivity* to Inuit traditions.[657] If one of these three S's cannot, for reasons of national interests, be practised in the same manner as before, the interaction structure will change and the tranquillity of regional politics may be disturbed. For the US to continue her sensitivity-policy should be no serious problem given the reduced US presence in the island. The same reasoning goes for the Home Rule Government's possibility to continue its policy vis a vis the US in defence-related issues. The challenge is to the Danish-Greenlandic relationship and how the two governments handle their respective interests in regional politics. A key-variable in this respect appears to be the issue of environmental preservation. If the two parties can act jointly and pool forces within the environmental cooperative structure of Arctic politics, chances are good that the third relationship in the tripod may also develop harmoniously in the years ahead.

The matter of Arctic navigation has been the single most important issue where interests of high politics may clash between regional actors. Elevating environmental preservation to the same level of politics as military and economic affairs may turn out to be a significant achievement for the attainment of common security in regional politics. If so done, the Home Rule Government would prove itself not to be opposed to Arctic navigation on grounds of Inuit traditions. The achievement of common security in the region may best be accomplished by way of civility operationalized in terms of sustainable security to counter the possible harmful effects of senseless large-scale economic activity and Arctic navigation.

---

[657] Ibid. p. 58.

Thus far the two issue-areas of security and environment seem to coexist in a parallel fashion, from time to time orally merged into environmental security, but never in an operationalized way. Here the Danish government are confronted with the same challenge as Norwegian authorities (see chapter 4).

CHAPTER 7

THE NSR IN THE CONTEXT OF ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

By Willy Østreng

The focus of this chapter is on the interrelatedness of regional *environmental cooperation* and *national security* as expressed in the pan-Arctic processes of *regionalization*, *civilianization*, *mobilization* and *reconceptualization of security*. The overall objective is:

I. to assess the political usefulness of the employed conceptualizations on Arctic security and environmental cooperation against the realities of contemporary politics,

II. to discuss the NSR in the context of the former to highlight the route's environmental and security position, character and status in Arctic international relations in general,

III. to assess the challenges of the NSR as a source to promote and enhance a feeling of pan-Arctic community among the various levels of Arctic politics, both vertically within and horizontally between regional states. The core question here is whether the present challenges of the NSR as perceived by regional actors may further and deepen the present regionalization of the Arctic to develop from being a *co-ordinate political region* to a fullfledged *integration region* (see chapter 1).

I. Theoretical Concepts, Political Realities and International Cooperation

At least two requirements should be met to have the political system transform theoretical conceptions into measures of practical utility. **First, the concepts should possess the ability to influence and initiate policy processes**, i.e. to ease and contribute to policy-formulation, make the relevant constituencies aware of policy problems, define policy-direction and objectives and define measures of adequate management and protection of the relevant issue areas. **Second, the application of concepts should be perceived by the main players as useful and necessary for attaining and protecting their own self-interests.** This requirement is closely connected to the first in that it relates the political processes and means of the former to the national goals and objectives of the latter.

To further cooperation between self-interested governments at least one requirement should be met: **They should share a joint conceptual foundation of politics**, i.e. concepts reflecting a *joint political value base* from which concerted actions can be undertaken to deepen and broaden

regional collaboration. If such a foundation is not in place the political tug-of-war may become confrontational, antagonistic, filibustered and/or side-tracked. In anticipation that these three requirements are being met, collaboration will presumably be facilitated further provided they **concur in time and comply in content**; lack of fulfillment of the first will render the second irrelevant; If the first should collide with national interests it will negatively affect the perceptions of decision-makers; if the conceptual basis of politics should differ between the main players it may in itself become the object of political disagreement and conflict etc. In the ensuing discussion, these requirements will be applied to decide on the political utility of the various conceptions of security - environmental, economic, cooperative, common, sustainable etc - that have been employed throughout this book.

Basically, these conceptions are composed of words fitted together from the civil and military spheres, representing a mix of high and low politics, a bridging between realms. In principle, this may cause a cooperative problem. The inherent quality of high politics seems to restrict cooperation or, at best, make it exclusive to a restricted number of like-minded countries, whilst low politics more easily attracts pragmatic cooperation, even across gulfs of political competition and differences. In other words: High politics attracts *exclusive cooperation*, low politics *inclusive cooperation* (see figure 3). In principle, the fitting of words introduced here, implies that cooperative restrictions are being imposed on low politics, which in itself stimulates cooperation, and collaborative possibilities are being added to high politics, which in itself has a restrictive effect on cooperation. This poses the question: How will this conceptual fit of words relate to contemporary political realities and affect the cooperative mood of regional governments in Arctic relations ? Or put differently: Will regional cooperation benefit or lose out by fitting together spheres of conflicting qualities when it comes to cooperation ?

The Fit of Words in Northern Politics

In the case of Canadian politics, Franklyn Griffiths states that there is "no natural fit between the three words "environment," "security" and "Arctic."[658] Those words make up the prime focus of this study, which, at the outset, compels us to address the following question: What is the fit between the same three words in the policies of the other Arctic states?

At one end of a continuum-of-fit is the Norwegian government with a declared intention to interlink tightly the three words in the implemention of its extended security policy. Canada, not acknowledging the fit in any salient way, assumes the opposite position of Norway, closely followed by the United States which flatly refutes any fit between the two first words (security and environment), but accepts the linkage between security and Arctic, and environment and

[658] The citation is taken from Franklyn Griffiths, Chapter 3 in this volume.

Arctic. The Danish government, at least at the rhetorical level, assumes a position close to that of Norway, opting for a close fit between all three words, whilst the policy of the Greenlandic Home Rule government, nourished by Inuit tradition, opts for total integration in terms of *what* could be labelled sustainable security. The Soviet Union had a long tradition to relate the second and the third words - security and Arctic. The environment, strongly emphasized in the security doctrine of President Michail Gorbachev, is still being tossed around and played with by representatives of the new Russian regime, but in a manner apparently more loose and uncommited than in the heyday of the Murmansk-programme. The uncertainties and variations in policy when it comes to this triangular fit of words make the conceptual foundation of Arctic politics a most dubious one. Arctic governments seem partly to have developed different approaches and policies (Norway and USA), partly to overlook the connections (Canada), partly to pay lip service to the total fit (Russia) and partly to pursue a policy of fit, primarily to accommodate the interests of one particular segment of the region - Greenland (Denmark). The varying fit of words between the policies of Arctic states, is a mere reflection of the diversity of security perceptions and realities confronting the same states in the region.

From the point of view of the two big Arctic states, security in the North has for the last twenty years remained firmly *unidimensional*, restricted basically to securing the balance of terror. Apart from the military procurement necessary to sustain and support strategic deterrence, the bulk of Arctic territories have, with the sole exception of the Kola peninsula, been exempted from deployment of heavy conventional weaponry. To secure own nuclear military interests in the North, the United States has taken upon itself the main responsibility to defend Greenland.[659] The sandwiched position of Canada as a buffer in between the two big Arctic states makes it a safe bet to assume that Washington will come to the rescue of Canada in the event of the northern provinces being threatened by foreign invasion. This is why Denmark and Canada lack any tradition of framing their vital national security needs - restricted or extended - in the context of the North[660]. Thus, for the majority of Arctic states, *wider* purposes of military security have never been fulfilled in and from the Arctic. For these states the Arctic has remained a region very much marginalized in national security deliberations. Among the small regional states, Norway is the sole exception to this rule. Her security policy has long both been extended to comprise a bundle of issue areas, and has for more than fifty years been rooted in Arctic military and political realities as reflected in the *Overall Regional Security Regime* (ORSR) of the Barents quadrangle (Svalbard, Kola peninsula, Barents Sea and North Norway). Thus, the Arctic states differ both in their policy fit between the three words and in their security attachments, dependence and approaches to the Arctic. This further underscores the diversity when it comes to their conceptual foundation of politics.

---

[659] See Willy Østreng, Chapter 6 in this volume.

[660] This also goes for Sweden, Finland and Iceland.

On the other hand, this diversity does not - possibly with the exception of the United States - come across as based on rigorous, unchangeable national positions - stands of firm political commitment and conviction. Three out of five national governments actually acknowledge the fit (Norway, Russia and Denmark/Greenland), one ignores it (Canada) and one partly rejects it (USA). At the present time in most countries, the formulation of Arctic security policy is basically the responsibility of low- and mid-level bureaucrats and hired independent experts. Arctic politics is still waiting for high-level political decision-makers to enter the stage of policy-formation on a lasting basis. In this perspective, no political prestige of significance has been invested in policy formation in any of the Arctic countries, including the USA, which like the rest of the Arctic states lacks the "benefit of active political guidance."[661] This gives some leeway for policy change in most states. Thus, a political potential exists which, in due time, may work to close the pre-existing policy gaps and uncertainties of the conceptual foundation of regional politics. At present, Arctic politics are in a formative stage. In principle, most courses of developments are still conceivable. Much will depend on the ability, willingness and leverage of Arctic governments to develop mutual compliance when it comes to their conceptual foundation of politics. A fresh example highlights the potential at hand: The idea of an Arctic Council first came to fruition and implementation after a period of gradual harmonization of the conceptual foundations of politics between those Arctic states in favour of an establishment and the United States which initially repudiated it on grounds of security and sovereignty. Equally important: The idea received its most fresh impetus when the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien and President Bill Clinton "jointly entered the stage of decision" during a meeting in February 1995 when issuing a joint statement endorsing the establishment of the Arctic Council as soon as possible.[662]

The concept of extended security which in most instances includes environmental concerns is not in general a contentious issue between the Arctic states. The concept has actually been chosen by all governments as a basic parameter in their overall security posture, assuming it to meet the security needs of the 1990s, rating environmental degradation one of the main civil hazards to national well-being. The United States, which in principle, has resorted to extended security ever since 1945, is not denying the utility of the concept as such.[663] What the US Department of Defence does is to put down its foot when foreign governments propose merging military security with environmental considerations and applying the conceptual result: environmental security, to *the Arctic*. It is the Arctic application, not the overall usefulness of the

---

661 See Franklyn Griffiths, Chapter 5.

662 Oran Young: "The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations." *A Twentieth Century Fund Report*, New York, 1996, p. 9.

663 See Franklyn Griffiths, Chapter 5 in this volume .

conceptual construction that is opposed by US authorities. As pointed out by Griffiths, Washington's current problem in the North is "...requests from other Arctic states for multilateral civil collaboration for which the US had and continues to have little appetite."[664] The Department of Defence (DOD) - being the main US player in national policy formation - guards against commitments that may serve to impede the free movement of submarines, in Arctic Seas as well as in any of the world oceans. In a worst case scenario, the fragility of the Arctic bioregion may be used to call for extraordinary measures of environmental protection which may collide with this supreme military objective. Thus, the environmental uniqueness of the Arctic makes the region a *special* case in US military planning - a case calling for deviations in her overall policy of extended security. The crux of the matter is to preserve as many military options as possible. Simply stated: As a policy approach, securitification of the environment is not regarded by DOD as the preferred policy foundation upon which to promote American self-interests. Thus, in order to attract full US participation in Arctic cooperation, two corrections seem imperative in the conceptual foundation of regional politics: Environment and security should remain separate and multinational cooperation should be restricted to civil issue areas not relating to questions of security and jurisdictional matters. In the US perspective, security in the Arctic is not part of the ongoing process of regionalization - it is the exclusive domain of individual governments. Any scheme making US security interests in the region a multinational, cooperative concern violates the conceptual foundation of US Arctic politics. If no adjustments are made to accommodate US interests in the joint foundation of Arctic politics, the likelihood of "moving the United States to greater pro-action and leadership in Arctic cooperation"[665] seems slim. The need is to replace the notion of "environmental security" with the separate notions of "environment and security."

Environmental Security and Arctic Security

The inherent dramatic quality of the security concept when applied to the field of the environment has made polities, politicians and the general public at large more alert and attentive when it comes to the threatening aspects of a malfunctioning environment. The possibility that the environment may not only feed and sustain humanity, but also endanger its well-being has enhanced the issue area to a high level of political and public attention. In this respect, analysts and politicians alike have elevated it to become part of *high politics*, assuming that a healthily functioning environment is to be given equal importance as the need to protect national territorial integrity from external military aggression. The fitting of the two words has thus had both an *educational effect* on politicians and their constituencies, and a *political effect* in that "threat scenarios" possess the quality to promote political actions in terms of policy

664 Ibid.

665 Ibid.

formulation and definition of policy objectives. In this respect, the concept of environmental security satisfies the requirement to initiate and influence policy processes.

On the other hand, including under security civil issue areas presents problems in three different respects. First, by lumping together issue areas of different cooperative qualities from the civil and military sectors, most of politics is becoming security policy, and an increasing number of ministries are becoming security ministries, implying that the "magic circle of security"[666] is being penetrated and/or opened up to fields of low politics alien to, and possessing qualities challenging the traditional functioning of, high politics. As a consequence, civil issues become more complex and harder to coordinate between multiple ministries and to use as an object to foster and promote international cooperation.

Second, being part of high politics may also imply a "nationalization" rendering civil issue areas less congenial to international cooperation. The securification process thus may run counter to what was the original objective: *to stimulate cooperation in the field of security*. The choice is either to cooperate in a "nationalistic" field (security) or to "nationalize" a cooperative field (environment). Either of these alternatives is suboptimal. Little is gained, and international cooperation may lose out. The blending of high politics, which attracts exclusive cooperation, with low politics , which attracts inclusive cooperation, will increase the level of unpredictability and uncertainty in cooperative politics. The US position in the Arctic reflects this acknowledgment, but its embracement of extended security in its general security posture shows that Washington like the rest of the Arctic governments has failed in general to take stock of this dilemma (for a refinement of this point see below).

Third, in order to rate a political challenge a threat to the well-being of nations, the requirement is that it possesses dramatic proportions extending far beyond the challenges of everyday politics. It has to be exceptional in its manifestation and farreaching in its consequences. In the field of the environment such threats are being perceived: global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, sea level rise etc. As shown in the introductory chapter these are all Arctic-related threats. However, when it comes to environmental security, no one has as yet identified immediately workable *measures of adequate protection* to guard against threats of this kind. As long as no effective supranational structures to act on behalf of all exist to sustain the ecosystem, national interests may continue to block for concerted effective actions.[667] At present, the call

---

666 Iver B. Neumann and Ståle Ulriksen: "Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk," in Torbjørn Knudsen, Gunnar M. Sørbø & Svein Gjerdåker(eds): *Norges utenrikspolitikk*, Cappelen, Oslo/Bergen, 1995, p. 102.

667 For a more thorough discussion of this aspect see: Steinar Andresen and Jørgen Wettestad: "International Problem-Solving Effectiveness. The Oslo Project Story So Far," in *International Environmental Affairs. A Journal for Research and Policy*, vol. 7, no. 7, Spring 1995, pp. 127-149.

for pooling of resources to save the environment is no more than a mere reflection of the sad fact that national governments lack sufficient measures to ensure adequate protection and management. It mirrors the handicaps of the state-driven anarchical international system, which is the preferred system of governments because it safeguards their claims to territorial sovereignty.[668] As long as the basic mechanisms of this system are intact, tailing security to environment will be nothing but an act of pure semantics. The only achievement of this rhetorical trick is to enhance the public and political awareness of the environment as a potential threat to national well-being. This in itself is important, but in no way sufficient to withstand the detrimental effects of a malfunctioning environment against human societies. A lack of sufficient measures may pave the way for those suffering negative environmental effects caused by others to resort to the "traditional means of security," weapons and military violence, to punish the violater. The result of such a development will be more human suffering and environmental degradation as well as contributing to flareup more discontent with security policy than would otherwise have been the case.[669] In most instances of international conflict, and not least in relation to the preservation of the environment, the use of physical power and the waging of war are most undesirable developments in themselves and consequently not adequate measures of protection. Apart from armed force and economic sanctions, new protective measures to prevent environmental catastrophe have not yet been operationalized and put to function in real-life politics. The concept of security concerns the ultimate values and core interests of national politics in its claim for priority over all other issue areas in government attention. By extending the concept of security beyond military and economic affairs, more issue areas get their status and prominence elevated from low to high politics but without possessing what really counts in national survival: *issue-specific measures of an exceptionally protective character*. Environmental security possesses the political attention of high politics but only the measures of protection characteristic of low politics. The status of environmental security in national and international politics is thus ranked in between low and high politics, but closer to low than high due to lack of issue-specific measures of exceptional protection. If the concept of environmental security should prevail in national and international dealings, the only reason to attain it is that it gives higher priority to the issue area. This, however, could be achieved by simply labelling it environmental politics. That is what it is, as long as low politics in no way automatically implies low political priority. In most western countries health and medicare is a high priority issue without ever having been defined as an issue of high politics. Political priorities - low as well as high - apply indiscriminately to both spheres - the military as well as the civil.

---

668 Barry Buzan: *People, States and Fear* Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991 Second edition.

669 Ibid.

This discussion shows that the concept of environmental security does not in its entirety comply with all the aspects of the three requirements discussed above. The concept of environmental security is not part of the regional conceptual foundation of politics, it lacks in promoting the self-interests of a major player and is inadequate when it comes to providing issue-specific measures of an exceptionally protective character. In sum, the concept possesses some of the qualities necessary to make it convert into a measure of practical utility. The real debate among Arctic political actors at all levels is about the relative merits of "environmental protection" and "sustainable development" as organizing discourses. "National security" is simply left out of the political discussion, both as an object of cooperative endeavours and in relation to environmental protection. Thus, in the Arctic the concept of environmental security is more of an impediment than a catalyst to further international cooperation in terms of regionalization, transnationalization, civilianization and mobilization. This, however, is not to say that cooperation cannot be achieved in the field of security. What we are saying is that cooperation is probably not being promoted by bridging the civil and military sector in conceptualizations like environmental security. Cooperation within the field of security will most effectively be promoted by relying exclusively on the cooperative qualities inherent in the security field itself - cooperative exclusiveness (see above).

Comprehensive and Extended Security and the Arctic

At the present time, most Arctic governments officially base their overall policy on a broadened concept of security to comprise military as well as non-military issue areas - to meet a vast array of threats. This widening of security is either called extended, comprehensive or both, and the two forms are most often used pell-mell as synonyms. The present behaviour of governments in this respect is one of random pick rather than conscious choice. What matters and what has come to the forefront in the minds of governments, is obviously not the preciseness of concepts and the intricacies related to the interdependencies of the various security elements, but the need to signal preparedness to adjust their policies to meet the fresh multiplicities of post-Cold War security risks. In this perspective, either of the two concepts will do. Franklyn Griffiths states: "As of the mid-90's, Canadians speak with varying degrees of knowledgeability and frequency about civil, collective, common, comprehensive, cooperative, cultural, demographic, ecological, economic, energy, food, global, human, military, national, personal, political, regional, shared and subregional as well as environmental security. A security perspective on the environment evidently requires us to consider the environment as one of many but as yet unspecified interdependent variables whose interconnections are still to be determined." This is a reasonable account of the present state of affairs of knowledgeability not only in Canada, but in all Arctic countries. At present there is a fair amount of conceptual confusion in need of clarification.

Environmental security is often associated with and incorporated in the broader concepts of extended and comprehensive security, both of which string military and civil issue areas into a

composite whole. In this manner they act as synonyms. But there are semantic differences as well. According to *Merriam Webster's New International Dictionary* the concept of comprehensiveness has a wide grasp embracing issue areas covering the totality of attributes that make up a notion signified by a general term, whilst the concept of extension constitutes issue areas that may be thought of as similar in some respects. Thus, comprehensiveness covers all matters of a given type completely or nearly completely, whilst extensiveness covers a matter in a linear and horizontal fashion, a joining of equals. If we apply these semantic differences to the field of security, the two concepts are different in the way they link the issue areas of the two spheres of security together. Whilst extended security exclusively relates issue areas of high priority possessing measures of exceptional protection (peer issue areas), comprehensive security is composed of issue areas of mixed origin assigned a security function and possessing measures of both exceptional and ordinary protection and management (mixed issue areas). Military and economic security both possess measures of extraordinary deterrence and protection (armed forces and economic boycott/embargo), and in times of strained conflicts they are used actively or passively in an orchestrated and integrated manner. In comprehensive security, military and economic issue areas make up the core of security buttressed as it is with an ever thickening coating of civil issue areas building interdependence between potential adversaries. In this way civil issue-areas assigned a high security priority, for instance environmental security, link up to and support the functions of core security: "A thickening web of common interest and collaboration is to choke the way to war. Ultimately it is to lead to community."[670] Thus, all civil issue areas possessing extraordinary measures of protection and assigned a high security priority are automatically transformed from low to high politics by moving from the *composite coating* to the *integrated core* of comprehensive security. The integrated core is what should be labelled extended security and the sum of the composite coating and the integrated core is comprehensive security. In this way, the concept of environmental security only makes sense when put in the context of comprehensive security, which by definition is a *mix of issue areas* from both spheres of human interaction. In terms of number of issue areas assigned a security function, no conceptualization is wider or more extensive than comprehensive security (see figure 1). What is the relevance of this distinction in Arctic international relations and how does it affect the potential for further cooperation?

Security and Cooperation in the Arctic?

The Murmansk programme made an implicit distinction between military and civil security.[671] This distinction is close, if not identical, to the distinction made between the core and coating of comprehensive security. The only difference between the two sets of concepts is that the core of

[670] Franklyn Griffiths, Chapter 3 in this volume.

[671] For a discussion of this distinction see Willy Østreng, Chapter 1 in this volume.

Figure 1: Comprehensive and Extended Security.



comprehensive security is composed of both military and civil issue (economy) areas (for a discussion of the cooperative implication of this mix of issue areas, see below) (see figure 2). However, when subsequently referring to civil security we will, for the sake of simplicity, exclusively address the civil issue areas of the coating and omit the civil issue area of the core.

The Cold War showed that military security was less than congenial to attract cooperation in the Arctic. Rather it created segmentation and marginalization.[672] The political values behind the Murmansk-programme reversed this situation. The implication of this seems to be that the civil sphere, or civil security, seeks, on its own premises, to build civil interdependence across borders. In this way civil security will interlink and pool resources with military security to buttress against the outbreak of war and violent conflict. Civil security is the thickening coating of non-military interdependence which builds around the core of military security. As the civil coating grows in thickness, the likelihood of resorting to military means to safeguard security diminishes. Thus, the separation between civil and military security in comprehensive security is not a call for delinkage but for disintegration between the two spheres. This implies that the two issue areas of the core (extended security) are so tightly interlinked that their individual cooperative properties more easily blend together. The slow pace of economic cooperation in the Russian North where the military is gradually regaining some of its former influence may be one example of this blending of properties. Comprehensive security in its turn seems to allow the issue-specific properties of each sphere to act with little or no interference from the other in such a way as to make optimal individual contributions to security, be they military or civil.

[672] For these concepts see Willy Østreng, Chapter 1 in this volume.

Figure 2: Civil and Military Security.



Comprehensive security seems to have the ability to enhance both military and civil security based as it is on the premise of extracting the fullest cooperative potential from individual spheres. Comprehensive security thus seems to further regionalization, mobilization and civilianization in both spheres of human interaction within the framework of their individual abilities and properties (see figure 3). The question is if this is just a theoretical reasoning or something to be traced in actual politics?

The establishment of the Arctic Council (AC) may serve to illustrate these conceptual distinctions or the reconceptualization of Arctic security as manifested in the Murmansk-programme. In the Declaration on the establishment of the AC, the Council is rated a "high level forum" to provide means for promoting cooperation "on common Arctic issues," with the explicit exception of matters related to military security.[673] The most common of the issues in Arctic regionalization is environmental cooperation, which is also the prevalent object of cooperation under the Arctic Council.[674] The implication of the Declaration is that the environment is only legitimate as an object of cooperation in its civil version, not as an object of security. Thus, to the AC-parties, environmental security is not a workable scheme or concept to promote cooperation as it is based on a *mix of spheres* and not on *issue-specific spheres*. If the conceptual foundation of regional politics is being defined on the basis of the Council Declaration alone, environmental security is no longer the basis for concerted cooperative action

673 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council," point 1, in *Arctic Bulletin*, WWF, no. 4, 1996, p. 4.

674 For a discussion of this aspect see Willy Østreng, Chapter 1 in this volume.

among the Arctic states. Comprehensive security, as defined here, is the security agenda indirectly designed for the Arctic in the AC-Declaration. This is, by implication, also what indirectly can be accepted by the United States. Washington's repudiation of environmental security in the region, indicates that US security policy in the region is restricted to military matters only. Here the security policy of the majority of regional states clashes with the fundamental orientation of that of the superpower. In practice, however, comprehensive security, defined as *linked separation* of military and civil issue areas, is the common denominator and the regional code of security building in the Arctic. The AC-Declaration proves the point. If the military and civil spheres are allowed to coexist in parallel in the region and to function according to their individual cooperative qualities, the civil component of comprehensive security will grow and become the common denominator of pan-Arctic security. Thus, the distinction between the core and coating of comprehensive security and/or between military and civil security, comes across as a necessary, if not sufficient, precondition for continued security-building in the civil sphere, irrespective of the quality of military cooperation in the region. In this respect, the United States has got it her way, as has the Murmansk-programme, and as has the expressed interest of all parties to promote regional cooperation. If the parties back away from making this conceptual dispute a problem beyond principles, political practice will continue to build civil security. In this way the conceptual dispute may be toned down and the effects on the conceptual foundation of regional politics may be contained as a flurry on semantics. In politics, concepts count, but practice decides. As was stated in the Canadian *Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade* in April 1997: "...there may be ways of drawing the United States into some discussions involving security questions without publicly saying that's what is happening."[675] This makes the connection to concepts like collective, common, cooperative and shared security.

Common Security and the Security Posture of Arctic States

Those are all useful conceptions as they either point to political processes (i.e.cooperative security) or to political objectives (i.e.common security) and can be applied to both spheres - the civil and military - and both types of security - extended and comprehensive. They tell you where to go, how to get there and what to do. At the same time they add one more important dimension to the discussion concerning what levels of politics are involved in security formulation: Apart from addressing the level of governments and the cooperative relationship between states, they also include non-governmental actors - individuals, local communities, native peoples etc. These conceptions are all-embracing when it comes to actors and policy

---

[675] *Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century*, Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Bill Graham, M. Chair, Second Session of the Thirty-fifth Parliament, Ottawa, *1997*, pp.78-79.

Figure 3: Inclusive and Exclusive Cooperative Security in Comprehensive Security.



levels, as comprehensive security is all-embracing when it comes to issue areas. Thus, comprehensive security depends on common security to involve all the actors and policy levels necessary to build and have the core and coating of security to interact - to provide for civil and military security. By so doing, these conceptions are of particular significance to the process of regionalization and, although to a lesser degree, to civilianization of regional politics. In addition they may prove to be necessary preconditions to further civility in military and economic utilization of the Arctic.[676] The question is whether these interrelationships and the need for multilateral collaboration are clearly acknowledged, understood and reflected in the security postures of the Arctic states, individually and as a group.

Judged from the political statements and rhetoric of most Arctic governments, a positive attitude towards international cooperation seems to be part of their respective security-thinking. On one end of the continuum Denmark is explicitly stating common security as its first priority foreign policy goal towards the year 2000. At the opposite end is the United States flatly refuting any cooperative element in regional security. Canada is close to the Danish position having throughout the post-World War II period submitted to collective security, which in the mid-1990's was supplemented with a cooperative and common security approach. The Russian position is one of uncertainty. Currently it is very difficult to identify consensus as to the definition and the components of national security, either among the Russian population in general or within government circles.[677] Nevertheless, the policy seems to be one of

[676] For a definition of civility see Willy Østreng, Introductory chapter in this volume.

[677] Raphael Vartanov, Alexei Roginko and Vladimir Kolossov, Chapter 2 in this volume.

Figure 4: Cooperative Security and Levels of Political Participation.



comprehensiveness "combining not only military-strategic, but also economic, environmental and cultural, internal and external components."[678] As pointed out in chapter 2, this policy is a product of a long evolution of political thinking and a compromise between the interests of a wide spectrum of political forces. It seems, however, to be based on the fundamental premises and reasoning behind the Murmansk-programme. In this respect the crux of Russian security policy seems to be one of fair stability. The Norwegian security position is undoubtedly one of cooperation, but in recent political statements more emphasis has been placed on comprehensive than cooperative security. At present this emphasis is solely a matter of taste and conceptual uncertainty. The Norwegian initiative to establish the BEAR is a fresh example of this. Norway thus groups together with Denmark and Canada on the cooperative side of the continuum.

As a whole the Arctic states lean heavily towards cooperation as a measure in regional security building. The only policy explicitly deviating from this pattern is that of the U.S. However, what the United States lacks in cooperative willingness in security matters, is made up for in its recent urge to intensify cooperation in the environmental field. This attitude will, by implication, contribute indirectly to the strengthening of the civil components of comprehensive security.

In what way will these concepts and overall security postures relate to and affect the utilization of the NSR?

---

[678] Ibid.

II. The Environmental and Security Position of the NSR

Until recently, none of the Arctic states, apart from the Soviet Union, paid much *political*, economic or strategic attention to the NSR, either to its existence or to its geopolitical potential. The beginning of the 1990's, however, saw some radical changes in the traditional pattern of NSR *usage, cooperation* and *organization.*

The New Pattern of NSR Usage

The pattern of usage changed as a consequence of two incidents: the Murmansk-programme, which paved the way to applying comprehensive security to the route by the implicit distinctions made between civil and military security, and the opening of the NSR to international shipping in July 1991. From 1989 to 1993 transit shipments along the Siberian coast increased by more than 270 percent, and from 1991 to 1993 by 18 percent. At the same time the number of foreign ships negotiating the route multiplied many times. This startling increase in percentage disguised the fact that the volumes of cargo and number of ships were extremely small from the outset; It is the increase from zero to one that makes the difference. In 1989 the volume of transit cargo was 55.2 thousand tons as compared to 208 thousand tons in 1993. The number of foreign ships making use of the Russian offer totalled some 15 vessels and the majority flew the flag of countries other than the Arctic five. Here, a note of caution not to jump to drastic conclusions seems appropriate.

Apart from the Russian Federation, no country possesses a fleet of ice-strengthened vessels satisfying the requirements to sail in ice-infested waters. The bulk of Western fleets have been designed to navigate the blue not the white oceans. On this backdrop, it would have been overly unrealistic to expect a sharp increase in foreign usage of the NSR after the opening in the 1990's. Thus, the present pattern of usage is not a sufficient criterion to say anything definite about the international, or for that matter circumpolar, interest in the NSR. More criteria are required.

The New Pattern of NSR Cooperation

The new cooperative pattern of NSR matters is reflected in the quality of the bureaucratic implementation of making the NSR available to foreign shipping. At present, two aspects should be noted: First, the ability of the Russian bureaucracy to provide efficient services to foreign shipowners wishing to avail themselves of the offer; second, the bureaucratic ability to make the route available for international research collaboration of relevance to the implementation of the new NSR-policy.

The few shipowners that have taken the Russians up on their offer, often complain about bureaucratic red tape in obtaining the necessary permissions and go-aheads. The oral complaints concern inefficiency in paperwork, lack of commitment, long delays for obscure reasons, lack of response etc. Summed up, the foreign perception is that the bureaucracy lags behind what are the requirements of efficient shipping. Apart from red tape, this inefficiency, may also reflect internal politics and the jockeying for positions between the military and economic sectors competing to increase own political influence. In terms of comprehensive security, it may reflect the blending effect of high and low politics (cooperative exclusiveness and inclusiveness) of two sectors battling to promote their interests in one and the same waters. If so, the lack of bureaucratic efficiency is not necessarily an expression of exclusiveness or lack of cooperative willingness, but rather the paralyzing effect of internal politics. Whatever the reason, much remains to be achieved in organizational and bureaucratic efficiency before this route is a viable means of transportation for western shipping interests.

In the field of scientific research, the experiences of *the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP)* may serve as an example of the new policy. INSROP is the only research programme thus far involving a multiplicity of research topics, including security and environmental matters, and a great number of scientists from several countries, directed explicitly towards the regional challenges of increased shipping along the NSR.[679] In this connection the route is an object of cooperative security to build civil security in an area long deprived of East-West interdependencies. As of the end of the 1990s, INSROP has not required field-research along the route, only access to Russian data, which has not been an easy task or without its stumbling blocks and delays in delivery, though to a restricted extent, data has been provided to benefit the programme. The policy of data restrictions relates to security. As stated by Vartanov, Roginko and Kolossov: "Opportunities opening up with the use of the NSR as an international passage challenge the security thinking process in Russia." [680] On the one hand they point out that INSROP as such may produce significant economic benefits for Russia as a transit country and as such may contribute effectively to the strengthening of its *economic security*. On the other hand they report that contrary to their own viewpoints, some Russian experts hold the view that INSROP may jeopardize Russia's *military security* due to massive infiltration of foreigners to strategically important and sensitive parts of the Russian Arctic. Here scientific cooperation in the perception of some Russian analysts interferes negatively with the goal attainment of the military establishment. Economic and military security are in conflict. The likelihood is that the same cleavages in viewpoints are represented within the Russian political system. The implication of this is twofold: First, cooperation is best served if issue areas are allowed to play on their individual abilities to contribute to international cooperation,

---

679 See Willy Østreng, Introductory Chapter in this volume.

680 See Raphael Vartanov, Alexei Roginko and Vladimir Kolossov, Chapter 2 in this volume.

Figure 5: The NSR and Comprehensive Security at present.



i.e. cooperation should be *issue-specific* in order to succeed to the fullest of its capacity. In other words: Cooperation in matters of high politics should be based on the principle of exclusiveness and in low politics on the principle of inclusiveness (see figures 3 and 4). A blending of the two principles is more likely to create suspicion and uncertainty than improved conditions for cooperation in either of the spheres. Second, even if cooperation is based on issue specificity, spill-over effects may penetrate from the coating to the core of comprehensive security. These effects can probably not be entirely avoided - at least not among interrelated issue areas that either benefit from or are harmed by the activities of the other - but they should be included as part of planning to minimize any negative influence they may have on cooperation. Since the NSR relates so heavily to the economy of Russia, the Route has a mixed affiliation both with the core and coating of comprehensive security. In the core it blends and mixes with military interests and as part of the coating it interacts with the core. This may explain why NSR-developments only drag along. However, as evidenced in chapter 1, the NSR has never taken on any great military/strategic importance as a link between the Pacific and the Atlantic. Therefore, chances are reasonably good that the perceptional military Cold War-grip on the Route will gradually loosen. If this happens the NSR will belong more clearly to the coating of comprehensive security, and consequently, may take on a more inclusive cooperative posture (see figure 5).

These problems, notwithstanding, the Russian partner of INSROP has decided to go on with the programme for two more years to fulfill its overall purpose: *to provide a multidisciplinary knowledge base from which governmental organizations, private enterprises and international*

organizations can extract scientific insight for the sake of rational decisions.[681] And most importantly: This base is open for usage for whoever needs it. Less than ten years ago all Russian publications about any Arctic-related issue were subject to special and heavy censorship procedures.[682]

On this backdrop, what can be concluded is that the civil sector is more independent of the military field than ever, and that there is no automatic subordination of the former to the latter. For the time being, the two spheres coexist, partly in conflict partly in harmony, in the NSR. The area of the Arctic most secluded during the Cold War, is now subjected to the practice of comprehensive and cooperative security by Russian authorities. Due to the novelty of this process, setbacks to this practice can not be excluded in the future.

The New Pattern of NSR Organization

The new organizational aspects of the route, saw the first light of day with the establishment of the Northern Forum (NF) in 1991 and subsequently with the Euro-Arctic Barents Region (BEAR) in 1993. During the Cold War any foreign involvement potentially threatening the sovereignty and utilization scheme of the Soviet Union, was strongly opposed by the authorities.[683]. Its management and usage was the exclusive concern and obligation of the USSR. It still is, but the usage of the route became an object of international discussion and attention in the 1990's. Among the priority topics identified by the founders of the NF was the NSR. The level of regional governments set this priority on behalf of all the counties bordering the shores of the Arctic Ocean. And it remained a priority issue until 1996, when it was suddenly dropped as a topic of short and medium term interest and omitted from the working agenda of the NF. The NF found that the NSR was no longer an issue area calling for immediate pragmatic action; it was removed as a priority issue to further Arctic regionalization and civilianization, and waitlisted as a topic to build civil security.

The other organization to adopt the NSR as an issue area of cooperation was BEAR. The *Working group on the NSR* under the Barents Council - the intergovernmental body of the Barents cooperation - is the venue of deliberations.[684] Apart from being an integral part of the organizational structure of BEAR, the Committee work on NSR matters has been below

---

681 Willy Østreng: "INSROP: A Multi-and Crossdisiplinary Challenge" in *The INSROP Newsletter*, issue no. 3, Vol 2, December 1994, p.1.

682 See Vartanov, Roginko, Kolossov: Op. cit, Chapter 2 in this volume.

683 See Willy Østreng, Introductory Chapter, and Vartanov, Roginko and Kolossov: Op. cit. in this volume.

684 See Willy Østreng, Chapter 4 in this volume.

expectations. Indications are that the level of engagement, knowledge, initiative, financial appropriations and leadership is scant among the participants, and many, in informal settings, even question the Committee's very existence. Undoubtedly, the present role of the NSR *within* the BEAR organizational structure is one of low priority and little functional urgency.

In sum, the significance of including the NSR in the environmental and scientific bodies of Arctic regionalization is small at best and at worst virtually nil. As time has passed, the tendency has been either to drop it from the political agenda (NF) or to play it down in priority (BEAR). The pattern has been, first: enthusiastic embrace by the relevant bodies, second: pragmatic downplaying of significance. Franklyn Griffiths states in the case of Canada that: "...hardly anyone... is thinking about the use of Russia's Arctic waters for bulk transit between Europe and the Far East or, for that matter, between the Russian North and Western Europe."[685] The last part of this sentence may be valid for Canada, but not in the boardrooms of western oil companies involved in oil and gas prospecting and development in the European part of the Russian North. For them the NSR stands out as one viable alternative to resolve the challenge of transportation. There are also some differences of opinion and interest between the Arctic governments in NSR matters, both in the context of security and environmental preservation.

All Arctic states have been confronted with the question of Arctic navigation. As such they are not totally unfamiliar with the problematique. Grouped along a continuum of interest, Russia occupies the one extreme end, designating great strategic and economic significance to the NSR. At the opposite end are Canada and the United States with no material or strategic interest for the route apart from the question of its status in international law. Their main attachment to Arctic navigation is through their clash over the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Somewhat closer to the Russian position, but at the American side of the center of the continuum, is the Norwegian government, which has been financially and politically supportive of the INSROP-programme and most instrumental in the establishment of the BEAR. Geographic position also makes Norwegian territory the westernmost gateway to the Northeast Passage. The Danish government has like its Canadian and American counterparts no expressed policy when it comes to the NSR. Through its exposure to the question of Arctic navigation - the two versions of the Arctic Pilot Projects (APP) - and participation in the Barents Council and political sensitivity to Greenlandic needs, Denmark probably belongs in between Norway and the North American position on the continuum. Thus, the continuum leans heavily towards non-engagement, both when it comes to security and environmental protection. Apart from Russia, the environmental concerns among regional states are pan-Arctic in orientation, not NSR-specific. This also goes for security. None of the Arctic states pay much attention to the security potential of the NSR. The combination of deeply extending ice and the shallowness of the shelf

685 See Franklyn Griffiths, Chapter 3 in this volume.

make the route a worthless waterway for naval projection of power and/or for rebasing. The only coastal waters of Russia stirring an interest of pan-Arctic scope is the Barents Sea, which, strictly speaking, is not part of the NSR, but the home waters of the Northern Fleet.

To sum up, the present pattern of NSR usage, cooperation and organization are new to the Arctic. The security thinking has also undergone a change from integrated and hegemonic to comprehensive and cooperative security. This, however, is not sufficient to influence much surrounding the route's status and position in circumpolar relations. In the perception of most Arctic states, the environmental and security challenges of the NSR are too futuristic in character to attract their immediate and serious attention. The NSR also lacks the ability to initiate and influence policy processes domestically in the other Arctic countries. Neither is the route deemed useful or even necessary for protecting the national self-interests of these states. The environmental and security position of the NSR is thus one of absolute marginality in Arctic international relations.

III. The NSR's Capacity to Build a Pan-Arctic Feeling of Community

Here we will assess the challenges of the NSR as a source to promote and enhance a feeling of pan-Arctic community among the various levels of Arctic politics. More specifically the levels to be addressed are those of central government - international relations -, regional governments - transregional relations - indigenous government - transcultural relations.

Level of Government - International Relations

The increasingly peripheral position of the NSR in the cooperative structure of Arctic international relations and civilianization make this conclusion unavoidable: In a short and medium term perspective, the NSR will not become the prime dynamo to further either the case of the environment or a pan-Arctic feeling of community among regional states, not to say move the region from a co-ordinate to an integration region. There are several reasons for this. As stated above, the NSR is neither important to the fulfilment of national self-interests nor has it the ability to influence domestic politics in any of the other Arctic states. NSR activities have not as yet caused any environmental problems deemed serious to the well-being of other circumpolar states. As such the NSR remains on the waiting-list to assume a priority position on the pan-Arctic political agenda of governments. Furthermore, this situation has been nourished by developments. In the last five years a substantial reduction of atmospheric emissions has taken place across the whole of the Russian North. Even if these reductions are solely attributable to a decline in industrial production and, in fact have been occurring at a slower rate than before, they are not likely to sound governmental alarm bells outside Russia.[686] In light of

[686] See Vartanov, Roginko and Kolossov: Op. cit.

this fact, the perspective that activities within the land, ocean and river areas of the NSR rectangle[687] may bring the Arctic bioregion into imbalance is not at all a question of political mention or worry. The fact that the volume of cargo and shipping has gone down and not up only contributes to underscore the correctness of this attitude. For the time being the NSR simply lacks the level of environmental urgency to be adopted as an issue to foster and further a pan-Arctic feeling of environmental community. Or to put it in terms of environmental security: to provide a reasonable assurance of protection against threats to national well-being or the common interests of the international community associated with environmental damage. Other parts of the Russian Arctic seem more apt to fill such a function.

It has been stated that the European part of the Russian North (especially the Kola Peninsula) and the Norilsk area are the most devastated areas in the entire circumpolar Arctic.[688] This geographically restricted spot, bordering the NSR rectangle in the east and Norway in the west, is being exposed to perhaps the worst air pollution, land-based marine pollution, degradation of forestry resources, and nuclear stockpiling and contamination in the world today.[689] Here the seriousness of pollution and the likelihood of harmful contaminants spreading across borders has prompted international willingness and action to pool resources for resolvement. Norway, Finland and Russia have agreed to invest in improving the cleaning technology to reduce the sulfur dioxide emissions of the Pechenga nickel works in the Murmansk oblast. Norilsk alone accounts for close to nine percent of the total industrial emissions in Russia. The magnitude of these emissions and their closeness to the Norwegian border has impelled the population in North Norway to conduct a political campaign against *The Death Clouds from Russia.* The same clouds may reach the northern counties of Finland, and for that matter Sweden. Against this backdrop, the three countries are each prepared to invest 300 million Norwegian kroner in cleaning the emissions, but the project has been interrupted due to the inability of the Russian side to comply. This sub-regional reaction to a problem affecting the well-being of at least two small neighboring countries, is now being supplemented with a cooperative project involving the United States. On the basis of a Russian request for assistance, the United States and Norway have recently entered into close cooperation with Russia to expand and up-grade a small processing facility for liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk. This is a cooperation between the Defence Ministries in the three countries, which, on September 26, 1996 entered into an agreement to cooperate on cleaning up defence related contamination in the Arctic.

These sub-regional cooperative endeavours are important in many respects; First, they are multinational projects building both military and civil security within the area of the BEAR;

---

687 For a definition see Willy Østreng, Introductory Chapter in this volume.

688 See Vartanov, Roginko and Kolossov: Op. cit.

689 Ibid.

Second, they are addressing the internal environmental problems of just one country, Russia; Third, the radioactive waste processing facility in Murmansk is attracting the attention and resources of a distant country like the United States; Fourth, the two projects cut across the former East-West divide. In other words: The level of environmental degradation in the Kola Peninsula is so alarming as to interrelate national interests across borders, to affect political processes and to form common policy goals between central governments. In sum, the problems in the Kola Peninsula, in contrast to those stemming from the NSR-rectangle, have reached a level of urgency sufficient to alarm some of the Arctic states into engaging in concerted action. The level of environmental degradation in the Kola Peninsula thus has the potential to arouse a feeling of community among some of the states. This mobilization is based on the sheer need for immediate fire extinction and not on the acknowledgement of preserving the long-term functioning of an interdependent bioregion.

Apart from environmental trouble-spots like the Kola Peninsula, Arctic international cooperation and civilianization is in general being promoted through the application of the global political agenda for the environment to the Arctic, and not through doomsday scenarios stemming from hazards of a bioregion in imbalance. Environmental trouble-spots will serve the purpose of underscoring the necessity to go on implementing the global agenda regionally - to build an integration region. The NSR rectangle has not as yet gained the status of a trouble-spot in governmental deliberations. For other levels of politics the perception may be different.

Level of Regional Government - Transregional Relations

In greater or lesser measure all Arctic governments agree to move the initiative northwards even as the nation-state retains ultimate responsibility for foreign rights and obligations.[690] This was the basic argument for the establishment of BEAR,[691] and the foundation of the Home Rule government in Greenland. The establishment of the Sami Assembly in Norway, Sametinget, drew on the same political premise. In other countries a tug of war is going on between local and central governments. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, various institutions in the different levels of Russian politics have been struggling for more power and influence. In terms of resources and their exploitation and preservation, both central and regional authorities claim property rights for all resources found within their respective territories. This center-periphery clash over resources remains to be resolved between levels of governments. The only thing they agree upon is that Russia's economic problems are of overriding importance to national security. The ownership of resources and their management is thus a key-issue in building environmental and economic security in North Russia. None of the levels of government has given in to the

690 Franklyn Griffiths, Chapter 3 in this volume .

691 Willy Østreng, Chapter 4 in this volume.

claims of the others. This multi-level and multi-player setting gives rise to a series of very important questions previously labelled the "polity-puzzle" of security.[692] The intricacy of this puzzle relates to the unresolved division of labour between the two levels, and to the question of which role local governments should have in matters of national and international security. As indicated in figure 4, if the new actors of the polity-puzzle are not allowed to interfere with the building of the core of security, and designated solely to strengthen the coating of comprehensive security, the puzzle might be less puzzling. The unpredictable element, though, is that the various actors may see it in their interest to revolt against such a scheme of designation and division of labour. These and related questions will head national and circumpolar agendas far into the next century.

In principle local governments throughout the Arctic have had the possibility to strengthen their position vis à vis their respective central governments through their participation and membership in NF. This body provides a venue at which to muster support through alliance building with other local governments. At the same time the NF is one more voice to speak their case. For more than five years local governments were alone in having a pan-Arctic body acting on their behalf. Central governments, being in absolute charge of Arctic affairs during the Cold War, got their organizational counterpart to NF in late 1996 with the establishment of the Arctic Council. This advantage on the part of local governments never came to fruition in terms of providing an important leverage to local authorities in their positioning vis à vis central governments. The NF simply failed to take off. Today its significance is more symbolic than real and political. The Arctic Council may actually prove to be a more powerful weapon in the hands of central government than NF has been in the hands of local governments.

Level of Indigenous Government - Transcultural Relations

When it comes to native participation in regional politics, the Arctic countries vary in their approach. The aboriginals dwelling on Russian soil seem to be worst off. According to Vartanov, Roginko and Kolossov: "Their natural environment is being undermined, traditional life-styles destroyed, they are totally deprived when facing the authorities, the military and the oil industry, and it is difficult to guarantee their survival in the coming decades."[693] If this description is correct, the centrality of government during the Cold War seems to have made indigenous people the regional and ultimate victims of superpower politics. Apart from the Greenlandic Inuits and the Norwegian Samis, most indigenous peoples in the Arctic feel deprived of their rights to political participation, land and resources. The concept of *sustainable security* has been introduced by an Alaskan Inuit to shelter indigenous life, culture and

[692] See Willy Østreng, Chapter 4 in this volume.

[693] Vartanov, Roginko and Kolossov: Op. cit.

livelihood from the environmental destructiveness of southern forces. Among the many components of sustainable security is the claim to participation in international, national and regional processes that affect native communities. Another claim is the respect and recognition of native rights to land, hunting and resources [694]. *Civility* in conduct is another term covering the same reality.[695] In this respect, it is interesting to note that some governments have taken steps to address some of the claims of sustainable security and civility. After 16 years of work, The Norwegian Sami Rights Committee has submitted its report to the government suggesting that the management of water, land and natural resources should be placed in the hands of a regional management body where the Samis are to be overrepresented in relation to the size of their population.[696] This, on the other hand has been strongly opposed by regional authorities afraid to lose rights the mainstream population has been enjoying for centuries. In this respect, new and unusual coalitions may be formed between native communities and central government to withstand opposition to regional reforms from local government. This vertical alliance-building may be supplemented by an international one as well.

The concepts of sustainable security and civility have a common denominator: the environment. As such they make up a joint conceptual foundation of politics, from which coordinated political action between indigenous peoples can be initiated across borders. The means and channels for concerted behaviour are present through international organizations like the ICC and the ALS. The political influence of Nordic Samis may be further enhanced through their participation in the sub-regional cooperation of the BEAR, which provides interaction both horizontally between the Sami communities across borders, and vertically between the Samis', local and central governments.[697] The sensitivity subsequent Danish governments have shown to the needs of the Inuits in Greenland,[698] and the empathy demonstrated by the Norwegian Sami Rights Committee for sustainable development, engenders fresh ground for penetration of native needs and interests in governmental circles. The interaction that will take place between representatives of central government and natives in the Arctic Council in the years to come will provide just another venue for the development of mutual understanding of the complexities of Arctic international relations.

---

694 See Willy Østreng, Chapter 6 in this volume

695 For a definition see Willy Østreng, Introductory Chapter in this volume.

696 The Sami Rights Committee Report.

697 Johan Eriksson: The Partitioned People: "International Borders as a Saami Predicament," in Jan Åke Dellenbrant & Ulf Wiberg (eds): *Euro-Arctic Curtains*, CERUM, Umeå, 1997, pp. 163-202.

698 For an indepth analysis of the Greenlanders' rights see: Lise Lyck (ed): *Socio-Economic Developments in Greenland and in other Small Nordic Jurisdictions*, New Social Science Monographs, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, 1997.

To conclude, there is a struggle going on between the various levels of politics on rights to political participation and access to resources throughout the circumpolar Arctic. This struggle is the benchmark and very essence of regionalization, mobilization and civilianization, and the process gradually providing civil security to a militarized region. The Arctic is a new and unique area for region-building. It stands in need of a great deal of more careful reflection and elaboration. Franklyn Griffiths' suggestion in chapter 3 to establish a track two working group to look into and demonstrate how dimensions and policy levels connect and interact in applying a comprehensive understanding of security, may prove to be a most useful means of action.

ATTACHEMENT 1

Review

(of the first draft of the report)

by

Oran R. Young

28 February 1997

Comments on "Biopolitics and Security in the Arctic"

Oran Young

There is much to praise about this project. It contains not only an impressive array of substantive materials on the security policies of the various ice states but also some conceptual arguments that are original and imaginative. I have no doubt that it can be refined to become a creditable addition to the growing library of INSROP publications. But the role of the reviewer is to raise questions and offer suggestions that may be helpful in guiding revisions. So let me turn directly to that task rather than adding further words of praise. In this connection, I assume that there is an interest in preparing this manuscript for publication as a book, and the comments I set forth in this memorandum are predicated on that assumption. For ease of exposition, I have divided these comments into two clusters: (1) those that are general in nature and pertain to the whole project and (2) those that pertain to individual chapters.

General Observations

I assume that the basic objective of this project is to place the debate about the future of the NSR into the larger picture of Arctic politics and the emerging agenda of the Arctic as a distinct region in international society. If this is the case, I think there are a number of general concerns that need to be addressed in revising the manuscript. I can divide them into six separate points.

1. I would argue that the Introduction and Ch. 1 need to provide a more substantial account of the emergence of the Arctic as a whole as a distinct region in international society, including more detail on the growth of a remarkable array of multilateral initiatives aimed at Arctic cooperation in recent years. The current discussion which is crammed into a few pages toward the end of Ch. 1 does not begin to do justice to this set of developments. The result is that the

five country chapters seem to be floating in thin air without sufficient context to make them easy to understand and evaluate.

2. I am extremely skeptical about the wisdom of adopting "biopolitics" and "environmental security" as the organizing concepts for this whole project. It strikes me that we can dispose of "biopolitics" right away. There is, in fact, little discussion of biopolitics in the whole manuscript, and no argument is advanced to the effect that "biopolitics" is different from any other form of politics in important ways. Why not simply drop the rhetoric of "biopolitics." The case of "environmental security" is more complex. But here are four reasons for skepticism. First and foremost, the players involved in Arctic policy issues basically don't think in these terms. The real debate is about the relative merits of "environmental protection" and "sustainable development" as organizing discourses, a fact that is largely lost from sight in the manuscript. Second, it is not remotely clear that the recent tendency to put more and more discrete issues under the overarching umbrella of security helps to clarify anything. On the contrary, it runs the risk of overloading the conceptual category of security without generating insights regarding anything. Third, the country chapters are very uneven with regard to their use of "environmental security" as an organizing principle. While the chapter on Canada is largely about "environmental security," for example, there is almost nothing about this theme in the chapter on Russia. Fourth, the final chapter basically concludes that there are fundamental drawbacks to the choice of "environmental security" as an organizing discourse, and for reasons that strike me as quite persuasive. Under the circumstances, the reader is left with the unavoidable feeling that the conceptual structure laid out at the beginning turns out to be a rather unfortunate choice.

3. I think there is a need in each of the country chapters to include a section describing the policymaking apparatus for dealing with Arctic issues as well as the substance of the various national policies. One of the key problems in pursuing international cooperation in the Arctic involves the striking differences among the ice states with respect to their policymaking structures and the difficulties these differences pose for reaching international agreements or even, in many cases, communicating effectively. The comments on the policymaking apparatus in the chapter on the US are perceptive and helpful in this connection. Each of the country chapters should include an analogous discussion. In some cases (e.g.

Russia), this will mean describing the changing character of the policymaking apparatus relating to northern issues. But this, too, would be quite helpful.

4. As they stand, the individual country chapters constitute apples and oranges. There is no need to impose strict uniformity on these chapters in terms of the issues they address. But the differences among the current versions of the chapters are extreme. Whereas the chapter on Russia, for example, presents a dense mass of descriptive material, the chapter on Canada paints a broad, philosophical picture. To make an effective book, some effort to make these substantive chapters broadly homogeneous seems essential.

5. In several of the country chapters, the link between the argument presented and the issues surrounding the NSR is tenuous at best. This is particularly true of the chapter on Canada, which is largely a philosophical discussion of various conceptions of security with a short discussion of Canadian perspectives on Arctic waters tacked on at the end. But somewhat similar concerns arise with respect to some of the other chapters. In keeping with the basic objective of the book, it is not necessary for each of the country chapters to discourse at length on the NSR. But I would think it would make sense to ask each chapter to address a handful of common questions that would draw out the implications of the analysis for the debate relating to the NSR which ultimately drives this project.

6. The whole manuscript needs updating. It is apparent from the text that much of this material was prepared a year ago; some of it seems more like eighteen months old. Yet events are unfolding rapidly in the Arctic, especially when it comes to the international politics of the Arctic as a distinctive region in international society. This should not be a particularly demanding job. But there is a compelling need to bring the entire project up to date.

Comments on Individual Chapters

Introduction and Chapter 1 - The problems with these chapters are covered in my general observations. The Introduction needs to reconsider the use of "biopolitics" and "environmental security" as organizing principles. Chapter 1 needs a stronger account of the emergence of the Arctic as a distinct region during the last ten

years and the resultant blossoming of initiatives aimed at international cooperation in the region.

Chapter 2 - There is a lot of substance in this chapter, but it needs serious revision. The basic problem is that the reader cannot see the forest for the trees or, in other words, loses sight of the overall picture in the welter of details. One way to deal with this problem would be to make better use of the two scenarios introduced on pg. 55. The text could refer back to these alternative futures regularly rather than simply mentioning them again in passing at the end. The chapter also needs serious editing by someone with excellent English.

Chapter 3 - This is a philosophical essay on Canada's role in the world and various conceptions of security. There is nothing wrong with this, but it would help to tie the discussion more explicitly to the Arctic in general and the NSR more specifically. I didn't see any compelling rationale for the choice of "the Arctic Marine Environment" as a testbed for the philosophical ideas, and I have somewhat different views of AWPPA and PAME than those articulated in the text.

Chapter 4 - This is a solid chapter framed largely in terms that would be familiar to mainstream security analysts with little knowledge of or interest in notions of "environmental security." The link to the NSR is slender, as the chapter itself admits. Also, I found the discussion of the BEAR in a chapter dealing only with Norwegian policy awkward. Of course, Norway was the driving force behind this initiative. But it cannot be understood without setting it into the larger picture of the new political architecture of Europe brought about by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the growth of the EU. As noted, moreover, the BEAR has adopted an extremely ambivalent posture regarding marine issues in general.

Chapter 5 - This is a kind of futuristic essay that has a strongly speculative cast. I like very much the description of the policymaking process regarding Arctic issues in the United States. On the other hand, the US has been adamant in its unwillingness to think in terms of extended or comprehensive security in dealing with Arctic issues. My reading is that this posture comes from pretty high levels and is not likely to change soon. We are having a hard enough time getting US policymakers to think in terms of sustainable development when it comes to dealing with Arctic issues. Again, I

have a somewhat different view of the PAME experience than that articulated in this chapter.

Chapter 6 - This is a sensible and generally solid chapter. The emphasis on Greenland seems appropriate. But I don't think the reader gets a clear enough picture of (1) the tension between Nuuk and the outlying communities regarding many resource issues and (2) the extent to which the Home Rule is driven by financial pressures and concerns about the future of commercial fisheries in dealing with issues involving the prospect of non-renewable resource development. I noted a number of little nit-picks in this chapter: (1) Inuit is a plural noun, (2) it is not appropriate to use Danish names for Greenlandic communities any more (e.g. Julianhab should be Qaqortoq, (3) Home Rule should always be capitalized, (4) the names of the political parties in Greenland need to be spelled correctly throughout, (5) AWPPA claims jurisdiction to 100 not 200 miles. I do not mean to single out this chapter in this respect. It would be helpful to fact check all the chapters in the same way.

Chapter 7 - This chapter is interesting. But it's disconcerting because it strongly reinforces my skepticism about the conceptual framework for the whole book articulated in the Introduction. Somehow the whole project needs better integration.

Conclusion

That said, let me return to my starting point. There is much good material in this manuscript, and I feel sure that it will be possible to turn in into a publishable book. But I hope the authors will make a serious effort to address the concerns I have expressed during the revision process.



The three main cooperating institutions of INSROP

Ship & Ocean Foundation (SOF), Tokyo, Japan.

SOF was established in 1975 as a non-profit organization to advance modernization and rationalization of Japan's shipbuilding and related industries, and to give assistance to non-profit organizations associated with these industries. SOF is provided with operation funds by the Sasakawa Foundation, the world's largest foundation operated with revenue from motorboat racing. An integral part of SOF, the Tsukuba Institute, carries out experimental research into ocean environment protection and ocean development.

Central Marine Research & Design Institute (CNIIMF), St. Petersburg, Russia.

CNIIMF was founded in 1929. The institute's research focus is applied and technological with four main goals: the improvment of merchant fleet efficiency; shipping safety; technical development of the merchant fleet; and design support for future fleet development. CNIIMF was a Russian state institution up to 1993, when it was converted into a stock-holding company.

The Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), Lysaker, Norway.

FNI was founded in 1958 and is based at Polhøgda, the home of Fridtjof Nansen, famous Norwegian polar explorer, scientist, humanist and statesman. The institute spesializes in applied social science research, with special focus on international resource and environmental management. In addition to INSROP, the research is organized in six integrated programmes. Typical of FNI research is a multi-disciplinary approach, entailing extensive cooperation with other research institutions both at home and abroad. The INSROP Secretariat is located at FNI.